

Studia Gilsoniana

A JOURNAL IN CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHY

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GILSON, DARWIN, AND INTELLIGENT DESIGN

According to Thomas S. Kuhn, the author of *The Structure of Scientific Revolution*,¹ at a particular time there can be in the scientific community a consensus as to how certain phenomena are to be explained. This explanation or theory permeates the world view in education and forms the background against which people do their thinking, acting as a kind of baseline. It is called a paradigm; and this paradigm is the framework within which the thinking of a particular era is done. Such was the Ptolemaic theory, the earth-centered theory embraced by nearly all for centuries. Even after Copernicus (1473–1543) had presented his heliocentric alternative, it still took centuries for the Copernican theory to establish itself beyond further challenge. While the old paradigm is under challenge, there are always defenders of the new theory who argue vigorously and ingeniously to attack the anomalies which appear to undermine the old theory. Since he published the *On the Origin of Species* in 1859, Charles Darwin's hypothesis of natural selection has become the paradigm of our time, and the concept of so-called evolution is one of the dominate theories of our culture. When Mortimer J. Adler came to write on the idea of evolution for *The Syntopicon Volume of Great Ideas*² he began:

This Chapter belongs to Darwin . . . The point is rather that many of the topics are dictated by and draw their meaning from his thoughts, and he figures in all the major issues connected with the origin of

¹ Chicago: The University of Chicago, 3rd edition, 1996.

² "Evolution," in *The Great Books of the Western World*, vol. 2 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), 451.

species, the theory of evolution, and the place of man in the order of nature.

Today there is an increasing recognition of difficulties with what we will call Darwinism, and these challenges to the dominance of this theory have prompted vigorous responses on the part of Darwin's defenders. Nevertheless there are instances of what may be considered challenges to the dominant theory, and here the work of Gilson and those behind the Intelligent Design (ID) movement fit in.

The insight regarding Kuhn's paradigm thesis and the challenge to the Darwinism is not original with me. It is the subject of the final chapter of Michael Denton's *Evolution: A Theory in Crisis*³ entitled "The Priority of a Paradigm." The overwhelming bulk of this study is a review of the evidence that can be brought to bear to support the evolution of species; but when the summation is made, the hypothesis that all nature represents a continuum of beings, which is sometimes called the community of nature, and that this continuity has developed over tremendous amount of time by the process of natural selection, by a mechanism of chance—Denton argues the evidence is not there. Quoting a great and articulate supporter of Darwin, Ernst Mayr: "all evolution is due to the accumulation of small genetic changes guided by Natural Selection and that transpecific evolution is nothing but an extrapolation and magnification of the events which took place within population and species." Denton comments on Mayr: "This theory remains as unsubstantiated as it was one hundred and twenty years ago."⁴ Denton affirms that on the microevolutionary level the Darwinian theory is a success; that is in explaining diversity in a limited area, but the gaps in the overall continuum, the so-called continuity of nature, still exist as they did in Darwin's time, and all the paleontological digging by Darwin's supporters has failed to uncover evidence to fill in those gaps.

That gaps cannot be dismissed as inventions of the human mind, merely figments of an anti-evolutionary imagination—an imagination prejudiced by topology, essentialism or creationism—is amply testified by the fact that their existence has been just as firmly acknowledged by the advocates of evolution and continuity.⁵

³ Bethesda, MD: Adler and Adler, 1986.

⁴ Id., 344.

⁵ Id., 345.

Within five years of Denton's challenge in 1986, Phillip E. Johnson's *Darwin on Trial*⁶ delivered a further blow to the paradigm of Darwinism as Johnson argued from the point of view of a trial lawyer and law professor that Darwin had failed to make a successful case for the origin of species by natural selection and its activation by chance.

In a feature of the 2nd edition in 1993, Johnson added an epilogue, "The Book and its Critics." In this reflection on the response to his critique of Darwinism and the scientific naturalism of the contemporary paradigm, he refers to Stephen Jay Gould's review in *The Scientific American* (July, 1992): "The review was an undisguised hatchet job aimed at giving the impression that my skepticism about Darwinism must be due to ignorance of basic facts of biology."⁷

Johnson's work provoked widespread negative response in scientific journals, but here was a critic who could not be dismissed as a young earth fundamentalist exponent of *Genesis*. In a relatively short time Johnson was the center of Symposia on university campuses where he was prepared to debate Darwinists. I cannot say how much this played into what was a growing movement of ID but it, the increasing criticism of Darwinism, was soon to be followed by other writings that, taken together, may be judged as a movement. And in the past few years this has come to be called "Intelligent Design."

*Darwin's Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution*⁸ by Michael J. Behe was a work by a professional chemical biologist who could not be dismissed as Johnson was with the remark that "he is just a lawyer." Rather Behe argues that the "irreducible complexity" of the organisms studied in molecular biology cannot be explained by the chance workings of natural selection.

Shortly after Behe's criticism was published, the writings of a mathematician and scientist began to appear; William A. Dembski's *The Design Inference: Eliminating Chance Through Small Probabilities*⁹ came out in 1998 along with a work edited by him, *Mere Creation: Science, Faith and Intelligent Design*.¹⁰ The next year, 1999, another book of his was published, *Intelligent Design: The Bridge Between Science and Theol-*

⁶ Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2nd edition, 1993.

⁷ Id., 160.

⁸ New York: The Free Press, 1996.

⁹ Cambridge, New York University of Cambridge Press, 1998.

¹⁰ Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1998.

ogy.¹¹ Here, as the titles indicate, the ID people, while not arguing from the religious premises or revelation, are indicating more than a simple openness to religion; they are showing that their arguments for design in nature leave the door open for an intelligent designer, i.e., a Creator. Dembski's work as a mathematician is to show how great the probability is against a species development by the chance process of natural selection.

These publications are accompanied by a number of websites and the funding of different institutes devoted to furthering the anti-Darwinist cause. In late September of 2002, I attended a conference on the University of San Francisco campus devoted to the program of ID. It featured splendid videos and well designed charts and slides. I should add the conference was organized by a colleague in the School of Business and only a few professors from the College of Sciences attended; the conference received part of its funding from a Jesuit foundation. But what you might call the scientific establishment on campus ignored the conference, although one of the biology department members, Professor Paul Chien, presented a paper on a Chinese archeological digging.

It should be noted that the ID movement has, of course, provoked a counter response from the Darwinists whose vigor in argument indicates that more than biology is at stake. The whole structure of naturalistic materialism and the respectability of atheism are being challenged, and the replies by the Darwinists are comparable to a religious jihad. Certain names come up at once; Stephen Jay Gould responded to Phillip Johnson; Daniel C. Dennett entered the list with *Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life*¹²; but most of all the fight has been carried by Robert T. Pennock whose *Tower of Babel: The Evidence against the New Creationism*¹³ and his well done anthology *Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theological and Scientific Perspectives*,¹⁴ a work of over 800 pages containing both pro and con Darwinist articles. Another author who should be mentioned is Richard Dawkins, whose book, *The Blind Watchmaker*,¹⁵ came out in the mid-1980's.

At some point it is necessary to define Darwinism. When Darwin published *On the Origin of Species* in 1859, his intention was to provide an explanation for the variety of plants and animals which populate the earth.

¹¹ New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999.

¹² New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995.

¹³ Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999.

¹⁴ Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.

¹⁵ New York: W.W. Norton, 1986.

His explanation is one which repudiates what he would consider a “supernatural” explanation; again supernatural in this context means immaterial, a non-mechanistic cause. Briefly Darwin sought to replace the account of our origin given in *Genesis* with his own mechanistic explanation, i.e., matter in motion explanation called natural selection. He sought to do away with the notion of a Divine Creator as the cause of the variety of life on earth.

Right from the start Darwin faced opposition from traditional religious persons who objected to the downgrading or rejection of Scripture’s account of our origins. Even today a vocal minority of “Creationists” oppose the sole teaching of evolution in our schools and use the political system to convince school leaders to include “creation science” along with the theory of evolution in public school’s curricula. These are sometimes referred to as the “Young Earth” opposition since in their literal reading of the Bible (particularly of the first chapters of *Genesis*), they interpret the origin of the universe to have been accomplished in some six days, less than 10,000 years ago.

Please note that I am not considering this sub-set of Darwin’s critics in this essay. Rather those who have come to be identified with the ID movement are contemporary working scientists, professors of natural science for the most part (Phillip E. Johnson, a law professor, is an exception) who having been brought up, as it were, in their undergraduate and graduate studies in Darwinism, and they came later in their own work to be impressed with its shortcomings and its failure to account for the origin of life, and the development of cellular processes and other living processes. Impressed with the complexity, the irreducible complexity of vital activities, they have come to reject the notions that the processes can be explained by chance. For Darwin’s natural selection is a blind action in which the biological processes were developed over an immense amount of time in a fashion that eliminated the mutations that failed to further life and saved the variations better suited to the environment. In a phrase the ID proponents are not buying a theory that asserts the world as we know it developed by chance. It had to have an intelligent design.

Perhaps here is the place to say a word about the “theistic evolutionists.” They are those who accept Darwin’s natural selection as the origin of species and the biological processes of the living things in the species. To put it simply they accepted Darwinism, but tried to “baptize” it by affirming that there is a Divine creator and what Darwin proposed was for them simply God’s plan all along. Here Teilhard de Chardin comes to mind

(interestingly in the literature his name is rarely mentioned; Phillip Johnson is one exception, but his name is absent from the indices of most books I have looked at). However, to the ID persons, this is to be rejected for these theistic evolutionists have accepted the Darwin thesis of natural selection as a full explanation of the biological processes, the very thing the ID people judge to be a failure.

Now for the parts of Darwinism that are accepted by the ID: the micro evolution within a species, the age of the earth since the Big Bang is some four and a half billion years. These are microbiologists whose study of cellular activity leads them to conclude that the result indicates more than a chance adaptation. The irreducible complexity they see indicates that it is mathematically improbable that what we have is the product of chance, a blind watchmaker. Rather in their scientific judgment Darwin's explanation falls short; the scientific observation they affirm indicates an intelligent design though they do not use the words that Gilson would call finality or purpose in nature.

In relating Gilson's *From Aristotle to Darwin and Back Again: A Journey in Final Causality, Species, and Evolution*¹⁶ to the ID proponents who are concerned to show the shortcomings of Darwin and raise doubts about his theory on the origin of species, that is the development of various life forms in plants and animals, I must be careful not to suggest that Gilson's intention is the same as theirs. Yes, in some ways they are on the same side in opposing the anti-creation thrust of Darwinism, but Gilson is neutral on the validity or truth of Darwin's hypothesis that natural selection can account for the transmutation of species.

As a matter of fact Gilson is careful to say he is not engaging in a work of biology; he is rather doing what Aristotle does in his *Physics*, or as we would say, more recently, the philosophy of nature. Also Gilson, the historian of philosophy, is intrigued by the aspects of the history of ideas that took place in 1859 when Darwin published his epoch making *On the Origin of Species*.

Gilson is intrigued by the fact that in the popular mind and in the later generations of the 19th and 20th centuries Darwin came to be known as the author of the theory of evolution. As Gilson notes, however, Darwin did not use the word "evolution" in the 1st edition of *On the Origin*, nor in

¹⁶ Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984. This is the translation of *D'Aristotle a Darwin et Retour* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1971) by John Lyon. Hereafter quoted as Gilson, *Darwin*.

the next four editions. It is only in the 6th edition of 1872 that the word “evolution” occurs and is used only once. Gilson, the historian, takes great care to show that it was Herbert Spencer (1815–1890) who, before Darwin in 1857, wrote of the progressive development he saw in nature and in society and began to promote the idea of an evolutionary process. And further, Spencer, the real father of evolution, was not taken with Darwin’s notion of natural selection. Gilson, the philosopher and historian of philosophy, shows a special sympathy for Spencer, the philosopher, and his deductive approach to his subject. Gilson is also a tremendous admirer of Darwin the biologist and his painstaking study of the biological processes in finches of the Galapagos Islands, the pigeons and the barnacles. He admires Darwin’s temperament and his wish to avoid controversy even as he comes to repudiate the Creation story so much accepted by the bulk of his contemporaries. Was Darwin right? Here is what Gilson says not up front as it were in his preface but tucked away in the middle of the Darwin/Spencer analysis:

. . . to know if the response of Darwin to the biological problem of the origin of species was true or not is a question the reply to which is beyond us. It is certain in any case that Darwin posed a scientific program, which he had long studied by scientific methods and to which, in his mind, the solution which he proposed has value only to the extent that it was scientific, that is to say justified by reasoning based on the observation of facts. Darwin was the incarnation of the scientific spirit, as avid in the observation of facts as he was scrupulous in their interpretation.¹⁷

Thus we can infer that Gilson was neutral on the truth of Darwin’s theory. At the age of 87 when he published in 1971 the French edition of his study, he had been working on the matter for some years. Only someone like Fr. Armand Maurer who was close to Gilson in the 1960’s (there were others, of course, like Pegis and Owens but in different ways they are gone) can tell us how long he worked at this question. His very footnotes indicate years of reading in English and French sources, and he was already giving public lectures which were in part chapters in his book. At the University of San Francisco in 1970 when the university was honored to present him with an honorary degree, his acceptance response was to read a part of his Darwin study. When you look at Gilson’s life span (1884–

¹⁷ Id., 61–62.

1978), you realize that while he was studying and teaching philosophy the controversy over evolution was part of the intellectual background of his formative years. More than that in *The Philosopher and Theology*,¹⁸ his intellectual autobiography, he reflects on the impact that Bergson's lectures at the Collège de France had on him. "Thanks to him, metaphysics, once banned by Kant, was being reinstated in France . . ."¹⁹ The publication in 1907 of *Creative Evolution* was an event Gilson felt obliged to comment on, yet, the treatment in Gilson's *Darwin* book is difficult to summarize. A mix of misunderstanding is involved. For Gilson maintains that whom Bergson is criticizing is really Spencer, and while Bergson is bringing out the inadequacies of the mechanism of evolution and favoring finality in nature, Bergson is misunderstanding the finality of Aristotle, and further Bergson's failure to appreciate what intelligence can truly accomplish is itself a limitation to his critique. But Gilson is always appreciative of the contribution Bergson made in recognizing the failures of Darwinism to fully account for the vitality of the natural world.²⁰

Though in these years of the late 1960's Gilson's research was leading him to a position not identical with the ID proponents, he shared somewhat the same judgments about the phenomenon which came to be called Darwinism. As a careful historian of ideas Gilson notes, the popular acceptance of evolution in the 20th century was a curious mixture of the biological research of Darwin and the propaganda for evolution as a philosophy promoted by Herbert Spencer. Darwin provided a hypothesis to account for the transmutation of species he called natural selection. Spencer provided a philosophy of progressive change and improvement called evolution. The merging of these theories in the popularization of the anti-biblical rejection of the teaching of *Genesis* on creation was accomplished in large part by someone like Thomas Henry Huxley, the author of an article on evolution in *Encyclopedia Britannica* (9th edition, 1878). As this movement came to be generally accepted by working natural scientists and incorporated into college and high school text books, the fact that the theory had not been demonstrated seemed to be overlooked. Later as the work of Gregor J. Mendel on genetics came to be known, these hereditary factors were brought into what we can call Darwinism and into the 20th century a new synthesis and modification of Darwinism was achieved.

¹⁸ New York: Random House, 1962.

¹⁹ Id., 134.

²⁰ Id., 90–104.

The landmark of the success of Darwinism was 1959, the centenary of the publication of *On the Origin of Species* when the academic world that loves to celebrate centenaries held an international conference at the University of Chicago to commemorate the work of Charles Darwin. In a word it was a triumph. It might be noted in passing that this was the year the English translation of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's *The Phenomenon of Man*²¹ appeared, and, in the scientific/religious mood of the time went on to great popular success for his proposal that evolution was the means God had chosen to achieve His work of Creation.

While I do not know the answer, I like to speculate the fuss that de Chardin was causing in Catholic intellectual circles may have been a motive for Gilson to go forward with his own research and reflections on the phenomenon of Darwinism.

It is a fact that both Jacques Maritain²² and Gilson²³ give a negative reaction to the phenomenon of Teilhardism when they were invited to comment. Of course, too they were conforming to the judgment of Pius XII and his encyclical *Humani Generis* of 1950.

As stated Gilson's research in the 1960's leading to its publication in 1971 was some twenty years ahead of the ID movement, but his work anticipated some of their principles with its emphasis on finality in nature which requires intelligence, and also the emphasis that the doctrine of natural selection as a process to account for the transformation of species remains undemonstrated and inadequate.

In his chapter on "Finality and Evolution," Gilson quotes with approval the articles on evolution in the *Encyclopédie Française* by Paul Lemoine, professor at the Museum of Paris: "Volume IV of the *Encyclopédie Française* will certainly mark an epoch in the history of our ideas on evolution. From its reading it becomes evident that this theory appears about to be abandoned."²⁴ In the footnotes for this section, John Lyon, the translator says:

Gilson gives no citation for any of the quotations from Lemoine. The passages he cites, however, are scattered throughout (pages of the Vth volume) . . . the section entitled "Que valent les théories de

²¹ Trans. Bernard Wall (New York: Harper, 1959).

²² *The Peasant of the Garonne* (New York: Holt, Reinhart, and Winston, 1968), 264–269.

²³ *Letters of Étienne Gilson with commentary by Henri de Lubac* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 59–65.

²⁴ Gilson, *Darwin*, 88.

l'évolution?" in "Conclusion Générale," IV. *Les êtres vivants* of the *Encyclopédie Française*.²⁵

Gilson has more from Lemoine and it is tempting to quote it extensively, but in a short article it is better to let an interested person go to the source and for my purposes suffice it to say that Gilson seems to agree with the Lemoine statement: "The result of this exposé is that the theory of evolution is impossible."²⁶

In a chapter titled "The Limits of Mechanism," Gilson continues to argue that the approach of Darwin which tried to account for the origin of species by just considering matter in motion, i.e., the material and efficient causes of a natural happening gives an inadequate picture of reality. What is missing is Aristotle's substantial form, and this immaterial principle is excluded from consideration by the methods of scientism, the naturalistic approach so favored by contemporary philosophy. There is, of course, an intimate connection in Aristotelian philosophy of nature between the formal and final causes, and while the ID people do not speak of substantial forms, their championing of design or purpose brings them close to the traditional philosophical position. It should be mentioned in passing that the virulence of attack by contemporary Darwinists on the ID position can partially be explained by their doctrinaire anti-immaterialism and atheism. To Daniel Dennett: Natural Selection makes it intellectually respectable to be an atheist; it was the gist of his book.²⁷

Further in "The Limits of Mechanism," Gilson anticipates the research of some of the ID writers by using the work of the American biologist, Walter M. Elsasser, then professor of geology and biology at Princeton University. His work *Atom and Organism: A New Approach to Theoretical Biology*²⁸ brought contemporary physics to the study of the cell, or in other words applied quantum mechanics to the cell. Again without trying to duplicate the Gilson chapter the conclusion is that the cell as a single entity eludes mechanistic explanation.

It is impossible to pose these questions without immediately seeing that, in nature such as we see her, no scientific observer has ever seen cells outside of some tissue, nor tissues subsisting spontaneously outside of a living body which itself is a member of a species. These are facts. It is too

²⁵ Id., 185.

²⁶ Id., 88.

²⁷ See note 12.

²⁸ Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966.

easy to reserve to science the facts which we can satisfactorily explain and to consign the rest to philosophy. The existence of cells is not contested. The question is only one of knowing whether it is scientifically demonstrated that organisms are “multiples of cells”? If such demonstration exists, we would love to know its whereabouts.²⁹

Gilson’s concluding chapter, “The Constants of Biophilosophy,” is more than a summary of the need to approach nature in an Aristotelian way. Yes, take account of substantial forms or souls in living things, but recognize also that the mechanistic approach to reality owes so much to Descartes for whom matter was extension. It is enjoyable to read Gilson, the great Cartesian expert on the Descartes about whom he first made his reputation as a great scholar of the texts of a philosopher. For example, after treating Paley and his example of a watch as a thing manifesting finality, Gilson remarks in passing: “We say that primitives take a watch for an animal, but only the genius of Descartes was able to take animals for watches.”³⁰

Gilson well understands that according to scientific method final causes are excluded from consideration, but he is calling for a biophilosophy which will be open to the reality of human experience as Aristotle was and recognize that teleology is present in nature. “Teleology is perhaps a contestable explanation; chance is the pure absence of explanation.”³¹

Referring to Julian Huxley, the descendent of Thomas Henry Huxley, the popularizer of the doctrine of evolution, who speaking of the mechanism of natural selection argued that it, with the aid of time, produced the world as we know it, Gilson says: “Here we have an inadvertent comedy, which we can avoid only by saying that, scientifically as well as philosophically, the mechanism of natural selection is simply a non-explanation.”³²

This is the tone of the final chapter. It is not a refutation of the work of Darwin. It is rather an expression of disappointment that the academic world has overlooked the fact that Darwin failed to establish what he set out to establish, i.e., the origin of species.

