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# **Scripta Philosophica**

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MARIA ASUNCION L. MAGSINO

## PEIRCE, SEBEOK, AND THE SEMIOTIC REFORMATION ON CONTEMPORARY COMMUNICATIONS

The sale sign says in bold twenty-inch font: 50% off. That sends off the message “there must be good buys in there.” You enter the store but you hardly find items on 50% mark-off. You complain and the sales attendant draws your attention to a four-centimeter text that reads “on selected items.”

Why do we demand signs to be accurate? Rectitude in the representation and interpretation of signs makes sense only in view of communication. Communication entails the expression of one’s thoughts, feelings, desires, etc., with the intent of engaging another in an exchange of views or a dialogue. For this to take place, the creation of a modeling system becomes imperative.

Communication in very simple terms entails an exchange of any kind of messages whatsoever. A message can consist of a sign or a string of signs transmitted from a sign producer, or sender, to a sign receiver or destination. This article argues that in whatever manner the sign is used to signify, the ultimate indicator of a successful transmission of messages in any system would be the conformity to a norm or an ideal. In fine, we unwittingly uphold the realist’s adage *adaequatio*

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*rei et intellectus* when we end an inquiry with a conclusive “such is the case!” Using Peircian terms, the test of truth ultimately lies in iconicity: truth is iconic. Peircian semiotics claim that iconicity together with indexicality assume that signs signify suprasubjective relations and functions. A framework for communication such as this can aid us in being more wary of contemporary Sophists selling out “truths” very attractively and for a cheap price. Fake news, “expert” opinions backed up by scientific research, proven and tested claims all flood our emails, social media posts, etc. Sadly though, they may all end up as hoaxes.

### **Modeling and Language**

Language in its various forms is a species of a modeling system. Yuri Lotman<sup>1</sup> defined a modeling system as one made up of elements structured by following rules for combining them. These elements hold a fixed relation to the entire sphere of knowledge, insight or regulation.<sup>2</sup> Where language is observed, then the presence of a mind<sup>3</sup> is assumed. And the mind’s ability to create communication models is derived from its semiotic capacity. Charles S. Peirce would describe semiotic capacity as the ability to discern sign relations and consequently generate a body of relevant and meaningful significations that eventually impacts activity and behavior.

John Deely explains<sup>4</sup> how Lotman’s modeling system differs from Thomas Sebeok’s. Lotman formulated a framework that identifies the natural or spoken language as the primary modeling system inas-

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<sup>1</sup> A Russian-Estonian semiotician circa 1922–1993.

<sup>2</sup> Lifted from Thomas A. Sebeok, *An Introduction to Semiotics* (London: Pinter Publishers, 2001), 140.

<sup>3</sup> Reference to the mind here definitely includes the Peircian quasi-mind.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. John N. Deely, “The Primary Modeling in Animals,” accessed July 20, 2017, [http://www.augustoponzio.com/files/12.\\_Deely.pdf](http://www.augustoponzio.com/files/12._Deely.pdf). And John N. Deely, *Semiotic Animal* (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2010).

much as it provides the underlying or basic infrastructure for all other human sign systems. Then, acquired supplementary superstructures in the form of written texts that cover the vast extent of human “culturescape” are created as the secondary modeling systems constructed upon natural language.<sup>5</sup> Thomas Sebeok later proposed the existence of an even more primitive modeling system which corresponds to the zoo-semiotic system, thus raising natural or spoken language to the secondary status and culture to the tertiary.<sup>6</sup> The continuity between these modeling systems can be exemplified as follows: understanding of the modeling system of the human body as a primary modeling system by a subject who puts it into a systematic and scientific knowledge as a kind of secondary modeling leads to the biological modeling which serves as the basis of the science of medicine as the tertiary model.

Thomas Sebeok<sup>7</sup> describes a model as any formalized system that stands for an object, event, feeling, or any reality for that matter. They take the form of images, concepts or ideas intrinsic to the mind. The corresponding physical or externalized species as language, gestures or material objects among others are models as well. Models reflect the manner in which the mind organizes semiotic relationships, and thus

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<sup>5</sup> Sebeok, *An Introduction to Semiotics* (2001), 140, and Daniel Chandler, “Semiotics for Beginners,” accessed Aug 19, 2017, <http://visual-memory.co.uk/daniel/Documents/S4B/>.


<sup>6</sup> Thomas A. Sebeok, *An Introduction to Semiotics* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), and Kalevi Kull, “Thomas A. Sebeok and Biology: Building Biosemiotics,” *Cybernetics and Human Knowing* 10, no. 1 (2003): 12. Sebeok acknowledges the congruity of this expanded paradigm with Popper’s famous Worlds 1–2–3 (see Karl Popper, *Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem* [London and New York: Routledge, 1994]). His World 3 is the world of culture; his World 2 is the subjective ‘human world’ which encompasses language developing together with the former in ‘symbiotic interaction’; and his World 1 is the whole material world of the cosmos, both inorganic and organic, including machines and all of biology. Sebeok, *An Introduction to Semiotics* (2001), 145–6.

<sup>7</sup> Thomas A. Sebeok and Marcel Danesi, *The Forms of Meaning: Modeling Systems Theory and Semiotic Analysis* (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2000), 2.

aid in recognizing patterns in things. They serve as exemplars of specific kinds of phenomena. Models also have a predictive feature and can serve as a guide. The predictive and exemplar characteristics of models find a very close parallelism with the structure of language, the component elements of which are its predictive and demonstrative roots.<sup>8</sup> Since communication is basically built around the capacity of language to demonstrate, specify or point out on one hand, and to predicate on the other hand,<sup>9</sup> we can thus take language in a broad sense to assume a system of modeling.

### Modeling and Semiosis

Modeling in a broad sense is a product of semiosis. Peirce defines semiosis as the process where Objects represented by Signs effects the emergence of Interpretants in the mind of a subject.<sup>10</sup>



This representation shows the intrinsic causal relation the sign holds with both the object it signifies and the interpretant it causes in the receiver of the sign. The involvement of such causal relations account for the objective realism of Peircian semiotics.

<sup>8</sup> Max Müller, *Lectures on the Science of Language*, revised 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: Charles Scribner, 1862), kindle location (KL) 2863–2865.

<sup>9</sup> For this reason, morphological changes in linguistic signs, e.g. words, accompany their specific manner of demonstrating (declension of substantive forms) and of predicating (conjugation of verbs) in a given sentence.

<sup>10</sup> Deely claims that “[T]here is general agreement . . . on the model of sign operative within semiotics: every sign consists in a relation connecting three terms. One term performs the function of other-representation (which Peirce calls accordingly the ‘representamen’); a second performs the function of self-representation or objectification (which Peirce calls the ‘object signified’, a somewhat redundant expression); and a third term performs the function of relating within the signification itself (even when the representamen or sign-vehicle is a natural event, such as a volcano belching smoke) the representamen to the significate.” John N. Deely, “Thomas A. Seebeek and Semiotics of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century,” in *Semiotics Continues to Astonish: Thomas A. Sebeok and the Doctrine of Signs*, ed. Paul Cobley et al. (Berlin–Boston: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co., 2011), 144.



Models predicate or describe the state of things. Peirce would say that Models reflect or mirror the things they want to signify iconically. Moreover, models are also used to serve as indicators that signify, not itself but another reality. These models would be equivalent to Peircian indexes. Peirce explains that the mind is affected by icons such that the mind elicits an image of things. Indexes prompt the mind to look for the object the sign points out to. Both icons and indexes are linked to their respective Objects synechistically, that is, in a continuous manner. Finally if the relation is understood only within the realm of certain conventions, then the sign is understood as symbolic. Almost always, symbols hold a fundamental iconic or indexical character, which we shall see later.


On one hand, it can be said that signs behave in peculiar ways which determine the manner the mind formulates secondary models.<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, the mind creates models in accord with its modeling capacity and, as Peirce would emphatically hold, always structured by the norms of Logic, Aesthetics and ultimately Ethics (in that order). These norms govern the vast symbolic world of tertiary models. Inasmuch as models and language conflate, they both have to be grounded on rules, structures or grammar to even make sense. Models should be subject to the assumptions and rules of logical operations for communication to take place.<sup>12</sup> The ultimate measure of success in communication is gauged by the iconicity achieved in the modeling systems creat-

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<sup>11</sup> The reference to “mind” here is congruent to the description Deely makes of the “postmodern” mindset that establishes the dependence of species-specific *Umwelt* of “objects” on things, contrary to the modernistic solipsistic “mind.” Biosemioticians recognize that “it is the distinction between ‘sign’, ‘object’ and ‘thing’, developed principally (by) Deely that is central to the recasting of semiotic theory with biosemiotics at its center.” Paul Copley et al., “John Deely, from the point of view of Biosemiotics,” *Biosemiotics* 10, no. 1/2 (May 2017): 3, DOI: 10.1007/s12304-017-9291-x.

<sup>12</sup> Sebeok, *An Introduction to Semiotics* (2001), 148.

ed by the *utterer* (Object) and the *interpreter* (Interpretant).<sup>13</sup> As such, there is truth in communication which is consistent with the Peircian formulation that Truth is ultimately iconic.



The sign-object-interpretant relationship involves complex semiotic systems. For the Tertiary Model to reflect the truth about its object which is the Primary model, the system has to reflect its primordial source iconically.

In keeping with Peircian semiotic principles, the mental model *in toto* is also a sign.<sup>14</sup> The reference to the model as a sign precludes its existence as a single unit. A model should be seen as a complex semiotic system that can be called a “text”<sup>15</sup> or a *composite form* of a sign. It represents non-unity<sup>16</sup> Objects in a “combinatory” manner.<sup>17</sup> Although texts take on the formal properties of the semiotic signifiers that make it up, they are more than simply the aggregate of their signified Interpretants.<sup>18</sup> As we shall see, classifying modeling systems as primary, sec-

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<sup>13</sup> Cf. Peirce MS 318, 205–6 quoted in John N. Deely, “The Grand Vision,” *Transactions of Charles S. Peirce Society* 30, no. 2 (1994): 371–400. In another article, Deely writes, “Peirce was the first to identify triadic relation as the being proper and formal to the sign (which he was not) as the foundation of semiotics, but rather because in introducing the distinction between interpreter and interpretant, the latter of which ‘need not be mental’, Peirce had opened the way to what I would describe as ‘the full vista of the action of signs.’” Cf. Deely, “Thomas A. Seebeck and Semiotics of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century,” 141. It is worthwhile to note that both Object and Interpretant are related to the Sign which is, using Deely’s term, suprasubjective.

<sup>14</sup> Peirce formulates the doctrine of signs as a way of describing the genesis and development of human knowledge or thought. It is with these ideas that Peirce writes in the cognition series of 1868–1869 that “man is a sign.” Cf. Charles S. Peirce, *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings*, vol. 1, ed. Nathan Houser (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1992), 54.

<sup>15</sup> Kalevi Kull, “A Sign Is Not Alive—A Text Is,” *Sign Systems Studies* 30, no. 1 (2002): 329.

<sup>16</sup> Sebeck and Danesi, *The Forms of Meaning*, 201.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 29.

ondary and tertiary also derives from the modeling capacity of the mind to formulate a system and the kind of texts that emerge from it.

### **Primary Modeling System (PMS)**

Communication is a process involving the movement of signs or the transmission of Form between at least two minds. It spans the generation up to the consequent interpretation of these signs. For the communication process to be completed the mind as receiver must be able to elicit the Interpretant determined by the Sign. This simple process describes the semiotic production of an iconic Interpretant which characterizes the primary modeling system's innate capacity for *simulative* modeling. It is a system that allows the mind to mirror or simulate perceptual Objects.<sup>19</sup>

Communication completed with the generation of an Interpretant is signaled by the exhibition of a habit or response that accompanies sign interpretation. Behavioral response is assumed to be in synchrony with the model of "reality" the mind's modeling capacity enables it to formulate. The mind's modeling capacity should allow the organism to come up with a model of Nature that will enhance survival, or else "it will surely be doomed, by natural selection, to extinction."<sup>20</sup> Survival thus would be the ultimate mark of success of an organism's PMS.

The regularity of the pattern observed in PMS can be captured in an Iconic model which is marked by predictability. Yet some deviations from patterns of behavior do occur. This is so because semiotic processes do not actually take place in a vacuum.<sup>21</sup> Some intrinsic and/or

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<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 44–5.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 145.

<sup>21</sup> Peirce clarifies that since "connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that there can be no isolated sign." Charles S. Peirce, "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism," *The Monist* 16 (1906): 492–546; also found in Charles S.

extrinsic conditions provide the context where the processes occur ultimately affecting the realization of the communication process. Hence, aside from semiosis, communication assumes the satisfaction of certain conditions, e.g. rules, as requisite for success.

Primary modeling can account for phenomena in nature such as osmosis, camouflage, mimicry, simulation and the like. Among humans, the natural language code provides a modeling resource that enables them to convert requirements for “concrete living existence” into “active plans.”<sup>22</sup> In human semiosis, the PMS takes on various formulations that ranges from the plainly physical to the highly abstract: *singularized* as in the case of the “OKAY” hand-gesture; *composite* as in a still life painting; *cohesive* as in the attempt of simulating the movements of a swan in the ballet “Swan Lake;” and *connective* as in the using the “love=sweet taste” metaphor in discourse.<sup>23</sup>

Sebeok cites the signs observed among “infants and the signs of the human body, both in its more culturally dependent manifestations as well as its natural-biological manifestations”<sup>24</sup> as examples of PMS. Human language as PMS satisfies not only an iconic modeling but an ‘indicational’ or indexical function as well. The PMS enables children to formulate a working knowledge of the world as their “world.” Then, when mere looks and gestures prove insufficient to communicate<sup>25</sup> his ever expanding “world,” children have to resort to the use of the extensional verbal modeling of language which is speech.

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Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vols. 4, ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933), 511.

<sup>22</sup> Sebeok and Danesi, *The Forms of Meaning*, 108.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.

<sup>24</sup> Augusto Ponzio, “Thomas A. Sebeok, Hybrid Joke-Teller,” in *Semiotics Continues to Astonish: Thomas A. Sebeok and the Doctrine of Signs*, ed. P. Copley et al. (Berlin–Boston: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co., 2011), 332.

<sup>25</sup> Müller, *Lectures on the Science of Language*, KL 351–2.

Science seems not to have much difficulty accepting the paradigm of reflecting the object of its study as PMS iconically. The sign of approval is given to any scientific theory that proves itself as adhering to the following statement of “iconicity:” I have evidence to prove my claim that “such is the case.” However, when the primary modeling is an offshoot of the natural law, e.g. elaboration of human sexuality, there seems to be a problem. In contemporary interpretations, the consideration of the human body as the PMS of the human modeling by a subject or SMS are not to be taken as related or connected. The more popular interpretations of sexuality emanate from communication frameworks grounded on modernist ontologies. Thus, a metaphysics grounded on realism is imperative in the elaboration of this framework.

This Peirce-Sebeok framework for communication, which John Deely places as “postmodern” is premised upon what he designates as the suprasubjective nature of sign relations and their equally suprasubjective functions. For this to be understood, he has taken pains to differentiate the Piercian object from the Kantian object. The former is dependent on the “thing” which is independent of the subjective mind while the latter is found intrinsic to the mind.<sup>26</sup> Deely maintains that the relation of the object to the thing is extrinsic to the subject. It is this relation that functions as a sign to an intended mind. Let’s say that the object reflects the thing. The sign then functions as an icon. If the object points to the thing, then the sign functions as an index. This manner of signifying relation and function assumes the presence of an interpreter. For a sign to be considered a sign, a mind or receiver has to be affected by such a sign generating an Interpretant. However, Deely maintains that though the Interpretant happens in the interpreter’s mind, it is determined by the Object while counting on the capacity of the mind to generate it.

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<sup>26</sup> John N. Deely, “A Sign Is What?” *Sign Systems Studies* 29, no. 1 (2001): 712 & ff.

## Secondary Modeling System (SMS)

It is now the subject's turn to create a modeling system. With this in mind, Sebeok warns against the temptation to conflate "three incommensurate semiotic practices and their corresponding appellations: 'communication', 'language' and 'speech'." He differentiates communication, universally associated with the living, and language, attributed to humans alone thus rendering the phrase "languageless human" oxymoron. Though one cannot speak without having a language, having a language does not assume the ability to verbalize or indeed externally manifest in any other manner such as script, sign languages, sound codes or the like. He asserts that "these three phenomena evolved quite separately in phylogenesis as well as emerge severally in human ontogenesis. The labels are thus by no means interchangeable."<sup>27</sup>

Charles Morris (1901–1971) considered language as a sign system that includes mathematics and symbolic logic in its class together with all varieties of spoken and written languages. He excludes animal signs though because there is no evidence that any animal connects or relates signs in such a way that they produce combinations according to those fixed regulations that define any language system.<sup>28</sup> Among those salient characteristics that mark a clear distinction between human and animal communication, two are of particular importance, namely double articulation and syntax.<sup>29</sup> All human languages consist of tens of

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<sup>27</sup> Thomas A. Sebeok, "Semiotics and the Biological Sciences: Initial Conditions," Discussion Papers No. 17 (Collegium Budapest / Institute for Advanced Study, November 1995), 9, accessed July 30, 2017, <http://livingbooksaboutlife.org/pdfs/sebeok.pdf>.

<sup>28</sup> Ponzio, "Thomas A. Sebeok, Hybrid Joke-Teller," 335.

<sup>29</sup> Sebeok affirms that syntax is not found in zoosemiotic systems, although this feature does abound in endosemiotic systems, such as the genetic code, the immune code, the metabolic code, and the neural code. It is noteworthy that Sebeok in 1976 introduced the endosemiotic sphere (signs in the body) as different from zoosemiotics. See Sebeok,

thousands of signs, which are combinations of form and meaning.<sup>30</sup> Besides, the incorporation of syntax in language accounts for the possibility among humans to represent immediate experiences as well as “to frame an indefinite number of possible worlds.”<sup>31</sup> Such considerations strongly favor the hypothesis that language is exclusively and uniquely human.

Language is a Secondary Modeling System (SMS). The SMS can be defined as the capacity to formulate systems to signify Objects with “extended primary forms and with indexical (indicational) forms.”<sup>32</sup> Language subsumes both ‘indicational’ and ‘extensional’ modeling processes. Indicational modeling hinges upon association by contiguity.<sup>33</sup> This model serves to direct attention towards the referent’s location, situation, presence, absence, distance, direction, orientation, or in some context of occurrence.<sup>34</sup> Nonverbal forms of indicational modeling have been documented in various animal species. But they are not capable of extensional modeling. The capacity for extensional modeling assumes the power of abstraction as prerequisite for language. Even Locke recognizes this barrier as dividing man and brutes.<sup>35</sup>

In contrast with indicational modeling, extensional modeling is a uniquely human capacity that entails the application of primary, singularized, composite, cohesive or connective models into secondary ones by extension, that is, through connotation, morphological modification

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*An Introduction to Semiotics* (2001), 149, and Kull, “Thomas A. Sebeok and Biology: Building Biosemiotics,” 9.

<sup>30</sup> Halvor Eifring and Rolf Theil, *Linguistics for Students of Asian and African Languages* (Oslo: University of Oslo, 2005), 2–3.

<sup>31</sup> Sebeok, *An Introduction to Semiotics* (2001), 149.

<sup>32</sup> Sebeok and Danesi, *The Forms of Meaning*, 10.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 95.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 87.

<sup>35</sup> Müller, *Lectures on the Science of Language*, KL 185–91.

or linkage in the case of connective modeling.<sup>36</sup> An example of this would be the extensional modeling of the word, *crash* which is initially coined to simulate a shattering sound that would connote a “sudden devastation.” Thus the word *crash* can be extended to other abstract referents by connotation, e.g. “their business crashed” or “my computer crashed” or “he came in as a gate crusher.” We appreciate how language procures a representational power for humans precisely because of its extensional modeling capability. This expands the domains of human knowledge on one hand and of expression on the other. Extensional modeling thus proves to be a uniquely human capacity because it presupposes natural language (primary modeling system) as well as speech (human secondary modeling system).<sup>37</sup>

The human capacity for language is postulated to have evolved as an adaptation mechanism. It was built by selection with the development of a system of mutual adjustment of the encoding with the decoding capacity required by the cognitive function of modeling. Through selection, humans developed a capacity for communication which enhanced its fitness for survival. Millions of years later, humans developed other features that enhanced fitness for some evolving role but were not built by natural selection. Stephen Gould and Elisabeth Vrba coined the term *exaptations* to designate such features.

Language came as a derivative exaptation for communication then speech developed out of language as exaptation over a succeeding period of approximately two million years.<sup>38</sup> Language which manifested first in the form of speech aided in the fine-tuning of ‘ear and mouth work’. Then much later language as script was also ‘exapted’ for the role of communication. A second exaptation of speech was for second-

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<sup>36</sup> Sebeok and Danesi, *The Forms of Meaning*, 82.

<sup>37</sup> Ponzio, “Thomas A. Sebeok, Hybrid Joke-Teller,” 333.

<sup>38</sup> Stephen Jay Gould and Elisabeth S. Vrba, “Exaptation—A Missing Term in the Science of Form,” *Paleobiology* 8, no. 1 (1982): 4–15.



ary modeling, i.e., for ‘mind work’.<sup>39</sup> The exaptation of speech to modeling implies that speech is forever involved in the mind work, in the thought. The Interpretants that emerge in the mind as determinations caused by Sign, which are loosely referred to as “thoughts,”<sup>40</sup> are made possible by speech.

Understanding the difference between language and speech can lead us to see that communication may take place with language as a PMS yet without speech as is the case with a deaf-dumb person who is using sign language. But thinking which assumes interpreting is not possible without speech or SMS. A speech deficient person still retains his SMS capacity which only means that from a semiotic perspective, “language is not reduced to speech but speech is a specification of language.”<sup>41</sup> The language which is specific to man as a semiotic animal comprehends the acoustic verbal model as much as the non-verbal gestural or the tactile model, depending on the kind of sign vehicle that intervenes, which is not necessary limited to the verbal in a strict sense.

Since human language as SMS employs extensional modeling, the Interpretants or thoughts that are elicited in the mind are not as fixed and predictable as habits formed in PMS. Relying on the human mind’s symbolic capacity, extensionality generally allows the interpretation of the same sign in more than just a singular manner. Besides, signs as symbols, icons or indices do not, strictly speaking, exist as such in the real world.<sup>42</sup> Since Peircian signs are not designated to denote the Object as a metaphysical entity but merely its relation to it, a single Sign can serve as an icon, an index and a symbol depending on

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<sup>39</sup> Sebeok, *An Introduction to Semiotics* (2001), 147, and Ponzio, “Thomas A. Sebeok, Hybrid Joke-Teller,” 334.

<sup>40</sup> Charles S. Peirce, *Semiotic and Significs: The Correspondence Between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby*, ed. Charles S. Hardwick, J. Cook (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), 195.

<sup>41</sup> Ponzio, “Thomas A. Sebeok, Hybrid Joke-Teller,” 335.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

the relation it holds with its Object. One can say, “This is a chair” taking the Object as an exemplar of what is understood as “a chair.” In this case, the Sign “chair” serves as an Icon. When one says, “Go around that chair,” the Sign “chair” is taken as a point of reference. The same sign serves as an Index in this case. In saying, “He is to be seated in the presidential chair,” the Sign “chair” is taken to mean a place of honor. Thus, the very same sign serves as a Symbol.

A marked difference divides human and non-human modeling capacity. Animals model solely a representation of the ‘existent world’. Man can elaborate an SMS that includes models of a potentially unlimited variety of ‘possible worlds’.<sup>43</sup> This rich interior semiotic resource constitutes the person’s symbolic realm, his own world of Thirdness. In here the person creates his own modeling system that serves as the communication tool when relating with the external world.<sup>44</sup> This innerworld takes on some form of consistency as a SMS. This subjective modeling system may or may not take the form of conventional human language that comprises words and statements. We can somehow see this idea in these words of Peirce:

Meditation is dialogue. “I says [sic] to myself, says I,” is the vernacular account of it; and the most minute and tireless study of logic only fortifies this conception. The majority of men commune with themselves in words. The physicist, however, thinks of experimenting, of doing something and awaiting the result. The artist, again, thinks about pictures and visual images, and largely in pictured bits; while the musician thinks about, and in, tones. Finally, the mathematician clothes his thought in mental diagrams, which exhibit regularities and analogies of abstract forms almost quite free from the feelings that would accompany

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<sup>43</sup> Thomas A. Sebeok, “Signs, Bridges and Origins,” in *Origins of Language*, ed. J. Trabant (Budapest: Collegium Budapest, 1996), 106.

<sup>44</sup> Peirce writes to Lady Welby, “A thought is a special variety of sign. All thinking is necessarily a sort of dialogue, an appeal from the momentary self to the better considered self of the immediate and of the general future.” Peirce, *Semiotic and Significs*, 195.

real perceptions. A person who from childhood has habitually made his reflections by experimenting upon mental diagrams, will ordinarily lack the readiness in conversation that belongs to one who always thought in words, and will naturally infer that he lacks talent for speech when he only lacks practice.<sup>45</sup>

In fact, symbolic communication can also be found even among animals. A rhesus monkey before an aggressor sticks out its tail stiffly behind as an indicative sign of fear and it may do exactly the same gesture in the presence of its young as a symbolic sign of motherly solicitude and that is so that her infant balance on her back.<sup>46</sup> However more often than not, symbolic communication in and among humans involves the use of language. “(W)ithout words to objectify and categorize our sensations and place them in relation to one another, we cannot evolve a tradition of what is real in the world.”<sup>47</sup> The indexical relationship of our representations with the Object should ultimately generate habits that are Iconic of the Object.

The importance of understanding the nature of SMS can be appreciated more in the light of the relation it holds to Tertiary Modeling Systems. Sebeok aptly captures this significance in this text:

The notion of a secondary modeling system, in the broad sense, refers to an ideological model of the world where the environment stands in reciprocal relationship with some other system, such as an individual organism, a collectivity, a computer, or the like, and where its reflection functions as a control of this system’s total mode of communication. A model of the world thus constitutes a program for the behavior of the individual, the collectivity, the machine, etc., since it defines its choice of operations, as well as the rules and motivations underlying them. A model of the world can be actualized in the various forms of human behaviour and its products, including linguistic texts—hence

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<sup>45</sup> Charles S. Peirce, *Charles Sanders Peirce: Contributions to the Nation*, vol. 3, ed. Kenneth L. Ketner, James E. Cook (Lubbock: Texas Tech Press, 1979), 258–9.

<sup>46</sup> Sebeok and Danesi, *The Forms of Meaning*, 125.

<sup>47</sup> Ruth Hubbard as quoted in Sebeok and Danesi, *The Forms of Meaning*, 82.

the emphasis on the verbal arts—social institutions, movements of civilization, and so forth.<sup>48</sup>

### **Tertiary Modeling Systems (TMS)**

Among humans, a communication system that links minds in the form of an exchange of ideas lends to the creation of a Tertiary Modeling System (TMS). The TMS features highly abstract, symbol-based modeling processes implying the mind's ability to further extend forms to stand for abstract referents without any apparent sensory origin.<sup>49</sup> It exemplifies a system that is responsible for fabricating assemblages that blend together nonverbal and verbal signs and texts in highly creative models that merit to be called 'true culture'. The TMS is 'a system of representing all the subtleties of language'<sup>50</sup> taken in both its broad and narrow sense.

Persons resort to TMS early on in their lives. When a child is learning to use a culture-specific name to refer to an object, he is already engaging in a Thirdness form of knowing. This activity actually involves the TMS capacity of the child which is intrinsically connected to his SMS that allows him to pool semiotic resources coming from them as interpreted Objects. From there, he learns to utilize the symbolic resources of culture-specific abstract systems of representation for his own modeling activities.<sup>51</sup>

Such characterizes the realm of anthroposemiosis where the concept of language as a tool of communication is more overt. Language as TMS or a culture-bound model acts as the standard against which a number of SMS conform, reform or reconfigure their subjective model-

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<sup>48</sup> Thomas A. Sebeok, *Contributions to the Doctrine of Signs* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1985), 23.

<sup>49</sup> Sebeok and Danesi, *The Forms of Meaning*, 120.

<sup>50</sup> Sebeok, *An Introduction to Semiotics* (2001), 149.

<sup>51</sup> Sebeok and Danesi, *The Forms of Meaning*, 10.

ing systems. But at the same time, language as a TMS is created by a collectivity of SMSes. Such exemplifies the symbiotic and synechistic relationship between SMS and TMS.

TMS is a modeling system that involves purely symbolic forms which implies that these forms have the capability to be freely applied as representations even for abstract Objects, e.g. those generated through SMS, and not constrained by any apparent sensory connection between the Sign and the Object.<sup>52</sup> This gives room for creativity and resourcefulness in the utilization of forms done by the interpreting mind. The creativity of the human mind is often categorized as a prototype of emergence.<sup>53</sup> As a phenomenon, emergence refers to the “spontaneous generation of a higher-order novel synergy arising from the interaction of component processes.”<sup>54</sup> The TMS itself is emergent in that the processes that lead to its formulation are not necessarily linked in fluidity or continuity. There can be large gaps or leaps leading up to the emergent.

The human mind alone possesses the ability to fabricate or put together such model. This led Terrence Deacon to append to *Homo Sapiens sapiens* the designation “Symbolic Species,”<sup>55</sup> Ernst Cassirer “symbolic animal”<sup>56</sup> and John Deely “semiotic animal.”<sup>57</sup> The end

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<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 121.

<sup>53</sup> The exosomatic functions of the human mind (consciousness) are intended towards matters that transcend the satisfaction of corporeal existence and are measured against something extrinsic to the mind itself. These are indicative of emergent nature of human consciousness. Jacob Klapwijk, *Purpose in the Living World? Creation and Emergent Evolution* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 90–7.

<sup>54</sup> Terrence Deacon and Tyrone Cashman, “The Role of Symbolic Capacity in the Origins of Religion,” *Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture* 3, no. 4 (2009): 494.

<sup>55</sup> Terrence W. Deacon, *The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language and the Brain* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1997).

<sup>56</sup> Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, vol. 3: *The Phenomenology of Knowledge* (London: Yale University Press, 1957).

<sup>57</sup> John N. Deely, *Semiotic Animal* (South Bend, IN: St Augustine’s Press, 2010).

product of TMS is the creation of culture, which can be considered as an “interconnected system of signs, texts, codes and connective forms.”<sup>58</sup> This world of culture then would define the unceasing communication man carries out between his innerworld and the external world which together *in toto* would constitute the person’s “world.”

Anthroposemiosis is unique as the only semiotic system that utilizes all three modeling systems, working interdependently and interactively in the production of models and, consequently, of knowledge. But its real uniqueness is heavily grounded in the biology of the human species.<sup>59</sup> The great significance of human language is aptly encapsulated in these words of linguist Max Müller:

Language has been called sacred ground, because it is the deposit of thought. We cannot tell as yet what language is. It may be a production of nature, a work of human art, or a divine gift. But to whatever sphere it belongs, it would seem to stand unsurpassed—nay, unequalled in it—by anything else. If it be a production of nature, it is her last and crowning production which she reserved for man alone. If it be a work of human art, it would seem to lift the human artist almost to the level of a divine creator. If it be the gift of God, it is God’s greatest gift; for through it God spake [sic] to man and man speaks to God in worship, prayer, and meditation.<sup>60</sup>

### **Truth as Iconic**

Iconicity leaves the stamp of likeness between object and interpretant. A statement or an utterance formulated by a subject can be taken as a singular sign signifying an object intended to be communicated to a receiving mind. Truthfulness in the sign modeled by the subject is marked by its iconicity with the object intended to be communicated. A

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<sup>58</sup> Sebeok and Danesi, *The Forms of Meaning*, 129.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 171.

<sup>60</sup> Müller, *Lectures on the Science of Language*, KL 52–6.

successful communication ensues when the receiving mind, who is another subject, generates an interpretant iconic of the object the modeling subject initially uses as its point of reference. In a simple illustration of communication, it is easier to uphold the norm that truth is iconic.

However, with the extended capacity of the human subject to generate secondary models far removed from the things the objects of the signs they generate signify, maintaining the norm of truth as iconic become a challenge. As a safeguard to ensure the adherence to this norm, Peirce establishes Logic, Aesthetics and Ethics to be the ultimate arbiters of iconicity. And as for Deely, the appeal to the suprasubjective relations and functions inherent in signs serves as immunity against the tendency for modeling systems to succumb to solipsism which generates relativistic cultural models. The utility of a Peirce-Sebeok framework, such as what this article proposes, can aid in the formulation of models that uphold truth as iconic. It can likewise serve as a tool to evaluate the “truthfulness” of contemporary cultural models by ultimately tracing that of which such models stand, in effect, as icons.



## **PEIRCE, SEBEOK, AND THE SEMIOTIC REFORMATION ON CONTEMPORARY COMMUNICATIONS**

### **SUMMARY**

Language in a broad sense becomes imperative for communication to ensue. Language considered as a system of signs and signification is achieved through a process involving sign relations, e.g. semiosis. Charles S. Peirce’s Theory of Signs can provide a basic framework for the elucidation of the intelligibility of signs. Furthermore, the ability for generating sign processes in an organized manner is determined by what Thomas A. Sebeok designates as an organism’s modeling capacity. Modeling capacities range from primitive to complex, thus generating three orders of language corresponding to language as a Primary Modeling System (PMS), a Secondary Modeling System (SMS) and a Tertiary Modeling System (TMS). This Peirce-Sebeok framework for communication, which John Deely places as “postmodern,” is premised upon what he designates as

the suprasubjective nature of sign relations and their equally suprasubjective function. Thus, Sebeok's Modeling Theory together with Peirce's doctrine on the nature and behavior of signs can be used to direct the generation as well as the interpretation of language systems in accordance with the ultimate norm of communication, that is, to reflect truth as an icon of reality.

#### KEYWORDS

language, communication, sign, signification, semiosis, Charles S. Peirce, Thomas A. Sebeok, modeling system, John Deely, postmodernism, suprasubjective nature of sign, modeling theory, truth, icon of reality.

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CLAUDIO MARENGHI

## LA ORIGINALIDAD DE LA ONTOLOGÍA TOMISTA Y SU GIRO EN TORNO AL SER

### Aristóteles y la ontología de la esencia

Aristóteles es el filósofo que acuña la fórmula que designa el objeto formal de la metafísica: ‘το όν η όν’, cuya versión latina pasa a ser ‘ens qua ens’, esto es, ‘el ente en tanto ente’. Desde entonces, esta disciplina se configura como la ciencia que estudia los elementos que constituyen el ente, por eso su eje pasa a girar en torno a esta pregunta: “El problema antes, ahora y siempre discutido, pero nunca resuelto: ¿qué es el ente?”<sup>1</sup> Pero tal como lo hiciera antes su maestro Platón, el preceptor de Alejandro sostiene que lo verdaderamente real en el ente es la ‘esencia’, es decir, ‘lo que’ el ente es. La gran diferencia entre estos clásicos griegos es bien conocida: Platón ubica la genuina realidad de la ουσία en las esencias trascendentes del ‘mundo inteligible’, en tanto que Aristóteles la coloca en el seno del ‘mundo sensible’, en la inmanencia de cada uno de los entes que nos circundan y en nosotros mismos como entes reales y concretos.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Aristóteles, *Metafísica*, 1028 b 2–4.

<sup>2</sup> Para Platón, propiamente hablando, el mundo inteligible ‘es’, en tanto que el mundo sensible ‘existe’, porque la realidad de las ideas es siempre idéntica a sí misma, en tanto que las cosas están en constante cambio. Por eso, el mismo Platón, en diálogos de ma-

Cuando Aristóteles habla de ουσία, se representa una unidad ontológica, esto es, una sustancia o ser en sí, capaz de subsistir por sí misma. “La realidad en el sentido verdadero, primero y riguroso de este término, es lo que no es ni predicable de un sujeto ni presente en él, por ejemplo, un hombre o un caballo particulares.”<sup>3</sup> La ουσία es lo que está siendo, siempre consistente en algo individual y concreto, situado en un aquí y ahora, que en general se puede señalar con esas palabras que los lingüistas denominan deícticos: ‘esto’, ‘eso’ o ‘aquello’. No es ni un accidente ni una idea general, sino que es siempre un sujeto individual concreto de pleno derecho, es decir, una entidad que posee en sí misma lo necesario para existir y que confiere la existencia a esas determinaciones complementarias inherentes a ella, a las que se denomina accidentes.

Hilando más fino en la cuestión, el término ουσία en Aristóteles encierra dos acepciones: ουσία como el ente individual concreto (consideración de la ουσία como sustancia y accidentes) y ουσία como la esencia del ente individual concreto (consideración de la ουσία como materia y forma). Bajo la primera consideración, hay que señalar que el ente individual concreto es indefinible, escapa a nuestras posibilidades conceptuales, pero no por ello debe ser descartado de la investigación, como hizo Platón en sus ansias de inteligibilidad pura, sino que debe ser asumido como punto de partida del auténtico filosofar, para el cual lo verdaderamente existente son, precisamente, esas sustancias individuales y “no es necesario buscar la definición de todo.”<sup>4</sup> Bajo la segunda consideración y de acuerdo a lo que se dice en el libro Z de su *Metafísica*, la última palabra en la constitución del ente parece ser la forma:

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durez como el *Parménides* y el *Sofista*, reconoce autocríticamente que su doctrina es incapaz de dar razón del mundo de lo existente sujeto al devenir.

<sup>3</sup> Aristóteles, *Metafísica*, 1017 b 23–26.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 1048 a.

“Digo que la forma es el ser de cada cosa y su realidad primera.”<sup>5</sup> Sabido es que, más tarde, los medievales resumirán esto diciendo: “la forma da el ser.”<sup>6</sup> En efecto, al actualizar la materia, la forma hace que el ente sea lo que él es, confiriéndole de esta manera su rostro inteligible. En esto Aristóteles es fiel a su maestro: la forma le da el ser al ente, pero no el ser sin más, el ser en el sentido fuerte del término, ya que no lo hace existir fuera de su causa última y fuera de la nada, sino tan sólo ser ‘tal o cual’ ente, es decir, lo especifica, limita y determina a ser ‘algo’ que es.

Así las cosas, pareciera que

la ontología de Aristóteles experimenta la sollicitación de dos tendencias opuestas: una totalmente espontánea, que lo hace situar lo real en el individuo concreto, y la heredada de Platón, que lo invita a situar lo real en la estabilidad inteligible de la esencia,

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<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 1032 b. Otras citas elocuentes de esta obra que justifican lo que decimos son: “El ser mismo recibe tantas acepciones como formas hay de atribución, pues las significaciones del ser son tan numerosas como estas formas” (*Ibid.*, Δ, 7, 1007 a). “Significar la realidad de una cosa no es algo distinto del ser de esa cosa” (*Ibid.*, Γ, 1007 a).

<sup>6</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *De Principiis Naturae*, c. 1. Autores contemporáneos como Stephen Brock, Lawrence Dewan y Rudi te Velde, haciendo un revisionismo basado en textos tomistas, han remarcado el papel determinante de la forma en la constitución del ente finito. Desde distintas perspectivas, estos autores han reaccionado contra la hegemónica interpretación del ser tomista realizada por Etienne Gilson y Cornelio Fabro, para reivindicar el valor de la forma como constitutivo ontológico en el pensamiento del Aquinate. “Forma dat esse,” dice Tomás de Aquino en la *Suma teológica*: “El primer efecto de la forma es el esse puesto que todo tiene esse de acuerdo con su forma” (I, q. 42, a. 1, ad 1). De modo que estos tres autores han visto entre forma y ser, no solo una “conexión per se” (Lawrence Dewan, *Lecciones de Metafísica* [Bogotá: Fondo de Publicaciones Universidad Sergio Arboleda, 2009], 135), “una estricta proporción” (Stephen L. Brock, “L’ipsum esse è platonismo?,” in *Tommaso d’Aquino e l’oggetto della metafísica*, ed. Stephen L. Brock [Rome: Armando, 2004], 274) o una “conexión intrínseca y necesaria” (Rudi A. te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas* [Leiden–New York–Köln: Brill, 1995], 224), sino que también atribuyen a la forma, precisamente por el íntimo vínculo que la une al esse, el carácter de perfección. Cfr. Liliana Irizar y Santiago Castro, “El ser, la forma y la persona: sobre la raíz ontológica de la dignidad humana en Tomás de Aquino,” *Revista Lasallista de Investigación* 10, no. 2 (julio–diciembre 2013): 128–50.

que es siempre idéntica a sí misma, a pesar de la pluralidad de los individuos.<sup>7</sup>

El problema aristotélico reside, entonces, en resolver la tensión entre lo individual concreto (lo que ‘existe’, según Platón) y lo universal abstracto (lo que ‘es’, según Platón), esto es, nada menos que el problema de lo uno y lo múltiple ligado al problema del cambio y la permanencia, con el que Heráclito y Parménides inauguraron la especulación metafísica occidental. “Es cierto que solo el individuo ‘existe’, pero solo del universal puede decirse que ‘es’. De manera que una filosofía que no comenzó interesándose sino en el existente, aborda los entes de una manera en que su existencia no llega a proponerse.”<sup>8</sup>

Pareciera, entonces, que no hay para Aristóteles diferencia alguna entre hacer que el ente sea y hacerlo ser lo que es, es decir, no hay distinción real entre ‘ser’ (εἶναι) y ‘esencia’ (οὐσία): ‘ser’ y ‘ser esto’ serían, entonces, expresiones equiparables en relación al ente. Incluso, siguiendo esta misma línea, en un momento cumbre de su mayor obra, llega a sostener que “es lo mismo decir un hombre y ser hombre que decir hombre.”<sup>9</sup> La esencia y el ser de una entidad constituyen la misma cosa o, dicho de otro modo, la οὐσία es un bloque monolítico donde ‘ser tal’ y ‘ser’ son ambos una misma cosa. Para el Estagirita, lo realmente real es la ‘esencia’ y, más concretamente, la ‘forma’, que es el principio inteligible, determinante y dador de sentido del ente.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Etienne Gilson, *El ser y la esencia* (Buenos Aires: Desclée, 1951), 54.

<sup>8</sup> Oscar Herrera, “La esencia y la existencia: Santo Tomás y Francisco Suárez,” *Revista de filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica* 37 (enero-junio 1999): 115-22.

<sup>9</sup> Aristóteles, *Metafísica*, IV, 2, 1003 b.

<sup>10</sup> Influenciado por su formación jesuita suareciana, Descartes critica la noción de forma como si ella fuese una sustancia, no un coprincipio junto a la materia, a tal punto que abandona el hilemorfismo y trata a los escolásticos de borrachos, por ver dos cosas allí donde sólo hay una. Si el ente no alberga en su seno una forma sustancial, queda reducido a simple materia que ocupa un lugar en el espacio, esto es, una ‘res extensa’. Como ésta solo resulta pasible de modificaciones mecánicas, todos los seres resultan simples mecanismos extensos. Y conocer el mecanismo por el cual funcionan estos

El ser del ente, entonces, lo constituye la esencia, lo que hace que el ente sea tal o cual ente. Aristóteles se cuestiona principalmente qué es la realidad y qué principios la configuran. Y esto, a pesar de que, para él, una cosa son los principios de inteligibilidad que autorizan la definición de una esencia y otra cosa la existencia del ente concreto individual.

“La definición no demuestra que la cosa definida exista, porque aun cuando en la actualidad exista algo que equidiste de un centro, sin embargo, ¿por qué tendrá que existir la cosa nombrada en la definición? Las definiciones no nos dan ninguna garantía ulterior de que la cosa definida pueda existir o de que esto sea lo que ellas pretenden definir.”<sup>11</sup>

Más allá de su esencialismo de base, Aristóteles tiene el mérito de haber advertido que, en el ente, la esencia y la existencia no son lo mismo, porque el ser como tal sólo indica el hecho de existir. Y sin que siquiera lo haya sospechado, en su doctrina del acto y la potencia se encuentra el más profundo supuesto teórico de la distinción real entre esencia y ser que mencionará Boecio, vislumbrará Avicena y elaborará Tomás de Aquino.

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cuerpos, nos permite actuar sobre ellos, lo cual puede brindarnos cierta utilidad. En el *Discurso del método* René Descartes reniega de la inutilidad de la filosofía especulativa escolástica, proponiendo en su lugar una filosofía práctica que permita el dominio de la naturaleza, en la misma línea en que lo había planteado Francis Bacon en su *Novum Organum*. Este rechazo inicial del hilemorfismo, malentendido por Descartes en función de deformaciones históricas, se compensará con la postulación del mecanicismo y favorecerá, a la larga, el desarrollo de la ciencia y de la técnica moderna. Cfr. René Descartes, *Discurso del método*, trad. de M. García Morente (Buenos Aires: Espasa-Calpe Argentina, 1943), I parte, VI; Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum* (Buenos Aires: Losada, 1949).

<sup>11</sup> Aristóteles, *Segundos Analíticos*, 92 b 14.

## Tomás de Aquino y la ontología del ser

Tomás de Aquino asume este esquema ontológico aristotélico, pero lo supera al discernir, en el seno de lo real, la presencia de un principio constitutivo del ente anterior y fundante de la ‘essentia’, que él designa con el infinitivo del verbo ser, esto es, el ‘esse’. Así, si en virtud de la ‘forma’ el ente es ‘lo que’ es, en virtud del ‘esse’ el ente simplemente ‘es’. “El corazón de lo real no es simplemente la sustancia que es, ni siquiera la forma cuyo acto le hace ser lo que es, sino el ‘esse’ cuyo acto le hace existir.”<sup>12</sup> Así, la ontología tomista se suelda perfectamente con la ontología aristotélica, ahondando hasta una nueva dimensión existencial. En efecto, para Santo Tomás el ‘esse’ es el fundamento último de todo cuanto existe: “El ser es lo más perfecto en todas las cosas, es la actualidad de todos los actos y la perfección de todas las perfecciones.”<sup>13</sup>

‘Esse’ es la noción clave y la más intraducible de la metafísica del Aquinate. ¿Qué significa ‘esse’?

Se ha de saber que ‘esse’ se dice de tres maneras. Primero, llámese ‘esse’ a la quiddidad o naturaleza de la cosa, como cuando se dice que la definición es la fórmula que significa lo que es el ser, y en efecto la definición significa la quiddidad de la cosa. En segundo lugar, llámese ‘esse’ al acto mismo de la esencia, así por ejemplo vivir, que es el ‘esse’ de lo que vive, es el acto del alma y no el acto segundo que es su operación, sino su acto primero. En tercer lugar, dicese ‘esse’ a aquello que significa la verdad de la composición de los términos en las proposiciones, y en este sentido ‘esse’ se llama a la cópula, y así concebido, el ‘esse’ no

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<sup>12</sup> Gilson, *El ser y la esencia*, 108. “La forma, en cuanto potencia, limita el esse, pero es estrictamente potencia para ser, no para no ser. Esto es decididamente una perfección, el poder ser-virtus essendi” (Stephen Brock, “Tomás de Aquino,” en *Philosophica: Enciclopedia filosófica on line*, ed. Francisco Fernández Labastida & Juan Mercado [2013], accedido el 10 de octubre de 2017, <http://www.philosophica.info/archivo/2013/voces/aquino/Aquino.html>).

<sup>13</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *De Potentia*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9.



se halla plenamente constituido sino en el entendimiento que asocia o disocia los términos, pero se funda sobre el ser de la cosa, que es el acto de la esencia.<sup>14</sup>

Queda más que claro en este texto tomista que el sentido fuerte de ‘esse’ es el que lo comprende como ‘actus essendi’, instancia fundante de la realidad de la esencia y de la verdad de los juicios del entendimiento.<sup>15</sup>

Tenemos, entonces, dos órdenes de actualidad que se dan a simultáneo en la constitución metafísica del ente: 1) el orden de la ‘forma’ que, al actualizar la materia, hace que el ente sea tal o cual, y que lo inscribe dentro de una determinada especie; 2) el orden del ‘esse’ que, al actualizar la esencia compuesta de materia y forma, hace que el ente exista fuera de su causa última y fuera de la nada. Ambos órdenes tienen una estructura de acto y potencia, porque “la razón de composición entre materia y forma y entre esencia y ser, es siempre como la de potencia y acto.”<sup>16</sup> Pero hay que advertir que el primer orden se subordina al segundo, porque “por la forma se hace la sustancia el recipiente apto de aquello que es el ser.”<sup>17</sup> Efectivamente, esencia y ser como principio potencial y principio actual dividen al ente como tal, dado que son los componentes últimos del ente en general, tanto de los

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<sup>14</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *In I Sent.*, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1.

<sup>15</sup> A lo largo de toda la obra tomista encontramos infinidad de sentencias alusivas a la preeminencia del ‘esse’ sobre la ‘essentia’ en la constitución metafísica del ‘ens’. Transcribimos algunas citas que ilustran esta tesis: “El ser es el mismo acto por el que una esencia es” (*In I Sent.*, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1); “Toda cosa es porque tiene ser” (*Suma contra gentiles*, L. I, c. 22); “El ser es aquello por lo cual algo es” (*Suma teológica*, I, q. 75, a. 5); “Se dice del ser que es el acto del ente en tanto es ente” (*Quodlibetales*, IX, q. II, a. 3); “Entre todas las cosas, el ser es aquello que de manera más inmediata e íntima conviene a las cosas” (*De Anima*, a. 9); “El ser es aquello que es más íntimo y profundo en cada cosa” (*Suma teológica*, I, q. 8, a. 1); “El ente es aquello que participa del ser, de acuerdo a cada modo de ser” (*Suma teológica*, I, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3); “Todo lo que se añade al ser de la cosa, le es accidental” (*Quodlibetales*, IX, q. II, a. 4).

<sup>16</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Suma contra gentiles*, L. II, c. 54.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 55.

espirituales como de los materiales, en cambio, materia y forma no constituyen más que los componentes de la esencia de los entes materiales.

Tomás de Aquino destaca estos dos órdenes, denominados más tarde orden predicamental y orden trascendental, a lo largo de toda su obra:

Encuentro, por lo tanto, en la sustancia compuesta de materia y forma dos órdenes: uno por el cual la materia se ordena a la forma; otro por el cual la misma cosa compuesta se ordena al ser participado. No es, entonces, el ser de la cosa, ni la forma ni la materia, sino algo que adviene a la cosa por la forma.<sup>18</sup>

Adviértase que el texto dice que el ser ‘adviene’ al ente, o sea, que el ente no posee el ser como una propiedad suya, sino que lo tiene ‘de prestado’, por así decirlo. Obsérvese también que la ‘forma’ habilita al ente a recibir el ‘esse’ bajo determinada configuración: “la cosa tiene ser por la forma.”<sup>19</sup> En nuestra experiencia humana, lo verdaderamente existente es la sustancia hilemórfica realizada y actualizada, pero esta actualización tiene dos dimensiones que no deben perderse de vista, una principal o el ‘esse’ y otra secundaria o la ‘forma’. Si bien brinda al ente su rostro inteligible, la forma como principio determinante no tiene ningún tipo de actualidad propia anterior al ‘esse’ que ella recibe y especifica. Y en tanto la actualidad de la forma posee un carácter ‘esencial’, al hacer que el ente sea ‘lo que’ es, la actualidad del esse es de raigambre ‘existencial’, ya que, gracias a él, el ente simplemente ‘es’. Sobrepasando el plano de la ‘esencia’, Tomás de Aquino estima que el

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<sup>18</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *De substantiis separatis*, c. 8. Lo mismo se quiere transmitir al decir en otra obra de modo más conciso: “Es evidente, a partir de lo que se dijo, que la sustancia completa es el destinatario correcto de su propio ser” (Tomás de Aquino, *Suma contra gentiles*, L. II, c. 55).

<sup>19</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Quodlibetales*, I, q. 4, a. 1, c. “La forma por medio de la cual se limita el esse sustancial de una cosa es también un principio constitutivo de tal esse” (Stephen Brock, “Harmonizing Plato and Aristotle on Esse: Thomas Aquinas and the *De hebdomadibus*,” *Nova et Vetera* [English Edition, 2007]: 491).

‘ser’ actualiza a la materia y a la forma, o sea, a la esencia misma, haciendo de ella un ‘ente’ real y existente: “Lo que tiene el ser es, por eso mismo, actualmente existente.”<sup>20</sup>

Así, el orden trascendental es el fundamento del orden predicamental, por más que en casi toda su obra el Aquinate se mueva desarrollando lo que acontece en este último orden y sea necesaria una exégesis para comprender en profundidad lo que sucede en el primer orden.<sup>21</sup> Desde las metafísicas griegas de Platón y Aristóteles hasta la especulación de Tomás de Aquino, se ha producido, entonces, un salto metafísico notorio desde la consideración de la ‘existencia’ como la mera presencia fáctica de los entes en el aquí y ahora, hasta el reconocimiento de un principio constitutivo en el ente mismo al cual le debe su actualidad. Tal primer principio es el ‘esse’, que es la participación primera que recibe todo ente de su fundamento último: el ‘Ipsum Esse’. El ‘esse’ es el primer efecto de la acción creadora y la primera de todas las perfecciones concedidas a los entes finitos: “Lo primero en las cosas creadas es el ser, el primer efecto es el ser.”<sup>22</sup>

Dentro de los dos órdenes señalados, el acto de la esencia como esencia es la ‘forma’ y el acto de la esencia como ente es el ‘esse’. En rigor, no se trata de dos actos en el ente sino de uno sólo, que adquiere dos significaciones, según se hable de la forma en relación a la materia

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<sup>20</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Suma teológica*, I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3.

<sup>21</sup> “La filosofía comienza por afirmar y resolver el problema del origen radical del ente, que es el del ‘ser’, pero una vez resuelto este problema inicial, se interesa por ‘lo que’ existe. No es, pues, sorprendente que, en la obra de Santo Tomás, el nivel de la sustancia, de la esencia y de la causa formal sea aquél en que nos movemos casi de continuo” (Gilson, *El ser y la esencia*, 87).

<sup>22</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *De Potentia*, q. 7, a. 2. Entre las fuentes del pensamiento tomista hay que destacar a Platón, Aristóteles, Plotino, Proclo, Dionisio, San Agustín, Boecio, Avicena y Averroes. Pero, tal como señala Cornelio Fabro, sus dos fuentes principales son la inspiración horizontal aristotélica (con sus nociones de causalidad y acto-potencia) y la inspiración vertical platónica (con sus nociones de participación y esse intensivo). Cfr. Cornelio Fabro, *Participación y causalidad en Santo Tomás* (Navarra: EUNSA, 2009), c. 2.

o del ser en relación a la esencia hilemórfica.<sup>23</sup> “La esencia actualizada es efectivamente lo que es (id quod est) y el acto de ser es aquello en virtud de lo cual la esencia es actualizada (quo est).”<sup>24</sup> No hay que pensar que la ‘essentia’ pueda existir sin el ‘esse’, como si fuese algo anterior a lo que adviniese el ‘esse’, porque el ‘esse’ es el acto fundante de la realidad total de la ‘essentia’. Por el ser, la esencia es un ente, pero el ser mismo no es un ente, sino aquello por lo cual el ente existe. En este sentido, es necesario reconocer que Tomás de Aquino plantea claramente la ‘diferencia ontológica’ siete siglos antes que Martin Heidegger: “El ser no es el ente, sino que es aquello por lo que el ente es.”<sup>25</sup>

Desde la perspectiva cognoscitiva, la ‘essentia’ es conceptualizable, porque se expresa en un concepto y remite a una idea, pero el ‘esse’ no lo es, aunque es inteligible y expresable. Y que el ‘esse’ no pueda ser conceptualizado quiere decir que no podemos definir lo que significa, para un ente, su ser. En este sentido, la esencia constituye el objeto adecuado del entendimiento humano, mas no el ser que la actualiza, el cual sólo es remedado en nuestros juicios, cuando unimos o separamos un sujeto de un predicado por medio de un verbo que, además de cumplir con su función copulativa, también prescribe su

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<sup>23</sup> “No hay dos actos. La forma no tiene ningún tipo de actualidad propia anterior al esse que ella trae. Más bien, el término ‘acto’ tiene dos significados. El principal es esse. Algo está ‘en acto’ solo en la medida en que tiene esse. Pero, el esse es siempre según una forma, y aun cuando la forma es distinta del esse y es potencia para el esse, éste se sigue inmediatamente de la forma, per se. Y así, en un sentido secundario, tal forma también es ‘acto’: aquélla por la cual, per se, una cosa está en acto. El esse es como si fuera la misma ‘actualitas’ de este acto. Sin embargo, no parece del todo correcto decir que, para Tomás, la forma es secundaria en cuanto forma, o incluso que es secundaria en el sentido más propio de ‘forma’. Porque Tomás postula una forma que es idéntica a su esse, y que es forma ‘en el máximo grado’. Esto es concebible, porque el esse mismo es lo más formal de todo” (Brock, “Tomás de Aquino,” en *Philosophica: Enciclopedia filosófica on line*).

<sup>24</sup> Gallus Manser, *La esencia del tomismo* (Madrid: Consejo de Investigaciones Científicas, 1947), 538.

<sup>25</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *De hebdomadibus*, L. 1, 2.

función existencial. De este modo, la ontología tomista se enfrenta con el misterio del ser, al reconocer en el seno del ente, la presencia de un dato inefable en virtud del cual los entes existen.<sup>26</sup>

### **La esencia: su relevancia en una filosofía del ser**

En el seno del ente, el ser confiere la existencia a la esencia que lo recibe. Sin la esencia como coprincipio constitutivo del ente, el ser no sería el ser de tal o cual ente, por lo que ser y esencia mantienen un vínculo íntimo y de mutua interdependencia. En la constitución del ente finito, la esencia no es nada sin su ser y el ser no es nada si no es ser de una esencia. En efecto, la esencia es el fundamento del pluralismo ontológico y de la diversidad de especies existentes. “Las cosas son diferentes, en lo que tienen de esencias diferentes, en virtud de las cuales adquieren el ser de manera diferente.”<sup>27</sup> Etimológicamente, ‘es-sentia’ deja traslucir la raíz verbal ‘esse’, aunque la ‘esencia’ no sea el ‘ser’, sino más bien “aquello por lo que y en lo que la cosa tiene el ser.”<sup>28</sup> La esencia cumple varias funciones fundamentales en una

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<sup>26</sup> “Una ontología que tenga por objeto el ente así concebido, descansa primero y necesariamente sobre la sólida base de las esencias aprehendidas por sus conceptos y formuladas por sus definiciones, pero siempre considerará en la esencia conceptualizable, el acto de ser que no es conceptualizable y significa el acto del juicio. Por eso, solo el juicio, que enuncia lo que es y lo que no es, llega al fin hasta la verdad de las cosas. Llega a su verdad porque, en y por las esencias, llega a los actos de ser. Por ahí se echa de ver cómo, en la doctrina de Santo Tomás, la verdad del juicio no tanto se funda en la esencia de las cosas, cuanto en el ser de éstas. La adecuación del entendimiento con la cosa, que es propiamente la verdad, halla su expresión completa en la operación de un intelecto que, sobrepasando la simple aprehensión de la esencia de un ente, llega al acto que la causa, por el que es” (Gilson, *El ser y la esencia*, 112).

<sup>27</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Suma contra gentiles*, L. I, c. 26, n. 3. “El ser recibido de Dios tiene que ser recibido en algo como en un sujeto, tiene que ser recibido en una esencia específica determinada, medido y limitado por ella, sin lo cual no es posible la multiplicidad ni la diversidad de las cosas” (Manser, *La esencia del tomismo*, 609).

<sup>28</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *De ente et essentia*, I, 4.

filosofía del ser como la de Santo Tomás de Aquino: 1) designa un modo del ‘esse’; 2) marca un principio de limitación del ‘esse’; 3) señala un principio de multiplicación del ‘esse’; 4) representa un principio de especificación del ‘esse’; 5) constituye un principio potencial respecto del ‘esse’ como acto.

Sin embargo, en relación causal o de dependencia, la esencia pertenece al ser y no a la inversa, porque todo es en virtud del ser. “El ser es el mismo acto por el que una esencia es.”<sup>29</sup> Si la esencia no perteneciera al ser, la determinación le vendría al ser de algo que está fuera de él, es decir, de la nada. Es verdad que la esencia tiene actualidad como esencia, pero recibe esta actualidad del ser. “Así como el que conoce es, al mismo tiempo, pasivo en el acto de conocer, porque recibe el objeto, no de sí mismo sino de afuera, así también la esencia actualizada por el ser es siempre, al mismo tiempo, pasiva, porque recibe del ser su actualización.”<sup>30</sup> Hasta podría decirse que la esencia es una suerte de autocontracción modalizada del ser, más que una determinación externa.<sup>31</sup>

Una importante consecuencia de esto es que de la variedad que resulta de la diversidad de las esencias, se genera una estratificación de entes en el universo en distintos niveles. Gracias a la participación de la unidad del ser en la multiplicidad de los entes de acuerdo a sus respec-

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<sup>29</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *In I Sent.*, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1.

<sup>30</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *De ente et essentia*, I, 4.

<sup>31</sup> Conviene pensar, entonces, la esencia como la propia autodeterminación del ser. “Resulta imposible que la determinación de un acto de ser le venga de afuera, es decir, de otra cosa que de él mismo. En efecto, la esencia propia de un acto finito de ser consiste en no ser más que tal o cual ‘esse’, no el ‘esse’ puro, absoluto y único” (Etienne Gilson, *El tomismo* [Pamplona: EUNSA, 1978], 31). “Es preciso, entonces, admitir que la esencia es, por supuesto, el esse, pero determinado, delimitado o, más bien, es preciso admitir que la esencia es la determinación, la delimitación, la restricción y encogimiento del esse. Es lo que Santo Tomás da a entender cuando dice que la esencia es un modo de ser” (Etienne Gilson, *Introducción a la filosofía cristiana* [Madrid: Encuentro, 2009], 136).

tivas esencias, la realidad es comprendida en función de una analogía ontológica que se ordena en cascadas descendentes, donde cada nivel entitativo inferior tiene su origen en la atenuación del grado inmediato superior. “De los diversos modos de ser, se constituyen diversos grados de ser.”<sup>32</sup> Así, el hombre es una atenuación ontológica del ángel, el animal del hombre, el vegetal del animal y el mineral del vegetal, esto es, un orden que desciende desde lo más actual a lo más potencial y desde lo más espiritual a lo más material.

Gnoseológicamente, la esencia de un ente es lo que responde a la pregunta: ¿qué es tal o cual cosa?, porque “la esencia es eso que la definición de la cosa significa.”<sup>33</sup> Y la ‘definición’, a su vez, no es otra cosa que la explicitación de las notas constitutivas de la expresión mental de la ‘esencia’ que es el ‘concepto’. Ontológicamente, la esencia se refiere al modo de ser del ente, el cual básicamente puede ser ‘en sí’ o puede ser ‘en otro’. Cuando decimos del ente que es ‘sustancia’, esta noción no agrega nada a la noción de ente, sino que simplemente nos referimos a un modo de ser subsistente del ente, como cuando nos referimos a minerales, vegetales, animales, humanos o ángeles. Y cuando decimos del ente que es ‘accidente’, tampoco agregamos nada a la noción de ente, sino que simplemente se especifica que nos referimos a un modo de ser inherente del ente. A la categoría ‘sustancia’ se añaden los ‘accidentes’, que según la taxonomía aristotélica que sigue Santo Tomás son: cantidad, cualidad, relación, ubicación, situación, tiempo, hábito, acción y pasión. “La sustancia se define con relación a sí misma, el accidente se define con relación a la sustancia, que es el sujeto del que depende su ser.”<sup>34</sup>

No hay que perder de vista, sin embargo, que las esencias se dan siempre en los entes individuales existentes, adoptando así las mani-

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<sup>32</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Suma contra gentiles*, L. I, c. 50, n. 7.

<sup>33</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *De ente et essentia*, II, 3.

<sup>34</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *De potentia*, q. 8, a. 4, ad 5.

festaciones típicas de lo que existe de este modo. Si bien la aprehensión intelectual puede considerar la esencia independientemente de la percepción directa del ente individual o los entes individuales en cuestión, en un estado de idealidad y de universalidad, como sucede con las segundas intenciones de la lógica, esto no significa que la inteligencia humana sea un receptáculo de esencias universales unívocamente significadas. “La materia individual, con todos los accidentes que la individualúan, no cae en la definición de la especie. No caen en la definición de hombre, esta carne y estos huesos, o la blancura y la negrura, o algunas cosas similares. Por eso, esta carne y estos huesos, y los accidentes que designan esta materia no se incluyen en la humanidad y, sin embargo, se incluyen en lo que es el hombre.”<sup>35</sup>

La esencia se expresa mentalmente en un concepto partiendo de una imagen psíquica y se la comprende siempre referida a una imagen psíquica, siendo esta representación sensible, singular y concreta, en un proceso que combina la abstracción desde la imagen individual al concepto universal y la conversión desde el concepto universal a la imagen individual. Esa representación sensible, singular y concreta que acompaña a todo conocimiento humano es constitutivamente temporal, con lo cual en nuestra inteligencia no puede haber esencias puras, sino conceptos simbólicos que son fruto de un conocimiento intencional a la vez intelectual que sensorial, acerca de entidades mundanas intencionadas a la vez inteligibles que sensibles. No tenemos, por ejemplo, una experiencia intelectual aislada de ‘árbol’ o ‘agua’, sino de ‘este árbol’ o ‘esta agua’, en un mundo contextualizado espacio-temporalmente, a partir de cuyas imágenes sensibles podemos considerar ‘lo que es’ en cada caso ‘el árbol’ o ‘el agua’ en general, pero siempre asociado esto a una imagen y, por ende, a un mundo histórico. Más que esencias, conocemos ‘aspectos’ de las esencias desde nuestra ‘perspectiva’ humana,

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<sup>35</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Suma teológica*, I, q. 3, a. 3, c.



siempre limitada y situada en un horizonte de comprensión espacio-temporal, pues sólo la mente infinita de Dios puede conocer ‘sub especie aeternitatis’ la esencia íntima y última de las cosas. Es en este sentido que Santo Tomás puede decir que “nuestra intelección es en tal grado débil que ningún filósofo jamás ha podido descifrar ni siquiera la esencia de una mosca.”<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Tomás de Aquino, “In Symbolum apostolicum expositio,” en *Opuscula omnia*, T. 4, op. 33, 350. Esos ‘aspectos’ que conocemos de las cosas suelen tener que ver con nuestra ‘perspectiva’ humana y con el uso que le damos a las mismas. Tomemos el ejemplo propuesto del agua, que es algo no humano que forma parte del mundo humano. ¿Qué es el agua? Podríamos enseguida decir que el agua es un compuesto químico cuya fórmula correspondiente sería H<sub>2</sub>O: eso es lo que nos enseñan las ciencias sobre el agua y, sin dudas, es cierto. Pero decir del agua que es H<sub>2</sub>O implica aceptar un paradigma científico propio de la modernidad que no es para nada evidente a quien no fue formado en ese modelo epistemológico. Si se le hubiera dado esa respuesta a un griego de hace 2500 años, no la habría podido comprender y, tal vez, hubiera retrucado con su visión científica del agua considerada como uno de los cuatro elementos de la naturaleza. Sin embargo, en el mundo circundante en que nos movemos, el agua aparece más bien como un líquido que sirve para beber, para limpiar, para calmar el calor. Decir esto no implica perder el referente de su significado científico, sino simplemente reparar en que en ese conocimiento de las cosas, tiene mucha injerencia la relación y el diálogo que tenemos con los otros acerca de las mismas, en función del uso social que de ellas hacemos de acuerdo a nuestro mundo vital. Y ese aspecto del agua es universal y objetivo, dado que para todos los hombres de todas las épocas el agua sacia la sed, limpia nuestra casa y nos refresca en verano, en esto podemos estar de acuerdo con el griego de hace 2500 años y con quien sea. En este sentido, nada más lejos del auténtico tomismo que pensar las esencias fijas e inmutables, al modo platónico o al modo moderno racionalista. Esa es la idea errónea que muchos neoescolásticos han dado al decir, sin mayores matices, que para Tomás de Aquino el objeto del intelecto es la esencia universal abstracta. Más allá de su consideración universal y abstracta de parte de nuestro intelecto, las esencias que conocemos son en sí mismas individuales y dinámicas, están en un constante hacerse, en un ‘proceso eidopoiético’ enclavado en el espacio y el tiempo, en un desarrollo entitativo más o menos actualizado de acuerdo a sus potencialidades.

## La distinción real: el ser y la esencia en el seno del ente

Así como la actualidad del ente se hace patente en dos direcciones, esto es, la actualidad esencial que la forma confiere a la materia y la actualidad existencial que el ser otorga al compuesto hilemórfico, así también existen dos tipos de composición: la materia se compone con la forma para constituir la esencia, y ésta, a su vez, se compone con el ser para componer un ente. Se trata, ante todo, de una ‘composición’ de principios constitutivos, entre los cuales también media una ‘distinción’. “Ninguna cosa, en tanto es compuesta de esencia y de ser, puede ser simple.”<sup>37</sup> Pero es la ‘composición’ la que funda la ‘distinción’ y no a la inversa. Como el ente es una unidad forjada por la íntima unión de la esencia con el ser, resulta importante aquí señalar la primacía ontológica de la unión sobre la separación.<sup>38</sup>

Todo ente es siempre un compuesto de esencia y ser: “Es necesario que el mismo ser se compare con la esencia, que es algo distinto de él, como el acto respecto de la potencia.”<sup>39</sup> Si se trata de un ente espiritual, supone al menos esta composición. Si se trata de un ente material, supone dos composiciones escalonadas en profundidad: la de la forma y la materia, que constituyen la esencia, y la de la esencia así

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<sup>37</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Suma contra gentiles*, L. I, c. 22, n. 9. Severino Boecio fue el primero en vislumbrar la distinción real y acuñar la fórmula: ‘quod est’ y ‘quo est’. Es célebre su afirmación: “Diversum est esse et quod est” (*De hebdomadibus*, L. 64, 1311). En la obra de Santo Tomás encontramos varias fórmulas convertibles con la de ‘essentia et esse’, a saber, ‘natura rei et ipsum esse’, ‘quidditas seu natura et esse’, ‘substantia et esse’, ‘quod est et quo est’ (Cfr. Manser, *La esencia del tomismo*, 595). Cabe mencionar aquí que esta distinción real tomista entre ‘esencia’ y ‘ser’ es la condición de posibilidad de la diferencia ontológica heideggeriana entre ‘ente’ y ‘ser’.

<sup>38</sup> “La fórmula más usada habla de ‘distinción’ de essentia y esse, pero Santo Tomás mismo emplea preferentemente la palabra ‘composición’, sin duda porque, de hecho, la ‘essentia’ y su ‘esse’ no pueden jamás darse aparte. Ellos se componen conjuntamente sin haber jamás existido en estado separado” (Gilson, *El tomismo*, 177).

<sup>39</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Suma teológica*, I, q. 3, a. 4, c.

constituida con su acto de ser. Estas dos composiciones y, por consiguiente, estas dos distinciones, se parecen bajo cierto aspecto y difieren bajo otro. Se parecen en que ambas son composiciones de acto y potencia, es decir, de un determinante y de un determinado. Y difieren en que la composición constitutiva del ente corpóreo es la del acto de la forma con la potencia de la materia, en cambio, la composición constitutiva del ente existente es la del acto de ser con la esencia misma, tomada como ya constituida, pero todavía en potencia con respecto al existir. Tomás de Aquino lo resume magistralmente: “No es, entonces, el mismo orden de composición el que tiene la materia respecto de la forma que el que tiene la esencia respecto del acto de ser, aunque ambos tengan la misma relación de potencia al acto.”<sup>40</sup>

En el *De veritate* el Aquinate afirma categóricamente que “todo lo que se da en la sustancia compuesta está compuesto realmente” y continúa diciendo que “aquello que figura en la categoría de sustancia como ‘lo que es’ es subsistente en su ser y es menester que ‘su ser’ sea otra cosa que ella misma.”<sup>41</sup> Es decir, lo que merece el nombre de sustancia subsiste por su propio existir (*suo esse subsistens*), por lo que concierne que su ser sea algo diferente de su esencia (*oportet quod esse suum sit aliud quam ipsum*). Salvo en Dios, único ser absolutamente simple en el que esencia y ser sólo se distinguen idealmente, en el orden creado hallamos esta composición real en todas las cosas: “Lo primero que debemos considerar es que el ‘ser’ y ‘lo que es’, difieren en lo absolutamente simple según el orden de las intenciones, en tanto que en los compuestos difieren realmente.”<sup>42</sup>

Muerto Santo Tomás, su discípulo Egidio Romano comienza a referirse a la distinción real entre ‘essentia’ y ‘esse’ como si fuese una distinción entre ‘res’ y ‘res’, en vez de una distinción entre principios

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<sup>40</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Suma contra gentiles*, L. II, c. 54.

<sup>41</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *De veritate*, q. 27, a. 1, ad 8.

<sup>42</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *De hebdomadibus*, L. 1, 2.

constitutivos de la ‘res’. Dicho de otro modo, el mencionado alumno hace entre ‘essentia’ y ‘esse’ una distinción ‘inter res’ en vez de hacer una distinción ‘intra rem’, siendo esta última el verdadero sentido que la distinción encuentra en la obra tomista.<sup>43</sup> Egidio Romano sabe que en el pensamiento de Tomás de Aquino el ‘esse’ es otro respecto de la ‘essentia’, tal como el Aquinate repite sin cesar: “El ser de la cosa es otro respecto de su esencia.”<sup>44</sup> La deformación de la doctrina tomista acontece cuando el ‘aliud’ es traducido por ‘otra cosa’ en vez de por ‘otro’, con resultados metafísicos nefastos, porque el ‘esse’ no es ‘otra cosa’ respecto de la ‘essentia’, sino un ‘principio’ distinto de ella, siendo que de la unión de ambos principios surge la ‘cosa’. En suma, la realidad no está hecha de realidades, sino de principios ontológicos complementarios que la establecen como tal.<sup>45</sup>

Y la ‘existencia’, el estar siendo fuera de su causa y fuera de la nada, que la cosa recibe gracias al ‘ser’, no está incluida en su ‘esencia’ o en la definición de la cosa. Debemos recordar que ‘existir’ y ‘ser’ no son sinónimos, como muchos interpretan erróneamente, sino que el ‘ser’ es causa del ‘existir’. Mientras que para un ente el ‘ser’ es el

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<sup>43</sup> Egidio Romano, *Theoremata de esse et essentia* (1280) y *Quaestiones disputatae de esse et essentia* (1286). Si bien esta distinción entre ‘essentia’ y ‘esse’ parece tener su primer esbozo en los tratados de lógica de Aristóteles, no aparece ni el menor rastro de la misma en su *Metafísica*. Aristóteles reconoce dos modos de interrogar sobre el ente: por un lado, preguntar si es (esse), cuya respuesta es evidente a los sentidos o requiere demostración; por otro lado, preguntar qué es (essentia), cuya respuesta implica una definición. Cfr. Aristóteles, *Segundos Analíticos*, 92 b, 8–10.

<sup>44</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *In Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, IV, 1, 2, 558.

<sup>45</sup> Hay que advertir algunas aclaraciones lingüísticas: Tomás de Aquino a veces denomina a la ‘essentia’ como ‘natura’ o como ‘quidditas’, en tanto la esencia es principio de operaciones o en tanto se mienta su definición. Al ‘esse’ lo suele llamar también ‘actus essendi’ o ‘ipsum esse rei’. Y otras veces, siguiendo el lenguaje de Boecio, el Aquinate reemplaza ‘essentia’ por ‘quod est’ y ‘esse’ por ‘quo est’, es decir, ‘lo que es’ y ‘aquello por lo cual es’. Tanto Boecio como Santo Tomás refieren el ‘quod est’ a la ‘essentia’, en tanto que el ‘quo est’ Boecio lo refiere a la ‘forma’, siguiendo fielmente a Aristóteles, en tanto que Santo Tomás lo refiere al ‘esse’. Cfr. Boecio, *La consolación de la filosofía* (Madrid: Akal, 1997).

coprincipio que actualiza su esencia, para un ente ‘existir’ es el hecho resultante de que la esencia esté actualizada por su respectivo acto de ser. Para cualquier ente real, existir es ser fuera de su causa última y fuera de la nada. La ‘existencia’, entonces, es un estado de la ‘esencia’, a saber, el estado que surge de poseer el ‘ser’ en acto, siendo el otro estado, de no poseer el ‘ser’ en acto, la ‘posibilidad’.

Si por la ‘esencia’ conocemos lo que le pertenece a la cosa, debemos concluir que aquello que no le pertenece por definición o aquello que no se puede deducir de ella en calidad de propio, le debe pertenecer por otro. “Toda cosa, en cuanto es cierta esencia y cierto ser, es compuesta. Pero Dios no es compuesto, por lo que se dice que Dios es su misma esencia.”<sup>46</sup> De allí que de la distinción del ‘esse’ respecto de la ‘essentia’, se arriba a la distinción entre el ‘ser imparticipado’ y el ‘ser participado’, es decir, entre el ser que es el ser ‘por sí y desde sí’ al ser que es ‘por otro y desde otro’, esto es, la distinción entre el creador y las creaturas que refiere la cuarta vía tomista. “En todo ente limitado, el ser y la esencia son realmente diversos, porque tal ente sólo puede tener ser participado, ya que únicamente en Dios, que es el Ser mismo, son realmente idénticos el ser y la esencia.”<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Suma Contra Gentiles*, L. II, c. 22.

<sup>47</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *In Anal. Post.*, II, lect. 6. “En Dios la esencia y el ser se identifican y sólo se diferencian lógicamente, porque él es Dios. En toda creatura difieren, precisamente por ser creatura, es decir, por tener ser recibido. La composición de essentia-esse es en todo el reino de lo creado la más general y la más profunda, porque abarca todo lo material y todo lo espiritual y ella sola lo comprende todo” (Manser, *La esencia del tomismo*, 592). “Para Santo Tomás, la distinción entre ser y esencia no se refiere tanto a una composición interior del ente, cuanto a la distinción entre el ente creado y el ser que es el ente divino. Es ahí donde se capta plenamente el significado de la distinción entre el ser y la esencia: quiere decir que la creatura no realiza plenamente todo el ser que está en Dios” (Ignacio Andereggen, *Filosofía Primera* [Buenos Aires: Educa, 2012], 104). “Lo que es idéntico con el esse en Dios, solo puede estar presente en cualquier otra cosa como potencia para el esse” (Dewan, *Leciones de Metafísica*, 151).

## La diferencia ontológica y sus implicancias: del ente al ser

Es sabido que lo primero conocido por nosotros es el ente: “El ente es lo primero que capta la inteligencia.”<sup>48</sup> Con esto Santo Tomás nos dice que no hay para nosotros en esta vida nociones simples, porque la noción elemental que captamos y que está supuesta en todos nuestros conocimientos es la de ente y, como sabemos, se trata de una noción compuesta que mienta el ser y la esencia. Pero, en tanto Aristóteles concibe el ente como “lo que es” (ente referido a la esencia), Tomás de Aquino lo concibe como “lo que tiene el acto de ser” (ente referido al ser),<sup>49</sup> porque “así como el nombre de cosa se deriva de la esencia, así también el nombre de ente se deriva del ser.”<sup>50</sup> Para Aristóteles, ‘ser’ es siempre ser algún ‘ente’, más particularmente y en el sentido pleno, es ser uno de esos entes que, gracias a su forma, poseen en sí mismos la razón suficiente de lo que ellos son. Esto es así, porque la ontología aristotélica no ha superado el plano de la esencia y no ha alcanzado el acto existencial mismo del *esse*, el “acto del ente en cuanto es ente.”<sup>51</sup> Para Santo Tomás, como hemos visto, el ‘ente’ es gracias al ‘ser’, idea que se repite a lo largo de toda la obra tomista: “El ente se deriva del acto de ser.” “El ente es aquello que participa del ser de acuerdo a cada modo de ser.” “Se dice del ser que es el acto del ente en tanto es ente.”<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Suma teológica*, I, q. 5, a. 2, c. Por eso mismo, por ser el objeto de la inteligencia el ente mismo, “el alma humana es, de algún modo, todas las cosas” (Aristóteles, *De anima*, III, 4–5).

<sup>49</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *In Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, XII, 1, 1, 2419; *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 4, a. 3.

<sup>50</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Suma contra gentiles*, L. I, c. 25, n. 10.

<sup>51</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Quodlibetales*, IX, q. II, a. 6.

<sup>52</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 1; *Suma teológica*, I, q. 8, ad. 1; *Quodlibetales*, IX, q. II, a. 3.

El ente, en suma, es un compuesto de esencia y ser. En su definición etimológica, ‘ens’ recibe su nominación del ‘esse’, aunque también hace referencia a la ‘essentia’: “El nombre ‘ente’ tiene un significado que se deriva del mismo ‘ser’, aunque también se emparenta con la misma ‘esencia’.”<sup>53</sup> En su definición real, ‘ens’ no es ni el ‘esse’ ni la ‘essentia’, sino el resultante de la unión de ambos, esto es, ‘algo que es’. Aristóteles destaca en el ente la ‘essentia’ y Santo Tomás destaca en el ente el ‘esse’.

En un ‘id quod est’ o un ‘esse habens’, se puede acentuar espontáneamente, sea el ‘id quod’ y el ‘habens’, sea el ‘esse’ y el ‘est’. No sólo se puede hacer, sino que uno lo hace, y es generalmente el ‘id quod’ y el ‘habens’ lo que se acentúa, porque ellos representan la ‘res’ que existe, es decir, el ente en tanto que objeto de concepto.<sup>54</sup>

La inteligencia humana, al estar trascendentalmente abierta al ser del ente, encuentra implícitamente en todo lo que intenciona un indicio del ser absoluto, puesto que, en el fondo, todo ser participado y finito nos habla indirectamente del ser imparticipado e infinito: “ente se dice de lo que participa del ser de modo finito.”<sup>55</sup> La expresión acuñada por Heidegger: “el ser del ente” (das Sein des Seienden), que se encuentra en *Ser y Tiempo* y todas sus obras posteriores,<sup>56</sup> nos parece adecuada

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<sup>53</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *In Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, II, 24, 467.

<sup>54</sup> Gilson, *El ser y la esencia*, 122. “Esta tendencia natural a conceptualizar y atenerse al concepto es tan fuerte, que ha dado nacimiento a numerosas interpretaciones del tomismo, en las cuales el ‘esse’, es decir, el acto mismo de ser, parece no jugar ningún papel efectivo. Cediendo completamente a esta pendiente natural, uno haría del tomismo una filosofía del ‘id quod’, abstracción hecha de su ‘esse’. Para operar a tiempo una corrección que se impone, puede resultar útil calificar al tomismo de ‘filosofía existencial’. Recordar así el sentido pleno del término ‘ens’ en la lengua de Santo Tomás de Aquino es poner en guardia contra el empobrecimiento que se le haría sufrir, así como a la doctrina de la que él es principio primero, al olvidar que el concepto significado por él implica una referencia directa al ‘esse’: nam ens dicitur qua si esse habens” (*Ibid.*).

<sup>55</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *De Potentia*, q. 8, a. 2, ad 1.

<sup>56</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Ser y Tiempo* (Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1997).

para referirse al ‘esse’ tomista, dado que el ‘esse’ (ser) constituye el ser mismo del ‘ens’ (ente), podríamos decir nosotros el ‘esse entis’, expresión que no está presente en la obra del Aquinate, pero que está en sintonía fina con su ontología. No hay que olvidar que el ser del ente es acto y no potencia, siendo que lo que no tiene potencialidad está, por eso mismo, despojado del devenir. Dicho de otra manera, el acto de ser del ente en devenir no está en devenir: “el ser es algo fijo y en reposo en el ente.”<sup>57</sup>

Con todo, hay que aclarar que el ‘ser del ente’ tomista no se refiere al mero ‘estar siendo’ fenomenológico del ente, a lo que nosotros denominamos ‘existencia’, como parece significar en el pensamiento de Martin Heidegger, sino al ‘acto de ser’ ontológico que lo fundamenta. En este sentido, el ‘acto de ser’ funda y respalda la ‘existencia’, que es un estado de la ‘esencia’, el estado que surge del hecho de que el ente esté siendo efectivamente aquí y ahora, en este espacio y este tiempo, por tener el ente su esencia actualizada por el ser. El ser del ente, entrevisto por Parménides en la aurora del quehacer filosófico al sostener que “hay que decir y pensar que el ente es,”<sup>58</sup> parece haber sido eclipsado en la ontología griega clásica, cayendo en un ‘olvido’ como sostiene Martin Heidegger, porque para Platón y Aristóteles resulta necesario decir y pensar no tanto que el ente ‘es’, sino más bien ‘lo que’ él es.

Desde entonces, la esencia acapara la atención filosófica y se afirma como el único sentido del ser del ente. Pero con Tomás de Aquino el ser del ente vuelve a despuntar como el dato filosófico de mayor envergadura, ya que gracias a él todos los entes existen y sin él no habría nada.

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<sup>57</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Suma contra gentiles*, L. I, c. 20, n. 24.

<sup>58</sup> Geoffrey S. Kirk, John E. Raven, Michael Schofield, *Los filósofos presocráticos* (Madrid: Gredos, 1969). Parménides, *Sobre la naturaleza*, Fragmento 8.



El mismo ser es lo más perfecto de todas las cosas, pues se compara a todas las cosas como acto, ya que nada tiene actualidad sino en cuanto que es. De ahí que el mismo ser sea actualidad de todas las cosas y también de todas las formas, de hecho no se compara a las otras cosas como el recipiente a lo recibido, sino como lo recibido al recipiente. Pues, cuando digo ser del hombre o ser del caballo o de otra cosa, este mismo ser es considerado como recibido, no como algo a lo que en sí mismo le compete ser.<sup>59</sup>

### **Lo uno y lo múltiple: el ser infinito y los seres finitos**

La multiplicidad de los entes que conforman el universo, esto es, la unidad de lo diverso, convienen en cierta avenencia, sea la de la especie o la del género. Más allá de esta unicidad de orden predicamental, encontramos la conveniencia de todas las cosas en el ser mismo de ellas, que es una unidad de orden trascendental. Efectivamente, todas las cosas se distinguen en ‘lo que’ son y se parecen en ‘que son’. En función de esto, “es necesario, por lo tanto, que todas las cosas tengan un mismo y único principio de su ser,”<sup>60</sup> porque el ser está presente en todos los entes en diversos grados, más o menos intensivos, según sus respectivas esencias. En el *Comentario a las sentencias* dice Tomás de Aquino: “Encontramos la existencia en la esencia de todas las cosas, en algunas en mayor dignidad y en algunas en menor dignidad. Sin embargo, estas esencias no son el ser que tienen, dado que se puede con-

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<sup>59</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Suma teológica*, I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3. “¿Qué es el ser del ente? El mismo no es un ente. En tanto que tal, el ser del ente no es, él no tiene existencia propia separada de la sustancia de la que hace un ente. Ella no es más que por él, pero él mismo no es más que en ella y como ser de éste ente. Es por ello que uno no podría tener intuición intelectual del ser de un ente, porque él no nos resulta perceptible más que en la percepción sensible de la sustancia que él actualiza” (Etienne Gilson, *Acerca del ser y su noción en Santo Tomás* [Roma: Citta Nuova, 1972], 10).

<sup>60</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *De Potencia*, III, 6 resp.

cebir siempre la esencia de una cosa sin concebir su existencia.”<sup>61</sup> Por esta vía, entonces, se accede al ser en sí mismo considerado, sin esencia y sin limitación alguna. Así se prueba la existencia de un principio de todo el ser a partir de un ser que es el ser mismo: “Dios es el ser mismo.”<sup>62</sup>

Y en la *Suma Teológica* encontramos un argumento parecido:

Lo que está en algo que está más allá de la esencia suya, o es causado por los principios esenciales de la especie, como los accidentes propios que siguen a la especie, como lo risible sigue al hombre, o por algo exterior, como el calor en el agua es causado por el fuego. Si, pues, el mismo ser de la cosa es distinto de su esencia, es necesario que el ser de esa cosa o bien sea causado por algo exterior o bien por los principios esenciales de la misma cosa. Ahora bien, es imposible que el ser sea causado solamente por los principios esenciales de la cosa, porque ninguna cosa es suficiente como para ser causa del ser para sí misma, si tiene un ser causado. Por lo tanto, es necesario que aquello cuyo ser es otra cosa que su esencia tenga el ser causado por otro, pero esto no se puede decir de Dios, porque Dios decimos que es la primera causa eficiente, por lo tanto es imposible que en Dios sea una cosa distinta el ser respecto de su esencia.<sup>63</sup>

Puesto que Dios es el ser puro y simple, Dios es su mismo ser. Si fuera una esencia distinta de su ser, sería el ser de esa esencia, no el ser puro y simple. Esta idea la expresa Santo Tomás de diversas maneras: “Dios es su mismo ser,” “El ser de Dios es su misma esencia,” “La esencia de Dios es la actualidad misma de su ser” y, también, siguiendo de cerca a Avicena y Maimónides, “Dios no tiene esencia, porque su

<sup>61</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1.

<sup>62</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *In I Sent.*, d. 10, q. 5, a. 1.

<sup>63</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Suma teológica*, I, q. 3, a. 4, c. Este tema ya estaba instalado en la tradición del pensamiento cristiano. “Entre todos los nombres que se dan a Dios, el principal es ‘El que es’, pues este nombre todo lo abarca, e incluye el mismo ser como un piélago infinito de inabarcable sustancia” (San Juan Damasceno, *Exposición de la fe*, I, 9). “Dios, en efecto, posee y encierra en sí todo el ser, que no tuvo principio y no está destinado a terminar, como un océano de ser, sin confines ni límites, que va más allá de toda idea de tiempo y de naturaleza” (San Gregorio Nacianceno, *Oratio*, 38, 7).

esencia no es otra cosa que su propio ser.”<sup>64</sup> Y dado que no tiene una esencia distinta de su ser, Dios no es un ente y está por encima del ente: “La causa primera es super-ente, en cuanto es el mismo ser infinito.”<sup>65</sup> El ente por definición es un compuesto de esencia y ser, algo que es, restringiéndose a participar del ser de manera finita. Por esto mismo, dado que el ente es el objeto propio de nuestro intelecto, Dios escapa a nuestras capacidades y es absolutamente incognoscible: sabemos ‘que es’ pero no sabemos ‘qué es’. Toda pretensión de conocer algo del ser divino en sí mismo es una ilusión que nos hace concebirlo como un ser infinitamente inferior a lo que verdaderamente es: “Siempre será menor la semejanza entre el Creador y las creaturas que su desemejanza, porque la distancia que separa a la creatura de su Creador es infinita.”<sup>66</sup>

Sabemos que Dios es el ser mismo, pero no sabemos qué es el ser divino porque, al estar más allá del ente, escapa a nuestro conocimiento intelectual, ya que el objeto adecuado del entendimiento humano es el ente, o sea, la esencia dotada de su acto de ser.

Todos los otros nombres significan una cierta manera determinada de ser, como sabio significa ser aquella cosa determinada. Pero este nombre ‘Qui est’ significa el ser absoluto y sin nada añadido que lo determine. Es por lo que el Damasceno dice que no significa lo que es Dios, sino que significa una especie de océano de sustancia infinita sin término. Primero, cuando vamos hacia Dios siguiendo la vía de eliminación, comenzamos por negarle lo corporal. Segundo, negamos lo intelectual tal como se

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<sup>64</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Suma contra gentiles*, L. I: c. 22, n. 5; c. 21, n. 1; c. 24, n. 5; *De ente et essentia*, V, 30. Estamos de acuerdo con Gilson cuando sostiene que “no hay diferencia perceptible entre decir que la esencia de Dios es su ser y decir que es el ser sin esencia distinta del acto puro de ser” (Etienne Gilson, “Elementos de una metafísica tomista del ser,” trad. por Pedro Javier Moya, *Espíritu* 41 [1992]: 19).

<sup>65</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Super de causis*, prop. 6.

<sup>66</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Expositio super Decretales*, conclusión. “Nos es imposible concebir un ente que no fuera más que su acto de ser, lo cual sería para él ser sin ser nada. Sabemos, pues, que Dios es, pero ignoramos lo que es, por la sencilla razón de que no hay en Él un ‘lo que’ que conocer” (Gilson, “Elementos de una metafísica tomista del ser,” 21).

encuentra en las criaturas, como la bondad y la sabiduría, quedando, entonces, en nuestro intelecto solamente que Dios es, lo que lo deja en una cierta confusión. Pero al fin, eliminamos de él este ser mismo tal como es en las criaturas y el intelecto queda entonces sumergido en una especie de oscuridad y de ignorancia.<sup>67</sup>

Contra los intérpretes que remarcan la preeminencia de la vía catafática por sobre la vía apofática, consideramos más que claro que Tomás de Aquino, siguiendo a autores como Dionisio Areopagita y Escoto Eriúgena, invierte la ecuación:

La causa primera está más allá del ‘ente’, en tanto que es el ‘ser’ infinito mismo. Se denomina ‘ente’ a lo que participa de modo finito del ‘ser’ y ello resulta proporcionado a nuestro intelecto, cuyo objeto es la ‘esencia’, como se dice en el libro tercero del *De Anima*. Por ello, sólo resulta comprensible por nuestro intelecto aquello que tiene una esencia que participa del ser. Pero la esencia de Dios es el ser mismo, por lo cual está más allá del intelecto.<sup>68</sup>

Pretender hablar del ser simple, infinito y absoluto a partir de nociones compuestas, finitas y relativas, nos lleva a un conocimiento meramente ilusorio, porque “lo que Dios es permanece completamente desconocido.”<sup>69</sup>

Si tenemos en cuenta lo dicho hasta aquí y lo cotejamos con el nombre que Dios mismo se da ante Moisés en *Éxodo* 3,14: ‘Yo soy’ (Yahve),<sup>70</sup> debemos decir que Dios mismo se dio a conocer como el que ‘es’, aunque no ha dicho ‘lo que’ es. En términos tomistas, Dios se autorreveló como ‘esse’ y nada dijo de su ‘essentia’. Dios, entonces, simplemente ‘es’ sin ser ‘algo’, ya hemos señalado que hay aquí un misterio metafísico: ¿cómo se puede ‘ser’ sin ‘ser algo’? o, lo que es lo

<sup>67</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4.

<sup>68</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Super librum De causis*, L. IV, n. 175.

<sup>69</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Suma contra gentiles*, L. II, c. 49.

<sup>70</sup> Ex. 3,14: Ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὄν.

mismo, ¿cómo se puede ser ‘esse’ sin tener una ‘essentia’? Este misterio habla de Dios como el ser absoluto, como el ‘Ipsum Esse Subsistens’.<sup>71</sup> Santo Tomás reflexiona sobre esta importante cuestión, que correlaciona el criterio filosófico para hablar de Dios con el de la nomenclatura teológica, en varios momentos de su obra:

La esencia de Dios es, por ende, su ser. Moisés aprendió del Señor esta sublime verdad, cuando le interrogó si los hijos de Israel me preguntan cuál es su nombre, ¿qué les diré? Y el Señor le respondió: Yo soy el que soy. Así responderás a los hijos de Israel: El que es, me ha enviado a vosotros, haciendo ver que su nombre propio es: El que es. Pero todo nombre sirve para significar la naturaleza o la esencia de alguna cosa. Resulta, entonces, que el mismo ser divino es su esencia o naturaleza.<sup>72</sup>

La revelación hecha a Moisés en el Sinaí a través del Tetragrámaton, acerca de la identidad de la esencia y el ser en Dios, implica para Tomás de Aquino una revelación acerca de la composición y la distinción de la esencia y el ser en las creaturas: Dios es simple y las cosas son compuestas: “Por ser su mismo ser, Dios difiere de cualquier otro ente.”<sup>73</sup>

<sup>71</sup> “Dios es el mismo Ser Subsistente. Nos encontramos ante una determinación nocional de Dios que es original del cristianismo, íntimamente unida a la verdad de la creación ex nihilo. Platón puso en la cúspide de la pirámide de las ideas la Idea de Bien, no la de Ser. Aristóteles llegó a un primer motor inmóvil que era Acto puro de entender, pero no de ser” (Luis Clavell, *El nombre propio de Dios* [Pamplona: EUNSA, 1980], 156).

<sup>72</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Suma contra gentiles*, L. 1, c. 22. La lectura del pasaje del *Éxodo* 3,14 llevó a muchos autores judíos, cristianos y musulmanes, a identificar a Dios con el Ser. San Gregorio Nacianceno y San Juan Damasceno fueron los primeros en hacerlo dentro de la tradición cristiana, a quienes ya hemos citado. Entre los islámicos, Avicena parece haber sido el pionero: “Primus igitur non habet quidditatem” (Avicena, *Metafísica*, VIII, 4). Y entre los judíos, Maimónides llevó a cabo esta identificación: “De Dios sabemos que es, pero no lo que es” (Moisés Maimónides, *Guía de Perplejos*, I, c. 50). La definición metafísica de Dios como Ipsum Esse Subsistens está en los textos de Santo Tomás, pero la toma de San Agustín, cuando habla de Dios como ‘Ipsum Esse’ (San Agustín, *De Trinitate*, XV, 2) y de Dionisio Areopagita que habla del ‘αυτο το ειναι’ (*De divinis nominibus*, V, 4).

<sup>73</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *De Potentia*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 4.

## Participación, causalidad y creación

Dios ‘es’ el ser y los entes ‘tienen’ ser. Y “aquello cuyo ser es distinto de la esencia, tiene su ser causado por otro.”<sup>74</sup> Por eso mismo, las cosas tienen ser por causación o participación:

Como todas las cosas que son participan del ser y son entes por participación, es necesario que haya algo en el vértice de todas las cosas que sea por esencia su mismo ser, esto es, que su esencia sea su ser, y éste es Dios, que es la suficientísima, dignísima y perfectísima causa de todo el ser, del que todas las cosas que son participan el ser.<sup>75</sup>

En la tríada ‘ente’, ‘ser del ente’ y ‘Ser Absoluto’, el ser del ente nos remite al Ser Absoluto, que es la causa de todo ente por participación. Pero participar aquí no tiene un sentido físico, no es ‘tomar una parte de’ en el sentido en que la ‘parte’ integral participa del ‘todo’ cuantitativo, sino que tiene un significado metafísico, en el sentido de ‘poseer parcialmente lo que otro tiene totalmente’, al modo en que el ‘efecto’ participa de su ‘causa’.

En su sentido físico, ‘participar’ equivale simplemente a ‘tomar una parte’. Ejemplos serían la repartición de un pastel entre sus comensales o de una herencia entre los herederos legales. Lo que sucede en estos casos es que existe un todo material, que se divide en el momento de la repartición y que desaparece como todo, quedando solamente las partes que participaban de la anterior totalidad. Lo importante en la participación física es que en ella se atiende al objeto que se reparte y no tanto a los sujetos que la reciben: se trata de un todo que se fragmenta en sus porciones virtuales. Y como estas partes sólo conservan una relación histórica y no actual con el antiguo todo, no puede decirse que quienes las poseen tras el reparto participen ahora en algo común. En su

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<sup>74</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Suma teológica*, I, q. 3, a. 4.

<sup>75</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Sup. Ev. S. Ioannis*, lect., prólogo.

sentido metafísico, la participación se asemeja mucho más a la participación de orden moral, donde ‘participar’ equivale a ‘poseer parcialmente lo que otro tiene totalmente’. Ejemplos serían ‘hacer partícipes’ a otros de una noticia alegre o ‘compartir’ un momento de duelo. Este tipo de participación es muy distinto al anterior porque, aunque aquí también existe un todo, por ser inmaterial, éste no desaparece ni se destruye como consecuencia de que otros participen de él. Y como resultado de la participación, los implicados en ella no poseen propiamente una parte, sino que gozan del todo de manera limitada y distinta en cada caso: cada cual recibe lo recibido de acuerdo al modo del recipiente, metafóricamente hablando, ya que aquí se trata de algo inmaterial. Así, se advierte ya un doble sentido de participación: por un lado, participar es ‘comunicar’ transitivamente la perfección de la que se hace partícipe, por otro lado, participar implica ‘tener’ de manera limitada esa perfección participada.

En el lenguaje cotidiano, el verbo ‘participar’ se utiliza con sentido transitivo (hacer partícipe) y con sentido intransitivo (ser hecho partícipe). En el primer sentido, la participación significa ‘hacer partícipe’ a otro de algo, comunicarle algo que previamente no poseía y, por ende, ‘causar’ en él cierta realidad. En esta primera acepción, participar es la acción propia de quien causa y la idea sugerida por el término ‘participación’ viene, entonces, a completar y matizar la de la relación entre la causa y el efecto, por cuanto sugiere que éste recibe de manera parcial y limitada lo que en aquella se encuentra de modo más pleno y cabal. En el segundo sentido, la participación aparece como un derivado de lo que acabamos de describir, en cuanto algo o alguien recibe parcialmente lo que otro posee de manera más acabada y plena, efectivamente ‘participa’ de esa realidad o perfección. Aquí el efecto participa limitadamente de la cualidad transmitida por la causa. En suma, el vocablo ‘participación’ encierra dos sentidos: participar es la

acción de una ‘causa’ sobre un ‘efecto’; participar es la posesión parcial en un ‘efecto’ de una perfección que la ‘causa’ tiene totalmente.<sup>76</sup>

Los entes participan del Ser Absoluto para existir, lo cual significa que el Ser Absoluto es su causa eficiente: causalidad y participación se identifican, porque la causa es al efecto lo que el participante es a lo participado, en una relación analógica de proporcionalidad. Dios es causa del ser de los entes y, en consecuencia, es causa de la causalidad de los entes, determinada si es la de un ente meramente corpóreo, libre si es la de un ente portador de un espíritu. Es importante destacar que su actuar como causa primera no anula el actuar de los entes como causas segundas: así Dios es llamado ‘causa primera’ del ser de los entes y los entes son llamados ‘causas segundas’ de su propio acontecer. Esto equivale a decir que todo ente finito ‘participa’ del ser infinito de Dios, no en cuanto que tal o cual ente es una ‘parte integral’ de Dios, sino en cuanto que ‘está siendo causado’ por Dios. Así, uno de los puntos centrales del pensamiento de Santo Tomás es que todo lo que es ‘tal por esencia’ es causa de lo que es ‘tal por participación’, siendo que todo efecto participa, de algún modo, de la naturaleza de la causa. “Siempre lo que es por sí es causa de aquello que es por otro.”<sup>77</sup> “Así como aquello que tiene el fuego, pero no es el fuego, es ‘enfuegado’ por participación, así también aquello que tiene el ser, pero no es el ser, es ‘ente’ por participación.”<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Cfr. Tomás Alvira, Luis Clavell y Tomás Melendo, *Metafísica* (Pamplona: EUNSA, 1989).

<sup>77</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *In Anal. Post.*, I, lect. 2, 1.7.

<sup>78</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Suma teológica*, I, q. 3, a. 4, c. “Decir que el ser creado es el ser participado, significa decir que él es el efecto propio del ser no causado, que es Dios. Por esta razón, Santo Tomás pasa tan frecuentemente y sin articular el movimiento del pasaje de las ideas de ser por sí y de acto puro de ser, a las de causa de todo ser, de causado y de ser por modo de participación. Es en este nudo de nociones primeras, que se descubre el sentido del principio alegado por él, que ‘lo que es por otro se reduce, como a su causa, a lo que es por sí’. Al mismo tiempo se ve que la noción de ser por



La analogía es el correlato lógico de la participación ontológica, ambas doctrinas son un eje central en toda filosofía que se considere creacionista, porque Dios ha creado un universo graduado, participado y análogo, en el que los diversos estratos del ser participado corresponden a diversas esencias poseídas por los entes proporcionalmente, siendo la clasificación más amplia la que los divide en regiones: minerales, vegetales, animales, humanos y ángeles, donde se pueden distinguir grados ontológicos que van aumentando su perfección a medida que participan más de la causa primera del ser. “El ser de Dios es la medida, el ser de la creatura lo mensurado, y sólo en virtud de una participación analógica conviene el ser al Creador y a la creatura.”<sup>79</sup> Todo lo que es, por ser causado y participado, preexiste en Dios como en su fuente de una manera que no podemos vislumbrar. Dios es todo, porque el mundo no le agrega nada, pero no todo es Dios, porque el mundo tiene su propia consistencia ontológica, aunque siempre dependiente en su ser de su causa última. Lo único que no está en Dios es la nada, porque la nada no puede existir más que como ente de razón, fruto de nuestro modo de pensar finito, ya que para pensar necesitamos de apoyos imaginativos y privaciones, como cuando decimos ‘esto no es aquello’ o cuando decimos ‘no pienso en nada’.

En el orden trascendental, la ‘participación’ y la ‘causalidad’ están íntimamente relacionadas con la noción de ‘creación’: el ente participa del ser, siendo causado por Dios, porque el ser de los entes es creado por Dios. Dice el Aquinate siguiendo a Dionisio Areopagita: “Dios es fuente del ser,”<sup>80</sup> porque crear es dar el ser, causar el ser y

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otro, o por una causa, coincide con la de ser per modum participationis” (Gilson, *Introducción a la filosofía cristiana*, 157).

<sup>79</sup> Maurice De Wulf, *Historia de la filosofía medieval* (México: JUS, 1945), 286.

<sup>80</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Suma contra gentiles*, L. 1, c. 84. “Dios es en la doctrina metafísica del teólogo cristiano, más que una Existencia necesaria, el Acto de Ser en toda su pureza, vale decir, no es sólo una actualidad existencialmente plena, sin notas o determinaciones esenciales que lo limiten como lo era para Avicena y Maimónides, sino el

participar el ser. El ente creado emana de la fuente increada del ser: “la creación, como emanación total del ser, es desde el no ente que identificamos con la nada.”<sup>81</sup> Dios crea el ‘ens’ mismo, compuesto de ‘essentia’ y ‘esse’, aunque el ser sea el primer efecto del acto creador y todos los otros efectos lo supongan. “Digo que Dios simultáneamente da el ser y produce aquello que recibe el ser: así no conviene que lo haga a partir de algo preexistente.”<sup>82</sup> Dios crea el ‘esse’ y crea la ‘essentia’ en una fulguración simultánea que produce la totalidad del ente desde la nada.

De un primer principio, que es el Ser Absoluto, advienen por vía de creación actos de ser finitos y limitados por sus esencias. Y estas esencias no tienen un ‘esse proprium’ o un ‘esse essentiae’, con el cual subsistirían en la condición de entes posibles. Dios no es un receptáculo que contiene las esencias en su estado de posibilidad, las que estarían aguardando el momento de su creación, para abandonar su estado de posibilidad y conseguir su actualidad, como piensan Suárez y Wolff, siguiendo el viejo planteo de Avicena y Escoto. Esto es así porque fuera del ente creado sólo hay Dios como Ser Increado, no pudiéndose distinguir en Él esencias que subsistirían con su ser propio y que serían distintas del ser divino.<sup>83</sup>

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Esse mismo increado en el que su esencia ha quedado devorada por el ser y que, precisamente por ello es ‘fons essendi’, la fuente de la que proviene todo el ser de las criaturas” (Silvana Filippi, “En torno a la *metafísica del Éxodo*,” *Studia Gilsoniana* 4, no. 2 [April–June 2015]: 108–9).

<sup>81</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Suma teológica*, I, q. 45, a. 1. Santo Tomás suele usar el término plotiniano ‘emanatio’ para referirse a la ‘creatio’ siguiendo a los grandes autores cristianos neoplatónicos.

<sup>82</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 1.

<sup>83</sup> “Deus est ipsum esse per suam essentiam. Si se supone que el ipsum esse obra como causa, y se verá más adelante que obra como creador, su efecto propio será el esse de las criaturas. Este efecto Dios no lo causará solamente en el momento de la creación, sino todo el tiempo que duren. Las cosas existen en virtud del existir divino como la luz solar existe en virtud del sol. Hasta el punto que cuando el sol luce, es de día; en cuanto la luz cesa de llegarnos es de noche. De modo parejo cuando el existir divino deja un

Las esencias señalan la manera en que el ente participa del ser absoluto, el modo finito que tiene el ente de ejercer esa perfección total, haciendo posible que haya algo distinto de Dios. Al mismo tiempo, cada esencia es una manifestación única de Dios, cada una de ellas es una auténtica teofanía en su respectivo orden. Por eso, es muy cierto que Dios está en todas las cosas: “conviene decir que Dios está en todas las cosas de manera íntima,”<sup>84</sup> porque el ser creado deriva del ser increado en virtud del cual todo existe. La presencia íntima y por esencia del ser del creador en las creaturas es consecuencia de que crea el ser de los entes, a los que confiere y conserva el ser en virtud del cual son. Y si las creaturas se distinguen del creador por sus esencias, que les otorgan un límite y una configuración, en cambio por el ser se asemejan a él: “Todo ente, en cuanto tiene ser, es similar a El.”<sup>85</sup>

Hay una presencia y una distancia simultánea de Dios respecto del mundo, una inmanencia y una trascendencia del ser increado respecto del ser creado: no respetar esta tensión entre el ámbito de lo infinito y lo eterno en vistas al de lo finito y lo temporal, rompe la armonía dialéctica entre lo uno y lo múltiple, y entre la permanencia y el cambio, que son los problemas ontológicos por excelencia, derivando en planteos reduccionistas a favor de lo uno y permanente, que privilegian lo dictaminado por la razón desatendiendo a los datos de los sentidos, o a favor de lo múltiple y cambiante, que privilegian los datos de

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solo instante de hacer existir las cosas, es la nada. El universo tomista aparece por ello en el plano de la metafísica misma, como un universo sagrado. El universo tomista es un mundo de entes en que cada uno da testimonio de Dios por el mismo acto de existir. Como el más glorioso de los ángeles, la más humilde brizna de hierba hace, al menos, esta cosa admirable entre todas, existe. Este mundo en el que es algo maravilloso haber nacido, en el que la distancia que separa el menor ente de la nada es infinita, este mundo sagrado, impregnado hasta sus fibras más íntimas de la presencia de un Dios cuyo existir soberano le salva permanentemente de la nada; este es el mundo de Santo Tomás de Aquino” (Gilson, *El tomismo*, 168).

<sup>84</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Suma teológica*, I, q. 8, a. 1.

<sup>85</sup> Tomás de Aquino, *Suma contra gentiles*, L. 2, c. 22.

los sentidos desatendiendo el dictamen de la razón. La historia de la filosofía es testigo de los casos de ‘presencia sin distancia’ que desembocan en ‘monismos metafísicos univocistas’ y de los casos de ‘distancia sin presencia’ que desembocan en ‘nihilismos metafísicos equivocistas’. Para comprender adecuadamente esta tensión metafísica analógica entre lo uno y lo múltiple, es clave la correcta comprensión de la relación entre el ser y la esencia en el seno del ente, teniendo siempre en cuenta que la inmanencia del ser del ente nos reclama, por la vía de la participación y la causalidad, una trascendencia que es su origen y su meta.



## THE ORIGINALITY OF THE THOMISTIC ONTOLOGY AND ITS TURN TO BEING

### SUMMARY

The article attempts to delineate the core of the metaphysical thought of Thomas Aquinas consisting in overcoming Platonism and Aristotelianism. By following the teaching of great European Thomists of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Etienne Gilson and Cornelio Fabro, the author tries to summarize that which, according to him, seems to constitute the core content of Thomistic metaphysics, especially its turn to the theme of being. He also refers to selected critical texts of more recent Anglo-Saxon Thomists, such as Lawrence Dewan and Stephen Brock, who call for more attention to the subject of essence. By doing so, the author considers the notion of being consisted of essence and existence, the questions of ontological difference and real distinction, the relationship between the finite and the infinite, and also the linkage between causality and participation.

### KEYWORDS

ontology, being, existence, essence, participation, causality, Thomas Aquinas.

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**WHY AUGUSTINIAN APOLOGETICS  
AND LOGICAL DIALECTIC ARE NOT ENOUGH  
TO DEFEND THE REASONABLENESS OF  
THE CHRISTIAN FAITH IN  
AN INCREASINGLY-FRAGMENTED WORLD**

Evident to many Christians today is that contemporary Christian culture exists within a condition of severe identity crisis. Because we cannot preserve the identity of any being, including that of ourselves, without first admitting that identities other than ourselves exist independently of us, the rational starting point for anyone seeking to solve this problem must consist in admitting three evident truths: (a) beings other than ourselves (real natures) exist; (b) like us, the identity of such beings consists in being organizational wholes (wholes made up of parts); and (c) organizational unity exists in and through the harmonious relationship of the parts of an organizational whole to each other and to some chief aim, or act, the organization seeks to generate or cause (like building a house, extinguishing a fire, fighting crime or disease, or fostering psychological perfection).

To preserve the identity of Christian culture, we must first recognize three things: (a) what is a Christian identity; (b) what is a cultural identity; and (c) how these two identities can be essentially merged to

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become a third identity, or organizational whole: a Christian cultural identity. More: Because cultural identities are cultural wholes, we cannot possibly hope to resolve such a problem without first understanding what constitutes a cultural whole.

Like every organizational whole, *a cultural whole is an essentially harmonious relationship existing within some multitude of parts to cooperate to effect some numerically-one, common chief aim, end, good, or act.* Hence, cultural wholes are essentially *action-improving* wholes: Organizational principles that exist within other organizations (natures) that incline to bring these somewhat harmoniously-existing organizations to more harmonious, better, more perfect, operation.

Cultures, in short, are principles, qualities, that exist within organizations that, by nature, incline to generate within those organizations firmly-possessed, healthy operation. Like the health and disease of the body—as Mortimer J. Adler has well observed—cultural health consists in organizational health, the harmonious functioning of its parts, and cultures die from lack of harmonious functioning of these same parts.<sup>1</sup>

In relationship to the chief topic of this paper, the crucial point to understand about cultures is that, while, by nature, they incline to improve the health and perfection of the organizations within which they exist, organizational cultures can become diseased; and when they do, the culture inclines to cause the organization to become diseased, die from within.

Equally crucial to understand is that human cultures are chiefly caused within human faculties by repeated acts of human nature, and more precisely, by repeated acts of a human, faculty psychology. Wherever human culture exists, an image of the human soul and the

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<sup>1</sup> See Mortimer J. Adler, “God and the Professors,” *Philosophy is Everybody’s Business* 9, no. 3 (Winter 2003): 7–24. To read its online version, visit the following website: <http://www.ditext.com/adler/gp.html>, accessed June 10, 2017.



way it inclines to operate exists. Human cultures exist within the habits, talents, virtues, of its members. A totally untalented, non-virtuous, human organization or culture is an anarchic, non-existent, one.

These habits, talents, virtues, moreover, exist within human faculties, and these human faculties exist within a human soul naturally seeking to achieve self-perfection. This is so true that, if we study the origins of Christian culture and its educational institutions, we find that both are born of the natural human desire by the human soul to perfect itself and its operations: for human beings to become happy. Indeed, like hospitals, the first Christian educational institutions were chiefly the product of, originally brought into existence by and within, Christian culture; and by a psychology peculiar to the Christian soul and its vision of happiness. Such being the case, to preserve the identity of Christian culture in an increasingly fragmented world, we need to comprehend the distinctively Christian understanding of the human soul and of the nature of happiness that Christian psychology chiefly envisions, and preserve it!

A helpful way to do this is to consider the general development of the state of Western Christian education centuries prior to the development of the first Christian universities. When we do this, we find that this education had chiefly consisted in attempts initially started by the early Church Fathers (and, among them in the West, mainly with St. Aurelius Augustine) to use the liberal arts (which these thinkers tended mistakenly to conflate with “philosophy”) to generate within the soul of Christian students a “Christian Wisdom.”

The chief aim of Christian education at its inception consisted mainly in pursuit of wisdom to achieve perfection in action of the human soul. During the middle ages this pursuit of wisdom often became verbally expressed by the Augustinian dictum that philosophy consists in “faith seeking understanding;” and the soul being perfected by this understanding tended to be considered to be an analogous transposition

into Christian culture of the Socratic and Platonic teaching about a human soul: *an intellect or spirit existing separate from the human body*.

Despite the brilliance of St. Augustine, strictly speaking, philosophy is not “faith seeking understanding.” Strictly speaking, nothing akin to such a notion (such as enlightening inspiration by the gods) had been what the leading Ancient Greek philosophers, especially Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the pagan Greek neo-Platonists, had chiefly understood by “philosophy” (which these same Greeks had identified with “science”).<sup>2</sup>

Despite this fact, following the lead of St. Augustine, Church intellectuals started to popularize the notion that Christian Wisdom consisted in the practice of a Christian philosophy (the nature of which they did not precisely understand) by a unifying cause (the human soul), which they also did not precisely understand. Consequently, for centuries after its inception, Christian educational institutions could never adequately apply philosophy to the human soul as a proximate first principle fully to develop a Christian Wisdom.

*Among several mistakes Augustine had made in attempting to use Greek philosophy, and especially the teaching of Plato, as an apologetic in the service of Christian wisdom, was that he never adequately connected the human soul to the human body as its intrinsic animating principle, nor to the bodily senses in one act of personal knowledge, and of a philosophical/scientific act of knowing. While he had recognized the human soul to be connected to the human body in some intimate way, in principle, he did not tend to consider the human soul to be the generating principle of life, growth, and development existing of the human body. Nor, in principle, did he consider the act of philoso-*

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<sup>2</sup> For a defense of the above claims about the nature of ancient Greek philosophy and the beginnings of Christian education, see Peter A. Redpath, *Wisdom's Odyssey from Philosophy to Transcendental Sophistry* (Amsterdam and Atlanta: Editions Rodopi, B. V., Value Inquiry Book Series Volume 46, 1997), 1–62.

phy/science to be the act of what orthodox Christianity considers to be the whole human person, of a psycho-somatic composite.

Furthermore, unlike Aristotle, St. Augustine did not, *in principle*, tend to divide the human soul into higher and lower *faculties* participating in intellectual and sensory reason. He tended to consider the human senses and the human body to distract from knowing activity, which he considered to be entirely the work of the separated human soul, not of the human person as a composite of soul and body.<sup>3</sup>

One effect of St. Augustine's misunderstanding of the nature of ancient Greek philosophy, "Christian philosophy," and the human soul was that, at its inception, in its educational principles, Christian education in the West was born in a somewhat unhealthy condition: It was founded upon a *devastating mistake* of organizational self-misunderstanding, which essentially prevented it from comprehending how human reason could function both *abstractly* as a contemplative (or speculative) scientific intellect and *concretely* as a command and control prudential reason.

Despite the fact that Augustine was an intellectual genius and recognized the influence of human reason over the human appetites and emotions, *Augustine's psychology provided no adequate explanation of how human reason can straddle both speculative and practical activity so as to function as a principle of speculative and practical science and generate both the human intellectual virtue of speculative wisdom*

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<sup>3</sup> I am agreeing with interpretations of St. Augustine made by Vernon J. Bourke in his monograph *Aquinas' Search for Wisdom* (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1965), 70–1, 95–7; and Étienne Gilson in his *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, 1955), 74–7. While Augustine accepted the Christian teaching that the human person as a composite whole of body and soul knows, the Platonic and neo-Platonic principles he used to explain how human being knows never enabled him essentially to connect the human soul to the human body and explain how this numerically-one person as a composite whole knows.

(*metaphysics*) and the moral habit of practical wisdom: prudence (*ethics*).

Unhappily, this flaw in Augustinian psychology of the human person continued to influence Christian education from the start of the Christian West until the Christian universities of today. And, due to the post-Reformation fracture of Christendom, and the development of the inception of the falsely-so-called eighteenth-century Western “Enlightenment,” the influence of this flawed psychology in the form of a secularized Augustinian theology masquerading as the whole of human philosophy and science has become especially pernicious in our time.<sup>4</sup>

No one can expect to be wrong about human nature and the way it generates action essentially related to it as an organizational whole and expect to be right about human education. Yet Augustine’s mistaken teachings about the nature of the human soul and what Aristotle called a “form” became entrenched within Christian education for nine centuries, until St. Thomas started to challenge these mistakes so as to provide the principles upon which a more perfectly healthy Christian organizational and educational psychology could be formed.

I call this initial misunderstanding a “devastating mistake” because it is just the sort of error to which Aristotle had referred when he wrote about “small mistakes in the beginning” eventually leading to bigger mistakes later on.<sup>5</sup> Like all education, Christian education consists in organizational activity. Christian education is organizational education of the human person: of numerically-one psycho-somatic unit performing many intellectual and sensory acts *through many facultative*

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<sup>4</sup> For a detailed justification of the claims made in this paragraph, see Peter A. Redpath, *Masquerade of the Dream Walkers: Prophetic Theology from the Cartesians to Hegel* (Amsterdam and Atlanta, Editions Rodopi: B. V. Value Inquiry Book Series Volume 73, 1998).

<sup>5</sup> Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, bk. 1, ch. 5, trans. John L. Stocks (The Internet Classics Archive): “the least initial deviation from the truth is multiplied later a thousandfold,” accessed June 10, 2017, <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/heavens.1.i.html>.

*habits and acts* of one body/soul composite: one human person. Christian psychology of the human person does not understand a human being to be a spirit or an essentially separate intellect intimately connected to a human body as an external observer or motor. Nor does it conceive a human being to be an animal dispossessed of an intellectual soul. Like Aristotle, it considers a human being to be a soul/body (hylomorphic) unit.

While he considers human reason to be a faculty of an immortal human soul, St. Thomas Aquinas maintains the specific difference of a human being resides in the genus “animal,” not in the genus “spirit.” Strictly speaking, according to St. Thomas, *human beings are not incarnate spirits*. Human beings do not belong to the genus “spirit.” We are not differentiated in our genus by being on the lowest level of intellectual spirit, being the dumbest of angels. Essentially, we belong to the highest rank within the genus “animal” (the qualitative maximum [leaders, rulers] *in and of* the animal genus), which is specifically divided into rational and irrational. *St. Thomas locates our specific difference in an otherness within the sensitive, or animal, part of the intellectual soul!*<sup>6</sup>

In the case of the human soul, St. Thomas understands the soul’s relation to an animal body to consist in essentially connecting, through human sense faculties (like memory and imagination) of an animal body, an immortal intellectual soul and the activities of the whole human person to sense reality. He maintains that doing so enables the animal genus to become perfectly itself. The “sensitive soul” (the generic part of the human nature) causes *animal* rationality (a reason in touch with sense reality), not a disembodied, or abstract, syllogistic

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<sup>6</sup> See St. Thomas Aquinas, *The Summa Theologica*, I, q. 77, a. 3, respondeo, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Benziger Bros. Bilingual edition, 1947), accessed June 10, 2017, <http://dhsprory.org/thomas/summa/>.

rationality, to overflow into the appetitive part of the soul, and, through its activity, into the whole of material creation.

During the thirteenth century, St. Thomas Aquinas recognized that only a faculty psychology, and especially recognition of the faculty of a sentient, particular, reason in touch with sense reality, can enable development of the kind of self-understanding human beings (acting persons) capable of generating healthy educational institutions, colleges, and universities

Unhappily, since the time of St. Thomas, Christian educational institutions have largely lost their self-understanding of the nature of the human soul, and that their chief aim as institutes of highest education is essentially to help bring to operational perfection in their students the psychological faculties of the human soul as St. Thomas has described these. While helping students to become employed, get a job, is a noble activity, it is not the chief activity of a university in general or of a Christian university especially. Properly understood, all university education chiefly aims at generating wisdom within faculties of the human soul: to bring into being men and women of perfect virtue, the best of world leaders, including the best of job creators—*employers*, *not employees*. It does not chiefly consist in aping utopian socialist propaganda and vocational-training institutes so as to produce technocrats to bring into existence a new world order run by robots directed by Enlightened, artificial-intelligence plutocrats.

Absent a human soul in which human psychological faculties and habits exist, no human talent or virtue can exist. More: No intrinsic principle of causation exists within human beings for which we can be honored, praised, or shamed; rewarded, ignored, or punished for generating human activities like science and wisdom, prudence and foolishness, virtue and vice.

If the human soul does not exist as the chief, proximate, cause of science and wisdom, prudence and foolishness, virtue and vice, where

do these qualities exist? If they do not exist within the talents and flaws and virtues and vices of scientists, if the psychological qualities, habits, of scientists are not the chief cause of science, what is? If, as some contemporary scientists “falsely-so-called” proclaim, science is an aimless pursuit having nothing to do with perfecting the human person, then contemporary science is essentially anarchic, humanly worthless; and universities that chiefly aim to produce scientists chiefly aim at generating anarchists: men without chests.<sup>7</sup> If science has nothing to do with perfecting the human soul and the psychological health of our human faculties, then, essentially, at best, the chief aim of contemporary science appears to be reduced to producing tools for the chief aim of perfecting tools.

If such be the case, then, as Gilson tells us in his work entitled *Terrors of the Year 2000*, the father of postmodern man’s existential project (and, with it, of the contemporary Christian university) is Sisyphus, not Prometheus (as postmodernists have thought). While Gilson had claimed that our contemporary destiny has become “the absurd” and “truly exhausting task” of perpetual self-invention without model, purpose, or rule, our contemporary situation appears to be worse than he thought.<sup>8</sup> Absent any soul, faculties, or natural abilities, because even tool makers presuppose tool users to make their natures intelligible, because, in the contemporary world of Enlightenment intellectuals, we human beings have no nature, we cannot be tool users; and, hence, we cannot be *self*-inventors, or any kind of inventor or tool-maker. We cannot have Prometheus or Sisyphus as our father and model to imitate.

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<sup>7</sup> See C. S. Lewis’s excellent observations about the nature of the human soul and its essential connection to the human body as rational command and control principle in Chapter 1 (“Men without Chests”) in his celebrated *The Abolition of Man* (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 1–26.

<sup>8</sup> Étienne Gilson, *Terrors of the Year 2000* (St. Michael’s College, University of Toronto, 1949).

Even exercise of acts of perpetual boredom exceeds our natural abilities, since we have no such abilities.

By making the mistake of imitating the European Enlightenment's reduction of the whole of science to productive knowledge generated by some abstract collectivist *neo-gnostic spirit*, or *general will*, aiming at perfecting some utopian-socialist will to power over the material universe, unwittingly, most contemporary Christian universities worldwide have lost their self-understanding.

Hence, to conclude, if Christians seriously want to preserve their identity in an increasingly-fragmented contemporary world, they need to displace as their chief measure of educational excellence the collectivist mass, disembodied spirit, and disordered understanding of scientific reason that Enlightenment intellectuals mistakenly claimed, always and everywhere, to be the metaphysical foundation of all philosophy, science, wisdom, and truth. They need to stop educating human beings chiefly to become a collection of mechanistically-, technocratically-controlled serfs. In place of this chief aim of human education, as St. John Paul II well understood, they need, once again, to recognize the distinctively Christian understanding of the human soul and of the nature of happiness that Christian psychology chiefly envisions, *and preserve it!* They need to follow the lead of St. Thomas Aquinas and return focus of Christian education on perfecting the habits and talents of the individually-existing *acting* person: *Perfection of the psychological faculties of the sentient, embodied, individual actively engaged in free, personal, living relationships must once again become the chief aim of the Christian university.*





**WHY AUGUSTINIAN APOLOGETICS AND LOGICAL DIALECTIC ARE NOT ENOUGH TO DEFEND THE REASONABLENESS OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH IN AN INCREASINGLY-FRAGMENTED WORLD**

SUMMARY

From close to its inception, St. Augustine's misunderstanding of the nature of ancient Greek philosophy, "Christian philosophy," and the way the human soul essentially relates to human body caused formal Christian education to be (a) born in a somewhat unhealthy condition, (b) founded upon a devastating mistake of organizational self-misunderstanding, which essentially prevented it from comprehending how human reason could function both abstractly as a contemplative (or speculative) scientific intellect and concretely as a command and control prudential reason. This flaw in Augustinian psychology of the human person and Augustine's misunderstanding of the nature of ancient Greek philosophy continued to influence Christian education from the start of the Christian West until the Christian and secular universities of today. For contemporary Christian education to preserve its identity in an increasingly fragmented world, a psychology of the human person adequate to explain the essential connection between the human soul and body and the nature of philosophy must replace this flawed Augustinian psychology that continues to plague the contemporary world.

KEYWORDS

Christian, Christian philosophy, Christian cultural whole, culture, psychology, education, identity, organization, organizational psychology, principle, philosophy, self-understanding, soul.

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## FASHIONING EPISODES THROUGH VIRTUAL HABIT: THE EFFICACY OF PRE-LIVED EXPERIENCE

This inquiry argues for the efficacy of spontaneous mental pictures as primary agents for the implementation of habit change. Charles S. Peirce’s<sup>1</sup> concept of virtual habit, especially articulated in his later manuscripts, delivers his ultimate claim regarding the work of mental picture interpretants (meanings/effects) to construct novel belief and action schemas. Virtual habits produce this effect (settled beliefs or putting into action what the image depicts) consequent to their status as dicisigns (signs in which index and icon together assert and imply arguments). As double signs in which index takes a primary role, virtual habits appeal to their interpretants by offering propositions, assertions

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<sup>1</sup> I shall refer to Peirce’s writings using *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vol. I–VI: ed. Hartshorne and Weiss, and vol. VII and VIII: ed. Burks (Harvard University Press, 1931–1935, and 1958), in the standard way, by “CP”, followed by volume number, decimal point, and paragraph number(s); to catalogued items in *The Essential Peirce*, vol. 1: ed. Houser and Kloesel, and vol. 2: Peirce Edition Project (Indiana University Press, 1992 and 1998), by “EP,” followed by the volume number, a colon, and then the page number; his articles for the *Monist* collected in *The Logic of Interdisciplinarity: The Monist-Series*, ed. Bisanz (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 2008), by “LI” followed by the page number; and unpublished manuscripts by MS followed by the page number.

and arguments which depict episodic scenes.<sup>2</sup> As such, novel propositions/assertions are urged upon self or another as imperatives; and newly conceived arguments implying how events affect particular consequences are submitted to interlocutors.<sup>3</sup> This inquiry demonstrates how virtual habits constitute a primary source for constructing plausible remediative episodes and suggesting their implementation. Newly proposed predicates within image propositions open up new ways of thinking about factual relations; and when newly conceived arguments are submitted to others, they have the means to convince them of the veridicality of the inference implied within the image. In short, Peirce's notion of virtual habit reinforces his commitment to a genuinely pragmatic world view, in that new beliefs are asserted; and novel recommendations for courses of action are submitted.<sup>4</sup>

### **Foundational Considerations of Virtual Habit**

As early as 1867 (CP 2.398), the seeds for virtual habit (pre-lived mental images) were expressed in Peirce's adherence to the Scotistic distinction between three kinds of cognition: actual, habitual, and virtual. In 1871, he clarifies the nature of the two former kinds (*actualiter*, *habitualiter*) as follows:

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<sup>2</sup> Episodes can particularly lend themselves to Peirce's pragmatism, in that they can qualify as Existential Graphs, depicting in the mind beliefs and actions soon to be implemented (for further discussion of this issues, cf. 1906: MS 298; LI 353). Cf. Kenneth Boyd, "Peirce on Assertion, Speech Acts, and Taking Responsibility," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 52 (Winter 2016): 29.

<sup>3</sup> Francesco Bellucci, "'Logic, Considered as Semeiotic': On Peirce's Philosophy of Logic," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 50 (Winter 2014): 524. And Thomas L. Short, *Peirce's Theory of Signs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 179–80.

<sup>4</sup> For elaboration of Peirce's pragmatic stance, see Mathias Girel, "Pragmatic Clarifications and Dispositions in Peirce's *How to Make our Ideas Clear*," *Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia* 18 (Fall 2017): 45–68.

There are two ways in which a thing may be in the mind—*habitualiter* and *actualiter*. A notion is in the mind *actualiter* when it is actually conceived; it is in the mind *habitualiter* when it can directly produce a conception. It is by virtue of mental association . . . that things are in the mind *habitualiter* . . . (EP 1: 92).

Likewise, in EP 1: 92 (1871), Peirce elaborates on the same distinction:

The mind perceives likenesses and other relations in the objects of sense, and just as sense affords sensible images of things, so the intellect affords intelligible images of them. It is as such a species *intelligibilis* that Scotus supposes that a conception exists which is in the mind *habitualiter*, not *actualiter*.

The fact that *actualiter* is equivocal to “conceived” mental signs suggests a first-time look, if you will. This kind of knowledge representation entails non-ruminative mental processes not predicated upon integration with already existing knowledge. Such is often derivative of a priori knowledge or unconsciously conceived first impressions of sense.

While virtual habits can materialize from first impressions of sense (*actualiter*), they are not, in any way, equivocal with *actualiter*, given that they house novel inferences often from integration of several knowledge sources: long term memories, working memory components, and the like. Peirce’s concept of *habitualiter* encompasses operations intrinsic to virtual habits; it emerges consequent to comparisons with already conceived concepts, and hence requires more conscious deliberation—connecting incoming knowledge with previous concepts. Although *habitualiter* shares some of the qualities of *virtualiter*, (the knowledge sources on which they depend) it lacks the means to posit novel inferences.

The first explicit mention of *virtualiter* appears c.1905 (CP 5.504), although without much explication/foundation. But, in 1907 (EP 2: 413), Peirce reveals (without terming it virtual habit) the pivotal function of a thing which is in the mind *virtualiter*. In doing so, he in-

roduces the dynamic effects of pre-performed mental pictures upon belief and action schemas:

[E]very man exercises more or less control over himself by means of modifying his own habits; and the way in which he goes to work to bring this effect about in those cases in which circumstances will not permit him to practice reiterations of the desired kind of conduct in the outer world shows that he is virtually well-acquainted with the important principle that reiterations in the inner world [akin to virtual habits], fancied reiterations, if well intensified by direct effort, produce habits, just as do reiterations in the outer world; and these habits will have power to influence actual behavior in the outer world; especially if each reiteration be accompanied by a particular strong effort that is usually likened to issuing a command to one's future self.

It is here that Peirce determines that virtual habits, reiterations in the *inner* world, have the means not merely to suggest viable courses of belief and action in the *outer* world; but, in view of their vivid moving character, these image habits define the courses of action and belief. Furthermore, as "commands to one's future self," they compel the very conduct that they depict.

Peirce reiterates the imperative-like purpose of virtual habit:

[T]herefore I venture to think, be a sort of self-hypnotizing effect, when we strain, in some obscure way, to influence our future behavior, by calling it up as vividly as we can the image of a given sort of stimulus and that of our responding to it in the desired way. For we seem to command our organism or our soul as if we said to it: we will act thus: do you hear? Thus! Thus!! Thus!!! (MS 620: 26)

In supplying commands to the "future self," by way of sequential pictures<sup>5</sup> virtual habits urge (cf. supra discussions regarding Peirce's PHEME) the self to seriously consider adopting (asserting) the newly conceived proposition. Incorporating a prospective view of the self as

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<sup>5</sup> Harlene Hayne and Kana Imuta, "Episodic Memory in 3- and 4-Year-Old Children," *Developmental Psychobiology* 53 (April 2011): 321.

“future” is consonant with psychological definitions of episodic memory: “episodic memory supports the construction of imagined future events by flexibly retrieving and recombining stored information into a novel scenario.”<sup>6</sup> Hence, by retrieving past information, and by integrating it with inferences conceived of on-line, mental pictures propose novel propositions.

### **From Propositions to Assertions**

Imaging courses of imminent action and belief as specific salient episodes, illustrates more than a proposition; it indicates assertion of the proposition—the imagined behavior is adopted as veridical or as one’s own; otherwise effort to focus on and refine the image’s meaning would not be readily expended (1902–1903: CP 5.543). Accordingly, virtual habits represent quintessential exemplars of the earliest assertions emerging in ontogeny (as implied assertions), since they involve a real commitment (as required by Peirce) to the veracity of an ontological issue, hence affecting belief and action.

Let us distinguish between the proposition and the assertion of the proposition. We will grant, if you please, that the proposition itself merely represents an image with a label or pointer attached to it. But to assert that proposition is to make oneself responsible for it, without any definite forfeit . . . (c.1902–1903: CP 5.543).

The step of framing informational pictures (images) into an episode for future modes of conduct makes the proposition one’s own. This is orchestrated by attending to specific constructed mental episodes by way

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<sup>6</sup> Kevin Madore, Brendan Gaesser, and Daniel Schacter, “Constructive Episodic Simulation: Dissociable Effects of a Specificity Induction on Remembering, Imagining, and Describing in Young and Older Adults,” *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition* 40 (Fall 2014): 609.

of indexical pointers.<sup>7</sup> To elaborate: envisioning the proposition (attending to the integration of the how, where and when of its episodic features) implies affirmatively asserting it; as such, one has committed one's self to its truth value and the success of its effects.

Moreover, what is sorely under-recognized is the pivotal role of index in supplying the predicates necessary for virtual habits. It directs attention to meanings within the icon (augmenting subjects with predicates)—to reach propositional status. In fact, the most prominent purpose of index is to call attention to purposes for iconic features belonging to the image—ultimately to fabricate an episode for future conduct (e.g., the image of a withered tree supersedes subject status when index suggests the directive to remedy the condition).

In fact, Peirce utilizes index to wholly renovate the interpretants of signs whose representamen are pictorial in nature,<sup>8</sup> as is the case for virtual habits.

Before pictures in the mind have the power to establish new meanings, ordinarily novel modes of consciousness, they need to contain both an index and an icon, because without both representational components, pictorial signs can neither express nor imply propositions:

It is remarkable that while neither a pure icon or a pure index can assert anything, an index which forces something to be an icon as a weathercock does, or which forces us to regard it as an icon, as a legend under a portrait does, does make an assertion and forms a proposition (1904: EP 2: 307).

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<sup>7</sup> For further discussion, see Frederik Stjernfelt, "Dicisigns and Habits: Implicit Propositions and Habit-Taking in Peirce's Pragmatism," in *Consensus on Peirce's Concept of Habit: Before and Beyond Consciousness*, ed. Donna West and Myrdene Anderson (Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2016), 241–64.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Thomas L. Short, "Interpreting Peirce's Interpretant: A Response to Lalor, Liszka, and Meyers," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 32 (Fall 1996): 490; Short, *Peirce's Theory of Signs*, 256–60; and also Donna West, "Index as Scaffold to Logical and Final Interpretants: Compulsive Urges and Modal Submissions," *Semiotica* Special Invitation Issue (forthcoming).



It is obvious that the presence of index in pictorial signs provides the predicate for propositions and assertions. In its function as *dicisign*, it is the sign most able to imply arguments—allowing the interpreter to infer why and how to meanings beyond obvious ones:

But it is easy to see that the proposition proports to intend to compel its interpretant to refer to its real object, that is, represents itself as an index, while the argument proports to intend not compulsion, but action by means of comprehensible generals, that is, represents its character to be specially symbolic. The above is the best analysis the author can at present, make of the *dicisign* (1903: EP 2: 283).

Virtual habits utilize this quality of index; they constitute quintessential exemplars of *dicisigns*; they express propositions, while implying arguments.<sup>9</sup> As propositions, indexes as *dicisigns* compel attention to a novel fact in the inner world; at the same time, as arguments, they suggest conduct to be carried out in the outer world. In the *dicisign*, index plays a pivotal role in urging acceptance of novel predicates and in leveraging the novel assertion on other potential minds.<sup>10</sup> Here, index increases the potentiality of the dynamic interpretant by augmenting beliefs and actions associated with the picture/icon, “forcibly intrud[ing] upon the mind of the interpreter” (1903: CP 4.447). Index compels “like a mesmerizer—a pointing finger” (1885: CP 8.41) effects beyond what iconic components of pictures (subjects only) can afford.

Virtual habits utilize index move the static picture to another level—to submit an implied argument for others’ consideration.<sup>11</sup> These submissions contain alternative remedies (future conduct)—how to

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<sup>9</sup> For a more elaborated discussion of the *Dicisign*, see Donna West, “The Work of Peirce’s *Dicisign* in Representationalizing Early Deictic Events,” *Semiotica* (in press).

<sup>10</sup> Donna West, “Indexical Scaffolds to Habit Formation,” in *Consensus on Peirce’s Concept of Habit: Before and Beyond Consciousness*, ed. Donna West and Myrdene Anderson (Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2016), 224.

<sup>11</sup> For elaboration, see Donna West, “Virtual Habit as Episode-Builder in the Inferencing Process,” *Cognitive Semiotics* 10 (Fall 2017): 55–75.

handle anticipated consequences. They supersede meanings of hypoicons<sup>12</sup>—they have the power to express propositions and imply arguments. This sets virtual habits apart from static pictures; they flash glimpses of specific participants' future conduct before the mind. Here index is operational in that particular moving remediative templates insinuate themselves as viable candidates for enactment in the *outer* world. These pictures constitute pre-experienced scenes—ultimately commanding or suggesting modes of action in the immediate future.

### Virtual Habits as Determinations

Because virtual habits have status as propositions, they constitute specific, determinative scenes for particular purposes. Peirce is emphatic that proposals for possible (likely) states of affairs via virtual habits (particular mental episodes) draw upon determinations (beyond resolutions) which contain definite icons (1911: MS 674: 14–15; and 1898: MS 485). Peirce makes plain that specific moving images in the mind can form the foundation for inferential reasoning only if they preempt plausible recommendations for particular action schemes to be utilized by actual parties. To preempt these new action strategies, pre-action images (virtual habits) must rise to the level of determinations, superseding status as resolutions (1911: MS 674: 14–15). Peirce applies this rationale directly to virtual habits:

But, hell is paved with good resolutions; and therefore to this promise must be attached good security or . . . the resolve which is compared to . . . thinking must be baked into the hard brickbat of a real determination of the habit machinery of his organism, which shall have force to govern his actions. A determination is a virtual habit (1909: MS 620).

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<sup>12</sup> “If a substantive be wanted, an iconic representamen may be termed a hypoicon” (1903: EP 2: 273).

By “baking” the moving image into the “hard brickbat of his habit machinery,” Peirce illustrates how the determinative nature of virtual habits translates into conduct. Determinations are required; otherwise episodes would not be implementable into modes of action. They must be sufficiently specific, vivid, and be adopted as one’s own to have force to produce practical effects. In short, the determinative character of mentally conceived episodes (virtual habits) prefigures remediative strategies for implementation.

Given their determinative character, the effects of virtual habits are often equivocal, if not more notable than are those of habit proper, because in spite of the unactualized character of the former, its effects impel viable change, and are as real as those of habit proper. Peirce expresses this as follows: “[W]hile it [virtual habit] is not an ‘N’, has, nevertheless, the characteristic behavior and properties of an ‘N’” (1909: MS 620: 26). “N” here represents a culminating placeholder to impute a real effect—raising the status of the interpretant still higher, such that the effect of the imagined “N” is so potent as to bring about the actualization of the imagined episode. Peirce further illustrates these effects in his inclusion of Milton’s characterization of an unrealized habit<sup>13</sup>—a vivid imagination of a happening as if it actually materialized, in this case a feeling of having been touched. In point of fact, the touch which Milton’s Adam refers to rises beyond actual touch. The imagined effects (if they are sufficiently specific) can often supersede what actually transpires, and can even have the power to make more potent the perceived effects, thus encouraging subsequent interest in the paradigm. Peirce wishes to highlight the nature and power of effects

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<sup>13</sup> John Milton, *Paradise Lost*, VIII, 615–17: “Love not the Heav’nly spirits? And how their Love Express they? By looks only? Or do they mix Irradiance, virtual or immediate touch?” (accessed Sept 30, 2017, <http://www.paradiselost.org/>).

drawn from mental signs of real possibility, not from unfounded/obsessional hallucinations:<sup>14</sup>

By “virtual touch” Milton’s Adam meant something that was not touch, but we might all the delight that touch can bring. So a determination is not a habit . . . but it works all the effects of habit, and is, therefore, strictly speaking, a virtual habit (1909: MS 620: 26).

Here Peirce privileges “all the delights” that “habit can bring,” given their power to initiate and manufacture new effects, especially affirmative feelings to drive future inquiry.

### **Interpretants of Virtual Habits**

Virtual habits supersede mere imaginations; their interpretants have a distinctly modal character—to compel or to submit a new, plausible way forward (CP 8.338). Consequent to the effort in translating beliefs into novel action schemes, virtual habits contain logical interpretants,<sup>15</sup> while imaginations proper consist in emotional or at best energetic interpretants (in the event that a behavior ensues from the image). In short, the former (virtual habits) is characterized by a how-to for an improved state of affairs. As such, effects transcend limitations of Energetic Interpretants, superseding the proposal of single action schemes to satisfy individual outcomes. Instead, interpretants of virtual habits must be of the Logical kind, proposing a sequence of acts to be employed by a diversity of agents. The nature of the Logical Interpretant provides the objective character necessary to recommend courses of action, not merely for a single other, but for diverse others. Accord-

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<sup>14</sup> Donna West, “Peirce’s Creative Hallucinations in the Ontogeny of Abductive Reasoning,” *Public Journal of Semiotics* 7 (Winter 2016): 52.

<sup>15</sup> Mats Bergman, “Beyond Explication: Meaning and Habit-Change,” in *Consensus on Peirce’s Concept of Habit: Before and Beyond Consciousness*, ed. Donna West and Myrdene Anderson (Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2016), 187.

ingly, virtual habits integrate sequences of actions into a single whole or episode—such that a set of actions together has the foresight to renovate courses of action and consequences. This property of virtual habit results in measured steps toward remediation of a particular outcome. They obviate logical relations between event types—making salient relations among participants. Their episodic nature likewise highlights temporal and spatial conditions inherent to the events which comprise the episode.<sup>16</sup>

As such, the effects/interpretants of virtual habits are not dependent upon affirmation through actual implementation; they provide real value in knowing the effects before being materialized. Their effects transcend those of Energetic Interpretants (EP 2: 418).<sup>17</sup> They are not founded heavily upon retrospective experiences in which the self recalls past events; nor need they rely entirely upon observing others' past states of affairs. The effects of virtual habits ascend to prospective determinations of others' conduct together with considerations of the spatial and temporal conditions suggested were the episode to materialize for particular others. As such, Logical Interpretants propose possible, would-bes, useful to inform actual conduct. They ordinarily do so by initially projecting the self into a specific, likely state of affairs, then propose a revised episode substituting others. This obviates the fact that virtual habits are prospective in nature—not primarily constructed upon a single individual's past memories of event contours.<sup>18</sup> As such, virtual habits require a logical interpretant—capable of engendering a new objective order of things toward the ultimate interpretant.

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<sup>16</sup> Cf. Donna West, "Semiotic Determinants in Episode-Building: Beyond Autozoetic Consciousness," *Philosophy and Science* (under review).

<sup>17</sup> Erkki Kilpinen, "In What Sense Exactly Is Peirce's Habit-Concept Revolutionary?," in *Consensus on Peirce's Concept of Habit*, ed. Donna West and Myrdene Anderson (Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2016), 209.

<sup>18</sup> Stanley Klein, "The Temporal Orientation of Memory: It's Time for a Change," *Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition* 2 (2013): 226.

Establishing the comparative likelihood for certain kinds of virtual habits (states, single actions, sequential actions) to affect outcomes reveals which features are more responsible for significant remediative action. In fact, the need for the contributing event feature/event itself obviates the interplay between belief (underlying inferences) and action implementation, and reveals the degree to which age is a factor in mapping belief habits to modes of action. In view of the logical interpretants inherent to virtual habits, they can become a useful tool to generate decisions for remediative modes of action at early stages in ontogeny; and fashioning them across the life spectrum may unwittingly avert calamities.

The primary competency requisite to ascertaining the logical interpretants necessary for virtual habits include episode-building via auto-noetic consciousness. This involves projecting egocentric and allocentric perspectives into sequential event frames.<sup>19</sup> Wheeler, Stuss, and Tulving define auto-noesis as a system of memory that “renders possible conscious recollection of personal happenings and events from one’s past and mental projection of anticipated events into one’s subjective future.”<sup>20</sup> The interpretants of virtual habits must consist in more than a subject in which static images are projected in the inner world; interpretants need to incorporate moving events which suggest participants’ experiences within sequential frames. Absent sequential organization images could not suggest logical interpretants—courses of action likely to avoid or contribute to a consequence. Without an episodic component (incorporating auto-noetic consciousness), mental images, however

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<sup>19</sup> Endel Tulving, “Episodic Memory and Auto-noesis: Uniquely Human?,” in *The Missing Link in Cognition: Origins of Self-Reflective Consciousness*, ed. Herbert Terrace and Janet Metcalfe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 32.

<sup>20</sup> Mark Wheeler, Donald Stuss, and Endel Tulving, “Toward a Theory of Episodic Memory: The Frontal Lobes and Auto-noetic Consciousness,” *Psychological Bulletin* 121 (Fall 1997): 332.

vivid, do not qualify as virtual habits—they fall short of the means to pre-play novel logical event relationships.

To accomplish the former, goals must motivate images of event frames, to adequately capture how hypotheses translate into action to remedy real world problems. In short, until the interpretant rises to the level of the logical kind, images cannot lead to right guessing. They must incorporate appreciation for diverse perspectives in diverse situations (as do virtual habits)—projecting self into possible events which anyone may experience.<sup>21</sup> The logical interpretants would incorporate sufficient objectivity to extract course of action recommendations (Peirce’s directive in MS 637: 12) from imaged episodes.

### **Virtual Habit as Modal Operator**

In 1903, Peirce indicates that pictorial signs (originally Terms, Rhemes, and later Semes) can carry more than their explicit meanings/effects; they can imply arguments. In 1905 and 1906 Peirce determines that Propositions (which he ultimately refers to as Phemes and dicisigns) can contain implied arguments. Essentially, semes/Terms need not be limited to status as subjects of propositions, but can likewise imply their predicates. Moreover, “Phemes” can urge and imply arguments; and arguments and “Phemes” have the power to submit new perspectives for contemplation.<sup>22</sup>

Such a sign [the PHEME] intends or has the air of intending to force some idea (in an interrogation), or some action (in a command), or some belief (in an assertion), upon the interpreter of it, just as if it were the direct and unmodified effect of that which it represents (1906: MS 295: 26).

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<sup>21</sup> Cf. Donna West, “Perspective-Switching as Event Affordance: The Ontogeny of Abductive Reasoning,” *Cognitive Semiotics* 7 (Winter 2014): 149–76.

<sup>22</sup> Bellucci, “‘Logic, Considered as Semeiotic’,” 539.

Thus, when a PHEME or proposition “forces some idea . . . upon the interpreter,” it urges that individual to believe it and/or to act upon it; and it can implicitly encourage others to take seriously the tenets of a newly constructed proposition to integrate into their own behavioral system. Peirce further treats these interpretants in 1908 in his sixth trichotomy “appeal to the dynamic interpretant” contained within his ten-fold division of signs (1905: CP 8.338):

[A] sign may appeal to its dynamic interpretant in three ways: an argument only may be Submitted to its interpretant as something the reasonableness of which will be acknowledged . . . An argument or dicent may be Urged upon the interpretant by an act of insistence . . . Arguments or dicents may be and a rheme can only be Presented to the interpretant for contemplation.

As such, PHEMES can command others to think in new ways, or, can serve as submissions—allowing interpreters to contemplate veridicality for themselves.

The new taxonomy demonstrates further elevation of index—in its operation as PHEME, it infuses logical meanings into single episodes. Index ultimately expands the meanings of Dynamic Objects from having Energetic interpretants only, to having action effects which serve more objectively for diverse others as modes of remediative action. Since Index draws out implied meanings of icons (rhemes), it forces attention to meanings which are not explicit, not on the surface. Via index, unbidden pictures in the mind (rhemes) are elevated to PHEMES by incorporating predicates. To illustrate: through index, a depiction of a withered tree supersedes notice of the natural structure—it can imply a state of health of the surround, disease, parched state, and can even suggest courses of action for others to take (arguments).

Accordingly, as PHEME, index can suggest to the mind of the interpreter which states of affairs are real possibilities, urging them to take a particular course of action. It can likewise submit a plausible strategy for problemsolving which others can contemplate and poten-



tially adopt as their own. As PHEME, index represents event/beliefs not as mere affirmations and denials, but as submissions for habit change (1906: MS 295: 43) PHEMES and DICISIGNS depict events not merely as facts, but as episodes subject to the will of another (with subjunctive import).

In 1908 (EP 2: 490), Peirce augments the role of Index still further when he accords it symbolic status. This status is housed in what Peirce refers to as the “informational Index” or DICISIGN.<sup>23</sup> This kind of Index transcends its explicit function to URGE; it submits implicit arguments by compelling another’s attention to novel problem-solving approaches. Peirce widens the interpretants of pictorial signs when he affords index the means to imply meanings/effects not obviated in the sign itself (meanings unrelated to similarity or imitative sign-object relations). To elaborate, a virtual habit can imply a command to elicit responses from another to certain prospective conditions, or can convince another that newly conceived of approaches are warranted. In this way, as PHEMES, index’s influence approximates that of arguments.

When Peirce explicitly states that the term “does not clearly indicate its object” (1903: MS 491: 9), he demonstrates the true extent of index’s influence upon interpreters as argument. While in the proposition (later named “dicent/dicisign”), index explicitly draws attention to the Dynamical Object, other, more logical interpretants are implicit;<sup>24</sup> instead, meanings are left for the interpreter to speculate. When the Argument is explicit, however, both the Object and the Interpretant are

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<sup>23</sup> For further discussion, see Frederik Stjernfelt’s: “Dicisigns and Habits,” 241–64; “Dicisigns: Peirce’s Semiotic Doctrine of Propositions,” *Synthese* (2015), 1–36; and *Natural Propositions: The Actuality of Peirce’s Doctrine of Dicisigns* (Boston: Docent Press, 2014).

<sup>24</sup> Stjernfelt indicates that the dicisign is a proposition that likewise contains an implied interpretant: Dicisigns, then, are tools for the description of the phases of reasoning—we may add: “tools for making explicit propositions with the aim of conducting arguments. Thus both Rhemes and dicisigns may be seen as potential or truncated arguments rather than autonomous figures” (Stjernfelt, *Natural Propositions*, 78).

not left to speculation, which may block the way of inquiry—failing to encourage interpreters to construct and adopt for themselves viable inferences.

In sum, the success of virtual habits is directly proportional with the degree to which interpreters are permitted to infer logical meanings for themselves from the depiction. Virtual habits then constitute Phemes urging factual nuances via episodic icons; and they constitute Delomes when they have the power to submit to the interpreter novel logical event connections for their ascent. As such, virtual habits are Phemes which appeal to the mind of another for adoption. In this way, they must incorporate deictic elements of modal logic—illustrating diverse postures of possible episode participants.<sup>25</sup> As such, belief and action paths of particular others to whom the propositions of the virtual habit are submitted can be pre-experienced. This means to pre-experience the effects of episodes creates a range of real potential instantiations in which the imagined episode can have similar effects on others beyond the here and now. As such, pictures depict harnessed episodes detailing how agents and receivers can benefit from action implementation. In this way, virtual habits pre-depict successful action-paths to be taken—they flash the specific events and their sequence in the mind which have the force of compelling the enactment of plausible inferences (recommendations for courses of action).

## Conclusion

The upshot of virtual habits is the opportunity for early construction and review of potential strategies to be integrated within an objective belief and practical framework. Virtual habits allow outcomes to become obviated at an earlier stage in the inference-making process.

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<sup>25</sup> Cf. Donna West, *Deictic Imaginings: Semiosis at Work and at Play* (Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2013).

This kind of habit previews the ontological direction of action templates, associating them with their logical effects. Virtual habits depict the locations, participants, and times necessary for certain outcomes—depictions of the where, who, and when of soon to be enacted episodes. To this end, recognition of specific episode types housed within the virtual habit establishes both belief for inference plausibility and plans for how the action will be orchestrated. The specificity of the proto-plans as determinations invites immediate implementation of action-interventions, or recommendations to change action approaches. In this way, virtual habits transcend mere possibility for implementation of the action strategy; their vividity and specificity uniquely qualify them as soon to be actualized episodes.

Accordingly, virtual habits determine which images are submitted to others for contemplation (1905: CP 8.338), and which events will be put into practice, because the more impressionable the moving image, the more likely it is to be translated into conduct for problem resolution. In short, what virtual habits afford is a convincing path for immanent solutions, with index featured prominently in mentally conceived icons.



**FASHIONING EPISODES THROUGH VIRTUAL HABIT:  
THE EFFICACY OF PRE-LIVED EXPERIENCE**

**SUMMARY**

In MS 620 (1909), C. S. Peirce crafts his ultimate statement regarding habit-formation. Here he defines and illustrates the influence of specific vivid virtual habits with the objective of changing future beliefs/actions. The specificity of the proto-plans as determinations invites immediate implementation of action interventions, or recommendations to change action approaches. In this way, virtual habits transcend mere possibility

for implementation of the action strategy; their vividity and specificity uniquely qualify them as soon to be actualized episodes.

#### KEYWORDS

Peirce, virtual habit, episodic memory, dicisign, proposition.

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# Miscellanea

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MALGORZATA ŁOBACZ

**THE PROBLEM AND THE MEANING OF  
MATERIAL POVERTY IN  
THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION.  
THE ETHICAL AND PEDAGOGICAL ASPECT**

Let us . . . quietly accept our times, with the firm conviction that just as much good can be done today as at any time in the past, provided only that we have the will and the way to do it.

—Étienne Gilson<sup>1</sup>

Material poverty and all human difficulties and sufferings are regarded by man as a difficult reality. For some, this situation is a challenge to which they try to respond, others—especially the extremely poor—surrender, as they live day by day, trying to make their ends meet. At stake are also the disparities between rich and poor which increase with time, unfortunately to the detriment of the latter. The poorer half of humanity has as much wealth as the eight richest people in the world. At this point one deals with a question of globalization whose purpose is the integration and interdependence of countries, the desire to create “one world,” and so—greater solidarity and mutual support.

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<sup>1</sup> Étienne Gilson, “Medieval Universalism and Its Present Value in the Concept of Freedom,” in *Freedom: Its Meaning*, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940), 162.

However, a confrontation of these ideas with reality shows something radically different. Hence, how is it possible for the poor to find a meaning for their lives, how can they live their poverty through and avoid downgrading themselves as persons? These issues will be the central topic of discussion in this article.<sup>2</sup>

### **Poverty and Globalization**

Poverty is one of the largest and most common problems of humanity. There are countries where poverty touches only a small part of the population, but also there are those in which poverty affects a significant or even predominant number of population. The effects of poverty do not affect only the persons experiencing it, but also—in aspect of durability and range, it may affect the rest of society, including the ones considered wealthy in terms of material goods. Such situation raises many adverse phenomena, ranging from the biological and social degradation of the poor and their families, to the pathological behaviour (such as alcoholism, drug addiction) and crime.<sup>3</sup>

A very serious problem of modern times is hunger and malnutrition. Studies show that predominantly it occurs in Africa, mainly sub-Saharan part. FAO data show that the largest number of residents, about 20% (over 230 million), is struggling with natural disasters and malnutrition.<sup>4</sup> Such difficult situation can also be found in Chad, Zambia, Sierra Leone, Madagascar, Namibia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. In these

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<sup>2</sup> This article seeks to develop my previous considerations on poverty, published as: Małgorzata Łobacz, “The Role of School in Preventing the Marginalization of Poor Students,” *Journal of Preschool and Elementary School Education* 7 (2015): 95–110.

<sup>3</sup> Janusz Sztumski, “Ubóstwo jako problem społeczny [Poverty as a Social Problem],” *Polityka Społeczna* 8 (1995): 43.

<sup>4</sup> Marta Tomaszkiwicz, “Codziennie niemal miliard ludzi cierpi z powodu głodu [Almost a Billion of People Suffers from Hunger Every Day],” *Newsweek* (2016), accessed Aug 7, 2017, <http://www.newsweek.pl/swiat/glod-na-swiecie-ktore-kraje-najbardziej-dotkniete-sa-glodem-raport,artykuly,377357,1.html>.

countries the proportion of malnourished people in relation to the number of inhabitants varies from 33 to 48 percent. In addition, except for the areas in war: Syria and Iraq, the North Koreans are the most hungry among the Asian nations. Malnutrition touches there 41.6 percent of the population, that is, 10.5 million people.<sup>5</sup>

This situation arises from injustice in today's world. It takes place when some people gain disproportionately large share of the riches, and after that they isolate themselves from the rest of society.<sup>6</sup> Then, a sudden diversity among people happens, which is reflected in the increase in number of extreme groups with the lowest and highest income, and automatic reduction of the size of the group with the average income. Among other reasons, modern globalism leads to this situation. "It contributes to the economic development of the world, but its achievements are not distributed equally. The rich benefit more and the poor relatively less."<sup>7</sup> The financial gap between very wealthy people and those living in poverty constantly increases. In Oxfam's report, 3.6 billion of the poorest people in the world (half of the population) has about 426 billion dollars, which is as much as the eight richest people in the world have to their disposal. Around 795 million people in the world is starving. Starvation is not equally spread, geographically it concerns mainly the countries of the global South. Every ninth person

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<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Władysław Zuziak, "Etyka chrześcijańska wobec rozwarstwienia materialnego [Christian Ethics towards Material Disproportion]," in *Etyczne aspekty bogacenia się i ubóstwa [Ethical Aspects of Getting Rich and Poverty]*, ed. Adam Węgrzecki (Kraków: Akademia Ekonomiczna, 2003), 73.

<sup>7</sup> Włodzimierz Malendowski, ed., *Świat u progu XXI wieku. Wybrane problemy [The world on the beginning of the 20 century]* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe INPiD UAM, 2003).

in the world is starving, but every third person in the world suffers for some form of malnutrition.<sup>8</sup>

The existing crisis clearly has showed that the impact of globalization on poverty reduction is rather insignificant. Slowing economic growth stems largely from deep recession in countries that are big exporters of raw materials, in emerging markets and developing economies. Close to 60% of the countries referred to as emerging markets have had an increase lower than the long-term average. Developing countries exporting raw materials have increased by only 0.3 percent. The economists of the World Bank indicate that weak economic growth in 2016 was the result of not only lesser economic activity or a decline in foreign direct investment, but also the political uncertainty.<sup>9</sup> This situation favours the extension of poverty as well as social problems. The problem, however, does not lie in the fact of possessions, but in the way they are used.

Wealth often brings risks associated with selfish greed, desire for possession, laziness, sensual temptations and dishonesty. This, in turn, causes a threat both for the community and for the individuals.<sup>10</sup> Plato, in his famous dialogue “The Republic,” claims that people focused on acquiring and enlarging their assets enhance their greed, which becomes a major obstacle in their spiritual development. Excessive wealth makes people lazy, brings luxury and triggers subversive aspirations.<sup>11</sup> The problem of “unnecessary needs” luring men from what really mat-

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<sup>8</sup> United Nations Children’s Fund: A humanitarian organisation being a part of the UNO. It provides with medical care and helps in crisis, and elementary education for children in developing countries.

<sup>9</sup> *Bank Światowy* [The World Bank], accessed Aug 10, 2017, <http://biznes.onet.pl/wiadomosci/swiat/bank-swiatowy-w-2017-roku-globalny-wzrost-gospodarczy-wyniesie-2-7-proc-zagrozeniem/6qjsep>.

<sup>10</sup> Andrzej Zwoliński, *Etyka bogacenia się* [*Ethics of Getting Rich*] (Warszawa: WAM, 2002), 251.

<sup>11</sup> Platon, *Państwo* [Plato, *Republic*], vol. 2, trans. Władysław Witwicki (Warszawa: Alfa, 1994), 113–22.

ters was also noticed by ancient Christian moralists. Complaining about the so-called *polyktemosyne* (focusing on an excessive multitude of things in life), they urged to seek true values, thanks to which men could “grow” as persons.<sup>12</sup>

Wars and hatred in the world, and the division of humanity to the rich and the poor, contribute to poverty and, thus, to the dehumanization of those who must endure it. The power over the needy and excessive quest for prosperity multiply the clusters of both material and spiritual misery. And though food production is growing faster than population, a significant number of people die of hunger. This condition is a result of a big waste of life sustenance in the hands of the rich, while it would feed almost all the hungry people.<sup>13</sup>

The basis of growing poverty can be also found in capitalist economy and unemployment, as well as the lack of skills that come into being in the new system due to a habit to make a claim on the state institutions. This situation is even more difficult to overcome as the institutions responsible for social assistance do not have adequate funds to help people in need and restrict their support to the most drastic situations.

Poverty, being a significant social problem, causes clearly negative effects in this area. It reduces demand for goods, and at the same time market capacity which inhibits economic development. It prevents or significantly impedes the use of the existing opportunities to acquire education and maintain good health by the poor. It contributes to the growth of crime, and especially offences against property. It promotes the development of social pathology too, such as drug abuse and homelessness.<sup>14</sup> This problem was already noted in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, when

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<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 52–3.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 272.

<sup>14</sup> Tadeusz Kowalak, Ewa Leś, “Kwestia ubóstwa [A Problem of Poverty],” in *Polityka społeczna*, ed. Antoni Rajkiewicz et al. (Warszawa: Interart, 1996), 142.

there was a push for taking care of the poor in order to protect the public against the hotbeds of epidemic and criminals.

Misery is particularly severely experienced by those who are socially excluded, among which those chronically sick, unemployed, single mothers, people with disabilities, victims of the pathology of family life, and elder people are often found. They experience discrimination due to the lack of proper legislation, existing biases and stereotypes. The excluded people have limited access to relevant institutions which could help them improve their financial situation. They possess features that hinder them from using the common social resources due to the disability, dependence, long-term illness or other reasons.

In 2009, Pope Benedict XVI in his *Message for the World Day of Peace*, stressed that one of the main ways of building peace is globalization for the common good of the whole human family. He noted, however, that in order to do this, what is needed is a strong global solidarity between rich and poor countries, as well as within individual states, also the rich ones. “A ‘common code of ethics’ is also needed, consisting of norms based not upon mere consensus, but rooted in the natural law inscribed by the Creator on the conscience of every human being.”<sup>15</sup> He emphasized, therefore, that in this world it is becoming more and more obvious that peace is built only when the possibility of equitable growth is provided to all. The failures of unjust systems sooner or later will have to be taken into account. “It is utterly foolish to build a luxury home in the midst of desert or decay. Globalization on its own is incapable of building peace, and in many cases, it actually creates divisions and conflicts.”<sup>16</sup> Globalization centered on the welfare of every human being should head toward the solidarity of all humanity.

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<sup>15</sup> Benedict XVI, “Message for the 42<sup>nd</sup> World Day of Peace,” #8, accessed Aug 7, 2017, <https://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/messages.index.html#messages>.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, #14.

## **Ways of Helping the Needy**

Therefore, how should the poor be helped? Above all, the essential aim of any action for the poor should be breaking isolation and including them in the normal course of social life.<sup>17</sup> Existing forms of aid are grants and other payments for those in need which only perpetuate the social dependence of the poor. It is, therefore, illusionary help. "Granting unemployment benefits by the state . . . is in fact closing eyes to the need for a reform of the labor system, which in turn comes down to the need to reform the whole economic structure."<sup>18</sup>

That is why, such conditions need to be created so as to work and income have precedence over the financial aid.<sup>19</sup> To prevent this, the modern system of aid should, in lieu of gifts and loans, enable professional development of the poor.

Service to the poor and the needy in today's reality is a must not only social and charity organizations should face, but also individual countries and their specialized institutions. Eliminating the causes of poverty and the prevention of its effects become the challenge of social policy in each country. It is essential here to shape the appropriate allocation of state goods and services produced in the economy so that no one is excluded from access to them, and thereby, to ensure that it can satisfy at least the everyone's necessary needs.

To remedy a social problem namely poverty, international organizations such as the United Nations and ILO (International Labor Or-

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<sup>17</sup> Jerzy Boczoń, Witold Toczyski, Anna Zielińska, "Ubóstwo jako zjawisko społeczne oraz przedmiot pracy socjalnej [Poverty as a Social Phenomenon and a Subject of Social Work]," in *Pedagogika społeczna [Social Pedagogy]*, ed. Tadeusz Pilch, Irena Lepalczyk (Warszawa: "Żak," 1995), 364.

<sup>18</sup> Czesław Strzeszewski, *Praca ludzka: zagadnienie społeczno-moralne [Human Work: Social and Moral Issues]* (Lublin: TN KUL, 1978), 240.

<sup>19</sup> Danuta Zalewska, *Ubóstwo: Teorie, badania [Poverty: Theories, studies]* (Wrocław: Uwr, 1997), 11.

ganisation) are trying to enact specific actions to eliminate poverty in the world. Their poverty alleviation programs involve, first and foremost, increasing employment, pursuit of a sustainable economic development (available thanks to preservation and protection of resources), introduction of family planning, granting rights to resources to groups and local organisations.

Every development and every progress must put the human person in the center. Great changes and improvements, which we experience, cannot affect a human being, especially a poor and injured one; they cannot be implemented at all cost, if they are really to be worthy of man.<sup>20</sup> In his encyclical *Sollicitudo rei socialis*, John Paul II stresses that the constitutive element of the human progress “is the continual reappraisal of man’s work, both in the aspect of its objective finality and in the aspect of the dignity of the subject of all work, that is to say, man.”<sup>21</sup> Therefore, he pushes for the national and international programmes to take into account the “creative initiative” of every person, and activate them to work, instead of relieving them from poverty by giving donations.

Today, poverty is considered as a structural defect of specific communities. Among the reasons that cause this phenomenon one should name: unemployment, inadequacy of wages in relation to the work performed, the rate of change in economy exceeding the adaptation skills of workers finding new occupations and facing various forms of discrimination in the labor market.

In the Third World countries hunger and chronic malnutrition are mass phenomena. The populations of South Asia and Africa live in permanent malnutrition. Despite the progress in economic development and industrialization, the extent of hunger in many countries has a

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<sup>20</sup> John Paul II, “*Sollicitudo rei socialis*” (Rome 1987), #27–34, accessed Aug 10, 2017, <http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en.html>.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, #18.



growing tendency. A multitude of people suffer from starvation, not having access to drinking water and medical care.

Along with deepening material difficulties, numerous forms of assistance to those in need develop. Among the foreign organizations some deserve attention, these are: UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund),<sup>22</sup> WFP (World Food Programme),<sup>23</sup> Save the Children,<sup>24</sup> Oxfam (Oxford Committee for Famine Relief),<sup>25</sup> a French Action Contre la Faim (Action Against Hunger),<sup>26</sup> or Doctors Without Borders.<sup>27</sup>

In Poland, aid for the needy is provided in various forms. There are many organizations that support those in need: Polish Humanitarian Action, Polish Center of International Aid, Education for Democracy Foundation, Polish Medical Mission, Hear Africa Foundation, World Culture Foundation. The number of foundations is increasing, as well as *ad hoc* actions are often undertaken to help those suffering materially and physically: "Runnig for the Future," "Join us!," "A layette for a student," "Gold Rush," "The Campaign to Fight with Hunger," "The Truth about Aids," "Christmas Work to Help Children," "A Slice of Bread."

The existence of organizations and actions for the needy is a promotion of due respect for human dignity. The civilizational, technological and economic development and progress should never be done at the expense of a person. Moreover, poverty does not give anyone the

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<sup>22</sup> See note 6.

<sup>23</sup> The biggest humanitarian organisation in the world brought up to fight with hunger in the world.

<sup>24</sup> An international organisation whose aim is to introduce exceptional aid as well as long-lasting international development and activity focused on children and their families.

<sup>25</sup> An international humanitarian organisation whose aim is to fight with hunger in the world, and provide help in developing countries.

<sup>26</sup> An international organisation to fight with hunger in the world.

<sup>27</sup> An international organisation whose aim is to enable access to medical care to all people, especially in the war zone.

right to deprive the poor of their dignity. While being poor, men should see themselves as persons destined to grow in their humanity.

### **Poverty: A Chance for Personal Development**

In accordance with the universal ethical principles all people should be treated in the same way, especially those most suffering from illness or spiritual and material deficiencies. The weak require special care, therefore they are first to be given support and help.<sup>28</sup>

Paradoxically, experiencing weakness and human infirmity can contribute to the development of human personality. Awareness of the fact of the inadequacy and finiteness of their lives can direct poor and suffering persons to look for and discover absolute, unchangeable values in which they could find support and meaning. Such an effect, however, is not easy to be brought about, as it requires that the poor and suffering accept their limits and take an active attitude to them, for—as Adam Rodziński writes—“suffering is a work.”<sup>29</sup> It is also an expression of man’s transcendence to his tangible and intangible deficiencies. It allows discovering unchangeable living structures in the reality of openness to the supernatural. Awareness of such structures gives meaning to human life in the realm of contingency. Through the potentiality of human nature, persons are able to rebuild goodness encapsulated in themselves.

Poverty is also a special chance for those who stay with the needy to fulfill their humanity. Giving aid to the weak, they also help themselves, growing up as people. A kind of selflessness and treating people, especially the poor, sick and suffering, in a spirit of goodwill is that which is characteristic for such people. A man becomes mature

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<sup>28</sup> Cf. John Paul II, “Sollicitudo rei socialis,” #17.

<sup>29</sup> Adam Rodziński, *Na orbitach wartości [On the Orbits of Values]* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1998), 282.

when he can see a particular value of the person, as the fullness of humanity is only reached in seeing others in the light of love. In overcoming one's limits by living with values, one finds his own fulfilment as a human person.<sup>30</sup> Through it, one achieves a form of self-possession and self-governance. "In the action the person achieves his own accomplishment by becoming 'somebody' and the being 'somebody' is his manifestation of himself,"<sup>31</sup> and thus the transcendence of the acting person occurs. Next to the pursuit of "life according to a pattern," the person can also, although he should not, grow up to final split between what we are called to do and who we are as a result of specific self-determinations.<sup>32</sup> However, if he wants to achieve his fullness, the person needs to realize his contingency. These days, people are generally reluctant to think of their natural fragility and limitations, and escape into the wide variety of ideologies demanding pragmatism, consumerism or hedonistic lifestyle.<sup>33</sup>

A man as a person is multilaterally entangled in relationships, and at the same time he realizes that he is a subject of these relationships; he is self-aware of being a subject of his activity and experience. He also knows the nature of his ties with society; he knows that without community he could not be born as he needs parents, he could not get education or live personal life as he needs other persons to experience relationships which connect him with community. The first foundation of the need to establish social relationships seems to be contingency and potentiality of humanity. As a contingent being, man does not pos-

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<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 113.

<sup>31</sup> Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, trans. Andrzej Potocki (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), 157.

<sup>32</sup> Rodziński, *Na orbitach wartości*, 128.

<sup>33</sup> Wojciech Chudy, "Powołanie osoby niepełnosprawnej w nauczaniu papieża Jana Pawła II [The Calling of a Disabled Person in the Teaching of John Paul II]," in *Osoba niepełnosprawna i jej miejsce w społeczeństwie [The Disabled Person and His Place in the Society]*, ed. Dorota Kornas-Biela (Lublin: RW KUL, 1988), 130.

ness himself or goods necessary for life by himself as his own. As a potential being, he is aimed at good in order to complement his humanity. The inclination of the human person toward self-fulfilment is natural, i.e. necessary. The self-fulfilment of man as his natural assignment is carried out through specific relations with human and non-human beings in various human activities. Thus, in man as a personal being, there is a number of layers through which his personal life is actualized.<sup>34</sup>

The difficult situation of a poor person is an invitation for others to make a self-gift whereby they have a chance to enrich themselves. It all depends on them what they will do, which way they will choose, and how deeply they will engage. Will it be a journey of moral obligation connected with love to the person in need in the center? Or, will it be the road full of selfishness, leading to apparent happiness? Plato, who identified ethics with the theory of happiness, found that happiness is the source and reason for the existence of man. The essence of happiness, which is the final goal of human activity, is described as a moral obligation or valuable act which is ethical, i.e. serves man's self-realization. The excessive luxury which means an access to all types of material goods, often makes people "slaves" of property and immediate satisfaction, who regard nothing apart from proliferation of goods which they already possess, or replacing them with others, more perfect. This is what is called "civilization of 'consumption' or 'consumerism', which involves so much 'throwing-away' and 'waste'."<sup>35</sup>

The spread of various forms of social and economic injustice which touch masses of people, provokes the outrage of many whose fundamental rights have been denied and trampled upon. It calls for a radical renewal of individuals and societies "capable of ensuring jus-

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<sup>34</sup> Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Osoba i naród wobec globalizmu [The Person and the Nation towards Globalism]," *Człowiek w Kulturze* 14 (2002): 5–16.

<sup>35</sup> John Paul II, "Sollicitudo rei socialis," #28.

tice, solidarity, honesty and openness.”<sup>36</sup> The actual respect for human dignity and rights will not be possible unless individuals and communities overcome “self-interest, fear, greed and the thirst for power.”<sup>37</sup>

## Conclusion

People living next to each other are in a way dependent on one another. While meeting with each other, they experience each other, as they are “Others” in an ontological sense: I am not you, but you are not me.<sup>38</sup> People met and experienced are also “Others” in a physical and spiritual sense as those who are richer or poorer. There is a kind of asynchrony in relationships with the “Other” who is a weak, a poor, a widow, an orphan, etc., while I am rich and powerful.<sup>39</sup>

Help given to “Others” allows to find, experience and understand their dignity and human value. Such an attitude liberates help-givers from selfishness focused on the pursuit of their own benefits, enhances their readiness to help, arouses compassion, and makes them more aware of our contingency.

Each person lives in a certain social reality, at a specified level of existence. Within its borders, i.e. standards adopted by the community, they must find indispensable minimum needed for living. However, people affected by poverty, limited by economic barriers, may fail to

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<sup>36</sup> John Paul II, “Veritatis splendor,” #98, accessed Aug 10, 2017, <http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals.index.html#encyclicals>.

<sup>37</sup> John Paul II, “Address to the Young People in *Rizal Park*,” Manila, Saturday, 14 January 1995, #16, accessed Aug 10, 2017, <https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1995.index.html#speeches>.

<sup>38</sup> Anna Walczak, “Koncepcja rozumienia Innego w kategorii spotkania [The Conception of the Understanding of Another in the Category of Meeting], in *Pedagogika społeczna [Social Pedagogy]*, vol. 1, ed. Ewa Marynowicz-Hetka (Warszawa: PWN, 2006), 432.

<sup>39</sup> Emmanuel Levinas, *Czas i to, co inne [Time and the Other]*, trans. Jacek Migasiński (Warszawa: KR, 1999), 94.

fully meet the standards of participation in social life. This, in turn, most commonly entails the social exclusion, rejection, or isolation of the poorer part of the population. In the source literature, the term “poverty subculture” is used to describe the poor and their way of life. A man who is located within the range of influence of such subculture, is subject to many psychosocial mechanisms which determine his attitude and behavior.<sup>40</sup>

Poverty improperly dealt with by society may lead to or cause a depersonalization of both the poor and their neighbors. For the former are always exposed to danger of being attached with tags, ostracized, marginalized, stigmatized, and the latter—of missing the chance for personal fulfilment. In order to avoid the threat of depersonalization, then, poverty should be approached not only as a social problem, but also as a valuable lesson of humanity.



**THE PROBLEM AND THE MEANING OF MATERIAL POVERTY IN  
THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION.  
THE ETHICAL AND PEDAGOGICAL ASPECT**

**SUMMARY**

The author discusses the social and anthropological problem of material poverty from the ethical and pedagogical perspective. The article consists of three sections which respectively concentrate on the following topics: (a) poverty and globalization, (b) ways of helping the needy, and (c) poverty as a chance for personal development. The author concludes that poverty improperly approached by society can lead to a depersonalization of both the poor and those who live with them: the former are attached with tags or marginalized, and the latter miss the chance for personal development. In order to avoid depersonalization, then, poverty should be understood not only as a social problem, but also as a valuable lesson of humanity.

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<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 232.

## KEYWORDS

material poverty, ethics, pedagogy, society, globalization, poor, needy, person, other, personal development, depersonalization, humanity.

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**J. MARIANNE SIEGMUND**

**SILENCE AND  
THE AUDIBILITY OF THE WORD:  
CONTEMPLATIVE LISTENING AS A FUNDAMENTAL  
ACT OF THE NEW EVANGELIZATION  
PART 2: JESUS CHRIST, THE ETERNAL LISTENER\***

While part one of my arguing for contemplative listening as a fundamental act of the new evangelization shows that man’s ontological listening is an obedient readiness to hear the Word,<sup>1</sup> the present part claims that this readiness is modeled upon the eternal Listener, Jesus Christ.

The context of my argument concerns what it means to say that Christ reveals the human person to himself as a listener. Of primary importance is that one’s listening is based on the model of Christ’s own personhood. The first point I need to secure, then, is how the Son is a Listener. Explaining that involves showing first that the Son’s possession of divinity *as received* from the Father does not imply subordina-

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<sup>1</sup> J. Marianne Siegmund, “Silence and the Audibility of the Word: Contemplative Listening as a Fundamental Act of the New Evangelization. Part 1: An Anthropology of Listening,” *Studia Gilsoniana* 6, no. 4 (October–December 2017): 585–607.

tionism, but a perfection. Some texts from Thomas Aquinas will help show that reception in God is a perfection.

A second step is necessary in order to see how one may speak of the Son as a Listener, namely, that reception implies a kind of obedience. Since the Son receives the divine nature from the Father,<sup>2</sup> he can accurately be called obedient, precisely inasmuch as he possesses divinity *as received*. With the help of Hans Urs von Balthasar, who, in turn, develops Saint Thomas Aquinas, one shall see the importance of showing that reception implies an obedience. In addition, von Balthasar will also help show that the Son's obedience is not subordinationism.

Granted that the Son is obedient, my third step is to see how the Son's obedience is analogous to listening, and that the Son is the Listener, *par excellence*, in the Trinity by the very manner in which he possesses divinity. With my final point, it becomes clear that man is a listener based upon the model of the Son, for man's orientation to the Word is a form of listening.

### **Receiving: A Perfection in God**

The eternal Word is not only what man is created to hear, but he is also the uncreated model of man's hearing. This implies that the Word is not only Word, but is also the Listener to the Word that he himself is. Saying that the Word is also the Listener to the Word that he is makes a seemingly novel claim that I will need to justify. I do so by showing that there is something like obedient readiness in the Son's generation from the Father. Of course, this raises a question with re-

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<sup>2</sup> The *Catechism of the Catholic Church* speaks of God as "the first origin of everything and transcendent authority [primam omnium esse originem et auctoritatem transcendentem]." Further, as mentioned in the tenth footnote in the *Introduction* to this work, the Father is referred to as the "fontem et originem totius divinitatis [source and origin of all divinity]." Concilium Toletanum VI (anno 638), *De Trinitate et de Filio Dei Redemptore incarnato*: DS 490, in *Catechismus Catholicae Ecclesiae* (Citta del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1997), #239 and #245.

spect to classical Trinitarian theology. How can there be something like obedient readiness in the Son, given that he is God? Is he not exempt from obedience by nature? The first step that will enable me to address these questions will be to show that Thomas provides an opening, which allows me to make the seemingly radical claim that receiving is a perfection in God. Such an entryway is found in his concept of the divine persons as subsistent relations. For my discussion of subsistent relations in God, I first survey the whole of question twenty-nine in the first part of the *Summa Theologiae*, in order to provide a context for article four, which is my main focus.<sup>3</sup>

In question twenty-nine, Thomas is trying to show that the Boethian definition of *person* applies to the Trinity. Articles one and two explain and defend the validity of the definition. Article three argues for its application to God. However, when Thomas arrives at article four, he faces a problem: we speak of Father, Son and Holy Spirit as if they were three, distinct, individual substances, and necessarily so, inasmuch as they are indeed three distinct persons. And yet, as Augustine teaches, the persons differ, not as distinct substances, but as distinct relations. The question then, is this: does *person* in God signify the divine substance as essence or as relation? Thomas' answer is that *person*, applied to a Trinitarian person, signifies a relation as subsisting: "In God, 'person' signifies relation as subsisting."<sup>4</sup>

Thus follows several ontological implications for Thomas. That is, the persons have distinct being, but that distinction is relation. For example, the Father is his relation of paternity. In fact, he is a sheer paternity that is, simultaneously, the *suppositum* of paternity without

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<sup>3</sup> *S.Th.*, I, 29, 4. My analysis of the following Thomistic texts will be a continual comparison between the Latin edition and the English translation.

<sup>4</sup> *S.Th.*, I, 29, 4: "Persona igitur divina significat relationem ut subsistentem."

metaphysical complexity.<sup>5</sup> Thomas' use of *suppositum*, or subject, shows that the relation *is* the ontological subject that bears the relation. Divine paternity is God the Father, who is a divine person.<sup>6</sup> And, just as God the Father is paternity, so also God the Son is filiation, or being begotten.<sup>7</sup>

Thomas asserts, then, that the Son is his sonship, and his sonship is his act of being begotten. My next task is to qualify this assertion because, according to Thomas, a rational distinction exists between the Son being his sonship, and sonship being his act of being begotten. The distinction that qualifies my position, then, is Thomas' differentiation between notional acts, or acts that characterize the divine persons, and their relations, which are conceptually distinct from the notional acts.<sup>8</sup> When Thomas speaks of a notional act as that which characterizes a divine person, he means, for example, that "begetting" is a notional act that characterizes the Father. Similarly, "being-begotten" is a notional act that characterizes the Son. Although Thomas indicates that notional acts are conceptually distinct from the divine relations, he implies that they are the same, substantially. Thomas teaches, "the relations *according to our mode of understanding* follow upon the notional acts."<sup>9</sup> While both paternity and begetting describe the Father, there is a

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<sup>5</sup> *S.Th.*, I, 29, 4, ad. 2. The *suppositum* is the substance looked at from the logical point of view as bearer of the properties, that is, as the subject of the predicate. Applied to God, when we say that the Father is the *suppositum* of paternity we mean that he not only *has* paternity, but that he *is* paternity.

<sup>6</sup> *S.Th.*, I, 29, 4: "Sicut ergo deitas est Deus, ita paternitas divina est Deus Pater, qui est persona divina [Therefore, just as the Godhead is God, so is divine paternity God the Father, who is a divine person]."

<sup>7</sup> *S.Th.*, I, 30, 2: "Paternitas igitur subsistens est persona Patris, et filiatio subsistens est persona Filii [Therefore, subsisting paternity is the person of the Father, and subsisting sonship is the person of the Son]."

<sup>8</sup> *S.Th.*, I, 40, 4.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* The translation is given above for the Latin original: "relationes, secundum modum intelligendi, consequuntur actus notionales."

rational distinction between the two: the notional act of begetting belongs to the Father, but generation precedes the concept of paternity. Likewise, while the Son is his sonship, being begotten precedes the concept of filiation. However, substantially, the Son is both his sonship and his being begotten. Therefore, just as one may speak of the Father as identical to his paternity and to his act of begetting, so also may one speak of the Son as identical to his sonship and to his act of being begotten.

Joseph Ratzinger helps show how Thomas' argument, that the three divine persons *are* their giving and receiving, implies an "ontological revolution" in our understanding of the Trinity. As opposed to a merely intrapersonal understanding in the Trinity, this "ontological revolution" signifies the dynamism of interpersonal communion. If the Son is his sonship and his being begotten, then he "stands in complete relativity of existence toward the one who sent him."<sup>10</sup> Ratzinger explains that the Son's very existence is "being from someone and toward someone," because the Son is "absolute openness of existence without any reservation of what is merely and properly his own."<sup>11</sup> In other words, the Son is "nothing" more or less than his openness to the Father, ontologically. If the Son is relation and "exists only *as* relation," then his existence in relation implies that his receiving is a perfection.<sup>12</sup>

One might wonder whether the Son's act of receiving himself from the Father really is, in fact, a perfection. In the *Summa Theologiae* I, 27, 1, ad 3, Thomas implies that it is. He teaches,

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<sup>10</sup> Joseph Ratzinger, "Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology," *Communio International Catholic Review* 17, no. 3 (Fall 1990): 446. Here, Ratzinger cites Jn. 20:21 as an example of the Father sending the Son. In the Gospel according to John, the theme of the Son being "sent" is prevalent. It appears, for example, no less than six times in chapter seventeen alone (Jn. 17:3, 8, 18, 21, 23, 25), while in the Gospel itself, it is mentioned at least thirty-five times.

<sup>11</sup> Ratzinger, "Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology," 446.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 444.

To proceed from a principle, so as to be something external and different from that principle, is irreconcilable with the idea of a first principle; but to proceed from what is intimate and without diversity by way of intelligence is included in the idea of a first principle.<sup>13</sup>

In this text, Thomas teaches that, in God, when the Son or Spirit proceed from the Father, or first principle, their intimacy with the first principle is necessarily held intact. The relevance of this text is evident: because the Son proceeds from the first principle, while remaining within the first principle, the Son's act of receiving himself is a perfection. Thomas concludes that, in the perfection of the divine existence itself "are contained both the Word intelligibly proceeding and the principle of the Word, as whatever belongs to his perfection."<sup>14</sup>

One may object that, because whatever is generated, "receives its existence from the generator," the Son derives his existence from the Father as a creature.<sup>15</sup> In order to answer this objection, Thomas speaks of the similarity and difference between being created and being generated. After providing a couple of texts from the *Summa Theologiae* I, 27, 2, ad 3, I comment upon them in order to show that the Son's act of receiving himself does not mean that he is created, or that he is in any way subordinate to the Father.

Thomas teaches that on one hand, "what is generated in God gets (*accipit*) its existence (*esse*) from the generator, not as though that existence (*esse*) were received (*receptum*) into matter or into a subject,

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<sup>13</sup> *S.Th.*, I, 27, 1, ad 3. The Latin for the above translation reads, "procedere a principio ut extraneum et diversum, repugnat rationi primi principii: sed procedere ut intimum et absque diversitate, per modum intelligibilem, includitur in ratione primi principii."

<sup>14</sup> *S.Th.*, I, 27, 2, ad 3. "In ipsa enim perfectione divini esse continetur et verbum intelligibiliter procedens, et principium verbi; sicut et quaecumque ad eius perfectionem pertinent . . ."

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* The Latin for the above translation reads, "accipit esse a generante." Note that Thomas uses the word *accipit* for "receives." I note the significance of its use in the next paragraph.

which would conflict with the divine self-subsistence.”<sup>16</sup> Clearly, then, what is created comes from God, but, although sustaining creation, he remains distinct from it. In other words, the creature receives a perfection—of existence—to which it is not identical.

In the same text of the *Summa Theologiae*, I, 27, 2, ad 3, once Thomas has spoken of how God creates, he next discusses the different way the Son is generated from the Father, for the Son is not created. He explains, “when we speak of [the Son’s] existence (*esse*) as gotten (*acceptum*), we mean that he who proceeds from another has divine existence (*esse*) not as if he were other than the divine existing *esse*,” for the Son is of the same substance as the Father.<sup>17</sup> In both this text and the text in the preceding paragraph above, Thomas distinguishes between “getting,” or “accepting,” [*accipere*] and “receiving” [*recipere*]. He speaks of the Son “getting” his divinity, not “receiving” it. Thomas’ distinction points to a specific use of “receiving” to indicate getting a perfection that is not identical to oneself. Creation “receives” its existence in such a way that its existence is not itself. Unlike creation, however, the Son “gets” *esse*, but in such a way that he *is* identical to the *esse* he “gets.” Moreover, the Son *is* the *esse* he receives because there is no interval between receiving *esse* and being that *esse*. Therefore, the Son “gets” divine existence—so he does “receive” in a broad sense of the word—but he receives it in such a way that he is this *esse*. The distinction between “getting” and “receiving” supports our point: that the Son’s act of “receiving” divinity from the Father is a perfection, because it indicates his reception of divinity as that which is himself.

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<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* The Latin for the above translation reads, “quod est genitum in divinis, accipit esse a generante, non tanquam illud esse sit receptum in aliqua materia vel sebiecto (quod repugnat subsistentiae divini esse).”

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* The Latin for the above translation reads, “hoc dicitur esse acceptum, inquantum procedens ab alio habet esse divinum, non quasi aliud ab esse divino existens.”

By describing the divine persons as subsistent relations and the Son as his being begotten, Thomas prepares the ground for saying that receiving is, indeed, a perfection in God. But, if receiving *is* a perfection, how might one maintain that the Son's self-reception is analogous to listening? How can the eternal Son *listen*, as if to say that he is characterized by obedient readiness? Consequently, how may one claim that the Son *obeys* without falling into subordinationism?

### **The Son's Self-Reception: An Obedient Readiness**

Having seen with Thomas that the Son *is* subsistent self-reception by way of generation, I will proceed by showing the Son's self-reception as obedient readiness by relying on von Balthasar's development of the Son as subsistent relation to the Father.

By showing that obedience characterizes the Son as a divine person—and that such obedience is not subordinationism—I shall be able to argue that his obedience is intrinsically analogous to listening. And, if the obedience of the Son is analogous to listening, then the human person as listener—created on the model of Christ, who is the “true fulfillment of the idea of the human person”<sup>18</sup>—finds a theological grounding.

Let's begin with an important passage from *A Theology of History* by von Balthasar, which presents his view of the Son's inherent obedient readiness.

The Son's form of existence, which makes him the Son from all eternity (Jn. 17:5), is the uninterrupted reception of everything that he is, of his very self, from the Father. It is indeed this receiving of himself which gives him his “I,” his own inner dimension, his spontaneity, that sonship with which he can answer the Father in a reciprocal giving. In the same way that the Father's

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<sup>18</sup> Ratzinger, “Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology,” 450.



act of generation is not an outpouring into emptiness, but terminates in the begotten fruit; so the self of the Son is not the reception of something eternally alien . . . but the bestowal upon him of that which is most his own. But his communion with the Father is not merely like that of a human son with the one who has begotten him—simply a communion in their common human nature—but is a communion in the eternally uninterrupted act of his own generation, in which alone he is image and word and response. In the selfsame act in which he receives himself (and hence his divine understanding) he receives, too, the entire will of the Father concerning God and the world, and assents to it as his own.

But if, as Saint Thomas has it, his mission in this world is the manifestation, conformed to this world, of his being begotten (*generatio*), then his mode of being here on earth will simply be the manifestation in the created sphere, the translation into creatureliness, of this heavenly form of existence: existence as receiving, as openness to the will of the Father, as subsistent fulfillment of that will in a continuous mission. The Son in heaven . . . and on earth . . . [is] he who is open, he who receives, he who obeys . . . Just as the Son in heaven never interprets and uses his being a person in such a way as to shut himself off, but only as an arena of reception and response, so the incarnate Son's "self-consciousness" never becomes an object for him (for he has it only as something to give to God and to men); for the man Jesus, his hypostatic union with the Logos is not a religious entity, a theme in its own right; rather, the form of his human self-awareness is the expression, in terms of this world, of his eternal consciousness as Son.<sup>19</sup>

In a manner of speaking that differs from Thomas, von Balthasar's explanation of the earthly attitude of Jesus, which reveals the character of his eternal person, describes him in a concrete, lively sense of personal exchange. While von Balthasar does not explicitly comment upon Thomas, he is, in fact, "putting flesh" on the notion of subsistent

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<sup>19</sup> Hans Urs von Balthasar, *A Theology of History* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 30–2.

relation. He particularly helps one see the richness of the Son as his act of being begotten.

In the passage above, von Balthasar emphasizes that the Son is not only his own. Indeed, he is the Son “from all eternity,” uninterruptedly receiving “his very self from the Father.”<sup>20</sup> Further, von Balthasar explicitly speaks of the Son receiving divinity from the Father, the source and origin of divinity. In receiving divinity, the Son reciprocates that generosity back to the Father and it is their communion in “the eternally uninterrupted act” of the Son’s generation.<sup>21</sup> Next, von Balthasar makes it clear that the Son is not subordinate to the Father, for he receives divinity as *his own*. Because divinity belongs to the Son by divine right, as “that which is most his own,” he is not subordinate to the Father. One may conclude, then, that the Son is co-equal, co-eternal and consubstantial with the Father, as Nicaea teaches.<sup>22</sup>

Von Balthasar speaks of the Son receiving divine will and of obeying in some sense. In fact, the Son’s obedience to his own self-reception from the Father is obedience to the very form of his existence, which von Balthasar describes as “receiving, as openness to the will of the Father.”<sup>23</sup> But further, the Son receives divinity as *his*, but always with a relation to the Father that he is. Always receiving himself from the Father means the Son always consents to the Father’s will; such radical consent embodies the Son’s constant readiness. Evident in all of this, one has the liveliness of an event happening now. This dynamic self-reception of the Son is simultaneous with his reception of “the en-

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<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

tire will of the Father concerning God and the world,” to which he “assents . . . as his own.”<sup>24</sup>

How may one understand the Son’s reception of the divine will as obedience without subordinationism? The divine will of the Son manifests his obedience to the Father because he receives will with his divinity precisely as *given from* the Father. By possessing the divine will with his divinity as *received*, the Son *obeys* the form of his existence, and in readiness, he consents to it as his own.<sup>25</sup>

To speak of the Son receiving the Father’s divine will seems to suggest that he is subordinate to the Father. This is not true, however, for in the Godhead, there is only one will. To speak of the Son receiving the Father’s will, then, means that he *receives* it as his own will, which is the same will as that of the Father. The same will that begets, is the same will that is begotten. And, the fact that the divine will is always the Son’s will, means that his reception of it is a perpetual event.

The Son’s obedience in the Trinity, however, is not a human obedience; it is manifested in a human mode in the obedience of Jesus, who embodies the eternal attitude of the Son. The earthly attitude of Jesus’ obedience is the incarnate expression of an event within the divine Godhead. The Son’s earthly “form of existence” signifies his Trinitarian life.<sup>26</sup> Because the life of Jesus on earth is one of human obedience, von Balthasar precisely specifies his existence “as receiving, as openness to the will of the Father, as subsistent fulfillment of that will in a continuous mission.”<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.* There is one divine will in the Blessed Trinity. The Father possesses the divine will as *origin*, whereas the Son possesses the divine will as *received*.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

## The Son's Obedience and Listening

Granted that the Son receives divinity from the Father as that which is given, yet always possessed, and granted that the form of the Son's existence is receptive obedience, how does the Son's self-reception imply listening? What does it mean to say that the Son is both the Word and the hearer of the Word that he is? The task of this part of my argument is to elucidate the sense of the Son's self-reception as listening, since, as obedient sonship, he is both Word and hearer of the Word.

How is the Son's obedient readiness analogous to listening? First, the Son is the Word. But also, the Word receives himself. To say that the Word receives himself means that the Son wants to be nothing but what the Father says. For, the Word is not only from the Father and toward the Father, but also *the Word* is "existence that is completely path and openness," which I have described as obedience.<sup>28</sup> That the Son wants to be what the Father says implies a fidelity to the intention of the Father speaking that is analogous to listening. In fact, the Word *is* that act of listening, precisely because he is the perfect expression of the mind of the Father; he wants to be only what the Father wants him to be. Therefore, to say that the Son obeys the Father by his self-reception as Word—for he receives himself as "image and word and response"—is to say that the Son's self-reception is listening.<sup>29</sup> Because the Son, the Word of the Father, receives himself in obedience to the Father, he listens to the Word he is. This enables us to conclude that, in the Trinity, the Son is the Listener *par excellence*.

Some of the Fathers of the Church, such as Ignatius of Antioch, speak of the Father as the silent ground of the word. After providing some texts from Ignatius' Epistles both to the Magnesians and the

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<sup>28</sup> Ratzinger, "Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology," 446.

<sup>29</sup> von Balthasar, *A Theology of History*, 31.

Ephesians, I comment upon them in light of von Balthasar's remarks in *Theo-logic II: Truth of God*.

First, Ignatius speaks of "God, who has revealed himself in his Son, Jesus Christ" who is the "Word of his own from silence proceeding."<sup>30</sup> Second, Ignatius speaks of three secrets "brought to pass in the deep silence of God," namely, Mary's virginity and childbearing, and the death of Jesus.<sup>31</sup> Having been "prepared in the silence of God," these mysteries could then be "proclaimed aloud to the world."<sup>32</sup> In these texts, Ignatius draws upon the fact that the Word reflects in himself the depth of paternal silence. Commenting upon these passages, von Balthasar first notes that, "the deeds of the Incarnate Word were performed 'silently', in a manner corresponding to the unity of speech and silence in God."<sup>33</sup> Proceeding from the silence of the Father, the Son "gladdened the heart of the one who sent him" in his very being.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Ignatius of Antioch, "The Epistle to the Magnesians," #8, in *Early Christian Writings: The Apostolic Fathers*, trans. Maxwell Staniforth (New York: Dorset Press, 1986), 85–92.

<sup>31</sup> Ignatius of Antioch, "The Epistle to the Ephesians," #19, in *Early Christian Writings*, 72–84. Scriptural references for Mary's childbearing include the following: Mt. 1:20–21, 2:1; Lk. 1:42, 2:5–7. Scriptural references for the death of Jesus include the following: Mt. 27:50; Mk. 15:37; Lk. 23:46; Jn. 19:30. A Scriptural reference, which refers to Mary's virginity is Lk. 1:27. Here, Luke uses the Greek word, *παρθενος*, meaning "virgin," or "unmarried girl" rather than *γυνή*, which means "wife," or "woman." The Vulgate uses *virgo* ("virgin, maiden"), which is even more specific. For additional documentation on Mary's virginity, see the following: Pius IX, *Ineffabilis Deus*, Apostolic Constitution Defining the Dogma of the Immaculate Conception (Boston: St. Paul Books and Media, 1995), 4; John Paul II, *Redemptoris Mater*, #39 (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 1995). The Latin Vulgate we use in this work is the following: Aloisius Gramatica, ed., *Bibliorum Sacrorum, Iuxta Vulgatam Clementinam*, Nova Editio (Citta del Vaticano: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1913).

<sup>32</sup> Ignatius of Antioch, "The Epistle to the Ephesians," #19, n. 17, in *Early Christian Writings*, 72–84.

<sup>33</sup> Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theo-logic II: Truth of God*, trans. Adrian J. Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 63.

<sup>34</sup> Ignatius of Antioch, "The Epistle to the Magnesians," #8, in *Early Christian Writings*, 85–92.

Second, von Balthasar reflects that, “the one who truly possesses Jesus’ word can also hear his silence”;<sup>35</sup> third, this hearer of the word himself ‘works by means of his word and is known by means of his silence’.<sup>36</sup>

Von Balthasar not only adds that the divine Word reflects the depth of paternal silence, but also, the human person who hears the Word likewise reflects something of the silence of God by his own listening to the Word. It is precisely through listening to the Son that one understands his silence such that the person’s “own words have the force of actions and his silences the significance of speech.”<sup>37</sup> Indeed, such a person manifests the Word in his own words. A concise summary of Ignatius’ remarks is his comment that, “it is better to keep silence and be than to talk and not be.”<sup>38</sup> Interpreting Ignatius, one may claim that the human being who listens to the Son *is* more fully *person* than one who does not listen.

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<sup>35</sup> von Balthasar, *Theo-logic II: Truth of God*, 63. Although the reference is not cited at this spot in von Balthasar’s text, this particular quotation is from Ignatius of Antioch, “The Epistle to the Ephesians,” #15, in *Early Christian Writings*, 72–84.

<sup>36</sup> von Balthasar, *Theo-logic II: Truth of God*, 63. Although not specifically noted by von Balthasar here, the last quotation that he cites is found in Ignatius of Antioch, “The Epistle to the Ephesians,” #15, in *Early Christian Writings*, 72–84.

<sup>37</sup> Ignatius of Antioch, “The Epistle to the Ephesians,” #15, in *Early Christian Writings*, 72–84. N.B. To say that one’s “words have the force of actions and his silences the significance of speech” is an example of the effect that the human person’s embodiment of the silence of Christ on the Cross has upon himself and upon others.

<sup>38</sup> von Balthasar, *Theo-logic II: Truth of God*, 63. This quotation of Ignatius is taken from von Balthasar since his text has a much smoother translation than Staniforth’s rendering of the same phrase in “The Epistle to the Ephesians,” #15. Ignatius’ observation that one is able to “be” in silence is significant because it is precisely a realization of who he is, which is who Christ reveals him to *be*: a silent listener. One discovers the truth of his being (as a listener) in silence. However, he not only recognizes the truth of his own being, but also he is able to recognize truth itself, for “truth can be recognized only from silence.” Romano Guardini, *Preparing Yourself for Mass* (Manchester, NH: Sophia Institute Press, 1997), 14.

### **The Eternal Listener: A Model**

If Christ is a Listener because his existence is openness to the Father, then the theological reason that the human person is a listener is because he is created, also in openness to the Father, upon the archetype of the eternal Listener. Indeed, since “relativity toward the other constitutes the human person,” he models Christ in his relation (intrinsic openness) to God and to others.<sup>39</sup> Thus, if man is created in the Word and as hearer of the Word, and if the Word is the eternal Listener, then I have a specifically theological basis for the claim that the person is ontological listening. One also begins to see that man’s ontological listening is an encounter in listening with the Listener, Jesus, the Incarnate Word.

Silence has an ontological dimension, which the nature of the person embodies, for he arises within the dialogical speech event.<sup>40</sup> Although the dialogicians do not use ontological categories, their insistence on the fact that the person is affected by relation gives me a necessary key: all human substance, in its ontological depth, is affected by dialogue because the person is created as a word in the Word. Augustine’s contribution to the notion of the person unites ontology and dialogical listening because, if man is created as a word in the Word—in the love of God—then ontological listening, which specifies man’s constitutive desire for God, lies at the inception of his very personhood.

If listening silence is an ontological readiness patterned on the eternal Listener, then it not only constitutes the human person, but it also connects anthropology with theology: the person is a listener in Jesus Christ, the eternal Listener; indeed, listening permeates his entire being. For, not only is he begotten from the Father, but also his being is

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<sup>39</sup> Ratzinger, “Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology,” 452.

<sup>40</sup> See Siegmund, “Silence and the Audibility of the Word . . . Part 1: An Anthropology of Listening.”

his being begotten; aptly is the Son described as an “arena of reception and response.”<sup>41</sup> The eternal Son’s self-reception from the Father constitutes him simultaneously as Word and hearer of the Word.

If being a human person means being addressed by another within an already ongoing communion, then the Son grounds this reality in his communion with the Father. In the “eternally uninterrupted act of his own generation,” he receives the Word he is.<sup>42</sup> But how, precisely, is the human person a listener in the eternal Listener? Man’s ontological listening reaches its fulfillment by participating in the Son’s listening to the Father, not as *the* Son but as an *adopted* son.<sup>43</sup> The act of adoption occurs also as a participation in the Cross with Mary: “Woman, here is your son.”<sup>44</sup> In fact, the Son’s obedient death (cf. Phil. 2:8)

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<sup>41</sup> von Balthasar, *A Theology of History*, 32.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Siegmund, “Silence and the Audibility of the Word . . . Part 1: An Anthropology of Listening;” and von Balthasar, *A Theology of History*, 31.

<sup>43</sup> Examples of Scriptural references, which refer to “adoption” include the following: Eph. 1:5; Gal. 4:5–7. In his first “Homily on Ephesians,” John Chrysostom emphasizes Christ’s role. “Do you observe how that nothing is done without Christ? Nothing without the Father? The one has predestinated, the other has brought us near . . . For great indeed, are the blessings bestowed, yet are they made far greater in being bestowed through Christ; in that he sent not any servant, though it was to servants that he sent, but the Only-begotten Son himself.” John Chrysostom also comments upon Gal. 4:5–7. He refers to our “promotion to sonship” as one of the effects of the Incarnation. He explains, we have become sons because we have “put on Christ, who is the very son” and “we have received the Spirit of adoption.” He continues, “Had not we been first made sons, we could not have called him Father.” See John Chrysostom, “Homilies on Ephesians, Homily 1: Ephesians 1:1–1:10,” in *Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians and Homilies on the Epistle to the Ephesians of S. John Chrysostom*, vol. 5 (London, England: Oxford, 1840), Eph. 1:4–5, and also *ibid.*, Galat. 4:4–7. Examples of Scriptural passages, which speak of the notion of the human person expressed in terms of “sonship” or “childhood” in his relation to God include the following: Lk. 6:35, 20:36; Jn. 1:12, 21:5; 1 Jn. 3:1–2.

<sup>44</sup> Jn. 19:26. It is interesting to note the original Greek for both verses twenty-six and twenty-seven of chapter nineteen: “γυναί, ἰδε ὁ υἱὸς σου . . . ἰδε ἡ μητέρα σου [Woman, here is your son . . . here is your mother].” The Greek word, “ἰδε” can also be translated as, “Listen!”



on the Cross in accord with the Father's will is the ultimate earthly moment, which concretizes his eternal listening. By his death in obedience to the Father's will, his sonship is made visible: having received himself from the Father, he returns that act of love by his own outpouring.<sup>45</sup>

## Conclusion

In part two of my arguing for contemplative listening as a fundamental act of the new evangelization, I highlighted Jesus Christ's act of listening as a revelation of his eternal sonship: he is the eternal Listener *par excellence* in the Trinity and, as such, he is the eternal archetype of the human. While many speculative issues surface on account of such a claim, I focused upon the notion of how listening as obedient readiness may be predicated of the eternal Son even though he seems naturally exempt from obedience. As an expression of traditional metaphysics, I developed—with the help of von Balthasar—Thomas' notion of the divine persons as subsistent relations. My key assertion is to maintain that, if the Son is the subsistent relation of sonship, then he receives himself from the Father. But such self-reception implies, as I showed, the Son's obedient readiness, which may be characterized as listening since the Son is both the eternal Word and the eternal listener of the Word he is. The ultimate theological reason that one is a listener, then, is because one is created on the model of Christ, the eternal Listener.



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<sup>45</sup> For Scriptural passages referring to the theme of “outpouring,” see the following: Jn. 3:16, 19:34; Rom. 5:5; Phil. 2:6–8.

**SILENCE AND THE AUDIBILITY OF THE WORD: CONTEMPLATIVE  
LISTENING AS A FUNDAMENTAL ACT OF THE NEW EVANGELIZATION  
PART 2: JESUS CHRIST, THE ETERNAL LISTENER**

SUMMARY

In the second part of her arguing for contemplative listening as a fundamental act of the new evangelization, the author turns to the theological perspective of Jesus Christ as the eternal Listener and, thus, focuses upon his act of listening, which is the unique personal form of his eternal divinity.

The author addresses the following issues. Granted that listening has to do with obedient readiness, how can one say it is in the eternal Son, who, being God, would seem to be naturally exempt from obedience? In order to answer this question, the author looks at the Balthasarian “enfleshment” of Thomas’ notion of the divine persons as subsistent relations. In brief, to say that the Son is the subsistent relation of sonship means that the Son receives himself from the Father. But this self-reception implies, the author argues, an obedient readiness. And, since the Son is Word, this obedient readiness translates into a “listening.” The Son is not only the eternal Word. He is also the eternal listener of the Word he is.

Within the Godhead, each person is his relation (of “opposition”) to the others and there is no difference between the person and his action. For example, the Son is his relation of sonship to the Father. But, one might ask, how could one speak of the Son’s obedience? How does one avoid subordinationism? The key is to see how the Son’s possession of divinity is compatible with a reception of it. If the Father is the “source and origin of all divinity,” the Son does, in fact, receive his divinity from the Father while, at the same time, he is co-equal and co-eternal with the Father. That the Father generates the Son does not mean, as Arius asserted, that there was a time when the Son was not. Rather, the Son always possesses his divine sonship as being given from the Father, while the Father possesses divinity as being given away. Divinity is compatible with relationality in the mode of reception. In the Godhead, reception is perfection. There are a number of texts from Thomas that the author presents in favor of this argument. Having established that reception is perfection in the Godhead, the author develops how this receptivity encompasses obedience and listening. For, in his receiving, the Son performs an act that, by an intrinsic analogy, one may describe as the taking of the gift of the Father into himself. In this sense, the Son is obedient to the “sense” of the Father’s self-gift. But, in the case of the Son, he is the gift. Not only that, he is the gift as Word. This suggests, as the author argues, that the obedience that characterizes him as a divine person is something intrinsically analogous to listening. Here, then, we find the ultimate theological reason that we are listeners: we are listeners because we are created on the model of Christ, the eternal Listener.

## KEYWORDS

Jesus Christ, listening, revelation, sonship, Trinity, God, metaphysics, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Thomas Aquinas, divine person, subsistent relation, human person, substance, obedience, the Word.

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# **Book Reviews**

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*Thomas Aquinas on Bodily Identity*  
by **Antonia Fitzpatrick**

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 203  
ISBN 978-0-19-879085-3

Antonia Fitzpatrick argues clearly throughout *Thomas Aquinas on Bodily Identity* that the Dominican saint never consistently achieves a coherent, unified understanding of the nature of the continuity of bodily matter across the human lifespan, death, and future resurrection. This inconsistency stems largely from Aquinas relying partly on Aristotle and partly on Averroes' commentary on the ancient philosopher without ever committing to either, the author comes to conclude.

Divided into four large chapters, *Thomas Aquinas on Bodily Identity*, provides a detailed foundation in Aristotle's thinking on matter, body, and soul before turning to Aquinas. This division of these two philosophers, as well as the inclusion of Averroes' influence on St. Thomas, enables the reader to see the interplay of these thinkers as well as the theological demands of the thirteenth century that drove St. Thomas to attempt a completely new anthropology in the first place. In the *Introduction*, Fitzpatrick sums things up:

Scholastic theologians took the doctrine of the resurrection to imply that material identity was crucial to personal identity, and, by extension, that human nature was composite, comprising a

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body as well as an immortal soul. Aquinas argued that a new theory of human nature that he had developed was the only available theory that could preserve the body, in addition to the soul, as an essential component of the human being.<sup>1</sup>

Aquinas defines his task, according to Fitzpatrick, as “reconcil[ing] Aristotle’s metaphysics with Peter Lombard’s *Sentences*”<sup>2</sup> which the Dominican deemed to be in need of Averroes’ commentaries on the ancient Greek.

How these authors envision the soul-body relationship features prominently in Fitzpatrick’s discussion. Matter and form, or potency and act, form the heart of human nature, being as they are in fact body and soul. Aristotle bases his composite view of the human on the idea that each soul “requires a particular kind of complex material subject: its ‘proper matter’.”<sup>3</sup> This concept runs throughout *Thomas Aquinas on Bodily Identity*, with the author emphasizing related metaphysical issues. Thus, “Aristotle’s teleological approach to analysing the composition of natural things entails a particular emphasis on their final causes . . . rather than on their material causes.”<sup>4</sup> The author also examines explanations for the causes of human generation, as found in the father and mother, revisiting these issues for each of the relevant authors. Starting from Aristotle, the thinking evolved through Averroes, the scholastics, and on to Aquinas. Readers can easily follow these different strands.

The author carefully defines important terms (including *form*, *essence*, *substance*, and *accidents*) according to each writer’s uses and definitions. Unlike Aristotle, Aquinas “holds that the essence of a material substance is composite. It signifies not only the form that places the

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<sup>1</sup> Antonia Fitzpatrick, *Thomas Aquinas on Bodily Identity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 32.



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substance in its species, but also the distinctive material pattern exhibited by all members of that species.”<sup>5</sup> Though deeply influenced by the ancient Greek author, Fitzpatrick portrays Aquinas retaining his perspective on these issues. Thus,

using Aristotle’s embryology as a starting point, Aquinas would construct his own picture of the material part of the individual human body. Capable of being understood only in relation to soul, the soul’s material subject was nonetheless really distinct from it.<sup>6</sup>

In other words, the body-soul relationship is essential both to the body and the soul. This latter, Fitzpatrick notes repeatedly, is only fully itself when acting as the form to a living body whose material substance matches only that particular soul. Between the person’s death and physical resurrection, the soul is less than its fullest self, existing in a kind of shadow world. Fitzpatrick never gets into this area more deeply, e.g. regarding the beatific vision offered to souls before the resurrection, probably saving readers some confusion at the expense of a wider discussion.

Recurrent themes covered by the author seem to reveal more consistency to Aquinas’s thought than the author is willing to admit. These themes follow the notion that the soul is only its fullest when united to the body. Fitzpatrick notes, for instance, that “material sameness was crucial to bodily, and personal, identity.”<sup>7</sup> The author is fairly clear on the role of prime matter in the consideration of material continuity, defining it as

the matter they understood to be found at the most primitive level in Aristotle’s physical universe: prime matter had no features of

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<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 49.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 52.

its own but was capable of bearing all forms; it was imperishable and persisted across all cases of substantial change.<sup>8</sup>

“Dimensive quantity,” in contrast, denotes the structural form of the body which plays a role “in configuring . . . matter” and providing for “the body’s autonomy relative to the soul.”<sup>9</sup>

Fitzpatrick relates this discussion of the nature of matter with Aquinas’s teaching on the necessity for some element of material continuity between the dead and resurrected bodies of the same person, which share the same core matter. The nature of this core matter or collection of particles, sometimes called “the ‘truth of human nature,’” was one of the most challenging aspects of the debate for these thinkers, something that Fitzpatrick traces throughout the chapters. For example, she notes that

Averroes’ analysis of substantial change suggested a way out of this difficulty . . . [as he] developed a theory proposing that prime matter itself must be invested with some of the formal features that Aristotle had ascribed to a mathematical body, in virtue of which it was spread out and possessed distinguishable parts.<sup>10</sup>

Key to understanding this is Aquinas’s partial but not full adoption of some of Averroes’ teachings on material continuity. Fitzpatrick pinpoints where Aquinas sometimes closely follows Aristotle and sometimes Averroes.

Aquinas sharply differs from Peter Lombard and many other scholastic theologians by defining the soul as the body’s only substantial form. Any other perspective, St. Thomas warns, invites a loose, even meaningless body-soul connection. “This would necessarily mean that soul and body were united only accidentally, or incidentally, and

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<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 63.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 79.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 65.

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not as essential parts of a unified individual person,”<sup>11</sup> Fitzpatrick observes. The following remark on Aquinas’s conception reflects the consistency of Fitzpatrick’s thesis, as it revives concepts covered in the chapters on Aristotle while addressing the theological and metaphysical issues encountered by Aquinas:

Like matter and substantial form, essence and *esse* are related as potency and act respectively. Substantial form is the principle that gives or communicates *esse*, or the composite’s act of existence, to matter . . . *esse* flows into the whole composite through substantial form.<sup>12</sup>

Due to such focus and consistency, the author covers a lot of ground while highlighting much of the nuance involved in these deliberations.

Readers thus come to the end of the book having a fairly clear idea of the positions of Aristotle, Averroes, and Aquinas. This includes how the latter’s contemporaries influenced him to take up this issue in the first place and how he responded to their questions and doubts. The author’s *Epilogue* outlines the continuing questions and doubts after Aquinas’s death. Some of these focuses on Christ’s body. Much of this pitted Dominicans against Franciscans, suggesting, as the author notes, that the back-and-forth may have been tied in with other differences. The continuing unsettled nature of this controversy reflects Aquinas’s great contribution to this theological and metaphysical issue yet how he failed—as Fitzpatrick claims—to provide a definitive analysis.



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<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 81.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 82.

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