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A TELEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE APPLICABILITY OF RHETORIC IN THE PERIPATETIC TRADITION

Applicability, conceived as emphasizing the aspect of functional applications of a theory, constitutes a crucial factor, and frequently even the aim of the development of modern sciences. Currently, applicability is also one of the evaluation criteria of educational processes. What is inapplicable, developing in the domain of *theoria* is understood as impossible to be employed to satisfy various human needs. Being situated outside the realm of functional applications is regarded as not being valuable. The factor of applicability is strongly emphasized by education, closely connected with the development of the sciences. Its efforts are directed towards attaining skills and competences and the practical nature of acquired knowledge.

These types of tendencies refer to rhetoric as well. Emphasizing the applicability of rhetoric consists in developing various methods and techniques of persuasion. This gives rise to a technical approach to rhetoric which is prevalent nowadays. According to it, rhetoric is a domain which is primarily supposed to provide efficient and universal

tools of persuasion, useful in various communication situations.¹ The principal goal is defined as the functionality and efficiency of rhetorical tools. This is connected with a neutral moral attitude of the rhetorician, judged mainly through the perspective of the efficiency of the methods employed. Such principles have become the determinants of a technical treatment of rhetoric.

However, in the case of rhetoric, highlighting its applicability encounters quite specific methodological conditions. They result from the very nature of rhetoric. Since rhetoric, by its very nature, is applicable. Instrumentality is revealed as one of its essential qualities. At the same time, rhetoric, in seeking a causal justification and interpretation of its applicability, does involve advanced theoretical consideration. Such consideration, in its scope, frequently goes beyond a purely technical treatment of rhetoric. Such a binary approach to the applicability of rhetoric allows one to define the problem fundamental to our deliberations. Our aim is to examine whether the applicability of rhetoric should be perceived solely with regards to the mode in which the rhetorical method functions and develops? Are there any boundaries and conditions of the applicability of rhetorical methods? Is it proper to rhetoric to apply its methods purely technically? Is it necessary to be led by the effectiveness of persuasion in every communication situation?

In seeking answers to these questions, we look for inspiration to the peripatetic tradition, primarily to Aristotle's deliberations contained in his *Τέχνη ρητορική*.² Against the background of Aristotle's analyses, we shall attempt to prove that the problem of the applicability of rheto-

¹ See Sharon Crowley, "A Plea for the Revival of Sophistry," *Rhetoric Review* 7, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 318–333.

² In the paper, we refer to the Greek edition: Aristotelis, *Opera*, vol. II, ex recensione I. Bekkeri, ed. 2 quam curavit O. Gigon (Berolini 1960–1961). Quotations come from the English translation: Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, trans. William Rhys Roberts, in *The Works of Aristotle*, vol. 11, ed. William D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949).

ric is related not only to the rhetorical method but first and foremost to the rhetorical end which is conditioned by the subject matter of the speech. These three factors form an integral whole in rhetorical communication. They enhance the character and significance of the end in rhetorical communication.³ This is why we are concerned with the nature of the relation which holds between the subject matter, the end of the speech and the manner in which the rhetorical method functions. Thus, the objective of this paper will be to examine the interplay of these factors with a view to seeking the boundaries of the applicability of rhetoric.

The Auditor as the Principal End of Rhetorical Communication

Rhetorical communication is effected under certain incidental conditions. In one of his fundamental rhetorical statements, Aristotle indicates that each speech consists of three elements: the speaker, the subject matter of the speech and the auditor.⁴ However, how do these three factors relate to the rhetorical method? Firstly, the holder of the rhetorical method is the speaker. Secondly, rhetorical argumentation is developed methodologically in relation to the point at issue in discourse, that is, the subject matter of the speech. Thirdly, the method is employed with respect to the auditor. Therefore, the rhetorical method would not be able to function without these fundamental reference points. Hence, while considering the applicability of rhetoric, it is of particular importance to examine these points. They are clearly linked to the rhetorical method. We may argue that the speaker or the agent of

³ This end functions in rhetorical communication in a multidimensional way, in relation to the auditor and in relation to the organization of specific kinds of rhetorical speeches. See Aristotle, *Rhetoric I: A Commentary*, ed. William M. A. Grimaldi (New York: Fordham University Press, 1980).

