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JACQUES MARITAIN
AND RALPH McINERNEY ON ANALOGY

Jacques Maritain wrote passionately of the grasp of the notion of being when he spoke of one sense¹ of his *l'intuition de l'être*:

„Let us have the courage to require our intellect, acting as such, to look the reality signified by the term [being] in the face. It is something primordial, at once very simple and very rich and, if you will, inexpressible in the sense that it is that whose perception is the most difficult to describe because it is the most immediate. Here we are at the root, at last laid bare, of our entire intellectual life. You may say, if you please, for I am here attempting to employ a purely descriptive terminology as a preliminary to the formation of a philosophic vocabulary, that what is now perceived is, as it were, a pure activity, a subsistence, but a subsistence which transcends the entire order of the imaginable, a living tenacity, at once precarious – it is nothing for me to crush a fly – and indomitable – within and around me there is

¹ The two senses are: first, the intellectual intuition of *ens qua ens* understood as an analogical notion harboring the possibility of immaterial beings and, second, the intuition of *esse, actus essendi*. For the texts of Maritain and a discussion of his „intuition of being“ thesis, see my articles, *How Thomistic is the Intuition of Being?*, in: *Jacques Maritain: The Man and His Metaphysics*, ed., by John F. X. Knasas (Mishawaka, The American Maritain Association, 1988), p. 83–92, and my *Gilson vs. Maritain: The Start of Thomistic Metaphysics*, ed. by D. Hudson and D. W. Moran, *The Future of Thomism* (Mishawaka, The American Maritain Association, 1992), p. 169–184.

growth without ceasing. By this subsistence, this tenacity, objects come up against me, overcome possible disaster, endure and possess in themselves whatever is requisite for this. These are metaphors, lamentably inadequate, which attempt to express not so much what my intellect sees, which is super-empirical, as my experience of the vision, and do not themselves enter the domain of metaphysics but which may make us aware that to the word „being”, when it expresses a genuine metaphysical intuition, there must correspond a primary and original datum, of its essence above the scope of observation”².

Though Maritain describes being as a „reality”, he is no Platonist. Elsewhere he is quite clear that being is an *abstractum* derived from sensible things that are the realities³. „Being” is a reality in the sense of an object of knowledge; hence, it is an intelligible reality. It is not a reality in the sense of a subsisting form; hence, it is not an ontological reality. But note its description as at once precarious and indomitable. Precarious because being is in a fly; indomitable because the same being appears in the next living thing. As a motion picture is more than each passing frame in the projector, so too being is much more than each passing thing. In the variety of things, the same being appears and manifests a richness while intimating a more profound horde.

Leaving the metaphor of growth without ceasing, Maritain elsewhere adopts the image of a liquid crystal:

„[Being] is a reality independent of myself, which constitutes, thus considered in itself, an entire universe of possible knowledge and

² J. Maritain, *A Preface to Metaphysics: Seven Lectures on Being* (New York, Sheed & Ward, 1958), p. 52–53.

³ For Maritain the „intuition of being” was always engendered *a posteriori* from the intellect’s contact with real things given in sensation: „I see [the metaphysician’s notion of being] as an intelligible reality which issues from the least thing and in diverse respects belongs to all things”, *Preface*, p. 63; „We must attain a certain level of intellectual spirituality, such that the impact of reality upon the intellect [...] gives the objects received through our senses [...]”, *ibidem*, p. 49; for remarks in *The Degrees of Knowledge*, trans. by Gerald Phelan (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1959), see: p. 212, „[...] as if in opening a blade of grass one started a bird greater than the world”; p. 213 on the concept of being making „incomplete abstraction from its analogates”; p. 214 on the transcendentals as „realized in the sensible in which we first grasp them” and being as „attained in sensible things by dianoetic intellection”. Finally, an example from *The Peasant of the Garrone*, trans. by M. Cuddihy and E. Hughes (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), p. 136: „[...]the procedure proper to philosophy, which has its starting point in experience and a prolonged intercourse with the world and with sensible reality”.

intelligibility, of intelligible mystery, and which is not *one* thing, purely and simply one, but which is everywhere found in essentially different forms. We are thus in the sphere where no sensible image avails anything, neither that of a body which is one purely and simply, nor that of a manifold of visible objects, which are an aggregate without unity. Its subsistence is purely intelligible, and far from excluding, requires its multiplicity and diversification. We might speak of it as a liquid crystal which is the environment of the metaphysical intellect. Being presents me with an infinite intelligible variety which is the diversification of something which I can nevertheless call by one and the same name"⁴.