It was Michael Denton who first, to my knowledge, raised the issue of a paradigm change revolution. In the final chapter of his book “The

²⁹ Gilson, *Darwin*, 113.

³⁰ *Id.*, 123.

³¹ *Id.*, 130.

³² *Id.*, 131.

Priority of the Paradigm,” he returns to the topic and, while re-affirming what he judges are the limitations of Darwinism, he recognizes a paradigm change occurs only when there is an alternative theory to replace the current one.

The twentieth century would be incomprehensible without the Darwinian revolution. The social and political currents which have swept the world in the past eighty years would have been impossible without its intellectual sanction. It is ironic to recall that it was the increasingly secular outlook of the nineteenth century which initially eased the way for the acceptance of evolution, while today it is perhaps the Darwinian view of nature more than any other that is responsible for the agnostic and skeptical outlook of the twentieth century. What was once a deduction from materialism has today become its foundation.

Ultimately the Darwinian Theory is no more nor less than the great cosmogenic myth of the twentieth century . . . The truth is that despite the prestige of evolutionary theory and the tremendous intellectual effort directed towards reducing living systems to the confines of Darwinian thought, nature refuses to be imprisoned. In the final analysis we still know very little about how new forms of life arise. The “mystery of mysteries”—the origin of new beings on earth—is still largely as enigmatic as when Darwin set sail on the *Beagle*.³³

Whether or not the ID movement is the beginning of the formation of a new paradigm is difficult to say. To move closer to that, the naturalistic method would have to be enlarged to embrace finality which the scientific method now excludes.

No alternative theory is on the horizon. Rather we seem to be in a phase comparable to the development of epicycles to save the Ptolemaic theory when the orbit of Mars could not be explained in the earlier versions of the Ptolemaic theory, and astronomers wedded to the geocentric theory were inventing ways to save their paradigm.

Should a paradigm shift come in the future decades, to Gilson’s credit, he wrote a work in 1971 which preceded the ID movement by some twenty years. And he did so by going back to Aristotle.³⁴

³³ Denton, *Evolution: A Theory in Crisis*, 358–359.

³⁴ Two other works which I used in preparing this article but did not quote in the footnotes are

GILSON, DARWIN, AND INTELLIGENT DESIGN**SUMMARY**

The article starts with stating the fact that today there is an increasing recognition of difficulties with Darwinism accompanied by vigorous responses on the part of Darwin's defenders; among the instances of challenge to the dominant theory, one can find a book of Gilson, *From Aristotle to Darwin and Back Again*, and those behind the Intelligent Design movement. In relating the book of Gilson to the ID proponents, the author concludes that, while in some ways they are on the same side in opposing the anti-creation thrust of Darwinism, Gilson is neutral on the validity or truth of Darwin's biological hypothesis. Gilson, however, whose book preceded the ID movement by some twenty years, seeks to analyze Darwinism from the perspective of the classical philosophy of nature. He well understands that, according to modern scientific method, final causes are excluded from consideration, but he calls for a biophilosophy which will be open to the reality of human experience as Aristotle was and recognize that teleology is present in nature. According to him, even if teleology seems to be a contestable explanation, chance as understood by Darwinists is the pure absence of explanation.

KEYWORDS: Gilson, Aristotle, Spencer, Darwin, Darwinism, evolution, intelligent design, teleology.

1) Michael J. Behe, "Faith and the Structure of Life," in *Science and Faith: Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual Convention of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars*, ed. Gerald V. Bradley and Don De Marco. (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2001); 2) George Sim Johnston, *Did Darwin Get it Right?* (Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor Inc., 1998).

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EVALUATING THE METAPHYSICAL REALISM OF ÉTIENNE GILSON

It is true to say that there would likely be far fewer students of Thomas Aquinas in North America today if not for the work of Étienne Gilson; it is equally true to say that Gilson’s work has made significant contributions both to the overcoming of modern philosophy and to the understanding of Thomas himself, particularly as regards the Angelic Doctor’s metaphysics and philosophy of knowledge. The resurgence of genuine Thomism—as opposed to the Suarezian impostor which had come to dominate—which followed Leo XIII’s *Aeterni Patris* had much to overcome, not the least of which was the preponderance of modernity’s idealist epistemology. Descartes’ mathematicism, the insistence that all things lacking the certitude of mathematics cannot truly be called “knowledge,”¹ begot Cartesian idealism, which in turn launched a centuries-long quest, carried out by numerous philosophers, for an answer to what might be best described as “the wrong question,” namely: “How is it that we can know things outside the mind?” This question, particularly in the most thorough treatment among moderns given it by Kant, coursed through philosophy so strongly that even many Thomists were swept along by its current.

Enter Gilson. By participating in the recovery of the thought of the scholastics, especially Thomas Aquinas, Gilson was able to formulate a theory of knowledge which, though aimed at answering the question of the moderns, avoided their fundamental errors. If one adopts the necessity of defending a knowledge of the extramental real, Gilson argued, by ground-

¹ Cf. Étienne Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1937), 132–133. Hereafter *Unity*.

ing it in a critical philosophy which begins with the nature of knowledge itself, one is condemned to idealism.² Against the idealist philosophy Gilson opposed a position which he calls “metaphysical realism,” that is, a philosophy which begins philosophical inquiry, and thereby provides a foundation for not only a theory of knowledge but for all branches of philosophy, in a systematic manner which takes **being**, *ens*, as its principle. Further, he argued that any attempt at a “critical realism” which attempts to synthesize the two positions is fundamentally impossible.³ Gilson’s view on the question of knowledge may be boiled down to a simple, mutually exclusive, and entirely exhaustive division: either one is a realist or one is an idealist, and there is no middle ground, for their points of departure are inherently incompatible.

In his missives against idealism, Gilson outlines many principles of his own theory of knowledge. Consequently, we will begin our consideration of his position on being as first known by looking at those works; secondly, we will turn to his interpretation of Thomas Aquinas on the relevant issues of abstraction and the nature of the concept; and thirdly, we will conclude by considering the opposition between realism and idealism which informs his philosophy.

Overcoming the Critique

Critique, of course, is the system established by Kant, principally in his *Critique of Pure Reason*; but the critical turn, that turn towards beginning our philosophical inquiries with a study of knowledge and a demon-

² Cf. Étienne Gilson, *Methodical Realism* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2011), 19: “If one’s starting point is a *percipi*, the only *esse* one will ever reach will be that of the *percipi*.” Gilson goes on in the following pages (19–21) to indicate that the essential point of critique is beginning with something of thought, which militates against the very nature of realism, and hence a critical “realism” is impossible, but ends up inevitably in an idealism. As he writes on 21: “Modern scholasticism is a conscious realism, the fruit of reflection and considered choice, but which refuses to take as its foundation the solution for the problem set by idealism because the problem is posed in terms which, of necessity, imply idealism itself as a solution. In other words, surprising as the thesis may appear at first, scholastic realism is not a function of the problem of knowledge—very much the contrary would be true—but in it the real is posited as distinct from thought, the *esse* as distinct from the *percipi*, in virtue of a certain idea of what philosophy is, an idea which is the condition for the very possibility of philosophy.”

³ Étienne Gilson, *Thomist Realism and the Critique of Knowledge* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2012), 149: “We . . . have come to the conclusion that the critique of knowledge is essentially incompatible and irreconcilable with metaphysical realism.” Hereafter *Thomist Realism*.

stration of its ability to produce certitude, the turn which dominated modern philosophy, begins with Descartes and his *cogito*. What Gilson sees as fatally problematic in the characteristic epistemologies of modernity are three sequential problems which lead to the completion of the critical turn and thus to the various subsequent instantiations which attempted its incorporation.

1. First is that, against the advances of science which had been carried out during the centuries intervening the birth of Descartes and the death of Kant (or one might even say until this very day), philosophy—particularly in metaphysics and ethics—seemed to not advance one iota. Whereas physics and astronomy were making great strides forward, metaphysics seemed to spin its wheels in a mud pit of uncertainty, allowing skepticism to waltz past it unhindered. Thus both Descartes, motivated by the skepticism of Montaigne, and Kant, awaked from his dogmatic slumber by that of Hume, sought to recast philosophical inquiry in the model of the precise sciences. For Descartes, this precision was found in mathematics: where everything else seemed dubious, mathematics delivered answers which were clear, distinct, and could not be otherwise. Thus, while he did not reduce all sciences to mathematics, he did demand that the conclusions reached in an inquiry be mathematically-evident:

Descartes' own inference was that mathematical knowledge was the only knowledge worthy of the name . . . The whole philosophy of Descartes was virtually contained in that initial decision [to demand certitude equal to mathematics], for the *I think, hence I am* is the first principle of Descartes' philosophy, but it is his pledge to mathematical evidence that led Descartes to the *I think*.⁴

This mathematicism of Descartes led to his postulation of a common method for all inquiry and a common standard for evidence—for Descartes mistook the certainty a human mind has in the grasp of the inferior object, the mathematical abstraction, to be superior to the difficulty in penetrating the mystery of the superior object, the cognition-independent constitution of the (meta)physically real.

Immanuel Kant would be no less guilty of such an idolatry of method. Though developed significantly since the time of Descartes, there was still in the time of Kant an alluring simplicity of the ideoscopic sci-

⁴ Gilson, *Unity*, 132.

ences, particularly in contrast to the even-further muddled properly philosophical sciences. As Gilson puts it:

There was so striking a contrast between the obvious senility of metaphysics and the flourishing condition of positive science in the second half of the eighteenth century that nothing short of a fundamental blunder made by the metaphysicians themselves could account for their perplexities . . . To sum up the situation in a few words: all was well with science, but something was wrong with philosophy. What was it?

After groping his way through the problem for about fifteen years, Kant thought he had at last found the answer to that question. What defines science as a specific ideal of human knowledge is self-criticism. Perceiving as true what can be demonstrated, science dismisses all the rest as idle speculation, with the twofold result that it is always progressing, and always respected . . . The time had come when men could no longer feel interested in any discipline for the sublimity of its ambitions, but only for the soundness of its demonstrations.⁵

Thus, although he did not fall victim to Cartesian mathematicism, a much more extreme cognitive reductionism, Kant was nevertheless enamored of the “positive sciences,” especially Newtonian physics. What he sought, then, was not to apply the methodology of any one specific science to philosophy, but rather to discover what was common to all science and extrapolate that method to all inquiries, including and especially the philosophical. Only then could speculative thinking rest easily in the “soundness of its demonstrations.”

2. Second is that, following upon the demand for a certitude, be it based upon a mathematical precision as in Descartes or upon the verified roots of self-criticism which Kant sought—which certitude is innately repugnant to the nature of philosophical inquiry—it is deemed necessary by the modern epistemologist to establish some immovable, Archimedean point upon which knowledge can be based, something certain and not open to dispute, doubt, or the variegations of deceivable senses and incorrect judgments. Thus, Descartes found his *cogito* and Kant derived his system of *a priori* categories and intuitions. The consequence of these starting points is that only if “knowledge” itself is as narrow as the paradigmatic

⁵ Id., 224–225.

and ideoscopically-scientific discipline or method in which a starting point for certitude is found can the paradigm then be justly applied to all knowledge. As such, the meaning of “knowledge” for the moderns devolves from something said analogically to a purely univocal concept—the clear and distinct idea in the case of Descartes and the synthetic *a priori* judgment in that of Kant.

For Descartes, this meant eliminating from the meaning of “knowledge” anything which was not contained within a clear and distinct idea—most especially what can be grasped by the senses. In the brief First Meditation, Descartes introduces his intention and method: that is, dissatisfied with previous philosophical attempts to establish the truth, he proposes to reject as true all things which can be subjected legitimately to doubt—in the realm of speculation only, recognizing that to do so in the practical realm would be fruitless and mad—until he can establish for them some certain basis. This certain basis must be an idea clear and distinct, and not capable of being doubted. All subsequent ideas must also have this clarity and distinction to lay claim to being true.

While the First Meditation sees Descartes establish his systematic doubt, it is in the Second Meditation that the **methodological** starting point of Descartes’ inquiry—his firm and immovable Archimedean point—is found. The senses, being clearly something depended upon in common practical affairs, are rejected as providing certitude; for they are often deceived, Descartes claims, by illusions and mirages, and moreover, by dreams. Consequently, it is to some thought independent of sensation which he turns for an indubitable truth: namely, any thought composed of “I think” or “I exist.”⁶ That one inevitably provides himself with evidence of self-existence by reflecting on the fact of thought cannot be denied; that

⁶ This is not, however, an original thought. Roughly twelve centuries earlier, St. Augustine, in book 10, chapter 10 of his *De trinitate* writes: “Who doubts himself to live, or remember, or understand, or will, or think, or know, or judge? For whensoever he doubts, he lives; if he doubts, he remembers why he doubts; if he doubts, he understands himself to doubt; if he doubts, he wills to be certain; if he doubts, he thinks; if he doubts, he knows himself to not know; if he doubts, he judges that he ought not to consent blindly.” The same thought is echoed in Augustine’s *Enchiridion*, c. 7, n. 20, that “by not positively affirming that they are alive, the skeptics ward off the appearance of error in themselves, yet they do make errors simply by showing themselves alive; one cannot err who is not alive. That we live is therefore not only true, but it is altogether certain as well.” Additionally, Thomas Aquinas expresses the same indubitability of one’s own existence in *De veritate*, q. 10, a. 10, ad. 7: “Thus no one is able to think himself not to exist with assent; for in thinking something, he perceives himself to be.”

is, as Descartes wrote in his other most important work, *The Discourse on Method*, “cogito, ergo sum”—“I think, therefore I am.”⁷ Thus Descartes defines the human person as a “thinking thing,” as the conclusion derived from this evidence for the existence of the self.

In analyzing the notion of the “thinking thing,” Descartes posits understanding, affirming, denying, willing, refusing, imagining, and sensing to be functions of the mind, i.e., functions which belong to anything which has “thinking” as its mode of being. He continues to refine such a notion against the corporeal, which seems so inescapably present. Can bodies be known with clear and distinct ideas? Not bodies considered abstractly, vaguely and in general; but a concrete, particular body? To this question Descartes subjects for scrutiny a piece of wax, which he subjects to a series of tests with regard to its sense qualities, finding that the identity of the wax cannot be discerned by any of them. What Descartes therefore gleans from this experiment is that he still has found no source of certitude equal to that found in mathematics other than what is found in the intellect alone; sense or perceptual knowledge is entirely eliminated. “Brute animals,” then are considered to be merely unknowing animatrons. Knowledge is reduced to the univocity of strictly-intellectual certitude.

As is well-known, the problem of this relation of sense perceptions to knowledge—reduced as it is to such a univocity—dominated modern philosophy, and would be determinative for the direction taken by Kant. Now, whereas Hume, something of a catalyst for Kant, insists that the connection of cause and effect arises as a psychological impression formed by the constant juxtaposition of similar sense impressions, Kant claims that the connection of cause and effect is an innately possessed concept to which things’ appearances can be adequated.

This relating of an *a priori* concept to the sense intuition such that the two are irreconcilably distinct yet necessary to the attainment of knowledge, however, Gilson notes, proves to be the ultimate failing of Kant’s epistemology. To summarize Gilson’s argument:⁸ by reducing knowledge to the univocity of the intellectual, the *a priori* categories of the mind,

⁷ At §7 of 1644: *The Principles of Philosophy*, as well as (in French) in the *Discourse on Method* of 1637, “Je pense, donc je suis.” Nevertheless, the same sentiment can be found in *Meditation II*: “hoc pronuntiatum: *ego sum, ego existo*, quoties a me profertur, vel mente concipitur, necessario esse verum.” “This statement: *I am, I exist*, as often as it is advanced by me, or conceived by the mind, is necessarily true.”

⁸ Gilson, *Unity*, 236–237.

Kant's system collapses in on itself; for the veracity of knowledge, through the synthetic *a priori* judgments which occur within natural philosophy and mathematics, requires the union of two distinct sources of cognition—the categories of reason and the intuitions of the senses (or at least, in the case of mathematics, the pure intuition of space)—the positing of a cause for which union seems to transgress the very principles of Kant's epistemological system.

3. Third is that it thus becomes clear that in making the critical turn, one turns the universe inside out: for the first principle of all philosophy becomes **thought**, rather than **being**, and so rather than attempting to discern how it is that the intellect conforms to what is, the critical philosopher has no choice but to twist what is until he can explain thought. To quote Gilson:

The most tempting of all the false first principles is: that *thought*, not *being*, is involved in all my representations. Here lies the initial option between idealism and realism, which will settle once and for all the future course of our philosophy, and make it a failure or a success. Are we to encompass being with thought, or thought with being? In other words, are we to include the whole in one of its parts, or one of the parts in its whole?⁹

While it is certainly true that every being which is grasped, in its being, by a human, is grasped by thought—and that thought therefore makes every being an object for the human—it is nevertheless false to think that thought is therefore the first principle of our knowing things. As Gilson is quite right to point out, the intelligibility of things is not first and foremost because they are thought, but because they **are**.

It is against the backdrop of the critical turn, and his repudiation of it, that Gilson develops his own theory of knowledge. In consequence of what he perceives to be the failures of the critical turn, Gilson lays out several “laws” which he says are to be inferred from philosophical experience. While these are principally a prohibition against idealism,¹⁰ they nevertheless give the basic structure of the “metaphysical realism” favored

⁹ Id., 316–317.

¹⁰ Enumerated in id., 306–316. Especially the first, fourth, and fifth: “Philosophy always buries its undertakers” (306), “As metaphysics aims at transcending all particular knowledge, no particular science is competent either to solve metaphysical problems, or to judge their metaphysical solutions” (309–310), and “The failures of the metaphysicians flow from their unguarded use of a principle of unity present in the human mind” (312), respectively.

by Gilson. Here we will only focus on those few which are most pertinent to Gilson's realism.

First is that, "By his very nature, man is a metaphysical animal."¹¹

Second, "Metaphysics is the knowledge gathered by a naturally transcendent reason in its search for the first principles, or first causes, of what is given in sensible experience."¹²

Third, "Since being is the first principle of all human knowledge, it is *a fortiori* the first principle of metaphysics."¹³ This law follows for Gilson from two points: first, **being** is that "which the mind is bound to conceive both as belonging to all things and as not belonging to any two things in the same way;"¹⁴ second, that whatever "is first, last and always in human knowledge is its first principle, and its constant point of reference"—and since "metaphysics is knowledge dealing with the first principles and the first causes themselves,"¹⁵ one and the same being is the first principle of knowledge and the subject matter of metaphysics.

On the one hand, this law is absolutely true—being is certainly both the first principle of all human knowledge and the principle of metaphysics, but at the same time, it is also the first principle of biology, chemistry, mathematics, logic, and computer programming. It is true that *ens primum cognitum* has an intimate connection to the metaphysically-considered *ens*, but we should not be too quick to understand the *ens* which is said to be first known as one and the same thing as the *ens* which is the proper subject matter of the science of metaphysics.

It is with that in mind that we look at a fourth of Gilson's laws, "All the failures of metaphysics should be traced to the fact, that the first principle of human knowledge has been either overlooked or misused by the metaphysicians."¹⁶ Certainly, the idealists are guilty of this, having completely misapprehended the first principle of human knowledge—and it remains sound advice also for the realist.

Abstraction and the Nature of the Concept

To understand the consequences of Gilson's stark division between realist and idealist philosophies, particularly as this division bears upon his

¹¹ Id., 307.

¹² Id., 308.

¹³ Id., 313.

¹⁴ Id., 312.

¹⁵ Id., 313.

¹⁶ Id., 316.

interpretation of *ens ut primum cognitum*, we need to look at his treatment of St. Thomas' doctrine on intellectual knowledge, for it is in his interpretation of the Angelic Doctor that Gilson's own philosophy of a metaphysical realism is exposited.

First, it is to be noted that, with regard to abstraction, Gilson faithfully and closely follows Thomas in emphasizing that the object of intellectual knowledge is something universal. He begins by reiterating Thomas' oft-stated claim that the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity.¹⁷ The quiddity is said by Gilson to be the essence of a thing as known by a concept, a true but perhaps misleading statement. In terms of abstraction, he makes the problematic statement that this operation of the *intellectus agens* consists in the dissociation of the "universal and intelligible element" from the "particular and material element," a befuddling intersection of the two which he never explains.¹⁸ Gilson is very careful to point out both the intimate connection between the object of intellectual knowledge and the sensible thing in which that object is known, as existentially united in the concrete substantial constitution of the thing, and that the intelligible is in some manner separated out from that existential reality by abstraction.¹⁹ Through abstraction, something is realized in the intellect which allows the intelligible to be realized in the intellect apart from the material and particular, such that the concrete, particular, material being is subsequently known intellectually through the intellect's ability to grasp its nature.²⁰

¹⁷ *S.Th.*, Ia, q. 17, a. 3, ad. 1.