⁴ Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1358a36–1358b2.

persuasion persuades or employs a specific method of something (subject matter of persuasion) and for the sake of somebody (end of persuasion).

The subject matter of rhetoric involves certain theoretical interpretation problems. For we note that rhetoric does not have one, characteristic only for itself, methodologically distinguished formal subject (as e.g. physics, mathematics or philosophy). Since one may persuade to everything.⁵ However, the rhetorical problems under discussion concern specific points, thereby they do not develop in a “topiclessness” of subject matter. Rhetoric is treated by Aristotle as “the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion.”⁶ Thus, this definition underlines the presence of subject matter references with respect to which methodological rhetorical faculties are developed. Rhetorical argumentation develops in relation to the subject matter under discourse, hence rhetorical skills are employed always in relation to a specific subject matter of persuasion. The factors derived from the subject matter provide the grounds for persuasion. Aristotle grouped these subject matter references into three principal rhetorical genres. In our deliberations, we are concerned with the fact that he ascribed to these genres detailed ends of persuasion specific only to them. These detailed ends appear not only against the background of subject matter references, but they also refer to the auditor.

With a view to elucidating the problem of the applicability of rhetoric, it is important to note that Aristotle, making distinctions in rhetorical communication (indicating the orator, the subject matter of the speech and the audience) also determined the main end of rhetorical persuasion. The auditor to whom one is speaking that is the auditor

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1355b7–11; William M. A. Grimaldi, *Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric* (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1972).

⁶ Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1355b25–26.

(audience) is the fundamental end of rhetorical content.⁷ The content is directed to an auditor and it is because of him that it is effected. This is why the auditor determines the end of the speech.⁸ Aristotle concentrates on a more precise analysis of the auditor who determines the end of the speech. He does it by describing the relation between the orator and the auditor in the context of the subject matter of the speech. Namely, he indicates that the auditor may be either a critical witness (θεωρός) to the speech held or the one deciding (κριτής) the point at issue.⁹ Thereby the auditor acts as a judge of the case presented by the speaker. With respect to the temporal aspect, i.e. the relation to the time which the speaker's persuasive speech concerns, such judgments refer to the future or the past.¹⁰ This is why the audience, defined as the fundamental end of rhetorical speech, according to Aristotle, may have a threefold status: be a critical witness to a rhetorical content in the present, a judge deciding on past cases or a judge deciding on future cases. Aristotle makes a reservation as to the time used in epideictic speech by noting that it is "concerned with the present, since all men praise or

⁷ Grimaldi argues: "The auditor and his decision are ultimately the τέλος of the rhetorical process, the function of which is to consider those things about which men deliberate. This important role of the auditor immediately explains the equal importance of the three entechnic πίστεις . . . all rhetorical discourse is directed to the auditor as judge." Aristotle, *Rhetoric I: A Commentary*, 80. On the end of rhetorical persuasion in Aristotle, see also: Andrea A. Lunsford, Lisa S. Ede, "On Distinctions between Classical and Modern Rhetoric," in *Essays on Classical Rhetoric and Modern Discourse*, ed. Robert J. Connors, Lisa S. Ede, Andrea A. Lunsford (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), 37–49.

⁸ Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1358a37–1358b1. Similarly, Quintilianus notes that one may distinguish three kinds of auditors: the first seeking after pleasure, the second expecting counsel and the third deciding a case: "Tria faciunt genera auditorem: unum quod ad delectationem conveniat, alterium quod consilium accipiat, tertium quod de causis iudicet." Quintilianus, *Institutio oratoria*, vol. 1–7, ed. J. Cousin (Paris: CUF, 1975–1980), III, 4, 6.

⁹ On differences between θεωρός and κριτής, see Aristotle, *Rhetoric I: A Commentary*, 80–81.

¹⁰ See Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1358b14–15.

blame in view of the state of things existing at the time, though they often find it useful also to recall the past and to make guesses at the future.”¹¹

Combining the highlighted factors (auditor as a witness or judge and the temporal aspect), Aristotle classifies the audience. At the same time, he regards the classification of the audience as the grounds for distinguishing rhetorical genres. An auditor judging on future cases is situated on a symbolic agora, i.e. in the domain of political discourse. The auditor judging on past cases is situated in the Areopagus, i.e. in the domain of judicial discourse. In turn, the auditor defined as a critical witness (θεωρός) of the content concerning the present, judging the orator’s faculties, appears in communication regarding culture, e.g. education or art. The fields of politics, judiciary and education (παιδεία) provide for Aristotle models for the main forms of rhetorical discourse and thereby for genres of rhetorical speeches. With respect to the auditor who is the end of rhetorical communication, he distinguishes deliberative rhetoric (συμβουλευτικόν), judicial rhetoric (δικανικόν) and epideictic rhetoric (ἐπιδεικτικόν).¹²

A present-day interpreter of Aristotle who refers to the three distinguished rhetorical genres encounters various difficulties. Politics is understood in a different way nowadays. New forms of rhetorical content have been developed on the basis of audiovisual techniques (e.g. advertising).¹³ However, what is interesting and still relevant in Aristotle’s division is that the distinction into the three main rhetorical genres

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1358b18–20.

¹² W. Rhys Roberts in his translation is guided by pragmatic reasons (clarity of terms for the reader) and uses respectively the terms: political oratory, forensic (legal) oratory, ceremonial oratory. Grimaldi uses the terms: “a) deliberative rhetoric: the rhetoric of counsel or advice may (i) exhort or (ii) dissuade; b) judicial rhetoric: the rhetoric of the courts may (i) accuse or (ii) defend; 3) epideictic rhetoric: the rhetoric of the public or occasional event may (i) praise or (ii) blame.” Aristotle, *Rhetoric I: A Commentary*, 81.

¹³ See Lunsford, Ede, “On Distinctions between Classical and Modern Rhetoric,” 45ff.

is drawn with regard to the audience. Therefore, the focal point is the person of the auditor receiving specific subject matter contents presented by the speaker. Hence, it is not a division founded solely on the content of speeches themselves, neither is it a distinction based on the audience itself. It is a distinction made in a dual perspective: with respect to the person of the auditor as an auditor perceiving specific subject matter contents. Aristotle had in mind an auditor receiving content of a political and counseling nature, an auditor receiving content of a judicial nature and an auditor receiving content of a commendatory nature. Therefore, what is characteristic for Aristotle is that he constantly refers to a specific kind of oration's content which is shaped by the interplay of the three factors: speaker, subject matter of speech and auditor. None of these factors functions in isolation. They are interrelated and closely connected with one another. And it is the auditor who has the most prominent role in this division. Since it is he who constitutes the primary end of rhetorical communication.

Teleological Conditions of the Deliberative Kind of Rhetorical Communication

The audience which is the end of rhetorical communication is the addressee of the contents, which belong to specific subject areas. In Aristotle, the three basic kinds of audience are associated with three more detailed ends of rhetorical communication.¹⁴ The predominant kind of rhetorical communication is the deliberative genre (συμβουλευτικόν). It encompasses man's social improvement which affects modes

¹⁴ "Rhetoric has three distinct ends in view, one for each of its three kinds." Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1358b21. Grimaldi uses the terms: ultimate τέλος and proximate τέλος. For the deliberative kind the proximate τέλος is the advantageous, the harmful. For the judicial kind the proximate τέλος is justice, injustice. For the epideictic kind the proximate τέλος is the honorable, dishonorable. However, in each of the kinds the ultimate τέλος is the audience. See Aristotle, *Rhetoric I: A Commentary*, 82.

of state organization and relations which hold within it. It is associated with the addressee of public discourse and is defined by means of three terms: good, happiness, benefit. The auditor situated within the area of such discourse should be encouraged to some action or hindered from some action. Therefore, the act of speech constituting deliberative rhetoric is an act of counselling or dissuading.¹⁵ Against the background of the subject matter of this act, there appears a detailed teleological factor with regard to which the act of counsel is effected, i.e. a deliberative speech is organized. The speaker unfolds persuasively his deliberative content before an audience with a specific end in view (τέλος). It is because of this end that counsellors persuasively present specific actions as better and thus worthy of choosing whereas others are worse, not worthy of an auditor's choice. Thus, deliberative persuasion, occurring in this context as a more detailed end of communication, reveals good proper for the auditor. This good is understood by Aristotle broadly and analogously, also as happiness or benefit of an auditor.¹⁶ That does not mean that during his speech the orator is supposed to lead the hearer to realizing specific good, performing useful actions or attaining happiness. Deliberative speech is a communication situation. Thus, the presented terms reveal a detailed end with a view to which deliberative speech is effected. Describing them, Aristotle demonstrates with regard to what deliberative persuasion is developed. These terms become es-

¹⁵ Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1358b22–23, and also Christopher L. Johnstone, “An Aristotelian Trilogy: Ethics, Rhetoric, Politics and the Search for Moral Truth,” *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 13, no. 1 (1980): 1–24.

¹⁶ Aristotle gives prominence to good “as that which ought to be chosen for its own sake; or as that for the sake of which we choose something else; or as that which is sought after by all things that have sensation or reason; or which will be sought after by any things that acquire reason; or as that which must be prescribed for a given individual by reason generally, or is prescribed for him by his individual reason, this being his individual good.” Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1362a22–26. Aristotle emphasizes that what is useful is also good. While analyzing good, he mentions happiness as the first end.

essential for the mode in which counselling is performed, i.e. for persuasive employment of specific deliberative content.

Let us note that the task of the speaker as a counsellor is to persuade the auditor to perform some specific action in the future. Aristotle emphasizes that each action of man is motivated by an end. This end for the sake of which man performs some action is specific good. In the practice of human action, such good is known to man in the form of various particular and specific goods, for example: having specific food, health, clothing, accommodation, education, etc. Therefore, individual particularist goods constitute the motif of an auditor's action. With respect to counselling, rhetoric recognizes this state of affairs and against this background advises such actions which bring one closer to a specific good and dissuades from ones which make specific good more distant. Counselling occurs in the context of a specific detailed good whose attainment is expressed by the fact of a subjective experience, defined by Aristotle as happiness. This is why happiness and everything which is associated with it or which is contrary to it constitutes the motif of all encouragement and dissuasion.¹⁷ It is "glimpses" of experienced happiness, connected with a hope of attaining or with attaining individual goods, that attract man so strongly and motivate him to action. Due to this fact, a deliberative speaker refers to an auditor's happiness demonstrated as a consequence of attaining specific goods.

¹⁷ Aristotle holds that happiness is: "prosperity combined with virtue; or as independence of life; or as secure enjoyment of the maximum of pleasure; or as a good condition of property and body, together with the power of guarding one's property and body and making use of them." Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1360b14–18. Deliberative persuasion will take place here due to the quoted factors which constitute man's happiness. For more on Aristotle's understanding of happiness, see Terence H. Irwin, "Ethics in the *Rhetoric* and in the *Ethics*," in *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. Amélie O. Rorty (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1996), 142–174; J. L. Ackrill, "Aristotle on *Eudaimonia*," in J. L. Ackrill, *Essays on Plato and Aristotle* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 179–200.

Benefit and harm distinguished as ends of deliberative speech appear in a pragmatic context. They concern the choice of means of achieving an end, i.e. attaining good, experienced as happiness. Aristotle stresses that deliberative speech is not concerned with the choice of the end itself (good). Since, in principle, everyone is convinced of its validity (that it is worth being happy, free, healthy, safe, etc.). Deliberative speech concerns primarily means that lead to achieving the end. In this context, what is useful is also good.¹⁸ Thus, those goods-means advised by the speaker which bring the auditor closer to the end (i.e. to attainment of a specific good) are useful and those which make the auditor more distant from the end are harmful.¹⁹ With reference to a specific good, it is hard for a rhetorician himself as a counsellor to define why and in what manner a specific action is harmful and another one is useful. In this respect, a rhetorician takes advantage of various disciplines whose subject matter concerns such issues, e.g. economy, medicine or law.

However, we highlight a boundary situation which is defined by the fact that the end of content in deliberative rhetoric is the auditor's good (happiness, benefit). Rhetoric is expressed in communication and thus this end should be perceived against the speaker's references to the subject matter of the speech. Through the subject matter of the speech, this end is related to decisions taken by the auditor. Therefore, an end is a factor organizing a speech persuasively. A specific deliberative speech develops with regard to an end which in deliberative persuasion is an auditor's good (benefit, happiness). One may therefore conclude that the rhetorical method functions and develops in relation to an end. And the ultimate end of persuasion is the auditor. This is why persuasion which is effected in relation to the end (good) of persuasive speech

¹⁸ See Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1362a15–20.

¹⁹ See Alexander Broadie, "Aristotle on Rational Action," *Phronesis* 19, no. 1 (1974): 70–80.

concerns the auditor's good. Thus, the auditor's good (happiness, benefit) realized in the context of the reference of the speaker to the subject matter of speech constitutes the teleological boundary of communication contents in deliberative rhetorical discourse.

The fields of communication contents distinguished by future-oriented counselling motivated by the auditor's good (happiness, benefit) are rhetorical communication in the domain of broadly conceived public discourse. Model cases of *genus deliberativum* are not restricted only to the domain of man's social functioning. Deliberative acts provide grounds for development of the sphere of specialist advisory services, counselling and consulting concerned with satisfying human needs. They encompass various spheres of man's life (connected, e.g., with choice of a profession, feeding, physical condition, clothing, etc.). Within the confines of deliberative rhetoric, there is a wide variety of kinds of counsel and counsellors. And a teleological orientation of deliberative speech turns out to be essential for the way rhetoric functions and for its applicability. It is also employed in an analogous manner in other types of oratorical contents. However, the deliberative model appears to be the standard in this respect.

Teleological Conditions of the Judicial and Epideictic Kinds

The remaining rhetorical kinds: judicial (*δικανικόν*) and epideictic (*ἐπιδεικτικόν*) function in a manner analogous to deliberative persuasion. However, they differ in their ends with respect to which rhetorical persuasion proper to them is effected. The second of the basic kinds of auditors, and together with him also another end of rhetorical communication, is situated in the domain of judicial discourse. The fundamental acts of speech constituting judicial rhetorical communication are acts of accusing and defending. Aristotle stresses that "forensic speak-

ing either attacks or defends somebody: one or other of these two things must always be done by the parties in a case.”²⁰ Thus, judicial rhetoric consists in a dispute bringing in an accusation or claim and defense. In view of the fact that an accusation and defense may concern that which has already been performed, judicial rhetoric in the temporal aspect refers to the past. A decision is made in the present, but it pertains to deeds which were previously done. Given deeds as accomplished facts are subject to prosecution or defense. And prosecution and defense (similarly to persuasion and dissuasion) occur because of a specific teleological factor. This factor determines the orator’s speech. Specifying the end of judicial rhetoric, Aristotle argues that: “parties in the law-case aim at establishing the justice or injustice of some action, and they too bring in all other points as subsidiary and relative to this one.”²¹ Justice also has a social character, since it is done in relation to other people.

While characterizing the judicial discourse (*δικανικόν*), Aristotle deliberates, among other things, on kinds of law (natural, statutory), just and unjust deeds, motifs and kinds of committed crimes, the nature of criminals and victims. He treats these contents as premises proper for the development of argumentation in a judicial speech.²² Taking decisions for the sake of justice, one makes judgments as to whether a specific human action allows for other people’s rights. Such rights may result both from the ontological status of human nature and from the law, specific states of affairs or agreements concluded between people. Aristotle perceived justice as conformity of man’s actions to the law established for the good of the community. He also conceives of justice as a quality of acting based on legitimacy which is effected in a social

²⁰ Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1358b10–12.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 1358b26–27.

²² Cf. *Ibid.*, 1358b30–1359a15.

context (against relations with other people).²³ Other people's rights become a measure of man's just actions. They are also a measure of just actions of a state. Justice encompasses such parts as divisive, corrective (legal) and account justice.²⁴ In each case, just actions are those which recognize rights. Hence, they concern reasons due to which a necessity of some action arises. The basis of justice is equity (*ἐπιεικέες*) which indicates a proper measure of human action.²⁵ The functioning of equity becomes explicit mainly in those cases when the law referring to the recognized state of affairs is not adequate to determine the correctness of a specific action.

Justice indicated by Aristotle as the end of judicial rhetoric does not directly concern human actions. It concerns primarily a specific communication situation in which there is a speaker, a subject matter of the speech and an auditor. This is why justice is mainly done against the background of the subject matter of the speech. In judicial rhetoric, it concerns man's actions in relation to the rights that another man exercises. Speaking to an audience, a speaker refers to specific human actions with regard to their just or unjust character. Therefore, justice constitutes a criterion for the sake of which judicial persuasion is employed and a specific judicial speech is developed. Through the subject matter of the speech, the teleological factor refers to the auditor, since the decision of the audience concerning a specific act or event is taken with reference to justice.

²³ Aristotle argues: "for it is the special property of man in distinction from the other animals that he alone has perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the other moral qualities, and it is partnership in these things that makes a household and a city-state." Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. H. Rackman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), 1253a16–18.

²⁴ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. H. Rackman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), 1131a10–1134a16.

²⁵ See Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 1374a25–1374b24; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1137a31–1138a4. Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric I: A Commentary*, 299–300.

The field of rhetorical communication distinguished by accusing or defending motivated by justice is rhetorical communication in the judicial area. The paradigm here is a court speech in the accusing form (the prosecutor's) and in the defending form (the advocate's). It is also indirectly connected with other related fields as, for example, various forms of judicial and extrajudicial mediation. In mediations, the main teleological organizing factor is the so-called corrective justice. At this juncture, it should be indicated that the rhetorical method does not function in isolation, but it develops in relation to a specific end. The end is the factor organizing a speech. Therefore, it is the end that delineates the boundaries of the applicability of rhetorical persuasion in peripatetic rhetoric. In the case of judicial rhetoric, the teleological boundary of rhetorical communication is determined by justice. It is because of justice that a speaker makes a judicial speech before an audience deciding on past cases.

The third primary kind of auditor and thereby another end of rhetorical communication is the addressee in the sphere of cultural conditions. This concerns mostly the areas of morality (education) and art. The basic acts of speech constituting epideictic rhetoric (ἐπίδεικτικόν) are acts of praise and blame. Analogously to the previous rhetorical kinds, an act of praise takes place for a reason. For the speaker strives to elucidate the point under discourse from some angle. Such a factor determines the organization of a speech. Aristotle defines the teleological element indicating that "those who praise or attack a man aim at proving him worthy of honour or the reverse, and they too treat all other considerations with reference to this one."²⁶ For the contemporary recipient, the concept of nobleness (righteousness) seems to have a dimension of stylistic archaism. However, its meaning refers to man's general moral attitude, which is always of unfading relevance. Thus,

²⁶ Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1358b27–28.

what is employed for persuasive development of a demonstrative speech is man's action expressed in its relevance to good. Against the background of his ethics, Aristotle associates man's nobleness (*ἀρετή*) with his righteousness, conceived of as having permanent moral capacities for good actions. For Aristotle, virtue is "a faculty of providing and preserving good things; or a faculty of conferring many great benefits of all kinds on all occasions."²⁷ Among the elements of *ἀρετή* Aristotle mentions: justice, fortitude, temperance, magnanimity, justified pride, generosity, politeness, prudence, wisdom. The philosopher from Stagira stresses that all human actions aspire for *ἀρετή*. This is why all actions which are a manifestation of the presence of *ἀρετή* become beautiful.

In an analogous way, praise or blame may also concern things. It refers in particular to artifacts in the field of art (literature, music, painting, film). Therefore, praise or blame is expressed on account of nobleness or wickedness with respect to people, and on account of beauty (harmony, usefulness) with respect to things. And thus another end—nobleness once again delineates the teleological boundaries of rhetoric. For the sake of this end, an orator employs commendatory persuasion in relation to the auditor defined as a critical witness. The paradigm in this area is a commendatory speech. It is first and foremost connected with man's existential situations: birth, wedding, death. The customary celebration of existential events through baptisms, weddings and funerals provides an opportunity for oratorical speeches. These situations give rise to various types of jubilee speeches commemorating anniversaries of existential events (anniversaries of birth, wedding, death, name days). They also concern anniversaries of particularly momentous human decisions and works which had significant social consequences. In an analogous way, we may diagnose this type of content in other

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 1366b36–38. For Aristotle, *ἀρετή* consists in having permanent dispositions which are property directed by prudence and wisdom. See Irwin, "Ethics in the *Rhetoric* and in the *Ethics*," 158–160.

areas of culture (e.g. in art, religion) in which a speaker indicates factors improving human attitudes or creations.

Conclusion

Contemporary application of communication techniques leads to situations in which, thanks to effective advertising, great profits are achieved from the sale of a weak product. Politicians without proper social competences gain an enormous social acclaim by creating their images. These are cases in which we deal with the applicability of the method alienated from the ends of rhetorical persuasion specified for the auditor's good. Such procedures result in an instrumental treatment of the auditor. In such a situation, the method (τέχνη) functions autonomously, in a manner that is not teleologically connected with the auditor's good. For Aristotle, communication, which is characterized by a technical and autonomous application of the method itself, is not rhetorical communication. Admittedly, the point of rhetoric is persuading the auditor methodologically, but persuading him with regard to a specific teleological factor: good, justice, nobleness. Therefore, in the peripatetic tradition, the problem of the functioning of rhetoric is first and foremost considered in the teleological context. The end takes into account the specific character of the subject matter of persuasion. Only discerning the end against the background of the subject matter of persuasion allows one to develop a method.

The applicability of rhetoric is conditioned by its method. The method is systemically grounded in *officia oratoria* and is closely connected with the instrumentality of rhetoric. At the same time, the applicability of rhetoric depends on the action of the speaker as the holder of the means. Such an action is motivated by a specific end. On the one hand, it is built by rationally developed cognition, i.e. the intellectual factor. On the other hand, it is built by a decision of such or other appli-

cation of means, i.e. the volitional factor. Therefore, the teleological interpretation of the applicability of rhetoric indicates that we are not dealing with random persuasion of the auditor. Such persuasion is not guided only by efficiency. It does not concern the functioning of rhetorical methods themselves. Having means at one's disposal excludes the speaker's moral neutrality, postulated as part of the technical approach to rhetoric. In this context, without negating the issue of the primacy of an end, it should be stressed that each action of man with respect to the use of τέχνη is a human action. As a human action, it is at the same time a conscious and free action and thus it has moral relevance.

Cato the Elder's well-known statement: "the speaker is a righteous man, proficient at speaking" (*orator est vir bonus dicendi peritus*), combines proficiency, i.e. the rhetorical method, with the speaker's nobleness and righteousness. The nobleness of the speaker in the context of the applicability of rhetoric consists in the fact that the speaker respects the ends of persuasion connected with the kind of recipient. And therefore, the speaker has in mind the auditor's good, persuading or dissuading, accusing or defending, praising or blaming. For the rhetorical method is related to the communication situation. The method is developed by someone, for someone and for the sake of something. That is why the peripatetic tradition indicates an interrelated set of factors: speaker, subject matter and auditor. Against such a communicative background, one may distinguish three detailed teleological ends essential for the applicability of rhetoric: good, justice, nobleness. They are inherently connected with persuasive acts of speech: counselling (dissuading), accusing (defending) and praising (blaming).



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SUMMARY

For Aristotle, the classification of the audience is the basis of distinguishing the main genres of rhetoric. Due to the auditor receiving political, judicial or educational content, there is a distinction into deliberative, judicial, and epideictic rhetoric. There are three more specific ends of rhetoric connected with the three basic types of auditors. Due to the communicative character of rhetoric, these ends are achieved against the background of the relation to the subject of the speech, referring to the decisions made by the auditor. Deliberative rhetoric is speech or writing that attempts to persuade an audience to take (or not to take) some action. The specific end of this rhetorical genre is good. Judicial rhetoric is speech or writing that considers the justice or injustice of a certain charge or accusation. Epideictic rhetoric is speech or writing that praises (encomium) or blames (invective). Persuasion in rhetoric happens because of a specific end: goodness, justice, nobility. Thus, the specific nature of the end of persuasion is taken into account. Perceiving the end against the background of the subject of persuasion allows one to develop a method. The method that determines the applicability of rhetoric occurs in the tradition of peripatetic rhetoric in a non-autonomous way, but is closely related to the end and to the subject of speech.

KEYWORDS

Aristotle, end, deliberative rhetoric, judicial rhetoric, epideictic rhetoric.

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