Just as a liquid crystal assumes many different forms but is still the same crystal, so too on the intellectual level being is an intelligible object grasped in a multiplicity and diversity of many things. Again, the example of the liquid crystal is only a metaphor. Maritain is not party to a Hindu metaphysics that envisages us as waves on the ocean of the Absolute. Being is an intelligible object, not a real object. Nonetheless, this qualification does not gainsay the splendor of the intellectual vision. To observe how one and the same intelligible object can portray itself in and through abysmal differences is no small matter.

In *The Degrees of Knowledge*, Maritain describes the same phenomenon in more formal philosophical parlance. First, this classic text ought to be quoted:

„Even in the perception of the generic or specific nature the intellect attains in the individual more than the individual itself. It attains a universal object of concept communicable to all the individuals of the same species or of the same genus. And this is called *univocal*, since presented to the mind by a plurality of transobjective subjects and restored to them in judgments, it is purely and simply one and the same in the mind. *Unum in multis*, it is an invariant without actual multiplicity, realized in several, and by that very fact positing among them a community of essence. But in the perception of the transcendentals, we attain in a nature more than itself, an object of concept not only transindividual, but trans-specific, trans-generic, transcategorical, as if in opening a blade of grass one started a bird greater than the world. Let us call such an object of concept *super-universal*. The scholastics call it *analogous* [...] It differs essentially, even as a concept, from the universals, not only because it has a greater amplitude, but also and primarily [...] it is polyvalent, it

⁴ Maritain, *Preface*, p. 63–64.

envelops an actual multiplicity; the bird we spoke of a moment ago is at the same time a flock"⁵.

Maritain leaves the inimitable prose of „a bird that is at the same time a flock“ for a more prosaic and philosophically garbed description:

„Everything which divides [electrons and angels] from one another is the same being which I find in each of them – varied. I simply have to fix my attention on it to see that it is at once one and multiple. It *would be* purely and simply one if its differentiations were not still itself, or to put it otherwise, if the analogue presented to the mind made complete abstraction from the analogates; if I could think being without thereby rendering present to my mind (whether I am *de facto* explicitly aware of this or not is quite accidental) in essentially different ways some of the others in which this object of concept is realizable outside the mind. It *would be* purely and simply multiple if it did not transcend its differentiations, or, to put it otherwise, if the analogue presented to the mind made no abstraction from its analogates: in which case the word „being“ would be purely equivocal and my thought would fly to pieces“⁶.

Maritain's point is that an analogous concept is not picked out apart from the differences of its instances but within those very differences. As Maritain's great friend, Msgr. Gerald B. Phelan, remarked, the analogical concept is „a likeness in the very difference and a difference in the very likeness“⁷. What does this mean? First, analogy is a type of conceptualization. This point expresses the remote necessity for all discussion of analogy. In general, conceptualization is the cognitional

⁵ M a r i t a i n, *Degrees*, p. 212. Gerald B. Phelan, Maritain's intellectual *confrère*, also eloquently describes the intellectual perception of being in sensible things: „Yet, even at that high level, the intuition remains abstractive and its object still trails the garments of its lowly origin. No longer, however, do these garments veil and conceal the true face and figure of being as the trappings of sensible quiddity obscured them in the first concrete apprehension. No! The light of the intellect has wrought a transfiguration. Wrapped in its (now translucent) robes of quality, quantity and individuating characteristics, being shines through, illuminating its very garments with the glow of its substantial light and reflecting the still more brilliant mystery of the Beyond where Being dwells. Who said: 'I AM WHO AM'. Thus does *being* become the dominating concept in philosophy, the norm of all reflection in the order of nature and the basis of all rational knowledge. And, being as such is intrinsically analogical“. *St. Thomas and Analogy*, ed. by A. G. Kirn, G. B. Phelan, *Selected Papers* (Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1967), p. 99.