¹⁸ Étienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas* (New York: Random House, 1956), 218: "The proper object of the human intellect is quiddity; that is, nature existing in a particular corporeal matter. Thus it is not ours to know the idea of stone, but the nature of such and such a determined stone. This nature is the result of the union between a form and its proper matter. Similarly, the abstract concept "horse" is not presented to our mind as an object. It is the nature, rather, of a horse that has been realized in a given, determined, concrete horse. In other words, it is easy to discern in the objects of human knowledge a universal and intelligible element which is associated with a particular and material element. The proper operation of the agent intellect is to dissociate these two elements in order to furnish the possible intellect with the intelligible and universal which lay implied in the sensible. This operation is abstraction." Hereafter referenced by its French title, *Le Thomisme*.

¹⁹ In the parlance of many Thomists, but not Thomas himself, we could say that according to Gilson the universal and intelligible object is known in the real being, in *ens reale*.

²⁰ Cf. Gilson, *Thomist Realism*, 193: "Realist abstraction is an apprehension of the universal in the particular and of the particular through the universal. The concepts and judgments it utilizes substitute for our lack of an intellectual intuition of the singular."

Through this operation, according to Gilson, it is the subsistent principle or form which comes to be known apart from the individuating characteristics contained in the phantasm:

Now, to know what subsists, in individual matter, without taking into account the matter within which this object subsists, is to abstract the form from the individual matter which the phantasms represent.²¹

Consequently, Gilson goes on to assert that the “simplest aspect” of abstraction is the consideration of the essence of something without consideration of the distinguishing aspects of the individuals contained logically under those species.²²

Thus, in its separating function, Gilson appears to believe that the *intellectus agens* dissociates the essence of real beings by grasping the substantial form, such that what is grasped is independent of anything individuating; that the essence is grasped in a universal fashion. Again, he emphasizes at once the existential unity and the intellectual separation of the intelligible from the sensible, saying that the intellect considers the essences separately, but **in** the phantasms of the imagination.

Yet the separating out of form from matter is not the only function of the *intellectus agens*, for abstraction, of which Gilson says illumination of the sensible species is its very essence, results in the **production** of the intelligible. This productive function is not like some kind of photocopying, whereby the form contained in the image of the phantasm is exactly reproduced sans matter in the intellect, but rather the “engendering” in the possible intellect of what is potentially universal in the phantasm.²³ Gilson explains this process of the production of the intelligible by looking at two properties of the intellect and the phantasm: namely, their respective intelligibility and determination. For the intellect is of itself something intelligible, but it lacks determination, innately containing no proportionate object for its own consideration, whereas the phantasm is determinate but lacks intelligibility. Thus the *intellectus agens* confers intelligibility on the phantasm, whereby it in turn confers a determinate object to the *intellectus possibilis*. In other words, the form represented in the phantasm provides the specification inherently lacking in the intellect, which gives to that

²¹ Gilson, *Le Thomisme*, 218.

²² *Id.*, 218–219.

²³ *Id.*, 219.

form its intelligibility by separating it out from the material and particular aspects of the individual.

Yet, Gilson notes, abstraction alone does not constitute the knowledge of something, but there is a further process necessary; the intellect's operation does not terminate with the reception of the determinate abstracted form, with what we would call the *species impressae*. Rather, there is a further step which must be taken, namely, the formation of the concept, or what we would call the *species expressae*. The concept is no longer formally the same as the impressed species or the intelligible species as contained potentially in the phantasm, but is a similitude, an intentional being²⁴ existing only on the basis of thought, distinct from the impressed

²⁴ This admission made, perhaps, begrudgingly. Cf. John Deely, *Intentionality and Semiotics* (Scranton, PA: University of Scranton Press, 2007), 9–12. While Gilson's student, Joseph Owens, in his *Cognition: an epistemological inquiry* (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press; Houston, TX: University of St. Thomas Center for Thomistic Studies, 1992), uses the term "intentional being" frequently, he seems nevertheless to disavow that the notion is one which is genuinely of St. Thomas: "Aquinas, *De ver.*, 21.3.ad 5m, carefully distinguished the technical sense of the term *intentio* in its present context [as referring to first and second intentions of the mind] from what its etymology seemed to imply" (164, n. 20). The text referenced, *De veritate* q. 21, a. 3, ad. 5, states: "Nevertheless it must be known, that when it is said that the end is prior in intention, 'intention' is taken as the act of the mind, which is 'to intend'. When we compare the intention of the good and the intention of the true, 'intention' is taken for the rationale which the definition signifies; thus it is taken equivocally in the two places." Owens' interpretation of this passage seems, however, to first of all imply that the *intentio intellecta*, while of a kind of being, is an intentional being, which is distinct from the substantial or subjective being which is proper to things as they are in themselves, to the so-called *ens reale* of extra-mental being, and second of all to be contrary to what is stated in *SCG*, I, c. 53, n. 4: "This intention of the intellect, since it is a terminus of intelligible operation, is other than the intelligible species which makes the intellect to be in act, which it is necessary to consider as the principle of intelligible operation; although each is a similitude of the thing understood. For, by the fact that the intelligible species which is the form of the intellect and the principle of understanding is the similitude of an exterior thing, it follows that the intellect forms an intention for itself similar to that thing; because such as a thing is, such does it operate. And from the fact that the intention of the intellect is alike to some thing, it follows that the intellect, forming such an intention, understands that thing." In other words, the intention formed by the intellect—which has all of the marks of the *species expressa*—is for the intellect an orienting back towards the thing. In the previous passage of *SCG*, I, c. 53, i.e., n. 3, *intentio* and *definitio* are explained as synonyms; which should not be taken to imply that the *intentio intellecta* is something strictly immanent, as it were, but rather that it *per naturam* tends back towards the things to which it is alike. The point made in *De veritate* q. 21, a. 3, ad. 5, seems simply to be that there is no process of the individual possessing the *intentio intellecta* moving itself towards an entitative or subjectively-constituted union with the thing intended, as there is in the case of a practical intention. Cf. John F. Peifer, *The Mystery of Knowledge* (Albany, NY: Magi

intelligible species and expressed in the *verbum mentis*, considered as a **substitute** for the thing:

The act of knowledge is further liberated from the object in a still sharper way when the interior word or concept is produced. The name “concept” is given to what the intellect conceives in itself and expresses by a word. The sensible species and then the intelligible species, by which we know but which we do not know, is still the form itself of the object. The concept is the similitude of the object which the intellect brings forth under the action of the species. This time, therefore, we are in the presence of a substitute for the object. This substitute is no longer either the substance of the knowing intellect nor the thing known itself, but an intentional being incapable of subsisting outside of thought, which the word designates and which later will be fixed by the definition.²⁵

The nature of this intentional being of the concept is not further discussed by Gilson; but it is important to note that he considers it something distinct, in terms of its constitution, both from the substance of the intellect or the intellectual creature and from the thing known.

It seems at this point that Gilson becomes concerned with preserving the metaphysical realism of his interpretation of St. Thomas; for the admission of the concept as an object constituted in at least some measure by thought, dependent upon thought for its existence, seems to open the door to some of the difficulties of the idealist—as though Gilson heard in that admission a whisper of Kant’s unbridgeable chasm between noumena and phenomena. Thus, it is qualified that, whereas the impressed species is the direct likeness of the object itself, the concept is a representation of the form and so a likeness of it, but not directly:

Between the thing, considered in its own nature, and the concept which the intellect fashions out of it, there comes a twofold likeness or resemblance which it is important to be able to distinguish. First, there is the likeness of the thing in us; that is, the resemblance of the form which is the species, here a direct likeness, expressed from itself by the object and imprinted by it in us. It is as indistinguishable from it as is the action which the seal exerts on wax from the seal it-

Books, Inc., 1952), 163–164, n. 76. The attainment of the object is entangled in the notion of the *intentio intellecta*; we cannot immanentize the *intentio*.

²⁵ Gilson, *Le Thomisme*, 229. Cf. *S.Th.*, Ia, q. 85, a. 2, ad.

self. Consequently, this likeness is not distinguished from its principle because it is not a representation of it but its promotion and, as it were, its prolongation. Secondly, there is the likeness of the thing which we conceive in ourselves and which is not the form itself but nothing more than its representation.²⁶

First, we note that Gilson applies the example, taken from Aristotle's *De anima*,²⁷ of the impression of the seal on wax and applies it to the impression of the intelligible species upon the intellect.²⁸ Secondly, since the production of the concept, as expressed by the word and "fixed" by the definition,²⁹ follows upon the impression of this intelligible species, Gilson says that the fruit of the concept is given to it by the species of the thing, and therefore there is a true resemblance: "The concept of an object resembles it [the object] because the intellect must be fecundated by the species of the object itself in order to be capable of engendering the concept."³⁰

Gilson goes still further to defend the realism of his interpretation of Thomas' theory of knowledge. Because the process of concept formation is a natural one, and since its object is the intelligible, Gilson concludes that the concept is unerringly produced; there cannot be a mistake in the formation of a concept, and consequently there is an infallible conception of essences (emphasis added):

The operation by which the intellect engenders in itself the concept is a natural operation. In accomplishing it, it is doing what it is its nature to do. Since the process of the operation is as we have described it, we can conclude that **its result is naturally unerring**. An intellect which only expresses the intelligible, if the object has first impressed it in it, cannot err in its expression. Let us give the term "quiddity" to the essence of the thing thus known. We shall be able to say that the quiddity is the proper object of the intellect, which never errs in apprehending it . . . **The intellect conceives essences as infallibly as hearing perceives sounds and sight colors.**³¹

²⁶ Gilson, *Le Thomisme*, 229.

²⁷ Aristotle, *De anima* II.12, 424a 20–22; cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In de anima*, lib. 2, lec. 24, n. 551 and n. 554.

²⁸ Neither Thomas nor Aristotle, it would seem, ever applied the example of the wax and the signet ring to the impression of a species upon the intellect.

²⁹ The meaning of this term, "fixed by the definition," seems to me ambiguous.

³⁰ Gilson, *Le Thomisme*, 230.

³¹ *Id.*

Though there is an ambiguity in Gilson's notion of the concept—namely, whether or not it is synonymous with or somehow virtually contains the definition³²—this claim that the concepts whereby the intellect grasps essences is infallible is troublesome on several counts, and seems to us to be said in an attempt to justify the metaphysical realism of Gilson's philosophy of knowledge. As he adds just a little later, "To say that the immediate object of thought is the concept is not, therefore, to deny that it is the thing, but rather to affirm that it is the thing, inasmuch as the thing's intelligibility makes all that of the concept."³³ In a sense, but not the one evidently meant by Gilson, this statement is true: whatever intelligibility there is to be found in a concept is ultimately instigated or derived from that which is found in the experience had of things; but to say that the concept of a thing is, as the object of thought, the same as the thing itself because all of the concept's intelligibility is constituted by that of the thing itself is to oversimplify the truth of concept formation to the genuine detriment of understanding the truth of the human intellect.

Realism vs. Idealism and the Question of *Ens ut Primum Cognitum*

Ultimately, what we find in Gilson's approach is a systematic integration of St. Thomas' doctrine into a philosophy specifically oriented to the refutation of idealism. Having correctly identified that idealism is an untenable position, Gilson appears to overreact, taking as a given fact that there is an absolute dichotomy between the realist and idealist. This acceptance of such a dichotomy is the result of the presumption that all objects of thought are either the so-called real beings, *entia realis*, of extramental substantial constitution, or the logical beings, *entia rationis*, which exist only in thought. The closest Gilson comes to admitting the possibility of some third kind of object is in his depiction of the concept as an intentional being; but he quickly effaces this possibility, in an evident attempt to produce an airtight defense against idealism, by reducing the content of the

³² There does not appear to be sufficient textual evidence across Gilson's *oeuvre* to say definitively one way or another what his position was. It does seem to be a fair inference, however, based upon his response to Fr. Regis in the appendix to *Being and Some Philosophers*, 221–227, that what Gilson considers as the concept (adopting a notion closer to that which is found in modernity), *proprie loquendo* and in opposition to the broader sense of the *conceptus*, is that which has a distinct intelligible content, i.e., that which is or can be more fully expressed in a definition.

³³ Gilson, *Le Thomisme*, 233.

concept to that which is derived from the substantial form of the thing itself.³⁴

Gilson thought it impossible that a genuine metaphysics would be possible without “returning to realism pure and simple.”³⁵ This “pure and simple” realism requires that one take being as first known to be *ens reale*. Certainly, the first conception of being is germinated from something existing in the order of substantial constitution, from something somehow constituted between principles of essence and existence which in no way depends upon our intellect for its being. In a way, however, this is to make the inverse mistake of Plato—who thought that things must be constituted according to the way they exist in the mind—namely, to believe that what is in the mind is precisely the same as what it discovers in the thing. Thomas confirms a point very similar to Gilson’s statement that “nothing is in the understanding unless it has first been in the senses,”³⁶ for as the Common Doctor writes: “omnis nostra cognitio a sensu incipit”—“every one of

³⁴ Cf. Owens, *Cognition: an epistemological inquiry*, 152: “In abstraction, however, the corresponding representation is no longer individual and mixed with the other features, but expresses the one aspect only. It is called the concept, in the sense of an expressed species, but the thing itself, as presented in the concept, is what one knows through abstraction.” Again, *id.*, 153: “In late Scholasticism the intellectual representation tended to be called the formal concept, to mark it off as the concept produced by the mind. Contrasted with it was the conceived object, under the designation ‘objective concept’. This notion paved the way for the Cartesian doctrine of ideas as the proper object of the mind’s consideration. The notion of an ‘objective concept’ does not fit very well into an epistemology in which real sensible things are the direct object of our intellection. Rather, the object of the concept is the thing itself as known in abstraction. In this way the human nature, the animal nature, and the vegetative nature of a perceived object are represented in separate concepts. They are represented apart from each other, even though in reality they are never found in separation from the really existent individual.”

³⁵ Gilson, *Methodical Realism*, 92.

³⁶ Gilson, *Thomist Realism*, 183. It should be noted that the text Gilson cites, *De veritate* q. 10, a. 6, s.c. 2, has two marks against it for supporting the precise claim that Gilson makes: first, it is present in a *sed contra* which, while not contradicted by Thomas, nevertheless may not fully represent his own position; and secondly, even if it is taken as the meaning of St. Thomas, the text—“omnis nostra cognitio originaliter consistit in notitia primorum principiorum indemonstrabilium. Horum autem cognitio in nobis a sensu oritur, ut patet in fine Poster. Ergo scientia nostra a sensu oritur”—includes two terms, *originaliter* and *oritur* which signify that knowledge **begins** with sense; not that it always and in every case is reliant upon something having been contained in sense. This notion of beginning, seemingly in the sense of the first piece of a larger construction rather than as a persistent principle, is confirmed in the texts cited below, in which Thomas states that our cognition *incipit a sensu*.

our cognitions begins from sense.”³⁷ Nevertheless, we ought to note this important if slight difference between Gilson’s claim and the teaching of Thomas: while it is agreed that every cognition **begins** in sensation, Thomas never declares that **everything** in the understanding has first been in the senses. In fact, we can find texts which seem to support clearly that Thomas held a different position:

sense cognition is not the whole cause of our intellectual cognition. And therefore it is not to be wondered at if the intellectual cognition extends itself beyond the sensitive.³⁸

And:

A sign conveys something, on the basis of that which is known to us, by which we are led to the cognition of another. The first things known to us are things falling under the senses, from which every one of our cognitions has its rising; and therefore the sign as to its first institution signifies some sensible thing, insofar as through it we are led into the knowledge of something hidden.³⁹

And:

the cognition of the mind is said to have its origin from the senses not so much because that which the mind knows, the sense apprehends; but because from those things which the sense apprehends, the mind is led into further things, just as the sensibles lead the understanding to the divine intelligibles.⁴⁰

³⁷ *SCG*, II, c. 37, n. 2. Cf. *S.Th.*, Ia, q. 9, a. 1, c.; *S.Th.*, IIIa, q. 60, a. 4, ad. 1; *Sententia libri Ethicorum*, lib. 2, lec. 1, n. 2; *Super Isaiam*, c. 1, lec. 1; *Super Ioannem*, c. 3, lec. 1; id., c. 8, lec. 8.

³⁸ *S.Th.*, Ia, q. 85, a. 6, ad. 3: “quod sensitiva cognitio non est tota causa intellectualis cognitionis. Et ideo non est mirum si intellectualis cognitio ultra sensitivam se extendit.”

³⁹ *In IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2, c.: “signum importat aliquod notum quo ad nos, quo manuducimur in alterius cognitionem. Res autem primo notae nobis, sunt res cadentes sub sensu, a quo omnis nostra cognitio ortum habet; et ideo signum quantum ad primam sui institutionem significat aliquam rem sensibilem, prout per eam manuducimur in cognitionem alicujus occulti.”

⁴⁰ *De veritate*, q. 10, a. 6, ad. 2: “unde non pro tanto dicitur cognitio mentis a sensu originem habere, quod omne illud quod mens cognoscit, sensus apprehendat; sed quia ex his quae sensus apprehendit, mens in aliqua ulteriora manuducitur, sicut etiam sensibilia intellecta manuducunt in intelligibilia divinatorum.”

While Gilson may not have intended his statement to be taken to the letter, it seems that his adamantness against the idealist position would repudiate that any object of knowledge—as, at the very least, a specificative object existing independently of the act whereby a mind grasps it—is one which is not constituted within the subjective order. Certainly, he would not deny that there are *entia rationis* as objects of the intellect which are not actually existing in nature—there is no such thing as “animal” nor is there some independently existing “2,” yet we know them—but the notion that an *entia rationis* could be a specificative rather than a terminative object seems to have no place in Gilson’s metaphysical realism.

Ultimately, Gilson is consistent; as he himself stated, “any attempt on the part of a philosopher to shun the consequences of his own position is doomed to failure.”⁴¹ By taking *ens ut primum cognitum* as *ens reale*, Gilson is bound to uphold a strictly-realist notion of conceptualization. As a consequence, *entia rationis* are relegated to a kind of second-order of existence. The objects of knowledge are exclusively and exhaustively divided into the extra-cognitionally real, *ens reale*, and the intra-cognitionally unreal, *ens rationis*; and the two only meet in the consideration of *entia rationis* inasmuch as they are considered part of the substantial constitution of *entia realis*. To get beyond this division, Thomism needs a much stronger, well-developed, and robust notion of conceptualization.

EVALUATING THE METAPHYSICAL REALISM OF ÉTIENNE GILSON

SUMMARY

While there is an absence of treatises devoted to the question of *ens ut primum cognitum*, there is no shortage of brief and implicit treatments; indeed, nearly every Thomist of the past seven centuries seems to have at least something to say about the notion that being is the first of our intellectual conceptions. Most recent Thomist thinkers—including Gilson—assume this *ens* to be nothing other than the *ens reale* of things entitatively considered, operating as they do out of a framework within which realism and idealism are presumed to be exhaustive and mutually exclusive attempts to answer the question of human knowledge. It is the intent of this essay to examine how Gilson arrives at his position, which he calls “metaphysical realism,” and to point to some of the difficulties it entails.

⁴¹ Gilson, *Unity*, 302.

KEYWORDS: realism, critique, metaphysics, being as first known, *ens reale*, Thomas Aquinas, epistemology.

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GILSON, KRAPIEC AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY TODAY

The title of my article contains two big names: the one of Étienne Gilson (1884–1978),¹ a man whose enduring legacy and international fame make any attempt of introducing him simply redundant, and the other of Mieczyslaw Albert Krapiec, O.P. (1921–2008),² a long-time professor and president of the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland, and a tireless promoter of metaphysical philosophy, not only in the past years of the Soviet totalitarian regime when his University was the only enclave of free schol-

¹ For more information about Gilson, see Lawrence K. Shook, *Étienne Gilson* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984). To know why it is worth to refer to Gilson today, see Peter A. Redpath, “Why Gilson? Why Now?,” April 18, 2008, Warsaw, Poland (www.adler-aquinasinstitute.org/etienne-gilson-society/why-gilson-why-now/, accessed on Oct 15, 2015), and Peter A. Redpath, “The Importance of Gilson,” *Studia Gilsoniana* 1 (2012): 45–52.

² The original Polish spelling: Mieczysław Albert Krapiec (pronounced: myechisuaf albert krompyetz). For more information about Krapiec, see the Polish Thomas Aquinas Society’s website: www.ptta.pl/krapiec/index.php?id=glowna&lang=en, accessed on Oct 16, 2015. The actual influence of Krapiec can be confirmed by numerous publications referring to his thought, e.g., Gabriela Besler, “The Connection between M. A. Krapiec’s Existential Thomism and P. F. Strawson’s Analytic Philosophy,” *Congresso Tomista Internazionale: L’Umanesimo Cristiano nel III Millennio: Prospettiva di Tommaso d’Aquino* (Roma, 21–25 settembre 2003) (www.e-aquinas.net/pdf/besler.pdf, accessed on Oct 16, 2015); Natalia Kunat, “The Good as the Motive of Human Action According to Mieczyslaw Albert Krapiec,” *Studia Gilsoniana* 3 (2014): 155–166; Tomasz Duma, “To Know or to Think? The Controversy over the Understanding of Philosophical Knowledge in the Light of the Studies of Mieczyslaw A. Krapiec,” *Studia Gilsoniana* 3 (2014): 277–299; or Arkadiusz Gudaniec, “The Foundations of Mieczyslaw Albert Krapiec’s Metaphysical Personalism,” *Forum Philosophicum* 19:1 (2014): 61–96.

arly thought between Berlin and Seoul, but also recently at the dawn of the new millennium of Christianity.³

Although both these renowned scholars fully deserve their work to be studied and passed down to the next generations, the aim of my consideration here is not of a historical nature. I am not going to compare the Christian philosophy of Gilson with that of Krapiec to seek for similarities or differences between them. No, my aim is different. What I am going to do is to use their insights to resolve a problem of mine and of all those who profess to be both Christians and philosophers, and which can be expressed in the following question: is Christian philosophy possible today, now, at the present? We well know that Gilson promoted—accompanied by Krapiec and many other scholars—the possibility of identifying Christian philosophy in the Middle Ages, but what about its possible practice currently, in our time? The question seems to be of great importance due to the fact that what we usually encounter is bitter criticism which comes to us, Christians who earnestly try to do philosophy, from two sides at once: that of academy and that of the Church. Concisely speaking, for academy our philosophy is too Christian, and for the Church our philosophy is too academic.

Why Is It Difficult to Do Christian Philosophy in Academy?

The reason seems to be obvious: it is so because many scholars regard Christian philosophy as being too much dependent on Christian faith (or theology) and thus undeserving to be officially recognized as an academic discipline. Let us have, however, a closer look at the case.

In fact, the existence of Christian philosophy in the walls of the institutions of higher education should not be surprising because it is closely correlated with other branches of philosophy whose presence in the world of human science seems to be an undeniable and unimpeachable fact. For even if they do not label their departments or chairs with such names as “Islamic (or Muslim) philosophy,” “Jewish philosophy” or “Buddhist philosophy,” many Western universities offer courses in such subjects to their students. Nevertheless, the very idea of a philosophy with some religious

³ Especially as an originator and founder of *The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy* whose English version is about to be released. To see a selection of its entries, visit the Polish Thomas Aquinas Society’s website: <http://www.ptta.pl/pef/index.php?id=glowna&lang=en>, accessed on Oct 16, 2015.

epithet or branding still seems to many people philosophically unacceptable.⁴

I am sure that both Krapiec and Gilson would understand our problem perfectly. For Krapiec used to be a dean of a university department of “Christian philosophy,” and Gilson tried to introduce “Christian philosophy” as a term into philosophical vocabulary. And they both had to deal with criticisms undermining philosophy done under the Christian auspices.⁵

One of the most prominent opponents to Christian philosophy was Martin Heidegger. In his *An Introduction to Metaphysics*,⁶ Heidegger challenged Christian philosophy while discussing the nature of philosophical questioning which—according to him—was the cornerstone of true philosophy. Classifying the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” as the basic philosophical question, Heidegger asserted that

In a historical setting that does not recognize questioning as a fundamental human force, the question immediately loses its rank. Anyone for whom the Bible is divine revelation and truth has the answer to the question “Why are there essents rather than nothing?” even before it is asked: everything that is, except God himself, has been created by Him. God himself, the increated creator, “is.” One who holds to such faith can in a way participate in the asking of our question, but he cannot really question without ceasing to be a believer and taking all the consequences of such a step. He will only be able to act “as if.”⁷

The next step of Heidegger was to show that Christians’ belief in the Bible, which effectively hinders them from entering the realm of true philosophy, by no means can prevent non-believers from doing true philosophy. Why? Because the words of Genesis, “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth,” can provide no answer to the most basic philosophical question. He claimed:

⁴ Winfried Löffler, “Two Kinds of ‘Christian Philosophy,’” *European Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 5:2 (2013): 111.

⁵ Even if Krapiec, unlike Gilson, did not promote doing philosophy under the flag of “Christian” philosophy, but he was an ardent defender of Christians’ right and disposition to do authentic philosophy in academy. See Mieczysław A. Krapiec, *Człowiek—Kultura—Uniwersytet* [Man—Culture—University] (Lublin 1998), 149–277.

⁶ Trans. Ralph Manheim (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2005).

⁷ *Id.*, 6–7.

they are in no way related to it. Indeed, they cannot even be brought into relation with our question. From the standpoint of the faith our question is “foolishness.” Philosophy is this very foolishness.⁸

Concluding his pointed remarks on the correlation of religion and philosophy, Heidegger stated:

A Christian philosophy is a round square and a misunderstanding. There is, to be sure, a thinking and questioning elaboration of the world of Christian experience, i.e. of faith. That is theology. Only epochs who no longer fully believe in the true greatness of the task of theology arrive at the disastrous notion that philosophy can help to provide a refurbished theology if not a substitute for theology, which will satisfy the needs and tastes of the time. For the original Christian faith philosophy is foolishness.⁹

According to Heidegger, then, while professing his Christian faith, all the believer can do is pretend to be a philosopher. For, even if his faith beliefs have nothing to say about philosophy, each time he tries to practice philosophy, the believer can only act “as if.” For Heidegger, acting “as if” does not suffice for entering into the way of philosophy. The believer can make a theologian, but a philosopher not at all. For true philosophy is true foolishness for the believer, and it must be so because it forces him to compromise about that which he precisely professes to be uncompromising. That is why Heidegger saw an irremediable opposition between philosophy and religion and denied any true benefit for philosophy from collaboration with religious faith.¹⁰

Of course, Heidegger was not alone in attempting to discourage those who professed to be Christian philosophers. It is enough to recall the

⁸ Id., 7.

⁹ Id. Cf. Thomas D’Andrea, “Rethinking the Christian Philosophy Debate: An Old Puzzle and Some New Points of Orientation,” *Acta Philosophica* 1:2 (1992): 200.

¹⁰ D’Andrea, “Rethinking the Christian Philosophy Debate,” 203. Heidegger’s position seems to be close to that held by the opponents of Jacques Maritain, see Matthew S. Pugh, “Maritain and the Problem of Christian Philosophy,” *Maritain and America* (2009), 97: “Philosophy and Christianity describe two formally distinct orders. Philosophy operates under the light of natural reason, while Christian belief operates under the supernatural light of revelation. The premises of the arguments which philosophy uses are taken from reason and observation, while the premises of the arguments which Christian belief uses are given to reason by revelation. For this reason any use of Christian premises in philosophical argumentation turns philosophy into theology.”

case of Gilson who had to face the criticism from the generation of his colleagues like Emil Bréhier, who already in 1931 claimed that the idea of a “Christian philosophy” was as absurd as that of a “Christian mathematics,”¹¹ as well as from the generation of his students like Fr. John Wippel, who—in his articles from the sixties and eighties of the last century—raised his objections against Gilson’s understanding of Christian philosophy.¹² The main part of Fr. Wippel’s reservations regarding Gilson’s view was his fear that accepting Gilson’s position without qualification would lead one to holding that: 1) all Christians wishing to do authentic Christian philosophy would have—in a very real sense—to become theologians, and 2) such Christians would have to become theologians prior to their doing any Christian philosophy.¹³

In short, for many scholars Christian philosophy is indeed too much dependent on religious faith or theology to deserve positive recognition as a distinct discipline. Let us see now how Christian philosophy is in the contemporary Church.

Why Is It Difficult to Do Christian Philosophy in the Church?

Again the reason seems to be obvious: it is because many Christians today regard philosophy as being far away from the Church and her mission. How is that possible?

Let us start with admitting that since the Second Vatican Council the Catholic Church has undergone a considerable change in regards to her attitude toward philosophy. In 1992, Desmond FitzGerald wrote: “There have been moments since Vatican II when some of us teachers with a Thomistic background have wondered if the Thomism of our youth could carry beyond our century.”¹⁴ Of course, it was not Thomism which sought to abandon Catholic theology; it was rather theology which first sought to break its ties with Thomism. While the encyclical letter *Aeterni Patris* issued in 1879 by the Pope Leo XIII promoted Thomism in the area of

¹¹ Löffler, “Two Kinds of ‘Christian Philosophy’,” 115.

¹² D’Andrea, “Rethinking the Christian Philosophy Debate,” 197.

¹³ Id.

¹⁴ Desmond J. FitzGerald, “Gilson, *Aeterni Patris*, and the Direction of Twenty-First Century Catholic Philosophy,” in *The Future of Thomism*, ed. Deal W. Hudson, Dennis W. Moran (Notre Dame, IN: American Maritain Association, 1992), 83.

Catholic theology,¹⁵ the “New Theology” movement, arisen in the mid-twentieth century and represented by—for example—Fr. Henri de Lubac, S.J., encouraged theologians to experiment with modern philosophies.

According to Fr. de Lubac, the Catholic Church failed to understand the problems of a modern man, nor did she understand the sources of modernism, as a result of which she lost her universal dimension, that is, her catholicity. De Lubac aimed to restore a truly universal dimension to Church doctrine by opening up to each person, to the experiences of all epochs, cultures, peoples and religions. That aim was to be realized not only by returning to the roots of Christianity, but also by opening up to modernity, that is, by getting to know the intellectual situation of the world and confronting the problems of man, establishing relations with the new philosophical currents and proclaiming the Christian message in a language that is understandable for modern man.¹⁶ That was the initial thought which resulted in calling the Second Vatican Council and forming the Church we know today.¹⁷

The leading idea of the Church today is “mission” which involves a deep encounter of the Gospel with contemporary cultures. What seems to be indispensable for this mission are, for sure, biblical studies and knowing how to evangelize. But it would be regarded by many Catholics as strange indeed if any parish priest invited his parishioners to a Sunday course in philosophy as a vital preparation for proclaiming Jesus Christ to the world.¹⁸

¹⁵ *Nota bene*, Gilson claimed to be a Christian philosopher in the tradition of *Aeterni Patris*. See more in Étienne Gilson, *The Philosopher and Theology* (New York: Random House, 1962), 174–199. Gilson undermined, however, two of *Aeterni Patris*’ fundamental presuppositions: 1) that there was a single system shared by all the scholastic doctors, and 2) that post-Tridentine Thomism was the authentic expression of St. Thomas’ own thought (Gerald A. McCool, “Theology and Philosophy,” in *Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America*, vol. 32 (Toronto 1977), 78).

¹⁶ Zofia J. Zdybicka, “Lubac Henri de,” in *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, vol. 6, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk, S.D.B. (Lublin: PTTA, 2005), 530–531 [trans. David Daniel].

¹⁷ Some implicit echo of de Lubac’s diagnosis of the needs of the Church can be found in the opening address of John XXIII at the Council (Rome, Oct 11, 1962) where he said that the authentic doctrine of the Church “should be studied and expounded through the methods of research and through the literary forms of modern thought. The substance of the ancient doctrine of the Deposit of Faith is one thing, and the way in which it is presented is another” (*Gaudet Mater Ecclesia*, 6).

¹⁸ Cf. Craig G. Bartholomew, Michael W. Goheen, *Christian Philosophy* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2013), 3.

Even if a Catholic gets some understanding of how much profit philosophy can bring to evangelization, still he rather thinks of philosophy with reservation: it will be worthwhile to study for him only if it is practical, if it helps resolve cultural problems, or better, if it gives him advantage in religious discussions. We can imagine how bitter his disappointment would be if he enrolled in a course in philosophy to improve his preaching skills, and—instead of getting assurance to become a persuasive evangelizer—he met a professor who already during his first lecture, with an ice-cold methodological correctness, separated philosophy from religion.

One can find a story of that sort told in a book entitled *Christian Philosophy* by two Calvinist philosophers: Craig G. Bartholomew and Michael W. Goheen. The anecdote tells about two friends who signed up for a course in philosophy. Abby has just written an email to Percy to tell him how much she is delighted with her first lecture, and then:

Having sent her email off to Percy, Abby took a sip of her piping hot coffee and pressed the refresh button on her email, reflecting on how much she missed Percy. What—a reply from him already? No, not a reply but a new message headed “HELP!” Abby hurriedly clicked on the email. What could be wrong? Percy too had just had his first class in philosophy, but what a different experience than that of Abby. His prof had started out by explaining the difference between philosophy and religion. Religion was based on faith, but philosophy was a science based on reason alone. In philosophy you are justified in believing something only if it can be established by reason. The prof acknowledged that many in the class might be believers, but in his class they were to leave their faith at the door—only reason was an acceptable criterion in their discussions. The prof went on about the importance of rational, human autonomy in the quest for truth and explained how philosophy emerged as certain ancient Greeks abandoned belief in the gods and sought natural explanations for the state of the world. One brave student asked if religion had no place in philosophy, to which the prof replied, “It does as a subject for analysis, but it is valid only if it can be shown to be true by reason.” “What do you make of this, Abby?” wrote Percy. “I was quite shaken when I left the class. It all sounds so logical, but as I reflect upon it, isn’t human autonomy the great temptation to which Adam and Eve succumbed in Genesis 3? This is going to be one tough class. Any suggestion as to how to survive this course, or

do you think I should just drop it for now? I'm not sure my faith is ready for this." Abby quickly replied: "I see my prof again on Thursday. Let me get his advice and see if he can help."¹⁹

Let us take advantage of having such prominent professors as Gilson and Krapiec to try to help those Christian students who have a similar experience to that of Percy, or who are used to think of philosophy as being far away from the Church and her mission.

Is Christian Philosophy Possible Today?

We can take for granted that both Gilson and Krapiec would answer this question affirmatively. For both Gilson and Krapiec distinguished not only the historical sense of the term "Christian philosophy," but also its psychological sense denoting a practitioner of this philosophy. As experienced professors, however, they would surely voice certain reservations regarding how to practice Christian philosophy. Let me try to predict these reservations.

1. Christian philosophy cannot be identified with an art of persuasion because its final end lies in gaining understanding rather than being persuasive. It can be evidenced, for example, by Gilson's doubt in a persuasive might of the philosophical proofs for the existence of God. According to him,

no philosophy, no natural knowledge of God, could put us in possession . . . of a knowledge of God's existence that belongs to the economy of salvation. [He wrote] "It is true that if the God of revelation exists, he is the Prime Mover, the First Efficient Cause, the First Necessary Being, and everything reason can prove about the First Cause of the universe. But if Yahweh is the Prime Mover, the Prime Mover is not Yahweh. The First Efficient Cause never spoke to me by his prophets, and I do not expect my salvation to come from him. The God in whose existence the faithful believe infinitely transcends the one whose existence is proved by the philosopher. Above all, he is a God of whom philosophy could have no idea . . . The God of reason is the God of science; the God of faith is the God of salvation."²⁰

¹⁹ Id., 11.

²⁰ Richard Fafara, "Gilson and Pascal," *Studia Gilsoniana* 3 (2014): 42, note 39.

For this reason Christian philosophy is primarily addressed to those people who do not need to be evangelized due to already being Christians. A Christian philosopher, then, should not expect to succeed in evangelizing the world, but rather in supporting the evangelized by providing them with the rational justification of their faith. For this is the nature of Christian faith that it seeks as much rational comprehension of revelation as possible, and in this area the Christian philosopher can look for a legitimate job.²¹

2. The first reservation necessarily entails the second one, which is: Christian philosophy is the work of a Christian. This aspect seems to be of great relevance, because Christian philosophy neither reduces itself to supporting the Christian doctrine, nor limits itself to a body of truths and principles constituting an abstractly considered system, it is something more, namely it is a habit. Gilson and Krapiec unanimously follow Aristotle and Saint Thomas in regarding philosophy as a perfection of the intellect acquired through repeated acts enabling its possessor to demonstrate truths through their causes or principles.²² Peter Redpath—while commenting on Gilson—calls our attention to the fact that

[t]he ancillary relation that the act of a philosophical habit always has within the Christian soul is an essential part of its being, not an accidental condition of its relative state. Christian philosophy considered in its absolute, or pure, state is philosophizing ordered to, and imbedded with, faith's grace. Philosophy does not exist as the act of a habit in the Christian soul like mathematics exists within military science. Military science does not give the mathematician answers or hints to the questions that the mathematician seeks to answer. Nor does military science enter into the mathematical habit, infuse it with intelligible light, and intensify its activity's precision. Supernatural faith does all these things within the philosophical habit of the Christian philosopher.²³

Of course, such an explanation seems to implicitly endorse Heidegger's claim that—due to its marriage with faith—Christian philosophy can

²¹ Cf. D'Andrea, "Rethinking the Christian Philosophy Debate," 193–194.

²² Cf. Fafara, "Gilson and Pascal," 40–41, note 33; and Peter A. Redpath, "Thomist Humanism, Realism, and Retrieving Philosophy in Our Time," *Congresso Tomista Internazionale: L'Umanesimo Cristiano nel III Millennio: Prospettiva di Tommaso d'Aquino* (Roma, 21–25 settembre 2003), 4 (<http://www.e-aquinas.net/pdf/redpath.pdf>, accessed on Sept 25, 2015). See also Krapiec, *Człowiek—Kultura—Uniwersytet*, 254.

²³ Redpath, "Thomist Humanism, Realism, and Retrieving Philosophy in Our Time," 6.

be at most an as-if-philosophy which does not satisfy a necessary condition of being a genuine philosophy which, when posing questions, it does it in order to know the truth, and not merely to check or support the religious revelation.

Heidegger's objection, however, does not seem to be unquestionable. Its weakness becomes visible in the light of Krapiec's understanding of religion.²⁴ For Krapiec, religion is the focus of culture, which means that religion is the only factor which—while permeating all the spheres of culture, that is, theoretical, moral and productive sides of human life—gathers them together around the vertical transcendence of man. In consequence, removing religion from culture equates with depriving man of his vertical transcendence, whereas replacing religion leads to an ideology whose kind depends on a substitute provided instead of religion. For example, in the case of progress being a substitute for religion we will have progressivism, in the case of nation—nationalism, in the case of state—statism, in the case of evolution—evolutionism, and so on.²⁵ In result, Heidegger's condition for genuine philosophy to be done exclusively by non-believers appears unacceptable. For it seriously undermines the structure of culture by creating an artificial condition for it to function and provoking a new ideology to come out of the resultant disorder. According to Krapiec, what philosophy needs in order to be a distinct academic discipline is to have its own object and its own method.²⁶ For if no other academic discipline is required to be done by non-believers, then why is philosophy?

3. The third reservation can sound like this: Christian philosophy, that is, that which is done by Christians in order to get more rational comprehension of their faith, cannot function alone, but must go in tandem with its natural ally.

It could seem that such an alliance cannot be understood otherwise than as its unification with theology resulting in Christian philosophy's status as a handmaid of theology.²⁷ Theology (or better: Christian faith)

²⁴ See Mieczysław A. Krapiec, "Religia ogniskową kultury" [Religion as the Focus of Culture], in *O życie godne człowieka*, ed. Bohdan Bejze (Warszawa 1990), 194–227.

²⁵ Cf. Mieczysław A. Krapiec, "Rozważania o narodzie" [Considerations about Nation], *Człowiek w Kulturze* 1 (1993): 33.

²⁶ Krapiec, *Człowiek—Kultura—Uniwersytet*, 254–255. Cf. also id., 184: "Both the object and the method of philosophy (viz., the factors determining a given science) are in themselves neither Christian, nor Muslim, nor pagan."

²⁷ Cf. Pugh, "Maritain and the Problem of Christian Philosophy," 98: "Later, Gilson broadened his notion of theology to include philosophy. Insofar as theology uses philosophy,

plays, however, a different role than that of an ally. Its proper role is rather that of an external controller or an acceptance inspector.²⁸

For both Gilson and Krapiec, the natural ally of Christian philosophy is the classical philosophy of being whose roots go back through the ages to Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, and the pre-Socratics.²⁹ Admittedly, the classical philosophy of being does not aim at knowing God and His revelation, but its concentration on that which really exists makes that Christian philosophers can be provided with a sound understanding of man and the world which surrounds him.

Gilson and Krapiec nowhere maintain that the deliverances of faith should serve as a rational basis for demonstration in the practice of Christian philosophy. In numerous places they explicitly maintain the opposite. They maintain that if Christian philosophy is to be true philosophy then it must be the one which proves its identity by having real being as its object and metaphysics as its method.³⁰

Conclusion

The view that emerges out of the thought of Gilson and Krapiec on the question whether Christian philosophy is possible today, can be summarized as follows: if it is to satisfy both scholarly standards and missionary vocation of the Church, Christian philosophy—which in essence consists in doing philosophy by Christians in order to get more rational understanding of their religious faith—should be identified with the perfection of the intellect achieved by practicing the classical philosophy of being. And as such Christian philosophy is possible today.

philosophy becomes a part of theology. In this case, philosophy becomes the handmaid of theology by presupposing the truths of revelation, and then attempting to prove them rationally. For the later Gilson, philosophy is completely bent to a theological end.”

²⁸ See Krapiec, *Człowiek—Kultura—Uniwersytet*, 184–185. And Richard J. Fafara, “Zmiana ‘tonu’ w Gilsona pojęciu filozofii chrześcijańskiej” [A Change in ‘Tone’ in Gilson’s Notion of Christian Philosophy],” trans. Fr. Pawel Tarasiewicz, *Studia Gilsoniana* 1 (2012): 25: “But with the faith Gilson acknowledged the Church as its guardian and unceasingly cited Pope Leo’s encyclical.”

²⁹ Cf. Redpath, “Thomist Humanism, Realism, and Retrieving Philosophy in Our Time,” 2.

³⁰ Cf. D’Andrea, “Rethinking the Christian Philosophy Debate,” 198; FitzGerald, “Gilson, *Aeterni Patris*, and the Direction of Twenty-First Century Catholic Philosophy,” 87. See again Krapiec, *Człowiek—Kultura—Uniwersytet*, 149–277.

GILSON, KRAPIEC AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY TODAY**SUMMARY**

The author undertakes an attempt to answer the following question: is Christian philosophy possible today? The question seems to be of great importance due to the fact that what Christians who try to do philosophy usually encounter is bitter criticism which comes to them from two sides at once: that of academy and that of the Church. In short, for academy their philosophy is too Christian, and for the Church it is too academic. Being indebted to the insights of Étienne Gilson and Mieczysław A. Krapiec, the author comes to the conclusion that Christian philosophy is possible today only if: 1) it is not identified with the art of persuasion, as its final end lies in gaining understanding rather than being convincing, 2) it is the work of a Christian, and 3) it has the real world as its object and metaphysics as its method. For Christian philosophy—which in essence consists in doing philosophy by Christians in order to get more rational understanding of their religious faith—should be identified with the perfection of the intellect achieved by practicing the classical philosophy of being.

KEYWORDS: Christian philosophy, Gilson, Krapiec, metaphysics, university, Church, faith, theology, evangelization.

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CULTURE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF REALISTIC PHILOSOPHY

Modern theoreticians of culture emphasize that the notion of culture is so complex and so diversely used that it is impossible as well as unnecessary to define its basic meaning.¹ The word “culture” is one of the most ambiguous and complex expressions in the English language and its meaning constantly undergoes changes, modifications and dispersion.² Proliferation of senses related to the notion of culture “went so far that the humanists-researchers sometimes seem to be helpless, abandoning completely attempts to put in order the existing chaos and freedom in referring to the notion of culture. Hence, we read the recurring conclusion that ‘culture is everywhere’, that ‘it can be everything and nothing’ . . .”³

If my reasoning is correct, we can and should talk about a basic, source understanding of culture which is the ground for various individual perspectives. It has to be underlined that this is a philosophical understanding, which is not in contradiction to the functioning of different definitions of culture in individual cultural sciences.⁴ If there are different concepts of culture and different cultural sciences, there has to be a source understanding, the principal understanding of culture.⁵ In my deliberations, as defined

¹ Ch. Jenks, *Kultura*, trans. W. Burszta (Poznań: Zysk i S-ka, 1993), 7.

² See R. Williams, *Keywords: a Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (London: Fontana/Croom Helm, 1976).

³ W. J. Burszta, M. Januszkiewicz, *Słowo wstępne: kłopot zwany kulturoznawstwem*, in *Kulturoznawstwo. Dyscyplina bez dyscypliny?*, ed. W. J. Burszta, M. Januszkiewicz (Warszawa: SWPS “Academica,” 2010), 7.

⁴ See M. A. Krąpiec, *Człowiek w kulturze* (Warszawa: “Gutenberg-Print,” 1996), 148.

⁵ See M. A. Krąpiec, P. Jaroszyński, “Kultura,” in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, vol. 6, ed. A. Maryniarczyk (Lublin: PTTA, 2005), 136.

by the scope of the article, I will underline the moments that define this basic, metaphysical understanding of culture as used in realistic philosophy. According to this concept, culture in its most basic feature is rationalization (intellectualization) of nature. The article will focus on the following areas: genetic-exemplarist analysis of cultural works and definition of culture from the perspective of realistic philosophy.

In realistic philosophy, the understanding of culture is not primal or independent so that we have to refer it to more primal philosophical concepts—a general theory of reality. Hence, in the context of analysis of culture the existence of a pluralist world, constituting a multitude of beings, is assumed. We are also within the framework of an objective and realistic theory of cognition, and this influences the understanding of the fundamentals of culture. A second assumption we have to make is the thesis of the existence of a special structure of man who presents himself as a potentialized personality (a concretely existing, unique rational nature), developing slowly but with almost unlimited possibilities of actualization. In this context it ought to be emphasised that the understanding of culture is strictly connected to the understanding of man and his actions. According to a third assumption, when discussing matters related to culture we have to take into account the analogical nature of being which demonstrates itself in the fact that every being is unique, has its own “face” and “there are no rules that strictly, univocally bind its actions even though we find the same essential (but only general) structures in other similar beings.”⁶

A general understanding of the notion of “culture” and the shift in its meaning in the history of societies belong to the history of culture.⁷ Within philosophy the significant question is: “thanks to what” (wherefore) is culture the fruit of the personal life of man as a person?

The Subject of Culture

The term “cultural sciences” is significant only if we assume the existence of a universal category of a so-called “cultural order,”⁸ that is, a rational order. Already ancient thinkers discovered that all rational order, and

⁶ M. A. Krąpiec, “O filozofię kultury,” in M. A. Krąpiec, *Odzyskać świat realny* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1999), 378.

⁷ See A. Kroeber, C. Kluckhohn, *Culture. A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952).

⁸ See F. Znaniecki, *Nauki o kulturze*, trans. J. Szacki (Warszawa: PWN, 1971), 22.

thus culture, originate from man.⁹ In a philosophical explanation of the order or the phenomenon of culture in general we have to go back to its origins—to the traits and acts of man as a person, and so to conscious and voluntary activities. We have to look at all that is called culture and see the principal characteristic occurring in all these phenomena.¹⁰

It appears that “man can be found in all these cultural phenomena as the one who reflects on his thought and the activity originating from it which usually finds its expression in some kind of artefact, namely, cultural artefact.”¹¹ In this context a cultural phenomenon is everything that comes from man. If we conceive man as an *animal rationale*, then the phenomena in which there is a visible moment of interference of man as man, i.e., as rational being, will be regarded as cultural phenomena.¹² Hence, a trait common to all cultural phenomena is that they originate from man as a rational being.¹³

Areas of Culture: A Genetic Analysis

Philosophical analysis of cultural artefacts from a genetic perspective requires us to refer to the findings of Aristotle regarding the triple order of intellectual cognition: theoretical, moral and creative.¹⁴

Cognition is the fundamental human activity, and it leaves its mark on all experiences of a person as a person, on human moral behaviour, religious acts and acts of creative effort. “There can be no human (as human) activities or their artefacts—explains Krąpiec—without cognition guiding the acting,”¹⁵ and therefore there can be no culture. In his intellectual life man can get to know reality, absorb it intellectually and enrich himself by it. If by nature we understand the surrounding world, then we can distinguish the moment in which, as a consequence of the actualization of cognitive powers, we can “intellectually” accept this world, that is, internalize it. Then this world, in a way, is inside us in the Aristotelian mean-

⁹ See M. A. Krąpiec, *Człowiek i kultura* (Lublin: PTTA, 2008), 19; see Krąpiec, *Człowiek w kulturze*, 147.

¹⁰ On the primacy of reason over will in the order of cognition, see S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Summa theologiae*, cura et studio P. Caramello, vol. 1 (Torino 1963), I, q. 82, a. 3, resp.

¹¹ Krąpiec, “O filozofię kultury,” 380.

¹² In this sense culture means everything that man as a rational and free being adds to the world of nature. Culture—from the commonsense perspective—is a uniquely human way of existence, definitely different from the entire world of nature.

¹³ See Krąpiec, “O filozofię kultury,” 380.

¹⁴ See Krąpiec, *Człowiek i kultura*, 17.

¹⁵ Id., 20.

ing, i.e., in the act of cognition the soul becomes everything it recognises (*anima est quoddammodo omnia*).¹⁶

The first moment of contact with the world is a moment that belongs to purely theoretical cognition. This stage is of clearly informative (receptive) character since consciousness only informs us about things going on in the world around us.¹⁷ Truth is the criterion for this kind of cognitive agreement with the reality. “At the level of purely theoretical cognition—explains Krąpiec—‘getting to know’ means to agree oneself with encountered reality and the principal goal of theoretical cognition is to inform oneself as accurately as possible about what is.”¹⁸ Theoretical cognition in its essence is a selective, aspectual internalization of the content of an analogical being which has different stages. Already in medieval times (St. Thomas of Aquino) it was emphasized that the beginning of a cognitive movement of man was the ability to “read” (*intus-legere, intelligere*) the first principles of reality (*intellectus primorum principiorum*).¹⁹ Then the next stage includes reasoning based on the acquired cognitive contact with reality in various forms characteristic of different sciences.²⁰ Theoretical cognition is the basis for all further variations of human activity.

In addition to informative cognitive order we can also distinguish the realm of intellectual cognition in which man as a person reacts to the theoretically learned reality and in which man is the author of his acts. If the first stage was of a purely cognitive, informative character, it was about cognitive agreement with reality, the stage in question consists in conscious reactions to cognitively absorbed reality and in consciously and voluntarily releasing from ourselves acts of which we are the authors. In the process of releasing the acts from ourselves an important role is played by the reason which shows us which acts we should produce from ourselves in order to achieve a given goal or get closer to it.²¹ Previously recognized good constitutes the criterion for the order of intellectual-practical

¹⁶ See Aristotle, *Tractatus De anima. Graece et latine*, ed., versione latina auxit, comm., illustr. P. Siwek (Roma 1965), 431b–432a.

¹⁷ See Arystoteles, *O duszy*, trans. P. Siwek, in Arystoteles, *Dzieła wszystkie*, vol. III (Warszawa: PWN, 1992), 429b–430a.

¹⁸ Krąpiec, “O filozofię kultury,” 381.

¹⁹ See S. Thomae Aquinatis, *In II Sent.*, d. 39, q. 3, a. 1, resp.; see S. Thomae Aquinatis, *De ver.*, q. 16, a. 1, resp.

²⁰ See S. Thomae Aquinatis, *De ver.*, q. 15, a. 1, resp.; see S. Thomae Aquinatis, *In de div. nom.*, c. 7, a. 1, 2.

²¹ See M. A. Krąpiec, “Człowiek twórcą kultury,” in *Wiara i życie*, ed. B. Bejze (Warszawa 1985), 105.

acts.²² In this stage we learn not in order to agree with reality but in order to release from ourselves the acts which enable us to achieve the chosen goal of life. This plane sets the area of morality which in principle falls into appropriateness or inappropriateness of chosen acts-means, which enable us to achieve a chosen goal, the choice of goal and means being dependent on recognizing the objective structure of being (ourselves and surrounding reality).²³

The third order of cognition and human action is the so-called craft or creation of new works in extrapsychic material as a result of poetical cognition. Creation is facilitated by a special construction skill called art (Greek *technē*, Roman *ars*). Creative order is different both from the purely theoretical cognition and the sphere of practical-moral cognition. Its otherness demonstrates itself in the fact that I can behave actively and creatively towards the instilled cognitive images. I can divide them and from their elements construct something that was not there, something completely new. In the order of creative cognition cognitive sensations and images constitute the material from which I can create a new construction existing solely in my thoughts and embody it in extrapsychic material. A significant moment of the work of intellect is the construction itself (creation) of new ideas. The criteria for this construction may be beauty, harmony, strangeness, humour, etc.²⁴ An example of such creative construction is the Sphinx, whose elements were taken from the image of a woman and a lion.²⁵

It ought to be underlined that the orders of cognition specified above do not occur in a pure state, completely isolated. In life these three realms of cognition intertwine and condition each other.²⁶ If we separate them it is only in order to understand what culture is. The starting point is, however, always the theoretical-informative cognition, providing cognitive content which may become a factor controlling our behaviour and customs or a

²² See *id.* For broad analysis on this subject, see Krąpiec, *Człowiek i kultura*, 66–181.

²³ See Krąpiec, “O filozofię kultury,” 381.

²⁴ See M. A. Krąpiec, “Byt i piękno,” *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 6:1 (1963): 15–34; see M. A. Krąpiec, “Kultura i wartość,” in M. A. Krąpiec, *Człowiek, kultura, uniwersytet* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1982), 117–123.

²⁵ See Krąpiec, “O filozofię kultury,” 382.

²⁶ Krąpiec emphasizes: “. . . main realms of human action based on cognition and directly or indirectly resulting from cognition do not constitute separate realms; they complement each other because the very bases for division (human condition) do not allow us to distinguish between the mutually exclusive scopes” (*id.*, 109).

material transformed in the process of creative cognition. These three orders of rational human behaviour are permeated by religion, constituting a bond between the human person and the person of the Absolute, which is the focal point of culture.

Relation constituting religion—explains Krąpiec—is both the beginning and synthesis of personal acts of man (cognition and wanting-love, changing into action), as much as he becomes aware of his and the world's existential contingency, he addresses in his personal acts the Transcendent person as the ultimate reason of his entire being. Hence religion, whose object is a personal God, lifts entire human life to a personal level and not “material.”²⁷

Cultural Creativity

If culture means the way of being characteristic of man, then from the perspective of philosophy it is necessary to find the moment in which this process is initiated. Even though we are used to the fact that culture demonstrates itself in human creations it seems that it has to start earlier than that. Before an artefact is created first there has to be personal life in man, including thought, will, images and feelings, so everything that was “detonated” by an object.²⁸ Liberation of human spirit starts along with cognition of the world. The existence of real beings influencing us and our cognitive apparatus is a “detonator” of cognition while the content of exiting things enters us and remains in us as the content of cognition. And here we should look for the source of culture, which is primarily the internalization of the actually existing world performed in our cognition. We become aware of the external world, which upon entering our cognitive apparatus creates our internal cognitive life. Then—in the act of reflection—we may objectify our cognitive perspectives.²⁹ Then, in the reflected cognition, we create ideas, models, plans, that is, all that Plato once called “ideas” and Aristotle—“the exemplary cause” of our human action.³⁰ However, the condition for the objectifying of learned content and making it a model and

²⁷ Krąpiec, *Człowiek i kultura*, 23.

²⁸ See P. Jaroszyński, “M. A. Krąpiec koncepcja filozofii kultury,” in *Promotor kultury klasycznej. Wykłady otwarte imienia Ojca Profesora Mieczysława A. Krąpiec* (Lublin 2011), 28.

²⁹ See M. A. Krąpiec, “Intencjonalny charakter kultury,” in M. A. Krąpiec, *Odzyskać świat realny* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1999), 398.

³⁰ See Krąpiec, *Człowiek w kulturze*, 152.

plan for our behaviour is the primal cognitive contact with the actually existing world and intentional absorption of its content.

At this point we have to emphasise two things: a) the influence of the existence of being; b) grasping of the actual content of being.

The impact of the existence of being on human cognitive apparatus takes place directly³¹ and is signless.³² Therefore, there is no place for doubt or error. This means that man in his cognition is constantly in direct contact with reality,³³ he may incessantly verify whether the further phase of cognition—the presentation of its content in signs—is real or unreal. Direct and signless contact with the existing being in cognition is a significant matter since it is the epistemic *raison d'être* of the cognition itself; it is a super-intelligible moment of the cognition itself.³⁴ It is the “starting point” and final instance of the truthfulness of our cognition, i.e., compliance of the act of indirect cognition with the existing state of things.³⁵

The grasp of the content of things we are getting to know takes place through a transparent idea or notion. This is important for the understanding of the grounds for cultural creation. Man grasps things incompletely, superficially, selectively through his acts of intellectual cognition on which he in a way “hangs” the content of the thing grasped. Objective content of things is grasped through his cognitive acts solely in some traits (e.g., from the actually existing horse he grasps only that it is a four-legged animal that neighs, an Arab breed and with such characteristics). This content gains in him, in his cognitive acts, a new way of existence. This is the human way of existence. The horse grasped cognitively in its aspects already exists in man according to his way of existence. The created concept of a horse is a transparent sign that enables the cognition of the horse. Normally this transparent sign-notion is not the object of our cognition but only an intermediary (lens) enabling us to learn and understand the content of things.³⁶

³¹ It is about the mediation *ex quo, per quod* and *quod*.

³² See M. A. Krąpiec, *Metafizyka. Zarys teorii bytu* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1995), 136.

³³ See É. Gilson, *Byt i istota*, trans. P. Lubicz, J. Nowak (Warsaw: PWN, 1963), 249–250; see also J. Maritain, “Przedświadczone życie intelektu,” in J. Maritain, *Pisma filozoficzne*, trans. J. Fenrychowa (Kraków 1988), 80; J. Maritain, “Intuicja bytu,” in *Pisma Filozoficzne*, 145–161; M. A. Krąpiec, “Analiza punktu wyjścia,” in M. A. Krąpiec, *Byt i istota. Św. Tomasz “De ente et essentia”. Przekład i komentarz* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1994), 95–102.

³⁴ M. A. Krąpiec, “Doświadczenie i metafizyka,” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 24 (1976): 14.

³⁵ See Gilson, *Byt i istota*, 269; see also Krąpiec, “Analiza punktu wyjścia,” 95 ff.

³⁶ See Krąpiec, *Człowiek w kulturze*, 153.

Hence our spontaneous cognition is related to the specific existing reality and notions, propositions and reasoning are a transparent mediation (intermediary) that enables our cognitive contact with the real world. In addition, importantly for understanding the sources of culture, it is possible to cognize our cognitive acts both in theoretical cognition and in all other realms of our rational life. This is clearly seen in the context of poetical (creative) cognition where the fact of objectification of our cognition which takes place in the acts of intentional reflection becomes clearly visible. In the acts of reflexive (act-like) cognition we can clearly take as the object of our cognition—our cognitive acts themselves. So as in the theoretical cognition we reflect and objectify our notions in order to get to know their content better; in poetical, creative cognition one more element is added: an objectified notion becomes at the same time a *specimen* modelling our creative actions. When we want to create a tool we objectify our conceptual cognition but in this process of objectification we additionally “construct” our notions so that they become a “specimen”, a “plan” organizing our creative actions.³⁷

Significant for the understanding of cultural artefacts is precisely this moment of construction of appropriate ideas as specimens for further human acts. These ideas may later be expressed and “materialized” in anything (e.g., feelings, body, nature, etc.). The process has no deductive character where first occurs the construction of an idea and then its embodiment or execution. This construction of an idea often takes place with effort and depends on specific work in specific material.³⁸ The formal factor, expressed in construction of ideas in our creative cognition is an important moment of cultural creativity. The idea is the primal subject of created work.

Intentional content of the “work of art”—explains Krąpiec—suspended in human thought is in an “exemplary” state in comparison

³⁷ See *id.*, 154.

³⁸ “This does not mean—explains Krąpiec—that first we have a ready idea constructed in the smallest detail in the psychological intentional order and then we ‘transfer’ it into the extra-psychic material. You are not a painter if you paint only in your mind and not on canvas or other material . . . Still there is some kind of priority of subjectification of the creative ‘construction’, there is conscious realization of work, and this precisely points to thought as the first subject in which the created work originally becomes realised even though sometimes incompletely, less perfectly than when ‘transferred onto paper’, completed in the non-mental material. Priority of thought in the realm of creativity is unquestioned since every construct derives from thought, having its source in it” (*id.*, 111).

to its other forms. Thus being the exemplary cause of a work, the intentional content itself subjectified in thought constitutes a significant and self-comprehensible state of a “work,” while its other forms, outside thought, are comprehensible only by reference to the thought.³⁹

Reality in which the idea is embodied becomes the cultural artefact⁴⁰ which embodies the idea and is derivative from the intellect to the extent to which it fulfils it.

General Sense of Culture

As mentioned before, culture means all that is derived from man as his human action or creation.⁴¹ Culture in the basic sense is rationalization (intellectualization) of nature.⁴² According to this understanding all creations of nature (nature, man and his natural activities) to the extent to which they are subject to human understanding are manifestations of culture.⁴³ In this understanding culture includes everything that is found in nature as natural and that has been transformed under the direction of the reason.⁴⁴ Hence manifestations of human spirit (led by the reason) and acts and activities caused by the human reason constitute its realm in the broadest meaning.⁴⁵

In all realms of human life integrating the phenomenon of culture as a significant point to understand culture itself is the cognitive moment, the moment of the activity of the reason.⁴⁶ Specifically, it is about cognitive reception of content that takes place when the notion-sign is being created in our cognitive apparatus.⁴⁷ For that reason culture in its strict sense is of a sign character. Intellectualization of nature expressed in the most primitive notion-sign determines the sign character of culture and additionally enriches man with new contents, thus consequently enabling him to transcend

³⁹ Krąpiec, “Człowiek twórcą kultury,” 111.

⁴⁰ See Krąpiec, *Człowiek w kulturze*, 157–162.

⁴¹ See Krąpiec, “Intencjonalny charakter kultury,” 388.

⁴² “Culture in the basic sense is intellectualization . . . of nature in the scope available to man” (Krąpiec, “Kultura i wartość,” 120).

⁴³ See Krąpiec, “Człowiek twórcą kultury,” 104.

⁴⁴ See id.

⁴⁵ See Krąpiec, *Człowiek w kulturze*, 149–150.

⁴⁶ See Krąpiec, “Kultura i wartość,” 121.

⁴⁷ See Krąpiec, *Człowiek w kulturze*, 156.

himself through his acting and creating. Without this first act, without cognition, no personal “reaction” is possible.

Pointing to certain manifestations of culture we will notice that the above understanding includes the so-called object, function and subject culture, depending on what gives in to the creative or processing power of the human intellect: objects of nature processed by the human mind, or the human subject itself as long as it is able to give in permanently or temporarily to human intellect, or finally human activities, most importantly the activities of the intellect, which may continue to rationally improve themselves in various objective directions. The scope of such broad understanding of culture includes also its natural or supernatural character, depending on the additional factors influencing the reason. Whether only those that the mind can notice and verify itself or also those that it accepts under the influence of will and grace.⁴⁸

We can also differentiate the meanings of the notion “culture” on account of more temporary cognitive needs. There can be many differentiations depending on what forms of culture we will be interested in and what aspects of culture we will analyze. Such a perspective will include, with appropriate justification, the notion of “culture” with various adjectives: individual, social, mass culture; culture of different social classes; culture of various realms of human life; national culture, state culture, philosophical, scientific, religious culture; literary and artistic culture, agricultural and industrial culture, etc. All these individual perspectives, functioning for example within cultural studies, assume however its principal understanding. “In certain portions (proportions) they will be included in the distinguished understanding of the notion of culture—and this principal sense is: rationalization or intellectualization of nature.”⁴⁹

Analyzing the possibilities of the occurrence of culture we should point to appropriate states of being enabling its occurrence. Only the acceptance of the thesis that the being is internally complex and plural (pluralism) ensures the conditions necessary to explain the occurrence and development of culture.⁵⁰ Acceptance of the complexity of being allows us to notice the dynamism of being⁵¹ and the possibility of actualization of various elements of being. Also, man as a person has the possibility to

⁴⁸ See Krąpiec, “Intencjonalny charakter kultury,” 390.

⁴⁹ Id.

⁵⁰ See M. A. Krąpiec, “O filozofię kultury,” 384.

⁵¹ Id., 384–385.

develop internally through “intentional absorption” of the world. Development of man and his creativity is the actualization of potentiality of both man and the reality surrounding him. And culture manifests itself wherever actualization directed by reason takes place.

Against the background of various potentialities of nature and of human person appears the possibility of a variety of cultures because we can actualize potentialities in various ways and with the use of various ideas controlling the culture-forming human activity. The actualization of human potentialities usually takes place along three cognitive paths, however; hence in different times and places cultures with a predominance of science, morality, religion or technology appear. The three orders of intellectual cognition include the possibility of various realizations of culture. This results from the potentiality of human nature and unlimited possibilities of constructing the idea-specimen that materializes in cultural artefacts.⁵²

CULTURE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF REALISTIC PHILOSOPHY

SUMMARY

The article underlines the moments that define the metaphysical understanding of culture. According to this conception, culture in its most basic meaning is rationalization (intellectualization) of nature. The article is focused on the following areas: genetic-exemplarist analysis of cultural works and definition of culture from the perspective of realistic philosophy.

KEYWORDS: culture, nature, intellectualization, metaphysics, philosophy, realism.

⁵² *Id.*, 386–387.

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THE LUBLIN PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOL: FOUNDERS, MOTIVES, CHARACTERISTICS

The term “Lublin Philosophical School” describes a way of cultivating realistic (classical) philosophy developed in the 1950s by a group of philosophers at the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland. The Lublin Philosophical School is characterized by cognitive realism (the object of cognition is really existing being), maximalism (taking up all existentially important questions), methodological autonomy (in relation to the natural-mathematical sciences and theology), transcendentalism in its assertions (its assertions refer to all reality), methodological-epistemological unity (the same method applied in objectively cultivated philosophical disciplines), coherence (which guarantees the objective unity of the object), and objectivity (achieved by the verifiability of assertions on their own terms, which is achieved by relating them in each instance to objective evidence). The term is the name of the Polish school of realistic (classical) philosophy that arose as a response to the Marxism that was imposed administratively on Polish institutions of learning, and also as a response to other philosophical currents dominant at the time such as phenomenology, existentialism, and logical positivism. In a broad sense, the Lublin Philosophical School is the philosophical milieu of the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland (CUL).

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The Name of the School and Its Founders

The didactic and scientific works initiated at the beginning of the 1950s in the Department of Christian Philosophy at CUL by Stefan Swieżawski, Jerzy Kalinowski, and Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec, were described by Kalinowski (who since 1957 has lived in France) on the occasion of a discussion of CUL's philosophical legacy in the periodical *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, as the "école philosophique lublinoise."¹

In this way, the name "Lublin Philosophical School" began to function as a description of the program for teaching and the style for cultivating philosophy started in the latter half of the 1950s in CUL. In this program, philosophy was presented as an autonomous discipline possessing its own object, method, and purpose. The way philosophy was cultivated and understood would determine whether a philosopher's affiliation to the Lublin Philosophical School was actual or merely nominal.

Besides this name, others appeared interchangeable with it: "Lublin School of Classical Philosophy," "Lublin School of Christian Philosophy," "Lublin School," "Polish School of Classical Philosophy."

The Lublin Philosophical School (hereafter: the School) arose in the institutional framework of CUL's Department of Christian Philosophy (in 1991, in accordance with the requirement of the Apostolic Constitution *Sapientia Christiana*, called the Department of Philosophy), which was established by a decree of the Academic Senate of CUL on June 17, 1946, and began its official activity on November 10, 1946. The first years of the department's operation were concentrated on its organization.

Among the School's founders we should mention Swieżawski, Kalinowski, and Krąpiec. The main weight of the development of the School's philosophical program is connected with the works of Krąpiec, and he also left a basic distinctive mark on the School's philosophical character.

The Causes of the Rise of the School

Among the chief reasons for the rise of the School, we should mention the following: (1) the introduction of Marxism by administrative

¹ "W kręgu filozofii Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego. Z dyskusji o dorobku Wydziału Filozofii Chrześcijańskiej z okazji 60-lecia Uczelni [In the circle of the philosophy of the Catholic University of Lublin. From a discussion on the legacy of the Department of Christian Philosophy on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the school]," *Życie i Myśl* 28:11 (1978): 30.

means in all state universities, higher schools, and postgraduate studies—this ideologization of the teaching of philosophy threatened to shatter the foundations of humanistic culture by breaking the truth about man and the world, by enslaving free philosophical thought by ideology; (2) the need to develop an updated conception of classical realistic philosophy (which was deformed by Suarezian neoscholasticism and the essentialism of Christian Wolff and Joseph Kleutgen), the proposal of an alternative conception of maximalistic philosophy, and the response to other propositions appearing at the time, such as the Roman Ingarden's Kraków Phenomenological School and the Lvov-Warsaw School of Logical Analysis.

The Pressure of Marxist Philosophy

At the beginning of the 1950s, the Communist authorities in Poland intensified their action in teaching Marxist philosophy at all levels of schools—higher and secondary ones—with the intention of bringing a materialistic ideology in place of the Christian world-view. Adam Schaff gave expression to this “education policy” in 1950:

the condition for the complete ideological victory of the Marxist-Leninist world-view in Poland is, among other things, to overcome the ideological influences of philosophical currents that are alien to our class. It is a question here primarily of Thomistic philosophy, that is, the philosophy with a clear fideistic profile that is officially the philosophy of Catholic schools. Neopositivistic philosophy possesses important influence. Finally, a certain variety of E. Husserl's philosophy has some influence. Struggle with these alien ideological influences in philosophy is not easy. It is so simply because of the fact that Marxist scientific cadres are only now growing, and the adherents of Marxist philosophy are only beginning to occupy university chairs. Marxist theory, however, has influence by various roads. The wide network of Communist party schooling and mass action for spreading Marxist ideology are powerful weapons in the struggle with alien ideological currents. The greatest influence is exerted by the written word. Translations of the classic works of Marxism and of scientific Marxist literature are being published in fantastic numbers in comparison with prewar Poland. It is enough to say that more than 200,000 copies of Marx's and Engel's *Dziela wybrane* [Collected works] have been printed, 275,000 copies of Lenin's *Materializm i empiriokrytycyzm* [Materialism and empiriocriticism], over 300,000 copies of Stalin's *O materializmie dialektycznym i his-*

torycznym [*On dialectic and historical materialism*], and 1,300,000 copies of *Krótki kurs historii WKP(b)* [*Brief course on the history of the All-Union Communist Party*]. The struggle against bourgeois ideology in People's Poland is one of the aspects of the struggle taking place in this country and throughout the whole world of the camp of democracy and socialism against the camp of the imperialism that threatens humanity with the unleashing of a new world war. In light of the recent great historical victories of socialism, in light of the uninterrupted progress in socialist construction in the USSR and in lands of people's democracy, the perspectives of this struggle are outlined with complete clarity—there can be only one result: socialism's victory throughout the whole world. This will be the ultimate triumph of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism.²

The ideological and anti-national action organized by the government of the time inclined those who were lecturing on philosophy at CUL (Swieżawski, Kalinowski, Krąpiec) to defend “the philosophical reason” and sovereignty of Polish culture by planned scientific and didactic work in philosophy. The need to show the full truth about man in philosophy turned out also to be an important point. For the proper organization of social, political, religious, and cultural life depends upon this truth.

Appealing to objectively existing reality and the cognition and explanation of this reality was to be the antidote to the ideologized, Marxist philosophy administratively imposed on Polish scientific centers, and also to the limitations connected with the scientific positivism and anti-metaphysical attitude dominant in recent philosophy.

Among the professors of philosophy at CUL was born the postulate to rebuild realistic classical philosophy which would strive to have ultimate cognition of reality in its essential, necessary, and universal (transcendental) structures. It was to guarantee the apprehension of these aspects of reality which the natural-mathematical sciences could not reach on account of their methods.

A group of people prepared by an in-depth reading of classical ancient and medieval texts, sensitive to the things that threatened the full truth about the world and about man, saw that the abandonment

² Adam Schaff, *Narodziny i rozwój filozofii marksistowskiej* [*Birth and development of Marxist philosophy*] (Warszawa 1950), 403.

of classical philosophy would cause an enormous injury to man and culture. Hence their appeal to classical philosophy.

It was not a question of a return to the past, proper to historians, but of resolving contemporary problems by the continuation of a methodologically defined type of philosophy and by taking advantage of the experience of the best thinkers of the past and present in order to understand and explain reality as properly and as profoundly as possible.³

Beginning in the 1950s, CUL was the only school in Poland cultivating independent philosophical thought and providing a university education free of Marxist ideology. This became particularly evident when as a consequence of pressures from the Communist party on the authorities of the institutions of higher education and from the younger generation of the propagators of Marxist ideology who were attempting to prepare positions for themselves in university chairs, the most eminent professors of philosophy were removed from the state universities, including Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Roman Ingarden, Tadeusz Czeżowski, and Izydora Dąmbska. We should note here the provocative action against Tatarkiewicz performed by students who attended his seminar at the University of Warsaw and who were members of the Communist party [Polish United Workers' Party]—Bronisław Baczko, Henryk Jarosz, Arnold Słucki, Henryk Holland, and Leszek Kołakowski. This action was one element in a program aimed at taking the chairs over from professors who did not want to give way to Communist ideology.⁴

These professors found opportunities to give talks and guest lectures at CUL, and they could also continue to direct dissertations of their doctoral students (e.g., Maria Gołaszewska completed her doctorate with Ingarden at CUL).

At that time there were no textbooks or philosophical monographs serving the cognition and explanation of the world in a rationally justified and verifiable way. The works available bore the mark of Wolffian essentialism, making philosophy an object of sterile inquiries divorced from re-

³ Zofia J. Zdybicka, "O wierność rzeczywistości i pełną prawdę o człowieku—Polska Szkoła Filozofii Klasycznej [On fidelity to reality and the full truth about man—the Polish School of Classical Philosophy]," *Summarium* 8 (1980): 110.

⁴ Bronisław Dembowski, *Spór o metafizykę i inne studia z historii filozofii polskiej [Controversy over metaphysics and others studies in the history of Polish philosophy]* (Wrocław 1997), 307.

ality, or the mark of an apparent rationalism that tried to build philosophical systems after the model of deductive systems. Meanwhile, the seeming realism of materialistic philosophy (which was basically one of the forms of idealism, since it was based on an abstract idea of matter that was accepted *a priori*) had to be opposed with a common-sense and rationally justified vision of reality as really existing. It was a challenging task for the people who created the program of the School to develop and present the basic domains of philosophy in textbook form in the middle of a sea of Marxist literature.

The Polish School of Realistic Philosophy

The beginning of the School was also a response to the positivism (neopositivism) that was dominant in the latter half of the twentieth century in European philosophy, which was propagating a program of minimalistic and non-autonomous philosophy, and it was also a response to the currents of the philosophy of consciousness and the philosophy of language.

Attempts to combine realistic philosophy with phenomenology, esp. that of Ingarden, which declared itself to be realism, did not guarantee cognitive success on account of the different objects of inquiry (intentional beings existing in the cognizing subject instead of real things). Attempts to combine realistic philosophy with analytic philosophy also appeared problematic on account of their different object of inquiry, the methods they used, and their cognitive purposes. The same may be said about attempts to make realistic philosophy “scientific” by the formalization of its language, as those made by Jan Salamucha, Jan F. Drewnowski, and Józef M. Bocheński.

Proposals for the cultivation of philosophy from Ingarden’s Kraków Phenomenological School or the Lvov-Warsaw School of Logical Analysis (an analytic school) presented in opposition to the pressure of Marxism were characterized by a cognitive minimalism that was already in its starting point closed to existentially important human problems. For this reason they could not be a counterweight to Marxism. Furthermore, they were permeated by the positivistic mentality as manifested in reducing the description and explanation of the world to a narrowly understood scientific explanation based on a mathematical-natural model. They were philosophies that make the data of consciousness or language into the object of inquiry, leaving out of the area of inquiry what is most important, namely human being and the world that surrounds us.

The program of the School was directed to working out a new version of classical realistic philosophy that could be something capable of resisting Marxism, which proclaimed itself to be realism. In this program,

two postulates specific to the philosophy cultivated in the Lublin School have their source: (1) an in-depth consideration of historical experience by a return to the sources, to the original thought of important philosophers, in particular Thomas Aquinas, to avoid the deformations made by his commentators and later representatives; (2) methodological reflection which accompanied considerations on meritorious questions and took into account the generally accepted achievements of the logical theory of science.⁵

The School tried to bring its inquiries to bear on all the propositions advanced by contemporary philosophical currents. While understanding that human thought was subject to historical development, that man is a historical being, the School tried to pay close attention to the entire history of philosophy, esp. the periods in which new currents of philosophical thought appeared. At the same time, aware of the great number of philosophical currents and different ways of cultivating philosophy, the School emphasized methodological matters in philosophy. What turned out was a fact that philosophy, despite being one of the oldest domains of knowledge, still did not have a satisfactorily developed methodology of its own.⁶

The philosophy cultivated in the School, the central discipline of which was metaphysics, was accompanied by a broadly conceived methodological reflection in general metaphysics and the various particular metaphysics, and in the history of philosophy. Krąpiec's and Stanisław Kamiński's work *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* [*On the theory and methodology of metaphysics*], and Swieżawski's work *Zagadnienie historii filozofii* [*The question of the history of philosophy*]⁷ set the direction for inquiry and created the framework for the program of the School that was taking shape. The Chair of Metaphysics (General and Particular), the History of Philosophy, and Methodology of the Sciences took part in the works of the School.

⁵ Zdybicka, "O wierność rzeczywistości i pełną prawdę o człowieku," 110.

⁶ Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "O filozoficznej szkole lubelskiej [On the Lublin philosophical school]," in his, *Człowiek, kultura, uniwersytet* [*Man, culture, university*] (Lublin 1998), 249.

⁷ Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, Stanisław Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* [*On the theory and methodology of metaphysics*] (Lublin 1962); Stefan Swieżawski, *Zagadnienie historii filozofii* [*The question of the history of philosophy*] (Warszawa 1966).

The history of philosophy as cultivated at CUL by Swieżawski, which looked to the thought of Jacques Maritain and Étienne Gilson, “is the history of metaphysics. Thereby it alone functions also as a particular experience of metaphysics cultivated systematically in the chair dedicated to this discipline.”⁸ Logic and methodology were conceived as instruments to facilitate philosophical (metaphysical) cognition, and secondarily as autonomous disciplines (also in view of didactic needs).

In the methodological inquiries made by Kamiński in close collaboration with Krąpiec, the emphasis was on the development of research methods for philosophy, esp. for realistic (classical) metaphysics. They attempted to systematize the methods of rational and scientific cognition in general. The purpose was to show the context of scientific cognition, into which area not only the mathematical and natural sciences enter (a restriction forced by scientism), but also such sciences as philosophy, humanities, and theology.

In the School’s philosophical program, philosophy was put on the foundation of experience broadly conceived, including not only sensory and intellectual perception, but also the intellectual intuition (intellectualism) of the theoretical, that is, the inclination to know truth (*propter ipsum scire*). Moreover, the School indicated the consequences and practical ends that follow from truth which is not constructed, and justified and explained their appraisals and norms by referring to the ultimate essences of things.⁹

Because there were no monographic works on the basic divisions of philosophy, Krąpiec as he lectured on metaphysics faced the challenge of filling this gap. He began a systematic development of the main domains of realistic philosophy, the beginnings of which appeared in Aristotle, but which were given depth by Thomas Aquinas, and in the twentieth century in some domains were presented by Gilson. Gilson’s works were to be made available to Polish professors and students as quickly as possible. It was decided that philosophical teaching should look for support in the newly developed metaphysics, since it determines methodical teaching also in the other branches of philosophy that grow from the metaphysical trunk. Besides the metaphysical foundation of cognition, it also was to consider the in-depth historical-methodological reflection provided by the history of philosophy, the theory of knowledge, logic, and methodology.

⁸ Swieżawski, *Zagadnienie historii filozofii*, 250.

⁹ Zdybicka, “O wierność rzeczywistości i pełną prawdę o człowieku,” 111.

From metaphysics as the basic philosophical discipline new domains of philosophical inquiry began to emerge and find autonomy: the theory of knowledge, philosophy of religion, philosophical anthropology, philosophy of law, philosophy of culture, philosophy of art, the theory and methodology of metaphysics, the philosophy of politics, and particular ethics (e.g., ethics of work, ethics of scientific research).

The School was to be this

particular place where the links with the entire rich tradition were not broken, where there was no bowing to the pressure of cognitive minimalism, scientism, and also the pressure of the philosophy of the subject, which broke away from objectivism, not to speak of the pressure of ideology, which was especially strong in our country. Withstanding the latter pressure required intellectual and moral strength. The philosophers of this current of philosophy were aware of all the pressures and perhaps for this reason, for the most part, more than anywhere else, they were able to effectively defend the theory of man from curtailed visions that reduced man to the role of an instrument.¹⁰

Specific Character of Philosophy in the School

The things that characterize the School are: (1) a return to classical philosophers, that is, to their texts as sources, in the conviction that these philosophers have the most to say in philosophy, and (2) a methodological reflection taking shape against the background of ways in which philosophy has been cultivated up to the present time, including the ways of defining philosophy, of philosophical explanation and argumentation, and of constructing a philosophical system (without violating therein the postulate that philosophical thought should be open)—all of which is for the purpose of being freed from the verbalism that grew in the classical tradition. It was not so much a matter of some concrete and unimpeachable legacy (although the School actually tries to work for such a legacy), as a matter of continuing a certain tradition, a style of philosophical thought, which the School calls “classical,” “existential,” or “the philosophy of being.”¹¹

From the beginning in the School’s program, realistic metaphysics was indicated as the central philosophical discipline that plays a fundamen-

¹⁰ Id., 115.

¹¹ “W kręgu filozofii Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego,” 24–25.

tal role in the cultivation of philosophy and in philosophical education. Also the several particular metaphysics were distinguished; they took in the particular domains of philosophical inquiries. These inquiries were to be completed by a study of the history of philosophy (ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary) and were to be given depth by a reflected methodological, logical, and epistemological awareness.

The starting point in constructing the School (the new school of realistic philosophy) was an accent upon the existential understanding of being as the object of philosophy. The existential conception of being was the aspect of the new version of philosophy that indicated the basic differences in the Aristotelian, scholastic, and neoscholastic versions of classical philosophy. Among the things that contributed to a rediscovery of the existential concept of being were a return to the texts of Thomas Aquinas, and a special sensitivity to the problem of existence (and what poses a threat to it) on the part of the School's founders, who carried in themselves the tragic experiences of the Second World War. They saw that it is the act of existence that constitutes the most important and most perfect factor of being, a factor that needs to be affirmed and becomes the first and fundamental object of philosophical explanation. This fact sets the purpose for cultivating philosophy, which is the cognition and explanation of the really existing world of persons and things. The purpose of philosophy will thus be to indicate the necessary and ultimate factors that explain the existence of the world, and the existence of man in particular. The indication of being understood existentially as the formal object of philosophy became the point that integrated the different sections of philosophy in the explanation of reality.

Regarding the methodological reflection that should accompany realistic philosophy, Kamiński stated:

In the years 1952 to 1957 when we were developing the Department's full structure, our attention was especially turned on methodologies of sciences, and in general on the level of the meta-theoretical reflection on studies . . . Since in Poland in the period between the wars and right after the Second World War the analytic-critical attitude was dominant, therefore among us there was a special harmonization of classical philosophy, which was maximalistic

with regard to content, with the analytic-critical style of approaching to the philosophical problems.¹²

Kamiński paid attention to the specific character of metaphysical cognition that was revealed especially in the analogical character of the language of metaphysics, in procedures of explanation, demonstration, and rational justification, which often occur simultaneously. He underlined that methodological tools cannot be brought across from the natural or mathematical-logical sciences to metaphysics, but autonomous tools should be developed. The result was the development (in cooperation with Krąpiec) of a methodology of metaphysics that was unique in Polish and world science¹³ and the accent on the specific character of metaphysical demonstration and analogical-transcendentalizing language. Krąpiec insisted on going into depth and working out the conception of judgment-based (existential) cognition, which was the main form of realistic cognition.

In the School's program, the autonomy of philosophy was carefully maintained, both in relation to particular sciences, theology, and the then popular philosophical currents of phenomenology, analytic philosophy, and existentialism. This did not mean a separation of the School's philosophy from these currents and sciences. In cultivating philosophy, the School indicated the necessity of knowing the results of the mathematical-natural sciences, the theological sciences, and contemporary philosophical trends as elements of erudition and inspiration. The School entered into discussions with actual philosophical trends in order to refine the explaining methods of realistic philosophy, and also to take up new aspects of inquiry inspired by currents of contemporary philosophy (e.g., phenomenology, existentialism, and the philosophy of language).

Anthropological and ethical questions were devoted much attention to in the School's program too. The School undertook works in this domain, when Karol Wojtyła, having recently received his habilitation degree, joined in the School's team. The questions of classical ethics were enriched by the works of Wojtyła who strove to join ethical questions more closely with anthropology and metaphysics. Although in his description of moral acts he drew on elements of the phenomenological method, in his habilitation work on M. Scheler's ethics he showed that the ethics of values could not be transferred or applied to Christian ethics.

¹² Id., 30.

¹³ It was presented in Krąpiec's and Kamiński's book titled *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki*.

The history of philosophy as developed by Swieżawski was basically strengthened by Marian Kurdziałek and was joined to metaphysical inquiries by a concentration of efforts on showing not so much the history of thoughts (ideas) as the history of problems and how they were resolved. For this reason Krapiec worked out a so-called net of problems that the historian of philosophy should consider when investigating the views of particular philosophers or philosophical currents. The School undertook monographic studies on the philosophy of the Middle ages, with particular reference to the contribution of Polish philosophical thought. Institutes for studies on this problem were established at CUL and Polish Academy of Sciences.

Particular questions

The main factors that determine how philosophy is cultivated in the School are as follows: (1) an understanding of being as that which exists, as the object of metaphysical cognition; (2) the acceptance of a radicalized conception of cognition in which acts of existential judgments constitute the most primary cognitive acts (prior to acts of conceptualization); (3) a return to natural and integrated language in philosophy (in which the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic aspects occur inseparably); (4) a method composed of the description of facts, historicism, diaporesis in explaining problems, the question $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\ \tau\acute{\iota}$ [diá ti] and indication of the objective factor that renders the explained fact free of contradiction; (5) cognitive tools, including logic conceived as the theory for making cognition efficient (as distinct from making thinking efficient); (6) a theory of rational justification—indicating the ultimate and objectively verifiable reason for the investigated aspect of being.

A new understanding of being. The character of metaphysics depends completely upon the conception of being, which is its object. The first and basic question of metaphysics is the question concerning being, and the understanding and elaboration of the conception of being are its most important assignments. To understand what is new in this conception, we must resort to history. The conception of being conceived as that which exists was developed by St. Thomas Aquinas. He also delineated a method for arriving at being so conceived, described by the term “separation,” a path completely different from the “abstraction” of which—invoking Aristotle—later scholasticism spoke so much. Scholasticism, after all, had in large measure lost the legacy of Aquinas, simplifying and schematizing it, and it had grown distant from the living problems that grow on the soil of

realistic metaphysics which concentrates on the questions that follow from perceiving and analyzing individual and concrete existence.¹⁴

Realistic philosophy is directed to the cognition of really existing persons and things. This is the traditional and classical object of philosophical cognition, as opposed to various forms of subjectivism that reduce philosophy to an analysis of cognitive signs, concepts, language, or the data of consciousness.

The conception of metaphysical cognition. In realistic philosophy, cognition is based on common-sense cognition and is a development of it. Common-sense cognition connects us with the really existing world. Thus a theory of metaphysical cognition had to be developed so that, on the one hand, it would guarantee the reality and concreteness of the object of metaphysics, and on the other hand, it would guarantee its generality, based, however, not on abstraction, but on analogy. Only in this perspective could the School approach the task of reconstructing metaphysics as a whole, of working on many particular questions such as the theory of the analogy of being, the theory of transcendentals, the internal and external reasons of being (more precisely, the factors that render being free of contradiction), etc. The matter of cognition itself is also seen in a new light. Cognition is also a being, a being of a particular kind, and so cognition also lies within the scope of metaphysical inquiries. As it turns out, in this approach many epistemological questions lose their *raison d'être*. Some of them are simply pseudo-problems, while others recede into the background. The reconstruction of metaphysics entails the reconstruction of the theory of cognition, which is most closely connected with it, and which should basically be a particular instance or special domain of metaphysics.¹⁵

In working out the conception of realistic cognition, there was noted a fact that there are acts of direct cognition in which we are not aware of the opposition of subject and object. They are precisely the most original or pristine acts in which we experience existence itself. They find expression in the existential judgments to which metaphysics appeals. In a metaphysical judgment we have the directly given fact of the existence of something that we still have not cognized well. The very fact of existence “grabs us by the throat” so that at that moment we cannot speak of any doubt or cognitive distance. The doubling into subject and object is also excluded here;

¹⁴ Krapiec, “O filozoficznej szkole lubelskiej,” 251.

¹⁵ Id., 251–252.

this doubling can appear only in acts of reflection, while the existential judgment is the result of spontaneous pre-reflective cognition.¹⁶

The conception of language. The language that serves to communicate the results of cognition is an integrated language that is not one-sided and that does not overvalue any aspect of language (semantic, syntactic, pragmatic).

The language of the theory of being differs in its character from the language of other types of knowledge, and moreover, it is difficult to make a full semiotic determination of it. Although with respect to the analytical aspect it is close to the language of the formal sciences, at the same time it is marked by an integral and almost extreme realism. It concerns the qualitative aspect of reality, but at the same time it gives ontological and cognitive primacy to the general-existential aspect. In terms of its genesis it is derived from ordinary language and is chiefly based on it, but at the same time it uses terminology that has more specialized semiotic functions. Finally, it uses names with the widest scope, and at the same time it ascribes to these names content which is not at all empty. To reconcile these oppositions and to resolve the difficulties connected with them, what was developed was a doctrine adequate to the language of theory of being, that is, a doctrine of analogy, participation, transcendentals, and necessary truths.¹⁷

In the program of the School, what is underlined is that language is not an autonomous construct guided by autonomous laws and rules that are independent of the structure and nature of the world of things to which this language refers us, but it is in its subject-predicate structure grounded in the structure of things (in their composition of substance and accidents, essence and existence). The rules of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics also are grounded in the structure of things, the expression of which are Aristotle's categories, which show the objective grounding of predicates.

It is also underscored that it is part of the specific character of the language of metaphysics that it is a language of the first degree, that is, a language "to things," which means that it is directed to the perception of

¹⁶ Id., 253.

¹⁷ Stanisław Kamiński, "Osobliwość metodologiczna teorii bytu [Special methodological character of the theory of being]," in his *Jak filozofować?* [How to philosophize?] (Lublin 1989), 81.

things, and not to the definition of concepts. Furthermore, it is an analogical-transcendentalizing language so that it can transmit knowledge concerning all reality.

The autonomous method of metaphysical cognition. This method consists in the analysis of real facts in the light of the scientific question: “why” (διὰ τί [diá tí]), and in indicating such factors that render those facts free of contradiction, that is, the factors the negation of which entails the rejection of the facts that are being explained. Metaphysical separation, which allows us to differentiate the object of metaphysics and to cognize it in the framework of a so-called process of refinement, is such a method. The essence of metaphysical separation is reaching the factors of being (of an investigated event, fact, process, or construct) through which it exists. Thus it is not a method that parcels the object into parts that when known are, as it were, independent of the whole, but it is a method that allows us for cognitive purposes to differentiate definite essential factors of composition in order to better understand the whole of an existing being (of a phenomenon, event, or construct). Separation conceived analogically is also a method of the various particular metaphysics, and so of realistic philosophy as a whole.

The development of cognitive instruments. Logic is conceived as a set of instruments for cognition with understanding (differing from the instruments of effective thinking). Problems with the adaptation of contemporary logic to metaphysics arise primarily because this adaptation usually consists in the reduction of metaphysical cognition to logical-mathematical cognition.

The instruments contemporary logic uses are incapable of grasping and making efficient metaphysical cognition, which is concrete and transcendental cognition expressed in analogical language. This type of cognition cannot be reduced to (or replaced by) combinatorial or operational cognition.

The theory of rational justifications. Deduction as it is understood today does not appear among the methods of the philosophy of being. Metaphysical cognition is not a formal thinking that uses inference. Syllogistic deduction in the Aristotelian sense also does not appear here. For this reason here there is no apodictic argumentation as understood also in the Aristotelian sense. The chief reason for this is that metaphysical concepts cannot be strictly defined *per genus proximum et differentiam specificam*. The concepts of the philosophy of being are supergeneric and of infinite scope. If by deduction we were to call thought based on necessary states of

things, then the deduction so conceived would take place in the philosophy of being. It would presuppose, however, (1) a conscious construction of the object of the philosophy of being (a conscious construction also in the form of the noetic first principles: identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle, and reason of being), (2) a basically negative kind of argumentation by indicating the evident absurdity of the opposite proposition, the disagreement of the opposite proposition with the fact, the reduction of the opposite proposition to contradiction, the impossibility of any other way of presenting the matter even by a real or fictitious opponent. All negative argumentation is made in the light of a constructed proper object of philosophy (not arbitrarily constructed), apart from which we cannot philosophize at all, just as scientific investigations cannot be made in a science in isolation from its proper object.¹⁸

In realistic metaphysics we perform analyses of states of things. Although in this analysis all the ways of reasoning known in the contemporary methodology of the sciences occur, we are always dealing with a special kind of cognition that does not completely fit into separate formal classifications.

The School's Program

The School's program, developed in the meritorious aspect chiefly by Krąpiec, is made up of the following elements: (1) the objective way of cultivating philosophy, which is general metaphysics and the several particular metaphysics; (2) historicism, which protects philosophical thought from returning to ancient errors and shows the development of philosophical thought; (3) the awareness of methodological autonomy, which entails the need to develop autonomous methodological-logical instruments for general metaphysics and the several particular metaphysics; (4) the use of an integrated language (considering the semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic aspects), which determines the specific character of metaphysical cognition; (5) in the demonstration of metaphysical assertions, the use of the method of objective explanation (i.e., rendering free of contradiction, de-contradictification) of the investigated facts, events, or processes, by indicating real factors, the rejection of which would entail the negation of the explained fact; in this explanation we strive to show the foundations for delivering human cognition and thought from absurdity and apriorism by

¹⁸ Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, Stanisław Kamiński, "Specyficzność poznania metafizycznego [Specific character of metaphysical cognition]," *Znak* 13 (1961): 627–628.

indicating the objective reasons (causes) of existence for the investigated facts; (6) providing philosophical instruments for the realistic interpretation of the world and man, and revealing the foundations of the rationality of human cognition and action.

The task of deepening, developing and specifying the program of the School was connected institutionally with the Section of Metaphysics, which was directed from the beginning by Krąpiec, and he was also the chief animator in entering new domains of philosophical inquiry. Other sections—the Section of the History of Philosophy, the Section of Ethics, the Section of Logic and the Theory of Cognition (occupying different chairs)—joined in these works.¹⁹

Translated from Polish by Hugh McDonald

**THE LUBLIN PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOL:
FOUNDERS, MOTIVES, CHARACTERISTICS**

SUMMARY

The article is focused on the Lublin Philosophical School; it explains its name, presents its founders, reveals the causes of its rise, and introduce the specific character of the School's philosophy. It starts with stating the fact that in the proper sense, the term "Lublin Philosophical School" describes a way of cultivating realistic (classical) philosophy developed in the 1950s by the group of philosophers at the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland. The Lublin Philosophical School is characterized by cognitive realism (the object of cognition is really existing being), maximalism (taking up all existentially important questions), methodological autonomy (in relation to the natural-mathematical sciences and theology), transcendentalism in its assertions (its assertions refer to all reality), methodological-epistemological unity (the same method applied in objectively cultivated philosophical disciplines), coherence (which guarantees the objective unity of the object), and objectivity

¹⁹ Within the Section of Metaphysics, at the moment it was established (1956), two chairs were created separately: the Chair of General Metaphysics (directed by Krąpiec, and since 1997 by Andrzej Maryniarczyk), and the Chair of Particular Metaphysics (directed by Stanisław Adamczyk). Over time, from the Section of Metaphysics the following chairs of particular metaphysics emerged: Chair I of Particular Metaphysics (1969), renamed in 1970 as the Chair of the Theory of Cognition and joined to the Section of Logic and the Theory of Cognition, the Chair of the Philosophy of God and Religion (since 1973 directed by Zofia J. Zdybicka, and since 2002 by Piotr Moskal); the Chair of the Philosophy of Culture (since 1991 directed by Piotr Jaroszyński); the Chair of the Philosophy of Art (directed since 1996 by Henryk Kiereś), the Chair of the Philosophy of God (directed since 2005 by Włodzimierz Dłubacz).

(achieved by the verifiability of assertions on their own terms, which is achieved by relating them in each instance to objective evidence). The term is the name of the Polish school of realistic (classical) philosophy that arose as a response to the Marxism that was imposed administratively on Polish institutions of learning, and also as a response to other philosophical currents dominant at the time such as phenomenology, existentialism, and logical positivism.

KEYWORDS: Lublin Philosophical School, metaphysics, realism, philosophy, Krąpiec, Kalinowski, Swieżawski, Wojtyła.

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THE LUBLIN PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOL: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

The philosophical achievements of the Lublin Philosophical School (hereafter: the School)¹—which came into being in the institutional framework of the Department of Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland—took place at different stages of its development. It was connected with the involvement of new people and successive generations of new students who joined in the cultivation of realistic philosophy. We can regard the years 1950–1966 as the first stage of the School’s development, in which the School’s program was formulated. The following stages are the years 1967–1980, and 1981–2004, and the years that follow, in which new generations of students who take up inquiries in the spirit of the School’s program arrive (but also leave for other institutions).

Stages in the School’s Development

The years 1950–1966

The first stage was the time when the program of the School was formed (Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, Stefan Swieżawski, Jerzy Kalinowski, Stanisław Kamiński, Marian Kurdziałek, Karol Wojtyła and the first stu-

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¹ On the origin and program of the Lublin Philosophical School, see Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, O.P., Andrzej Maryniarczyk, S.D.B., “The Lublin Philosophical School: Founders, Motives, Characteristics,” *Studia Gilsoniana* 4:4 (October–December 2015): 405–422.

dents, most of which they were students of Krąpiec: Mieczysław Gogacz, Franciszka Wilczek, Antoni B. Stępień, Marian Jaworski, Władysław Stróżewski, Bronisław Dembowski, Zofia J. Zdybicka, Stanisław Kowalczyk, Stanisław Majdański, Tadeusz Kwiatkowski).

This stage was characterized by unity in inquiries, the visible group work of the chairs, and concern for the development of the several particular metaphysics, which was to lead to the development of a uniform realistic philosophy with a good set of methodological-logical instruments.

Other professors still taught in the Department of Philosophy—Józef Iwanicki, Wiktor Wąsik, Kazimierz Kłosak, Franciszek Tokarz, Feliks Bednarski, Antoni Korcik—but they did not join directly in the works that formed the program of realistic philosophy.

The books published in this period provide a picture of the contributions of particular persons in the School's development and indicate problems taken up in this period.² The works in the field of the methodology of metaphysics (and also ethics) show the effort to work out an adequate method of metaphysics.³ The rest of the works of the first students who

² The following works were published: Stefan Świeżawski, *Byt. Zagadnienia metafizyki tomistycznej* [*Being. Questions of Thomistic metaphysics*] (Lublin 1948), the second edition at the suggestion of Krąpiec was revised and published as the work of two authors: Świeżawski and Marian Jaworski, *Byt. Zagadnienia metafizyki tomistycznej* [*Being. Questions of Thomistic metaphysics*] (Lublin 1961); Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Realizm ludzkiego poznania* [*Realism of human cognition*] (Poznań 1959, Lublin 1995, 2nd ed.), and also his: *Teoria analogii bytu* [*Theory of the analogy of being*] (Lublin 1959, 1993, 2nd ed.); Jerzy Kalinowski, *Teoria poznania praktycznego* [*Theory of practical cognition*] (Lublin 1960); Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, Stanisław Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* [*On the theory and methodology of metaphysics*] (Lublin 1962; 1994, 3rd ed.); Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Dlaczego zło? Rozważania filozoficzne* [*Why evil? Philosophical meditations*] (Kraków 1962; Lublin 1995, 2nd ed.), and its French translation: *Pourquoi le mal?*, trans. Geneviève Roussel (Paris 1967); Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Struktura bytu. Charakterystyczne elementy systemu Arystotelesa i Tomasza z Akwinu* [*Structure of being. Characteristic elements of the system of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas*] (Lublin 1963, 1995, 2nd ed.), and also his: *Metafizyka* [*Metaphysics*] (Poznań 1966, Lublin 1995, 3rd ed.), and its English translation: *Metaphysics. An Outline of the Theory of Being*, trans. Theresa Sandok [et al.] (New York 1991).

³ The following works of Stanisław Kamiński: "O logicznych związkach zachodzących między tezami metafizyki [On the logical connections that occur between the theses of metaphysics]," *Sprawozdania z Czynności Wydawniczej i Posiedzeń Naukowych oraz Kronika Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL* [hereafter: *Sprawozdania z Czynności*] 10 (1959): 180–184; "O ostatecznych przesłankach w filozofii bytu [On ultimate premises in the philosophy of being]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 7:1 (1959): 41–72; "O definicjach w systemie metafizyki ogólnej [On definitions in the system of general metaphysics]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 8 (1960): 37–54; "O niejednostronną metodykę metafizyki [On the non-one-sided

joined in carrying out the program of the School are connected with investigations of the School.⁴

character of the methodics of metaphysics],” *Znak* 12:1 (1960): 1423–1428; “Rola dedukcji w metafizyce tomistycznej [The role of deduction in Thomistic metaphysics],” *Sprawozdania z Czynności* 11 (1960): 64–72; “Logika współczesna a filozofia [Contemporary logic and philosophy],” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 9:1 (1961): 49–84; *Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk* [The concept of science and the classification of the sciences] (Lublin 1961; 1981, 3rd ed.), and under a new title: *Nauka i metoda. Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk* [Science and method. The concept of science and the classification of the sciences] (Lublin 1992, 4th ed.); “O uzasadnianiu tez filozoficznych [On the rational justification of philosophical theses],” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 10:2 (1962): 37–65; “Czym są w filozofii i w logice tzw. pierwsze zasady? [What are the so-called first principles in philosophy and in logic?],” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 11:1 (1963): 5–23; “Co daje stosowanie logiki formalnej do metafizyki klasycznej? [What does the application of formal logic give to classical metaphysics],” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 12:1 (1964): 107–112; “Koncepcja analityczności a konieczność tez metafizyki [The conception of the analytic character and necessity of the theses of metaphysics],” *Sprawozdania z Czynności* 14 (1964): 65–70; “Aksjomatyzowalność klasycznej metafizyki ogólnej [Axiomatizability of classical general metaphysics],” *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 1:2 (1965): 103–115; “Metodologiczne typy etyki [Methodological types of ethics],” *Sprawozdania z Czynności* 15 (1965): 53–55; “O podziale filozofii klasycznej [On the division of classical philosophy],” *Sprawozdania z Czynności* 15 (1965): 55–57. And also: Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, Stanisław Kamiński, “Specyficzność poznania metafizycznego [Specificity of metaphysical cognition],” *Znak* 13 (1961): 629–637; and Stanisław Majdański, “O naturze logicznej transcendentaliów w aspekcie pryncypiów ogólnej teorii bytu [On the logical nature of the transcendentals in the aspect of the principles of the general theory of being],” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 10:1 (1962): 41–83.

⁴ Marian Jaworski, *Arystotelesowska i tomistyczna teoria przyczyny sprawczej na tle pojęcia bytu [Aristotelian and Thomistic theory of the efficient cause upon the background of the concept of being]* (Lublin 1958); Franciszka Wilczek, *Ontologiczne podstawy dowodów na istnienie Boga według Tomasza z Akwinu i Duns Szkota [Ontological foundations of proofs for the existence of God according to Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus]* (Warszawa 1958); Stanisław Kowalczyk, “Negacja analogii a poznawalność Boga [Negation of analogy and the cognizability of God],” *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 2:1 (1959): 93–101; Zofia J. Zdybicka, “O intuicji w filozofii [On intuition in philosophy],” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 12:1 (1964): 121–129; Zofia J. Zdybicka, Stanisław Kamiński, “O sposobie poznania istnienia Boga [On the manner of cognition of the existence of God],” *Znak* 16 (1964): 635–661; Władysław Strożewski, “O zasadnicze pytanie metafizyki [On the basic question of metaphysics],” *Znak* 17 (1965): 3–23; the following works of Antoni B. Stępień: “Charakterystyka metodologiczna teorii poznania [Methodological characterization of the theory of cognition],” *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 1:2 (1958): 43–55; “W sprawie stosunku między teorią poznania a metafizyką [In the matter of the relation between the theory of cognition and metaphysics],” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 7:1 (1959): 89–100; “W związku z teorią poznania egzystencjalnego [In connection with the theory of existential cognition],” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 8:1 (1959): 173–183; “Metafizyka a ontologia [Metaphysics and ontology],” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 9:1 (1961): 85–98; *Wprowadzenie do metafizyki [Introduction to metaphysics]* (Kraków 1964). The following works by Stępień oscillate around Ingarden’s phenomenology and the construction of the

In this period, the School took up studies on the methodology of the history of philosophy and translation work on the texts of St. Thomas Aquinas.⁵ It also initiated medieval studies. The works of Marian Kurdzialek were an important contribution in the area of historical studies, esp. mediaeval studies.⁶

During this period Karol Wojtyła wrote works in the area of ethics. Wojtyła worked to develop the traditional ethics of Thomas Aquinas to meet the needs of the time by putting new accents connected with an exact analysis of the moral experience. This analysis allowed him to see more clearly the very subject of moral being (the person), not so much in the person's attribution to the moral object (the accent of Thomas Aquinas) as in relation to the action of the person who is the one who elicits acts from himself, who performs acts, and thereby perfects himself.⁷

theory of cognition as a philosophical discipline independent of metaphysics, or rather, one that conditions metaphysics: "W kierunku metasystemu teorii poznania [Toward a meta-system of the theory of cognition]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 13:1 (1965): 105–111; "W sprawie możliwości teorii poznania [In the matter of the possibility of the theory of cognition]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 13:1 (1965): 73–87; "Zagadnienie punktu wyjścia teorii poznania [The question of the starting point of the theory of cognition]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 13:1 (1965): 89–104.

⁵ These studies resulted in the following works: St. Thomas Aquinas, *Traktat o człowieku—Summa teologiczna 1, 75-89* [*Treatise on man—Summa theologica 1, 75–89*], ed. Stefan Swieżawski (Poznań 1956, Kęty 2000, 3rd ed.); Stefan Swieżawski, *Zagadnienie historii filozofii* [*Question of the history of philosophy*] (Warszawa 1966, 2005, 2nd ed.); Mieczysław Gogacz, "W sprawie koncepcji historii filozofii [In the matter of the conception of the history of philosophy]," *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 7:3 (1964): 53–57, and also his: "O pojęciu i metodzie historii filozofii [On the concept and method of the history of philosophy]," *Ruch Filozoficzny* 25 (1966): 76–80.

⁶ Marian Kurdzialek, "Davidis de Dinanto Quaternulorum fragmenta," *Studia Mediewistyczne* 3 (1963): VII–LIX; "David von Dinant und die Anfänge der aristotelischen Naturphilosophie," in *La filosofia della natura nel Medioevo* (Milano 1966), 407–416.

⁷ Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Człowiek—suwerenny byt osobowy—w ujęciu K. Wojtyły [Man—a sovereign personal being—in the conception of K. Wojtyła]," *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 22:1–3 (1979): 65–70. In Wojtyła's works from this period there is an evident desire to provide an anthropological substructure for ethics: "Zagadnienie woli w analizie aktu etycznego [Question of the will in the analysis of the ethical act]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 5:1 (1955–1957): 111–135; "Natura ludzka jako podstawa formacji etycznej [Human nature as the foundation of ethical formation]," *Znak* 11 (1959): 693–697; "O metafizycznej i fenomenologicznej podstawie normy moralnej (w oparciu o koncepcje św. Tomasza z Akwinu oraz Maksza Schelera) [On the metaphysical and phenomenological foundation of the moral norm (based on the conceptions of Thomas Aquinas and Max Scheler)]," *Roczniki Teologiczno-Kanoniczne* 6:1–2 (1959): 99–124; *Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maksza Schelera* [*Appraisal of the possibility of building Christian*

Kłosak, who worked in the Section of the Philosophy of Nature established in 1958, animated the polemical dialogue with Marxism held in this period concerning materialism and evolutionism.

The years 1967–1980

The second stage in the School's development was the continuation of the direction started by the founders of the School and the first students, the construction of new sections of metaphysics, the expansion of fields of inquiry, attempts to refine their precision and to provide depth. This was the further building of the system of realistic philosophy, so that it would be capable of presenting resistance to the administratively imposed Marxist ideology and also the positivistic ideology that supported it.

The process began of making independent the studies of the particular sections. New students joined in the School's work: Bohdan Bejze, Stanisław Kowalczyk, Tadeusz Styczeń, Edmund Morawiec, Elżbieta Woliccka, Jerzy Gałkowski, Tadeusz Żeleźnik, Stanisław Wielgus, Edward I. Zieliński, Kazimierz Wójcik, Feliks Krause, with the younger students, Andrzej Wawrzyniak, Józef Herbut, Andrzej Bronk, Andrzej Szostek, Stanisław Kiczuk, Romuald Waszkinel, Anna Buczek, Andrzej Woźnicki.

New areas of philosophical investigations included questions on the metaphysics of man and the philosophy of law. The turning of the School toward anthropological inquiries did not indicate a departure from its metaphysical-cosmological orientation. Both orientations complete one another, and so in philosophical thought one cannot cut himself off from what is called the cosmological orientation because it is the ontological context that conditions this thought, the context of reality as a whole. Situated in contact with the world, man forms his consciousness and arrives at self-knowledge. Metaphysics also preserves this natural order.

Anthropology, on the other hand, completes the understanding of being, since it constantly starts from the experience that I exist, that I am, and not from some construction of my nature made in a circuitous way. The experience of existence is given in anthropology "from within," with all the aspects that enrich the problem of existence but also limit its range. This must be remembered. Indeed, the human being is a real being, but in

ethics with the assumptions of Max Scheler's system] (Lublin 1959); *Miłość i odpowiedzialność. Studium etyczne* [Love and Responsibility. An ethical study] (Lublin 1960, 1986, 4th ed.); "Człowiek jest osobą [Man is a person]," *Tygodnik Powszechny* (Dec 27, 1964); "O godności osoby ludzkiej [On the dignity of the human person]," *Notificationes e Curia Metropolitana Cracoviensi* (1964): 287–289.

the terrain of anthropology this being is apprehended in its specificity, starting from the human fact; the human being then is dealt with here differently than real being in general in metaphysics. Despite this, there is no difference in method here, but there is a difference in the way of determining the starting point that is explained in a metaphysical way, i.e., by appealing to the principle of sufficient reason.⁸

Methodological studies continued; they were directed to bringing further precision to cognitive instruments for general metaphysics and the several particular metaphysics (anthropology, ethics, the philosophy of God and religion).⁹

⁸ “W kręgu filozofii Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego,” 25–26. The following works were written: Mieczysław A. Krąpiec: “O realizm metafizyki [On the realism of metaphysics],” *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 12:4 (1969): 9–20; *Ja—człowiek. Zarys antropologii filozoficznej* (Lublin 1974, 1991, 5th ed.), and its English translation: *I—man. An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology*, trans. Marie Lescoe [et al.] (New Britain 1983); *Człowiek i prawo naturalne* (Lublin 1975, 1993, 3rd ed.), and its English translation: *Person and Natural Law*, trans. Maria Szymańska (New York 1993); “Doświadczenie i metafizyka [Experience and metaphysics],” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 24:1 (1976): 5–16; “Człowiek i wartość [Man and value],” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 27:2 (1979): 51–69; “Osoba i społeczność [Person and society],” *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 23:4 (1980): 17–27; the works of Romuald Waszkinel: “Przedmiot i podmiot w poznaniu wg Jana od św. Tomasza [Object and subject in cognition according to John of St. Thomas],” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 24:1 (1976): 17–48; “L’inspiration aristotelicenne de la metaphysique de Bergson,” *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 81 (1983): 133–157.

⁹ In this period publications in methodology were published: Stanisław Kamiński: “Wyjaśnianie w metafizyce (uwagi wprowadzające) [Explanation in metaphysics (introductory remarks)],” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 14:1 (1966): 43–77; “Aparatura pojęciowa teologii a filozofia [The conceptual apparatus of theology, and philosophy],” *Znak* 19 (1967): 888–896; “Metody współczesnej metafizyki [Methods of contemporary metaphysics],” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 15:1 (1967): 5–40; “Antropologia filozoficzna a inne działy poznania [Philosophical anthropology and other sections of cognition],” in *O Bogu i o człowieku [On God and Man]*, ed. Bohdan Bejze, vol. I (Warszawa 1968), 249–264; “O prawdach koniecznych [On necessary truths],” *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 4:1 (1968): 47–72; “O różnych rodzajach wiedzy o moralności [On the different kinds of knowledge about morality],” *Studia Theologica Varsoviensia* 6:1 (1968): 193–204; “Zagadnienia metodologiczne związane z filozofią Boga [Methodological questions connected with the philosophy of God],” in *Studia z filozofii Boga [Studies from philosophy of God]*, ed. Bohdan Bejze, vol. I (Warszawa 1968), 380–403; “Zagadnienie współpracy dyscyplin naukowych [The question of the collaboration of scientific disciplines],” *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 11:3–4 (1968): 57–64; “Uwagi o języku teorii bytu [Remarks on the language of the theory of being],” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 17:1 (1969): 41–54; “O koncepcjach filozofii człowieka [On the conceptions of the philosophy of man],” *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 13:4 (1970): 9–19; “O strukturze etyki [On the structure of ethics],” in *Logos i ethos. Rozprawy filozoficzne [Logos and ethos. Philosophical dissertations]* (Kraków 1971), 267–279; “Definicja religii a typy nauk o religii

Subsequently there was an intensification of inquiries in the theory of cognition. These inquiries in part looked to the School's program, and in part they marked the beginning of the formation of a separate program for building the theory of cognition as a philosophical discipline (in the place of the meta-philosophical discipline).¹⁰ Also in the domain of ethics very important studies and works were published.¹¹

[Definition of religion and the types of sciences concerning religion]" (with Zofia J. Zdybicka), *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 22:1 (1974): 103–160; "Z metafizyki człowieka [On the metaphysics of man]," in Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Ja – człowiek. Zarys antropologii filozoficznej [I – man. Outline of philosophical anthropology]* (Lublin 1974), 425–439; "Próba typologii metod filozofowania [Attempt at a typology of methods of philosophizing]," *Summariusz* 4 (1975): 3–10; "Teoria bytu i inne dyscypliny filozoficzne. Aspekt metodologiczny [Theory of being and other philosophical disciplines. Methodological aspect]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 23:1 (1975): 5–18; "Metody filozofowania do XX wieku (Przegląd ogólny) [Methods of philosophizing up to the twentieth century (General survey)]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 25:1 (1977): 9–45; "Metody współczesnej metafizyki [Methods of contemporary metaphysics]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 26:1 (1978): 5–50; "O metodologicznej autonomii etyki [On the methodological autonomy of ethics]," *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 21:3–4 (1978): 19–26; "Osobliwość metodologiczna teorii bytu [Methodological singularity of the theory of being]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 27:2 (1979): 33–49; Stanisław Majdański, *Problemy asercji zdaniowej [The problem of propositional assertion]* (Lublin 1972); Andrzej Bronk, *Język etnologii na przykładzie teorii religii W. Schmidta. Analiza metodologiczna [The language of ethnology in the example of W. Schmidt's theory of religion. Methodological analysis]* (Lublin 1974); Józef Herbut, *Hipoteza w teorii bytu [Hypothesis in the theory of being]* (Lublin 1978).

¹⁰ The following works of Antoni B. Stępień were published: "Rodzaje bezpośredniego poznania [Kinds of direct cognition]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 19:1 (1971): 95–126; *Teoria poznania. Zarys kursu uniwersyteckiego [Theory of cognition. Outline of university course]* (Lublin 1971); "Istnienie (czegoś) a pojęcie i sąd [Existence (of something), and concept and judgment]," *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 9:1 (1973): 235–261; "Rola doświadczenia w punkcie wyjścia metafizyki [Role of experience in the starting point of metaphysics]," *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 17:4 (1974): 29–37; "Tomizm a fenomenologia [Thomism and phenomenology]," *Znak* 26 (1974): 790–798; *Propedeutyka estetyki [Propaedeutic of aesthetics]* (Warszawa 1975, Lublin 1986, 2nd ed.); *Wstęp do filozofii [Introduction to philosophy]* (Lublin 1976, 2001, 4th ed.); "Aktualne spory o naturę i rolę poznania [Current controversies over the nature and role of cognition]," *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 21:1 (1978): 34–39.

¹¹ Karol Wojtyła: "Osoba i czyn na tle dynamizmu człowieka [Person and act upon the background of man's dynamism]," in *O Bogu i o człowieku [On God and Man]*, ed. Bohdan Bejze, vol. I (Warszawa 1968), 201–226; *Osoba i czyn [Person and act]* (Kraków 1969, Lublin 1994, 3rd ed.); "Problem doświadczenia w etyce [Problem of experience in ethics]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 17:1 (1969): 5–24; "Problem teorii moralności [Problem of the theory of morality]," in *W nurcie zagadnień posoborowych [In the current of post-conciliar questions]*, vol. III (Warszawa 1969), 217–249; "Osoba ludzka a prawo naturalne [The human person and natural law]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 18:2 (1970): 53–59; "The Personal Structure of Self-Determination [The Personal Structure of Self-Determination]," in

A new object of inquiries taken up in this period in was the philosophy of religion, built on metaphysics and philosophical anthropology (Zofia J. Zdybicka). The theory of the participation of being and questions connected with the role of religion in culture were elaborated.¹² In the do-

Tommaso d'Aquino nel suo VII Centenario [Thomas Aquinas in his seventh centenary] (Roma 1974), 378–390; “Antropologia encykliki *Humanae vitae* [Anthropology of the encyclical *Humanae vitae*],” *Analecta Cracoviensia* 10 (1978): 9–28; Stanisław Kamiński, “Punkty wyjścia w etyce [Starting points in ethics],” *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 22:1–3 (1979): 81–86; Tadeusz Styczeń: *Problem możliwości etyki jako empirycznie uprawomocnionej i ogólnie ważnej teorii moralności. Studium metaetyczne [Problem of the possibility of ethics as an empirically legitimate and generally important theory of morality. Meta-ethical study]* (Lublin 1972); *Zarys etyki [Outline of ethics]* (part I: *Metaetyka [Meta-ethics]*) (Lublin 1974); “Sumienie: źródło wolności czy zniewolenia? [Conscience: source of freedom or enslavement?],” *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 22:1–3 (1979): 87–97.

¹² The following works were written: Zofia J. Zdybicka: “Filozoficzne koncepcje religijności człowieka [Philosophical conceptions of man’s religiosity],” in *O Bogu i o człowieku [On God and Man]*, ed. Bohdan Bejze, vol. I (Warszawa 1968), 179–200; “Naukowy obraz świata materialnego a problem poznania istnienia Boga [Scientific image of the material world and the problem of the cognition of God’s existence],” *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 11:2 (1968): 15–26; “Problematyka Boga w filozofii współczesnej [The problematic of God in contemporary philosophy],” *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 12:2 (1969): 17–30; “Analiza pojęcia partycypacji występującego w filozofii klasycznej [Analysis of the concept of participation occurring in classical philosophy],” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 18:1 (1970): 5–78; “Ontyczna wspólnota bytów [Ontological community of beings],” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 19:1 (1971): 85–94; “Teoriopoznawcze aspekty partycypacji transcendentnej [Epistemological aspects of transcendental participation],” *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 7:1 (1971): 71–104; “Transcendentalna partycypacja bytu [Transcendental participation of being],” in *Logos i ethos [Logos and ethos]* (Kraków 1971), 171–196; *Partycypacja bytu. Próba wyjaśnienia relacji między światem a Bogiem [Participation of being. Attempt to explain the relation between the world and God]* (Lublin 1972); “Analiza metodologiczna Tomaszowych form argumentacji za istnieniem Boga, a zwłaszcza argumentacji z ruchu [Methodological analysis of Thomas’s forms of argumentation for the existence of God, and especially the argumentation from motion],” in *Studia z filozofii Boga [Studies from philosophy of God]*, ed. Bohdan Bejze, vol. II (Warszawa 1973), 223–242; “Czym jest i dlaczego istnieje religia? [What is religion and why does it exist?],” *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 16:3–4 (1973): 3–17; “Definicja religii i typy nauk o religii [Definition of religion and types of sciences concerning religion]” (with Stanisław Kamiński), *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 22:1 (1974): 103–160; *Człowiek i religia. Zarys filozofii religii [Man and religion. Outline of the philosophy of religion]* (Lublin 1977, 1993, 2nd ed.), and its English translation: *Person and Religion. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, trans. Theresa Sandok (New York 1991)—this was the first attempt in Polish philosophy, and in the world, to understand the philosophy of religion as a particular metaphysics built upon general metaphysics and philosophical anthropology; “Problem doświadczenia religijnego [Problem of religious experience],” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 25:2 (1977): 5–23; Stanisław Kowalczyk: *Filozofia Boga [Philosophy of God]* (Lublin 1972, 2001, 5th ed.); *Bóg w myśli współczesnej [God in contemporary thought]* (Wrocław 1979, 1982, 2nd ed.).

main of the history of medieval philosophy were written most important for mediaeval history works.¹³

Dialogue with the Marxists continued. Stanisław Kowalczyk wrote *Z problematyki dialogu chrześcijańsko-marksistowskiego* [*On the problematic of Christian-Marxist dialogue*].¹⁴

In the Section of the Philosophy of Organic and Inorganic Nature, which in the program of the School was initially situated within the several particular metaphysics, and which Stanisław Mazierski worked on to continue after Kłosak, studies were carried out making it independent in methodology, which consequently led to the philosophy of nature becoming autonomous in relation to the program for cultivating philosophy of the School. Studies would be carried out with the help of the methods of the biological and natural sciences. These studies would be focused on problems concerning: life (Włodzimierz Sedlak, Józef Zon, Marian Wnuk), cosmology and nature (Józef Turek, Stanisław Zięba), and other matters. Also a methodological reflection on the natural sciences would be developed (Zygmunt Hajduk).

¹³ Stanisław Wielgus, "Quaestiones Nicolai Peripatetici, editio critica," *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 17 (1973): 57–155; Marian Kurdziałek: "David von Dinant als Ausleger der aristotelischen Naturphilosophie," in *Die Auseinandersetzungen an der Pariser Universitat im XIII Jahrhundert* (Berlin 1976), 181–192; "L'idee de l'homme chez David de Dinant," in *Images of Man in Ancient and Medieval Thought* (Louvain 1976), 311–322; Jan Czerkawski: "Z dziejów metafizyki w Polsce w XVII wieku [On the history of metaphysics in Poland in the seventeenth century]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 24:1 (1976): 49–98; "Arystotelizm na wydziale sztuk Uniwersytetu Krakowskiego w XVI i XVII wieku [Aristotelianism in the section of arts of the University of Kraków in the sixteenth and seventeenth century]," in *Nauczanie filozofii w Polsce w XV–XVIII wieku [Teaching of philosophy in Poland in the fifteenth to eighteenth century]* (Wrocław 1978), 45–85; "Filozofia tomistyczna w Polsce w XVII wieku [Thomistic philosophy in Poland in the seventeenth century]," in *Studia z dziejów myśli świętego Tomasza z Akwinu [Studies in the history of the thought of Thomas Aquinas]* (Lublin 1978), 263–314; Edward I. Zieliński, *Nieskończoność bytu Bożego w filozofii Jana Dunsza Szkota [Infinity of God's being in the philosophy of John Duns Scotus]* (Lublin 1980); Stanisław Wielgus, *Benedykta Hessego "Quaestiones super octo libros «Physicorum» Aristotelis". Wstęp do krytycznej edycji [Benedict Hesse's "Questiones super octo libros «Physicorum» Aristotelis". Introduction to a critical edition]* (Lublin 1983); Benedictus Hesse, *Quaestiones super octo libros "Physicorum" Aristotelis. Editio critica, ed., introduction and commentary*, