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A Woman and a Man as Prime Analogical Beings*

Discussions about the related identities of men and women often vacillate between two extremes. On the one hand, what is perceived to be *common among women or common among men* is emphasized and universalized, while differences among individuals of either sex are de-emphasized. This approach is found in many traditional philosophers such as Aristotle, Rousseau, de Beauvoir, and so forth. On the other hand, *differences among individual men or individual women* may be emphasized to such an extent that no general characteristics of either man or woman is accepted. This approach is found to some extent in Plato, Foucault, Firestone and some post-modernist writers.

The first approach identifies *essential properties* of woman and *essential properties* of man while the second approach rejects in principle this search for essence. Followers of the latter approach argue that there is no unity to the terms *man* or *woman*, and they claim that philosophical discourse should focus instead on the *existence* of individuals without regard to sexual or gender differences. To sum up the differences between these two positions, it could be said that an identification of a universal essence of woman or of man focuses on a *univocal* application of the term *woman* or *man*, while the rejection of a common identity among women or among men implies that the

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term *man* has an *equivocal* meaning when applied to men or *woman* to have an *equivocal* application to women.

To move out of this false dichotomy between the univocal or equivocal use of the terms *woman* and *man*, I want to explore a theory of analogy, developed by Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec. His theory of analogy opens a creative new way to understand relations within and among existing beings. In an important text recently translated into English entitled *Metaphysics: An Outline of the History of Being*, and in „Analogy,” not yet published in English, Krąpiec has provided a general metaphysical framework for a theory of analogy. In this paper I will explore the application of this theory to the specific question of the related identities of man and woman¹. I hope to demonstrate that it provides a third way between the opposing dichotomy between the essentialist preference for univocal application of terms and the claim that substantive terms such as *man* or *woman* have only equivocal application.

The theory of the analogy of existence with its companion theory of the analogy of cognition as elaborated in Lublin Existential Personalism (also identified as Lublin Thomism) offers us an invaluable tool with which to consider the important question of the identities of woman and of man within the broader context of the search for a more accurate understanding of the identities of human beings, persons, and communities of persons.

Furthermore, the emphasis upon the starting point of this theory as the plurality of existence in reality places this theory in the line of realistic philosophies which begin with a reflection upon the way things are in the world. This means that we experience reality as analogical from the moment we begin to speak and to call things by

¹ See, M. A. Krąpiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline of the History of Being*, transl. by T. Sandok, New York: Peter Lang, 1991 [Part III: *Metaphysical Analogy*, 447-485]; *I-Man: An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology*, transl. by M. Lescoe and others, New Britain: Mariel Publications, 1983; and *Analogy*, in the unpublished English translation of *The Object of Philosophical Investigations*, translated by Hugh McDonald (1988). During May-August 1991 I held extensive conversations in Lublin with the author about the application of his theory of analogy to questions about the philosophy of man and woman. While I believe that I am in this paper being faithful to his thought on this subject, all responsibility for its claims is my own.

name. We have a cognition of a relation that we can really find in being. In the following passage Krąpiec summarizes the analogical structure of reality:

„Thus every contingent being is analogical in itself with regard to the fact that it is internally composed out of diverse parts which remain in relation to each other and to the whole in relations which ultimately signal the identity of being, despite the constant change (motion) of its *parts*. As it is analogical in itself, at the same time it is also analogical in relation to other real beings, and by virtue of this fact it creates an analogical, real unity, the *universum* of contingent beings. This analogical unity of contingent beings is based on the analogical internal structure of every being. For the components of a real being which are variously joined by relations are not something *simple*, *univocal*, but rather they occur in a stable interdependence upon one another in the constant substructural changes, and yet they create the analogical unity of being, the relational identity of being”².

What this means is that philosophical theories which either focus only on the separateness of entities in the plurality of being, or theories that focus only on the univocal commonness of beings present only half of the situation. Reality, as analogical, convinces us of the facts that real beings are in analogical relation to one another and real beings are analogical with themselves. Krąpiec argues that only an analogical understanding of reality accurately describes the whole human situation.

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
Various domains of analogy have been distinguished by Professor Krąpiec as including: analogy of being, analogy of cognition, analogy of predication, and reasoning by analogy. It is the first two of these four domains that will primarily be considered³. More particularly, by

² Krąpiec, *Analogy*, 11-12.

³ Analogy of predication will be included within the other two domains, while reasoning by analogy or what is also called heuristic analogy, commonly found in sciences or law, will not be considered here.

examining the analogical structure of being itself, analogy of cognition will be seen to have a grounding in the structure of reality.

Krapiec's theory of analogy of being focuses on two fundamental kinds of analogy which he calls *infra-ontic analogy*, or the analogical structure within a particular existent, and *inter-ontic analogy*, or the analogy between at least two separate existing beings⁴. The following table summarizes his structure:



Both analogies include the two key concepts of sameness and difference. So an infra-ontic analogy refers to the analogical construction of a single existing being which is simultaneously the same and different. We recognize someone as the same person we saw last week, or something as the same book we were reading yesterday. There is a unity of being within the entity that is the same while its parts may change, or an analogical identity with temporal duration. Krapiec claims: „We call this relational identity of being in all the changes of its relations the intrinsic analogy of being”⁵.

Reality itself is analogical in that any being has within it an analogical principle that explains how it can remain with the same identity through changes it may undergo. Krapiec states:

⁴ I am grateful to Beata Gallay, of Concordia University, for noting that the prefix *infra* is similar to the prefix *intra* as used in modern psychology and for offering several suggestions for the revision of this paper.

⁵ Krapiec, *Analogy*, 11.

„Infra-ontic analogy is thus the mode of persistence of contingent being which is variously composed of its components, components which are *joined* into one being by the uncountable net of the relations of all the components ordered to each other and to the whole”⁶.

In addition to infra-ontic analogy *within* a being, an inter-ontic analogy of being is made of a particular network of relations *among* existing beings. There are similarities among the way different groups of beings are organized with respect to their infra-ontic structures. All our experience of naming and of calling things by words and phrases reveals this experience of the inter-ontic analogical structure of being. Krapiec, a realistic metaphysician, makes the ontological claim that we would not use the same word for two different things unless the similarity was a part of reality itself⁷.

Krapiec's realistic metaphysics then claims that the analogy of cognition follows directly from our experience of the analogy of being. In addition to experiencing the inner relations of a being which keeps an identity through its change of parts, we also experience a network of relations among different categories of beings. Our language reflects this experience in its use of proper names for a being with an infra-ontic network of relations, and for the use of a common name for beings with an inter-ontic network of relations⁸. I am in general agreement with this metaphysical approach towards a theory of analogy, with its rejection of nominalism and an acceptance of the priority of an ontological starting point. In its expression, it seems to me to be original and potentially very rich for issues in the philosophy of the human being, of the person, and of man and woman.

⁶ Ibid., 15.

⁷ „Analogy is *omnipresent* in the world of really existing beings. Their structure and pluralism *forces* the analogy of cognition upon man; this perceptibly manifests itself in our everyday language, for the various names and the way they are used in expressions are also analogical”. Ibid., 1.

⁸ „Language itself is an expression and communication of our knowledge, and our knowledge concerns reality itself – being. There is no escape from analogy in its concrete use. Our common sense cognition (which is the basis for man's natural life and the basis from which the sciences and philosophy develop) is full of analogy, as analogy is broadly understood”. Ibid.

Krapiec's development of the analogy of being and of cognition is based on, but also goes beyond Thomas Aquinas's theory of the analogical structure of *kinds* of beings: of angels, human beings, animals, plants, and so forth. While Aquinas emphasized the way in which classes of things were analogous to other classes of things, Krapiec emphasizes the way in which a concrete existing individual within a class of things is analogous to other individuals within a common class. When the being is a human being, this aspect of his thought has been called a development of a theory of „existential analogy”⁹. In an existential analogy the network of relations among specific individual human beings or persons is the focus. In this situation the broader category of inter-ontic analogy is another term for existential analogy.

Krapiec makes a further distinction between two kinds of inter-ontic analogy: transcendental analogy and analogy of general proportionality¹⁰. Transcendental relations, relations that are common to all beings, are shared in every contingent entity that exists, i.e., its existence, its goodness, its intelligibility, and so forth. These transcendental relations reveal what Krapiec calls *metaphysical analogy*. Ultimately, thought about these transcendental relations leads to further thought about necessary existence, perfect goodness, pure intellect, and so forth. For the purposes of this paper, we will leave aside transcendental and metaphysical relations for the present and turn instead to a more

⁹ See P. Allen, *Analogy and Human Community in Lublin Existential Personalism*, „Toronto Journal of Theology”, 5, 2 (Fall, 1989), 236-46. For a description of Thomistic theory of analogy see R. M. McInerney, *The Logic of Analogy: An Interpretation of St. Thomas*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961, and G. P. Klubertanz, *St. Thomas on Analogy: A Textual Analysis and Systematic Synthesis*, Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960. For Thomas' original statement of his theory see Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Garden City, New York: 1964, I, Q. 13, 134, 5, 10.

¹⁰ „The analogousness of individual concrete beings, that is to say, the relational unity of the beings immediately accessible to our cognition, conditions in a necessary way another type of analogy, and thus also the relational (proportional) unity that occurs between individual beings. Inter-ontic analogy, as the basis of ontic pluralism, is thereby the basis of the analogy (relational unity) found between concrete beings. Inter-ontic analogy can be of two kinds: it can refer to the whole realm of being – analogy unlimited in its scope – or to a limited realm of beings. In the first case, we are dealing with transcendental analogy, in the second, with some type of analogy of general proportionality”. Krapiec, *Metaphysics*, 452.

detailed consideration of the analogy of general proportionality which considers a limited scope in being and which therefore has an application to the specific being of man and woman.

II

When we think about how parts are related to one another within an individual woman or man, we can begin with the recognition that a human being has many „centres of organization” which are interconnected. Contemporary science analyzes these centres of organization in terms of the relations of subatomic particles, atomic particles, cells, tissues, organs, systems, in increasing levels of complexity of organization¹¹.

It is at the level of system, and in particular the reproductive system, that the identity of a human being as female or male emerges. So at this level of organization of the human organism, the infra-ontic analogy begins to point to an inter-ontic analogy. Differences between two kinds of human being emerge in the three general areas classified as: chromosomes, hormones, and anatomy. These areas are also classified in scientific discourse under the broader categories of anatomy and physiology. Various sciences study these areas, identify differences and similarities, and elaborate generalizations about how males and females are differentiated. These generalizations, which approach univocity, are abstracted from any particular human being. In this

¹¹ „[...] we notice that in a living human organism there are about two billion cells, and each cell is also remarkably richly composed of molecules, and these are composed out of atoms, etc. – and all this together operates both within the confines of the cell and in the necessary context of other cells, tissues organs and the entire organism. Within the organism, therefore, we see necessary relational connections between the most various kinds of *parts* belonging to the same organism. Before us there appears an enormous *net* of relations which draw into a unity such different *parts*.[...] There is the circulation of blood and nutrients, the breaking down of old cells and the production of new ones, there are the motions of nerves, the known and unknown motions within the cell. [...] All these motions penetrate the entire organism, causing at times very profound transformations of the organism which nevertheless retains its identity”. Krapiec, *Analogy*, 11.

way a science may claim that xx is the female chromosome in cells, and xy the male chromosome in cells; that in females the hormone estrogen and in males testosterone have a predominant function; and that female anatomy includes ovaries, uterus, and breasts, while male anatomy includes testes, penis, and so forth¹².

We could say, using Krapiec's vocabulary of analogy, that a young girl growing into a woman or a young boy growing into a man is an example of an infra-ontic analogy, or of the intrinsic analogy of a being. In addition, on a level of inter-ontic analogy one girl is analogous to another girl, one woman to another woman, one boy to another boy, and one man to another man.

At the same time, our understanding of the infra-ontic structure of a woman leads to the need for an understanding of the infra-ontic structure of a man. That is, we can not understand what it means to be male without understanding what it means to be female. This understanding spans increasingly complex levels of inter-relationship from those found in comparative anatomical structures to functions of reproductive systems. Therefore, the infra-ontic analogy within a man and a woman, as male and female, at the level of chromosomes, hormones, and anatomy, necessarily leads to an inter-ontic analogy

¹² The scientific model of generalization tends towards univocity because it uses concepts which are abstracted from reality, even though it allows exceptions and even discovers them when, for example, it is claimed that there may be a masculinity gene found in a man with xx chromosome, or an individual woman may have a higher testosterone level than an individual man even though the reverse is the usual course, and so on. Speaking in the first person, Krapiec identifies this scientific tendency as a betrayal of reality: „In the process of creating univocal concepts, in a certain way I *betray* reality and I *steal* it from what interests me cognitively or can serve to satisfy my needs. I construct for myself a concept from the features which I have apprehended univocally; this concept normally serves as a medium in my understanding of the reality which I am cognizing". *Analogy*, 8. In this way the scientific model, once in place, measures individuals against it. The analogical model in contrast to the scientific model always cognizes the individual first and then considers the related differences second. It is *grounded* in the analogical plurality of reality itself. It is important also to note that science is always pushing its range of knowledge further, so today, for example geneticists are beginning to identify something they call a *masculine gene* which is usually but not necessarily tied to the xy chromosome. This may shift previous generalizations.

between a woman and a man. Their chromosomes are analogous, their anatomy is analogous, their reproductive functions are analogous, and so forth. So even though we are considering only the biological level of organization, we have identified three different kinds of analogy with respect to woman and man: (1) an infra-ontic analogy of a woman or a man considered as an individual; (2) an inter-ontic analogy among women and an inter-ontic analogy among men; and (3) an inter-ontic analogy of a woman and a man, or among women and men.

A similar pattern occurs when we move from the biological level of organization of systems within an individual human being to the presence of consciousness and its concomitant content of culture. It is at this level of organization that we discover the infra-ontic analogy of *femininity* and *masculinity* in a human being. Recognizing that these characteristics are culture bound, or to a great extent socially constructed, it is still possible to see that an individual woman or an individual man has a kind of infra-ontic organization in relation to what a particular culture considers as masculine or feminine. It is important to note that in the biological structure of identity the human being is nearly always considered as male **or** female, while at the level of consciousness and cultural structure, a human being is usually considered as masculine *and* feminine. An individual may have a broad range of characteristics some of which are considered as masculine and others as feminine within a particular culture. This means that a man would have an infra-ontic structure with the three components male, masculine and feminine, while a woman would have the infra-ontic structure with the three components of female, masculine and feminine.

In addition, if we think of the degrees of necessity within these components that attach to the ranges of difference between a woman and a man, we could say that the greatest degree of necessity attaches to genetic structure, less to anatomical structure, less to physiological structure, and even less to cultural characteristics identified as masculine or feminine. The possibility for choice and self-determination is represented in increasing degrees within these inter-related characteristics. In my view, free will decisions allow us to determine to some extent the kind of woman or man we want to be even within the constraints of the socially constructed aspects of our identity. We

cannot change our genes, but we can, given modern technology, decide to change our anatomical structure, we can decide to chemically alter our hormonal balance, we can decide to incorporate or reject certain characteristics that our culture has identified as masculine or feminine, and we can decide how to interact as a man or a woman in relation to all these different aspects of our individual identity.

Of course, the ranges of the freedom of decision here are very limited in the situation of changing anatomical structure, and they usually only occur in extreme situations of mental distress at an identification as male or female by an individual who desires the opposite identification. In areas of decision about cultural or socially constructed identified masculine or feminine traits the range of freedom is less limited. For example, a woman or a man may decide to develop what a culture identifies as a masculine trait or a feminine trait. With our consciousness, intellect, and will we can determine to some extent our infra-ontic identity as an individual woman or an individual man, and we can also determine our inter-ontic analogy in relation to an individual who is different from us in her or his identity as a woman or man¹³. Therefore, there is a space of freedom within the context of determinants that together form our sex or gender identity.

To summarize the infra-ontic analogical structure of a human being we could use the following two tetrahedral models: (1) a woman could determine herself in reference to her structure of femaleness (chromosomes, anatomy, hormones), and to her consciousness of

¹³ Over the centuries such suggestions have been made, and during the Enlightenment there were frequent univocal statements to the effect that woman is ... or man is... with the subsequent characteristics listing presumed universal masculine or feminine qualities. Often such characteristics were abstracted and detached from real individuals and then used as univocal concepts by which an individual human would be judged as not being a man or a woman, or a *real* man or a *real* woman. We have today an opposite situation in post-modernist writers, namely a suggestion that nothing should be identified as specifically masculine or feminine. Here the words are thought of as being equivocal in application. My own claim here is much more limited. I am simply stating that when an individual man or woman interrelates aspects of the self to forge a unique identity he or she refers in the process either to an identity as male or female and both to an identity as masculine and feminine as identified by the particular culture within which he or she lives. This is done in comparison with other individuals, so it is an experience of the analogical structure of reality.

femininity and masculinity within her culture; and (2) a man could determine himself in reference to his structure of maleness (chromosomes, anatomy, hormones), and to his consciousness of the masculinity and femininity within his culture. Within this latter category of consciousness would be included a differentiated lived experience of the body, of social experience of being brought up male or female, of linguistic gender, history, archetypes and so forth¹⁴. It is within this network of relations that we are able to actively determine to some extent our individual identities as a woman or as a man.

III

In addition to the fact that a single real being has an infra-ontic analogical character as described above, it is also the case that reality is full of beings which are ontically analogical to one another. We notice that two different beings have something similar about them, and we may call them by the same linguistic name. In this way general terms such as bush, tree, human being, man, and woman, are used to identify what is similar in ontically different existing things.

The history of philosophy has been filled with debates about the relation of universals and particulars, and there is no need in a paper of this scope to go over the same ground. The significant contribution of the theory of M. A. Krąpiec to this well-known problem is his metaphysical emphasis on the analogical structure of reality itself, that is, that things are analogical to one another. With this approach, the problem of sliding either into an emphasis of universality or of particularity is avoided. This is due to the recognition that reality contains a plurality of beings which are organized into categories of similarities, so that each individual being within a particular category can be grasped as analogical to (i.e., both alike and unlike) another being within a similar category.

¹⁴ For further elaboration of these models see P. Allen, *Integral Sex Complementarity and the Theology of Communion*, „Communitio: International Catholic Review”, 17 (Winter, 1990), 523-44; and Fuller's „Synergetics” and *Sex Complementarity*, „International Philosophical Quarterly”, XXXII, no 1, issue 125 (March 1992), 3-16.

As mentioned previously, those categories that cover the whole of reality such as existence, truth, goodness, beauty, etc., are considered to be examples of metaphysical analogy. The other categories which cover a particular segment of existence partake of a general analogy of proportionality, or analogy of a proportion of the whole of reality. The categories of human being, person, man, and woman are examples of this latter type. In this way, an individual man participates in an inter-ontic analogy with another single man, an individual man participates in a different way with a particular woman in the inter-ontic analogy of human being or person, and so forth.

By emphasizing the inter-ontic analogical character of reality we are able to consider the respective identities of a woman or a man in a new way that does not fall into the difficulty of elaborating a universal essence of „womanhood” or „manhood” which was so common to Enlightenment thinking. At the same time, we do not have to move to the other extreme of claiming that there is no common identity among women or among men as is found in much post-modernist thinking. Claiming that there is something analogical about two women in relation to their identities as women and something analogical about two men in relation to their identities as men or something analogical about a woman and a man in relation to their identities as human beings gives us a philosophical method to search for a clarification about the specifics of these analogies within a particular culture and then to develop our understanding further by comparison among other analogical characteristics within other cultures.

IV

If we consider how human beings may be considered as analogical to one another, there are many different ways to identify a similarity along with a difference in the existence of a particular individual. Frequently, categories such as race, class, nationality, religion, and so forth are used in a way that an individual who shares certain aspects of the characteristics of a particular category could be considered as analogical to another individual. It is important to note here that to

view two or more individuals of the same religion as analogical to one another is to emphasize both the uniqueness and unrepeatability of their individual existence at the same time that the common traditions and practices of their shared religion is also emphasized¹⁵.

If the different ways in which human beings may be considered as analogical to one another with respect to the formation of human communities is examined, the unique place of a woman and a man begins to emerge¹⁶. When comparing two individuals, a woman and a man, we find there is an essential likeness and an essential difference which is a part of the intricate infra-ontic analogical structure that each one has. A woman integrates her female identity, along with the feminine and masculine cultural dynamics, using the same faculties and powers as a man would use, i.e., the senses, intellect, and will, but data that are different in some respects from that of a man. Similarly, a man integrates his male identity, and the feminine and masculine cultural dynamics, using the same faculties and powers as a woman, but data different in some respects. The difference in data can come from the lived experience of the body, from the experience of being brought up as male or female within a particular culture and family, from the broader cultural dimension found in a particular language, history, or interpretation of archetypes, and so forth¹⁷.

Consequently, if we reflect on the unique way in which a woman and a man can be considered as ontically analogical it affords us a very

¹⁵ A. Woźnicki, S. Ch., argues against this view by claiming that a person cannot be considered analogous to another person because a person is a „unique, unrepeatably, *sui generis* entity”, and „a unique *self-contained-entity* cannot establish any common and universal relations. [...] Therefore, *communio personarum* is not based on *relations* but on *intentionality*”. Letter dated 2/10/92. I would argue, however, that an analogy always has a core of uniqueness for each analogate, along with a core of similarity. So we could speak of two human persons as being analogous to one another by being similar as human beings, and unique as persons.

¹⁶ This view was first posed to me in a private discussion with Peter Henrici, SJ.

¹⁷ For a more detailed elaboration of these different bases in data see, P. Allen, *Sex Unity, Polarity, or Complementarity*, in: *Women and Men: Interdisciplinary Readings on Gender*, ed. G. Hofmann Nemiroff, Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1987, 3-20; previously published in „International Journal of Women's Studies”, Vol. 6, No. 4 (September/October 1983), 311-25.

strong example of the inter-ontic analogy of human beings. It could be argued, however, that if we compared two individual women (or two men) from vastly different cultures that the concepts of essential likeness and essential differences necessary for analogy would be even more vividly perceived than between a man and a woman of the same class, culture, profession, etc. This criticism is well taken, and it demands a different ground for the claim that a man and a woman ought to be considered as prime analogical beings.

We saw in the discussion of infra-ontic analogy how an inter-ontic dimension appears. As soon as we think about what it means to be a female, we begin to think about what it means to be a male. The meaning of *female* is a sign pointing to the meaning of *male*. It is a similar case for thinking about the meaning of *masculine* or *feminine* within a different culture, although a woman may integrate both masculine and feminine characteristics while she may only be female, and similarly for a man.

If we think about the other categories mentioned above such as race, religion, class, and so forth, it would seem as though an infra-ontic analysis of individuals in many of these categories would not necessarily demand an inter-ontic reference. For example, one colour of skin such as yellow, does not point to another colour of skin such as black or white. It could be argued, however, that analysis of class would demand such an inter-ontic reference, so that to understand what it means to be a member of the proletariat one would have to refer to an individual within the ruling class, and so forth. Of course, in this situation it could be argued that to be a member of one class or the other was not a permanent aspect of an individual's identity, but it could change, whereas one's femaleness or maleness has a permanence in a woman's or man's identity. A similar argument could be given for change of one's religion, although not for race which also has a kind of permanence¹⁸. In any event, it would seem that necessity or permanence are not strong enough criteria in

¹⁸ There are those who argue today that race no longer has a clear differentiation. In this case, the claim for priority of the difference between a man and a woman is strengthened.

themselves to lead to the conclusion of a primacy for the analogicity of man and woman.

Therefore, I would like to suggest that the fundamental reason a man and a woman ought to be considered as prime analogates is related to their inter-ontic analogy serving as a model for human community. There is something unique about the inter-ontic analogy of a woman and a man that best exemplifies the way in which persons enter into relations in communities. Central to this are the blessings of biological, intellectual, or spiritual fertility which their interaction releases. Recently many excellent works have been written on fundamental aspects of communities of persons¹⁹. Among them all is the key concept that a person in community is characterized by „being for the other” or „giving of the self to another” or „acting for the other”, and so forth. In this way, communities of persons are different from societies of individuals who are characterized as „for the self” or „defining the self away from a group” and „creating the self through acts of will” and so forth.

When we consider the infra-ontic structure of a particular woman or a particular man it is obvious that each one is oriented „towards the other” because of the biological structure of genes, hormones, systems, and anatomy. Because the individuals are human beings, however, the exercise of this orientation is not forced but is conditioned by choice. A woman/person and a man/person can choose how to act in relation to the other, and they may choose a variety of different alternatives in relation to the other. Marriage is a kind of community that demonstrates how man and woman can be considered as prime analogates. If a marriage is biologically fertile, then we discover a further characteristic of the inter-ontic analogicity of a woman and a man, namely, the synergetic effect of a new reality issuing from the communal bond. It is at this point that a crucial aspect of the analogical reality of the two individuals is important to note, namely that there

¹⁹ See, M. F. Rousseau, *Community: The Tie That Binds*, Lanham, New York, London: University Press of America, 1991; J. Vanier, *Growth and Human Community*, New York and Ramsey: Paulist Press, 1979, and Pope John Paul II, *The Original Unity of Man and Woman: Catechesis on the Book of Genesis*, Boston: St. Paul Editions, 1981.

must be enough similarity for the conception to occur. This comes from the fact that both beings are human beings. In addition, there must also be enough difference between them for their bonding to issue in a new reality. They are two specific kinds of human beings, a man and a woman. It is in this sense that a man and a woman can be understood as prime analogates. They serve as a model for fertile bonding within the context of inter-ontic analogy.

In other forms of human community the principles of this model can be applied. When there is a good balance of sameness and difference among the persons who are bonded together „for the other” in an intellectual community, a political community, or a spiritual community, then a new fertile reality can emerge which will be an analogous form of new life. These can take many forms such as a project, book, political reality, dynamic parish, and so forth. The fertile new life will always spring concretely from the persons bonding together in a specific community, just as a child emerges from the concrete context of his or her parents. It would seem then, that M. A. Krąpiec’s philosophy of inter-ontic analogy, when applied to a theory of man and woman as prime analogical beings, provides an excellent structure for analysis of the relations of persons in community.

V

In the following section, I would like to consider some reflections to which the above study has given rise in the context of considering how human persons in community might relate to a Christian theological belief in God as a Communion of Three Divine Persons. It was mentioned at the beginning of this essay that Krąpiec introduces a philosophical theory of metaphysical analogy. The thrust of this kind of analogy leads from a consideration of characteristics that all beings share, such as existence, goodness, unity, and so forth, to a recognition that there must be an absolute or necessary Being, who is perfectly Good, perfectly One, and so forth. These metaphysical analogies then lead to the recognition of the existence of God in traditional Christian thought.

In this context, a further question may arise concerning the application of the philosophical theory of infra-ontic analogy and inter-ontic analogy to a consideration of the Trinity of Three Divine Persons in Christianity. Is there any basis for thinking analogically about the relation between a God who is understood to be a Trinity of Three Persons and the theory proposed above about a man and a woman as prime analogical beings? Augustine considered and then rejected the use of a direct analogy between a man or a woman and one of the members of the Holy Trinity because it brought to mind human sensuality which was foreign to an immaterial God²⁰. As previously mentioned, St. Thomas developed a theory of the use of analogical language to apply to a transcendent God when he claimed that the use of the terms *Father, Good, One*, and so forth, were applied analogically to God and to human beings. Aquinas also developed a theory of the analogy of various categories of beings such as plants, animals, human beings, angels²¹. In this context, it is proper to refer to God

²⁰ Augustine, *The Trinity*, Washington DC, The Catholic University of America Press, 1963, Book XII, Chapt. 5.

²¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I, Q. 13, art. 5 and art. 10. In addition, the Roman Catholic Church has traditionally used metaphorical analogy in its description of women religious as „brides of Christ”, or sacramental priests as „in persona Christi” wed to their „bride the Church”. „This revelation reaches its definitive fullness in the gift of love which the Word of God makes to humanity in assuming a human nature, and in the sacrifice which Jesus Christ makes of Himself on the Cross for His bride, the Church. In this sacrifice, there is entirely revealed that plan which God has imprinted on the humanity of man and woman since their creation; the marriage of baptized persons thus becomes a real symbol of that one and eternal covenant sanctioned in the blood of Christ”. *Familiaris Consortio* (1981), #13. „By means of celibacy, then, priests profess before men their willingness to be dedicated with undivided loyalty to the task entrusted to them, namely that of espousing the faithful to one husband and presenting them as a chaste virgin to Christ. They recall that mystical marriage, established by God and destined to be fully revealed in the future, by which the Church holds Christ as her only spouse”. *Presbyterorum Ordinis* (December 1, 1965), #16. „By freely choosing virginity, women confirm themselves as persons, as beings who the Creator from the beginning has willed for their own sake. At the same time they realize the personal value of their own femininity by becoming a *sincere gift* for God who has revealed himself in Christ, a gift for Christ, the Redeemer of humanity and the Spouse of souls: a spousal gift. One cannot correctly understand virginity – a woman’s consecration in virginity – without referring to spousal love, it is through this kind of love that a person becomes a gift for the

as the Prime Analogate, and a person as a derived analogate in the order of being, so God as Father is the Prime Being in the analogy with a human person as a father.

During the Pontificate of John Paul II we have seen the repeated introduction of the phrase „communio personarum” to apply to a man and woman bound in sacramental marriage, and even recently to the cooperative vocations of a Sacramental Priest, a Religious living a vowed life under the Evangelical Counsels, and lay person, in the married or single state, working together within a specific parish²². In addition, John Paul II has consistently suggested that this human reality of a communion of persons reflects the image of God as a communion of [Divine Persons what invites] thinking about analogy to consider the precise ways in which a communion of human persons can be thought of as analogous to the Communion of Divine Persons in the Trinity²³.

other”. Moreover, a man’s consecration in priestly celibacy or in the religious state is to be understood analogously. *Mulieris Dignitatem* (1988), #20.

²² Pope John Paul II expressed this concept in a Homily to Priests and Religious in Poland, June 1, 1991.

²³ „God, who allows himself to be known by human beings through Christ, is the unity of the Trinity: unity in communion. In this way new light is also thrown on man’s image and likeness of God, spoken of in the Book of Genesis. The fact that man „created as man and woman” is the image of God means not only that each of them individually is like God, as a rational and free being. It also means that man and woman, created as a „unity of the two” in their common humanity, are called to live in a communion of love, and in this way to mirror in the world the communion of love that is in God, through which the Three Persons love each other in the intimate mystery of one divine life. The Father, Son and Holy Spirit, one God through the unity of the divinity, exist as persons through the inscrutable divine relationship. Only in this way can we understand the truth that God in himself is love”. *Mulieris Dignitatem* (1988), #7; and “The narrative of the creation of man, in the first chapter, affirms right from the beginning and directly that man was created in the image of God as male and female. The narrative of the second chapter, on the other hand, does not speak of the *image of God*: but it reveals, in its own way, that the complete and definitive creation of *man* (subjected first to the experience of original solitude) is expressed in giving life to that *communio personarum* that man and woman form”. *Original Unity of Man and Woman*, #3.

First of all, some caution must be given to an analogy between the human communion of persons and a Divine Communion of Persons. The Trinity is One God, or philosophically speaking, one Being, whereas a community of human persons is a relationship between distinct beings. Another way of saying this is that the Holy Trinity *is* a relationship of three Persons while human beings *have* relationships among persons²⁴. This means that any discussion of the way in which a communion of Persons in the Trinity could be considered as an inter-ontic analogy with a communion of human persons must be conditioned by this qualification. Since both analogies contain the two dynamics of sameness and difference, it is possible to reflect on the ways in which relations among communion of persons might be considered similar in both the Divine Being and in human beings. One example would be that of „self-gift” of one person to another person.

Another clarification that must be made is that in the order of knowledge one ought not to go from what is „lesser known” to what is „better known,” and since the Trinity is so far beyond human knowledge there is a sense in which we ought not to try to explain human community by appealing to an analogy with a Communion of Divine Persons²⁵. Perhaps in contemporary alienated society some people have a greater grasp of the dynamics of the Trinity as a Communion of Divine Persons through a study of the Scriptures and documents of the Church and through the experience of prayer than they have had a personal experience of the dynamics of human community of persons. It therefore may through the experience of prayer than they have had a personal experience of the dynamics of human community of persons. It therefore may be possible to learn something from a reflection on the way in which the Trinity is a community of Persons and then try to consider its application as a model for human community. To use the same example as was used in the paragraph above, it may be possible for a man or a woman to reflect on the way in which Jesus gave Himself to the Father in obedience to a mission

²⁴ This is the position of Prof. Krapiec as articulated in private conversation.

²⁵ This is the position of Horst Seidl as articulated in private conversations.

and then to apply this model to an opportunity in his of her own life for „self-gift” to another in obedience to a mission.

Another area for reflection is: if we think about the two categories of the analogy of being that have been described above as infra-ontic and inter-ontic analogy we could ask whether they have any application to the Trinity as described in traditional Catholic teachings. If one has a concept of God as being outside of time, or as being the same yesterday, today, and tomorrow, it follows that the infra-ontic analogy of being would have no application, for it demands the centrality of change or fluctuation of parts through which the identity of the being stays the same. Perhaps a process theologian would challenge this concept of God; but within an Aristotelian, Augustinian, or Thomistic view there appears to be no place for temporal change within God Himself. At the same time, however, there is a way in which, during the historical mission of Christ on earth, there was also introduced into the heart of God a temporal dynamic. In this way, there is a certain sense in which the infra-ontic analogy of Being of God as a Trinity may have some application to the mystery of the Incarnation.

In terms of applying the other concept, inter-ontic analogy, to God, we have seen that Krapiec suggests that there is a central application in the category of metaphysical analogy or the transcendentals, or those things which are shared by all things which exist such as being, truth, goodness, beauty, and so on. Since the community of persons is something unique among a particular segment of being, or human beings, because it demands the exercise of intellect and will, it would not follow that a communion of persons is a metaphysical analogy of the inter-ontic form.

A further reflection arises concerning whether there is another way in which the Communion of Divine Persons can be considered ontically analogical to a communion of human persons. And yet, there is a sense in which a woman or a man is so different from a member of the Trinity that it would be incorrect to suggest that they could participate in an inter-ontic analogy the way in which a woman and a man participate in this kind of analogy through being the same kind of being although different in some respects. Indeed, this kind of suggestion often leads

to the difficult situation in which some people consider whether or not a woman is more like Christ, or the Holy Spirit, than a man or that a man is more like the Father or like Christ, and so forth. There seems to be something artificial about this attempt to lock down one of the members of the Trinity to an individual of one or the other sex with the exception perhaps of the relations themselves in the Trinity when they concern a particular dynamic such as paternity or filiation. Given the fact that males „generate in another” while females „generate in the self” it may be that there is something unique about this aspect of God that does have a closer analogical base to the male human being than the female.

I would suggest, however, that in other situations in which an identification is sought between one member of the Trinity and either a man or a woman, we will see an approach to analogy which tries to force an inter-ontic analogy between God and a human being where it does not belong. It is far more fruitful to consider the relations among the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as analogous to the relations among human persons, rather than one of the Persons in the Trinity as being analogous to one of the human persons.

There is something real about the analogy of communion of persons and of the call for communities of human persons to be ever more full reflections of the image of the Divine Community of Persons. What kind of philosophical structure for a theory of analogy can be provided to explain this? The answer to this question may be found in the clue of the concept of a person as one who is oriented towards another person in the form of the „gift of the self to the other.” It is the repetition of this willed act of self as a gift to another person that is the necessary condition for building up a human communion of persons. If we think about the fact that God is relationship, and that this relationship is one of perpetual offering of one Divine Person to another, of the Son to the Father, of the Holy Spirit to the Son and the Father, we can recognize that the relation of two persons in the form of mutual self-gift becomes the real basis for the communion of persons. Perhaps this could be called an „inter-relational analogy of being.” It is one that focuses particularly on the relationships of love and fruitfulness.

In conclusion, then, it has been suggested that the respective identities of a woman and a man are oriented towards this gift of self to another, but conditioned by choice, and that a woman and a man can be understood also as being „prime analogates” in relation to other categories of existing beings excluding God who is Prime in an absolute sense. It is perhaps not surprising then that in the book of *Genesis* a man and a woman are identified as being created „in the image of God,” and that Adam is filled with joy when he recognizes a woman as *like himself* („Here at last is bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh”), and yet woman is different enough from man that the blessing of fertility is able to be fulfilled through building together a communion of persons²⁶.

Kobieta i mężczyzna jako naczelné byty analogiczne

Streszczenie

Stanowiska na temat tożsamości mężczyzny i kobiety zawierają się między dwiema skrajnościami. Z jednej strony to, co jest postrzegane jako „wspólne między kobietami” lub „wspólne między mężczyznami”, jest maksymalizowane i uniwersalizowane, podczas gdy różnice między poszczególnymi przedstawicielami obu płci są pomijane. Takie podejście znajduje swoje źródło w wielu tradycyjnych filozofiach, np. Arystotelesa, Rousseau’a, de Beauvoir itp. Z drugiej strony „różnice między konkretnymi” mężczyznami lub „konkretnymi” kobietami są maksymalizowane do tego stopnia, że nie przyjmuje się żadnych ogólnych cech ani męskich, ani kobiecych. To podejście znajduje swoje źródło do pewnego stopnia w myśli Platona, Foucaulta, Firestone’a i niektórych pisarzy postmodernistycznych.

Pierwsze podejście odnajduje *istotne własności* kobiety i *istotne własności* mężczyzny, podczas gdy drugie – nie podejmuje w zasadzie badań nad istotą. Zwolennicy drugiego podejścia argumentują, że nie ma podstaw dla żadnej tożsamości terminów *mężczyzna* czy *kobieta*. Uważają też, że w zamian rozważania filozoficzne powinny skoncentrować się na *egzystencji* jednostki bez żadnych odniesień do biologicznych lub kulturowych różnic między płciami.

²⁶ I am grateful for funding for this article from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and for suggestions for its revision which were given by members of the Department of Philosophy, Concordia University, Montreal.

Podsumowując różnice między tymi stanowiskami, można by powiedzieć, że tendencją respektowania istoty kobiet lub mężczyzn sprowadza się do jednoznacznego stosowania terminów *kobieta* lub *mężczyzna*, podczas gdy odrzucenie istoty kobiet lub mężczyzn skutkuje wieloznacznością terminu *mężczyzna*, gdy jest on odnoszony do mężczyzn, a termin *kobieta* jest wieloznaczny w odniesieniu do kobiet.

Prudence Allen, w celu przełamania powyższej dychotomii między jednoznacznym i wieloznacznym użyciem terminów *kobieta* i *mężczyzna*, sięga po teorię analogii opracowaną przez Mieczysława Alberta Krąpca. Teoria ta, zdaniem autorki, otwiera nową drogę do zrozumienia relacji zachodzących w świecie bytów realnie istniejących. Dlatego też, celem niniejszego artykułu jest próba zastosowania teorii analogii dla określenia tożsamości mężczyzny i kobiety. Główny wniosek podjętych rozważań sprowadza się do tezy, że kobiety i mężczyźni, jako byty analogiczne i komplementarne, odnajdują swoją tożsamość w kontekście bezinteresownego daru z siebie złożonego drugiej osobie. Powyższa konstatacja pozwala skutecznie uniknąć jednoznacznej i wieloznacznej interpretacji tożsamości kobiety, jak i mężczyzny.