⁶ *Degrees*, p. 213.

⁷ P h e l a n, *St. Thomas and Analogy*, in: op. cit., p. 114.

picking out of a commonality amidst an appropriate multiplicity. Hence, Maritain speaks of an *unum in multis*. The multiplicity, then, is basic and the approach to the concept is from there. Essential to the grasp of a concept, analogical or otherwise, will be the careful crafting of the suitable multiplicity. Hence, subsequent discussion of analogy will always be in the light of some multiplicity. Second, the analogous concept is contrasted to the univocal concept. Characteristic of a univocal commonality is that it is picked out *apart* from the differences of the instances in the multiplicity. Hence, what makes the instances the same will not be what renders them different. For example, „triangle” expresses the commonality grasped in the equilateral three-sided figure and the right-angled three-sided figure. In this situation the equal sides of the first instance and the right angle of the second instance serve simply to differentiate the instances. The instances are the same in virtue of something else. With the analogical concept, however, we have a commonality that is grasped within the very differences of its instances. Since the commonality is within the differences, they serve to render the instances the same. Accordingly, Maritain described the analogous concept as making an „incomplete abstraction” from its instances.

The phenomenon of analogical conceptualization necessitates a further nuancing of abstraction. In the second chapter of the *De Ente et Essentia*⁸, Aquinas distinguishes abstraction into abstraction with and without precision. In the latter the differences of the instances remain implicit in the concept because the concept leaves itself open to them. Non-precise abstraction does not exclude what it does not include. This behavior keeps the concept basically identical with the instance and so predicable of it as one whole of another. With precise abstraction, the capacity or potentiality for the differences is not included in the concept. In this way the concept sinks to the level of a part of the whole datum and is not predicable of the datum.

As the Maritain texts make clear in their talk of „ens” as predicable of electrons and angels, analogy is an abstraction without precision. But one cannot leave it at that. Univocal concepts, e. g., „man”, are also abstracted without precision. They, too, continue to „hug” the instances sufficiently to be predicable of them. They also have an inti-

⁸ For commentary, see Joseph Owens, „The Accidental and Essential Character of Being in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas”, ed. by J. R. Catan, *St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God: the Collected Papers of Joseph Owens* (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1980), p. 84-90.

mate relation with the differences of the instances. Cannot univocal concepts also be described as making an „incomplete abstraction” from the instances? Complete abstraction would be the prerogative of precise abstraction. In sum, need exists to describe more accurately the abstraction without precision of a univocal concept, on the one hand, and the abstraction without precision of an analogous concept, on the other hand. It is somewhat of a delicate affair. We do not want to describe analogical conceptualization so that univocal conceptualization becomes precise; and we do not want to describe univocal conceptualization as so non-precise that no logical room exists for analogical conceptualization.

Maritain himself gives us a lead here. As cited, Maritain says that in contrast to univocal concepts, analogical concepts harbor an „actual” multiplicity. Their abstraction is so incomplete that no dumbing down of the multiplicity occurs. Not stated, but presumably the case, univocal concepts would harbor the differences of the instances only „potentially, ” not actually. Maritain does say that the univocal notion is „invariant without actual multiplicity”. But this description of the analogical concept is unsatisfying. If in analogical conceptualization, the multiplicity is left actual, in what sense can an abstraction be said to have occurred? Why are we not simply at the start of an abstraction rather than at its term? How can one express that an abstraction of an analogous commonality has occurred while conceding the actual presence of the multiplicity?

Another Neo-Thomist helps. In his *The Bond of Being: An Essay on Analogy and Existence*, James Anderson, working under the tutelage of Phelan, says that an analogous concept abstracts from its inferiors imperfectly „so as to include them actually and implicitly”.

„The analogical concept is radically different: it has only a relative or proportional unity, and it does not include the diversity of its inferiors potentially [...]. In order that it may not be univocal in any degree, therefore, the analogical concept must include diversity actually, without in any way rendering that diversity explicit”⁹.

Instead of employing just the terminological pair of actual/potential, Anderson enlists the further pair of implicit/explicit. With both pairs Anderson can better articulate the nature of analogy vs. univocity. The

⁹ J. Anderson, *The Bond of Being* (New York, Greenwood Press, 1969), p. 256-257. Anderson’s ingenious terminology could have come from a reading of *De Ver.*, XXI, 1c.

sameness-in-difference idea of analogical conceptualization is conveyed by saying that the abstracting keeps the differences of the instances actual though rendering them implicit. On the other hand, the sameness-apart-from-difference, characteristic of univocal non-precise abstraction, is glossed as an abstracting that not only renders the differences implicit to the commonality but potential to the commonality as well. Because in both cases, the differences are rendered implicit, then in both cases the abstraction is non-precise. But since in one case, the implicitness is congruent with their actual presence while in the other with their potential presence, then the abstraction can be respectively analogical or univocal.

It is true that the sameness-in-difference way of speaking about analogous concepts is not literally in Aquinas. But the idea is there. It is there when Aquinas says at *De Ver.* I, 1c, that being (*ens*) is not added to from the outside but by *modi* that express (*exprimunt*) something of being. Diversity appears on the surface of being not by launching things from the shore but by surfacing things from the depths. Also at *De Ver.* XXI, 1c, addition to being is contrasted to addition to animal. „Animal is limited by man because what is contained in the notion of man determinately and actually (*determinate et actualiter*) is only implicitly and, as it were, potentially (*implicite et quasi potentialiter*) contained in the notion of animal”. To contain its differences implicitly and potentially is not sufficiently intimate for being’s containment of its differences. Aquinas says that these differences are not outside the essence of being but are determinate modes of being. This resolution calls to mind Anderson’s formula for the manner of the containment, viz., „actualiter et implicite”. Finally, in the *Prima pars* (4, 3c) Aquinas describes analogical communication of form in terms of things communicating „*in eandem forma, non secundum eandem rationem*: in the same form but not according to the same formality”. So what Neo-Thomists call analogy and describe as sameness-in-difference is in so many words in Aquinas’ texts especially those pertaining to the *ratio entis*.

With such a rich understanding of the *ratio entis*, one can understand why for Maritain the grasp of being is not a passing affair in the life of the intellect. To experience the intuition of being is to experience an earthquake in one’s intellectual life. Thereafter one is not the same. Everything becomes of interest because every thing in its uniqueness gives us another take at the *ratio entis* whose treasure contains this difference and who knows what else. The more different beings that one knows, the better does one see the sameness that contains them all. In such manner one easily appreciates why some are

fascinated with the intellectual life, with knowing simply for the sake of knowing. Any item of knowledge is another bloom in the bouquet of being that they are assembling in their minds¹⁰.

Maritain's rich analogical understanding of the *ratio entis* disappears in Ralph McInerny's interpretation that in Aquinas analogy is only a logical doctrine. As McInerny will explain, the analogous common notion is best understood as a combination of the thing signified and a *place-marker*, a *blank*, that determinate modes of signification can *fill in*. When one carries over this interpretation of the analogous concept to the *ratio entis*, it generates a staggering loss to Neo-Thomist thinking about being. Are there „place markers“ or „blanks“ that can be „filled in“ in the *ratio entis*? Understanding the indeterminacy of being by a „blank“ seems to render being the most empty of concepts. Also, what becomes of the intellectual life? Will it not consist of filling in intellectual blanks, holes? Far from being the described motivator of intellectual inquiry, the notion of being becomes a repository of what we come to know. How interesting is that? Not much, I think. This result leaves us seeking to know, not to fill in being, but to satisfy our physical well-being or the quirks of our individual pleasure. And even if this indirect manner of pursuing knowledge uncovers in things an implication for a supreme being, such a discovery will not be intrinsically attractive but only continue to address our physical wants. Now the blank in being is filled in with an account that leaves us feeling safe or not alone. How does this remarkable table turning in our thinking about being come about?

McInerny succinctly describes analogy this way:

„As a logical term, „analogy“ signifies the relations among several meanings of a given word; analogy is a kind of signification, and it is usually exemplified by „healthy“. Consider the following list: (1) Fido is healthy, (2) urine is healthy, (3) food is healthy. Although the same term occurs as predicate in each of these sentences, it does not seem to have the same meaning in all of them as „man“ does in „Socrates is a man“ and „Plato is a man“. Nor does it seem to have entirely unrelated meanings as „top“ does in „he spins the top“ and „he opens the top“. That is, the meanings of „healthy“ in our list, while different, seem related. „Healthy, “ to use Thomas' language, is imposed to

¹⁰ For Aquinas' differentiation of analogy into the types of proportion and proportionality and for a discussion of what type is appropriate for the analogy between God and creatures, see my *Aquinas, Analogy and the Divine Infinity*, „Doctor Communis“, 40 (1987), p. 64–84.

signify from health, and we might formulate a common meaning for the various uses in (1), (2), and (3) above by saying that „healthy” means „related in some way to healthy” or „referring to health in some way”. This would be what Thomas means by the common notion (*ratio communis*) of an analogous name, but unlike the common notion of a univocal term (the example of „man” above) it does not apply equally to the things of which it is predicated. By applying equally Thomas means that when I say Socrates is a man I make no reference to anything else called a man, something else that might be thought to have prior right to the name. The common notion of the term Thomas calls analogous is unequally common to many things in this sense, that it applies to one thing primarily and to others secondarily. That is beyond the *ratio communis* of „healthy” (referring in some way to health), we can formulate a proper notion (*ratio propria*) which expresses a determinate reference to health, say, „subject of health”, which is the principal meaning of the term and is the meaning it has in (1). In (2) it would mean „sign of health”, and in (3) „preservative of health”¹¹.

Analogy signifies the relations among several meanings of a given word. What does this mean? McInerny gives as an example a relatedness seen in the meanings of „healthy” and which is expressed by a common meaning of „healthy”. From this it is clear that the relatedness between the various meanings is a sameness perceived in them. How does this sameness get described as analogical? Healthy must distinguish itself from the various instances but all the while suffering or undergoing different relations to the instances. Hence, „healthy” is more strongly related to the animal and more weakly related to the medicine. In contrast a univocal common notion would be another relatedness seen in various instances. For example, „related in some way to man” as seen in „Tom is a man”, „Dick is a man”, „Harry is a man”. The common notion is univocal because the blank expressed by the words „in some way” is always filled in the same fashion, viz., „subject of”. Interestingly, there seems to be no intrinsic difference between an analogical *ratio* and a univocal one. Intrinsically, both *rationes* contain blanks to be filled in. The difference between both is caused extrinsically. An analogical *ratio* is one whose blanks are filled in with different relations, e. g., some strong, some weak. A univocal *ratio* is one whose blanks are filled in by relations of the

¹¹ R. McInerny, *A History of Western Philosophy* (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1970), II, p. 324–325.

same kind. From the traditional Thomist perspective, all *rationes* in McNerny's account appear to be univocal. Finally, since these relations are undergone by the sameness only as it exists in the mind, then analogy is only a logical doctrine. The sameness and difference idea of analogy occurs only on the level of second intention. It is a concept of a concept. In other words, for Maritain's first intention understanding of analogy as a sameness within the differences of real things, McNerny substitutes a second intention sameness undergoing different predicational relations. Instead of analogy remaining a sameness in real differences, it is now a sameness with logical difference only.

Shortly thereafter McNerny summarizes his position this way:

„What is called the common notion (*ratio communis*) is quite indeterminate and might be thought of as involving the thing signified and a place-marker for determinate modes of signifying it, something like „health“, where the blank can be filled by „subject of“, „sign of“, and so forth, though, again, one mode of signifying will be controlling and enter into the secondary modes of signifying the *res significata*“¹².

He then applies the model to being: „The common notion of being is 'that which exists', so that existence (*esse*) is *the res significata*, and 'that which' (or 'having' in 'having existence') may be regarded as a place-marker for determinate modes of being“¹³.

Why is the Neo-Thomist version of analogy as sameness in real difference rejected? I believe that McNerny's reason is twofold. First, in McNerny's opinion, it is simply a matter of the Thomistic texts that analogy is a logical doctrine. True and as McNerny cites, the texts do contain a doctrine of analogical predication and predication is undoubtedly a logical notion for Aquinas. As the *De Ente et Essentia*, Ch. 3, explains, predication is something that happens to an essence thanks to its being set up with an *esse in anima*, something from which along with every other *esse*, the essence abstracts in its absolute consideration¹⁴. But there also appears to be a metaphysical approach to analo-

¹² Ibidem, p. 325–326. Also, „The Analogy of Names Is a Logical Doctrine“, in *Being and Predication* (Washington, D. C., The Catholic University of America Press, 1986), pp. 282–283.

¹³ M c I n e r n y, *History*, p. 326. Also, „That is, *habens* in *habens esse* is a blank or variable whose fillers or values will differ“ (M c I n e r n y, *Analogy of Names*, p. 283).

¹⁴ „Nevertheless, it is essential to a genus to be predicated: this is included in its definition [...]. Rather, the notion of species is one of the accidents that follow upon the nature because of the being it has in the intellect; and it is in this way, too, that

gy. I have mentioned I, 4, 3c, in which Aquinas divides the various ways in which „thing” communicate in the same form one of which is analogy. Also, the *De Veritate* texts that explain the way addition is made to being are couched in terminology taken from what the *De Ente* calls abstraction without precision. In the *De Ente* Aquinas introduced this doctrine to explain how matter is included in the definition of man. But later the consideration of an essence from the point of view of what belongs to its definition is called „absolute consideration”. Absolute consideration abstracts the essence from every *esse*, including existence in the soul. In short, the *De Veritate* discussions about being are from the viewpoint of its absolute consideration and so are prior to a logical treatment consequent upon an *esse in anima*. There seems to be a metaphysical analogy of being as well as a logical one. Certainly Maritain and other Neo-Thomists read the texts that way.

Other textual arguments by McInerney include the following. He points out that Aquinas denies that being is a genus, as if to imply that being is another kind of logical entity¹⁵. For it is true that genus is a technical term in logic. Since predication is essential to a genus and predication happens thanks to an essence acquiring an *esse in anima*, a genus is a logical entity. But in reply, the Thomistic usage is not always so tidy. Even in the *De Ente*, Ch. 2, Aquinas can be caught using the terms genus, species, and difference of natures abstracted without precision. Such an abstraction is later identified with the absolute consideration that abstracts the essence from every *esse*. Hence, Aquinas cannot yet be using the terminology in its strictly logical sense. Why not the same when Aquinas denies that being is a genus? I believe Maritain also is loosely using the same terminology in the first *Degrees* passage cited above.

the notions of genus and difference belong to it”. A. Maurer trans., *On Being and Essence*, p. 49–50.

¹⁵ „Thomas agrees with Aristotle that the sentence [‘being is a genus’] is false, but we have already seen the type of predicate ‘genus’ is, we know what it means to say that ‘genus’ is a logical term. Well, ‘Being is analogous’ is the affirmation Thomas offers when he decides that ‘Being is a genus’ is false. ‘Analogy’ must be a logical term, too”. M c I n e r n e y, *History*, p. 324. Earlier, McInerney remarked, „[...] a genus, in the sense of being predicable of many specifically different things, is true of the nature only as it exists in the mind. Furthermore it is only in the mind that substance exists apart from further determinations like ‘living’ and ‘nonliving’. Thus, in this case certainly it is our abstractive mode of knowing, the fact that we move through progressively less vague ‘fixes’ on thing to determinate knowledge, that is productive of the ‘things’ related by logical relations” (Ibidem, p. 308).

Furthermore, „universal” is another technical logical term of which genus and species are divisions. But in many place, e. g., *In II de An.*, lect. 12, *De Pot.* V, 9, ad 16m, and C. G. I, 26, Aquinas is on record that „universal” can also stand for the common nature as absolutely considered¹⁶. Is not that a precedent for introducing a parallel ambiguity to genus, species and difference?

McInerny thinks that the use of the term „ratio” in „ratio entis” also show that the discussion of analogy never gets outside the logical order¹⁷. But in this cited text (*In I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3c) „ratio” stands for the „intentio” of a conception. This *intentio* is described as the „signification of a name” and „as the definition of things that have a name”. These descriptions link *intentio* with the essence or nature abstracted without precision in the *De Ente*. For example, in the *De Ente*, Aquinas says that abstracted without precision the signification of the name „man” includes undesignated matter in its definition¹⁸. But essence abstracted without precision is also the absolutely considered essence that abstracts from every existence and so is not yet a properly logical notion. It is far from evident that the mere mention of *ratio* indicates a logical consideration.

McInerny also notes¹⁹ that for Aquinas the standard example of analogy is „healthy”. But in a famous text from the *Sentences* commentary (*In I Sent.* d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1), Aquinas designates this example

¹⁶ For the texts, see J. O w e n s, *Common Nature: A Point of Comparison Between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics*, „Mediaeval Studies”, 19 (1957), 6–7. A. M a u r e r, *St. Thomas and the Analogy of Genus*, „The New Scholasticism”, 29 (1955), 138, discovers a non-logical use of the term „genus”: „The natural genus, considered according to its concrete ratio, is not the logical genus of the logician or the mathematician”.

¹⁷ R. M c I n e r n y, *The Logic of Analogy*, „The New Scholasticism”, 31 (1957), p. 159.

¹⁸ „[Designated matter] is not part of the definition of man as man, but it would enter into the definition of Socrates if Socrates could be defined” (*De Ente*, ch. 2); as trans. by A. Maurer, *On Being and Essence* (Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968), p. 37. „For example, the term ‘man’ signifies the essence of the species, and therefore ‘man’ is predicated of Socrates. But if the nature of the species is signified with precision from designated matter, which is the principle of individuation, then it will have the role of a part.” Ibidem, Maurer, trans., p. 42–43. Speaking of the absolute consideration of the nature, Aquinas says, „For example, to man as man belong ‘rational’, ‘animal’, and everything else included in his definition (*in eius definitionem*); but ‘white’ or ‘black’, or any similar attribute not included in the notion of humanity (*de ratione humanitatis*), does not belong to man as man”. *De Ente*, ch. 3; Maurer trans., p. 46.

¹⁹ M c I n e r n y, *The Analogy of Names*, p. 278 and 286.

as analogical not *secundum esse* but *secundum intentionem*. McInerney takes this to mean that analogy is not a metaphysical doctrine but a logical one. The text demands much more discussion than I can give it now. Let the following remarks suffice for my present purposes. As I have noted, it is also from the *Sentences* commentary that Aquinas employs „*intentio*” for the „*ratio*” or „*significatio*” of the conception. Again this manner of describing „*intentio*” is markedly similar to the *De Ente* description of the absolutely considered essence abstracted without precision. This is an object of first, not second, intention. Aquinas’ talk about „*secundum intentionem*” should be talk about the situation in first intention. Hence, something analogous „*secundum intentionem*” would be a sameness within the differences of real things. If the sameness permeates only the accidents of that thing and does not extend to the different nature of the thing, the same notion analogous *secundum intentionem* could also be not analogous *secundum esse*. This happens with healthy as the mind sees it in the animal but only in the various relations that medicine and urine have to the animal. In short, „*secundum intentionem*” need not be read „*secundum secundam intentionem*”. „*Secundum primam intentionem*” will also work here.

Finally, McInerney cites C. G. I, 34, in which Aquinas says that analogical predication of God follows the order of our knowing, not the order of being²⁰. The reference to the order of knowing McInerney takes as a reference to the order of logic. But the trouble with the equivalency is that the knowing about which Aquinas is speaking is of real things, viz., first, not second, intentions. The knower is beginning from real things understood as effects of another real thing, God. This order in real things, not second intentions, determines the analogical imposition of the same name of God and creatures. Far from proving that analogical predication is fundamentally a logical doctrine, this text indicates a first intention, or metaphysical, basis.

But even if, as McInerney believes, analogy is a matter of second intention, why the univocal-like treatment of the analogous name? Certainly, it is difficult to find Aquinas speaking of the *ratio entis* as containing blanks or placemarkers to be filled in with determinate modes. As noted, for Aquinas the *modi* do not „fill in” the *ratio* but express (*exprimunt*) the *ratio*. So, even if analogy is only a logical doctrine, why express the logic the way McInerney does? This brings me to what I believe is McInerney’s second reason. This second reason goes

²⁰ McInerney, *Logic of Analogy*, p. 162–163.

back to the mentioned difficulty of understanding how a sameness-in-difference could possibly designate the product of an abstraction. In other words, the sameness seems to be insufficiently set apart from the instances to do justice to the requirements of predication. Without some distinction, you lack a sameness that when given cognitional existence can undergo the relation of predication. Because of that problem McNerny, in my opinion, interpretes analogy in the logical way that he does. In other words, I am saying that underlying McNerny's logical notion of analogy is the following thinking. In Aquinas analogy is at the least a logical doctrine. Any interpretation must preserve that. But the Neo-Thomist metaphysical interpretation does not preserve it. Hence, the Neo-Thomist interpretation self-destructs.

Understood as the apprehension of a sameness precisely within the differences of the instances, analogical abstraction is admittedly a difficult notion to grasp, though I think ordinary experience can be mined for illustrations of it. But even after one acknowledges the phenomenon, the task of technically describing it bristles with difficulties. How can the sameness abstract from the differences, how can it effect some distance here, without rendering itself univocal? On the other hand, how does the sameness keep the differences intimate to itself without obliterating itself? How can Maritain's riveting image of a bird that is at the same time a flock be given a more formal expression? I mentioned Anderson's ingenious play with the pairs implicit-explicit and potential-actual. Recall that at *De Ver.* XXI, 1c, Aquinas drew upon these pairs to describe the univocal notion animal. Animal contains „implicite et quasi potentialiter” what is „determinate et actualiter” in man. Anderson reshuffles the notions to express the analogous concept. What is in its different instances, the analogous concept contains „implicite et actualiter”.

From my reading, the Neo-Thomists offer no better formulation of the analogical concept. Perhaps others will craft a superior way to express the fascinating occurrence of sameness-in-difference. But the present issue is whether the Neo-Thomist formulation suffices for the needs of predication. As I contemplate the formulation, I think that it does suffice. Insofar as the differences of the instances are rendered implicit to the analogon without being rendered potential, one can say that an abstraction has taken place. Enough of a distinction between the instances and the sameness has been achieved. The sameness can then be accorded a cognition *esse* on the basis of which it can undergo relations of analogical predication. So, the need for predication to have a distinct universal term that is related to individuals, as Aquinas describes logical notions in the *De Ente*, can be met in the Neo-Thomist

understanding of analogical conceptualization. Though the notion of sameness-within-difference might at first appear to conflict with predicational needs, nuancing of the notion obviates the difficulty. One can read McInerney from cover to cover and never discover any intimation of this more basic dimension in the logic of analogy. It would be a profound tragedy if logical considerations of analogical predication eclipsed the Neo-Thomist understanding. Lost would be an appreciation of the fundamental richness and density that intelligibly stands behind our experience of things.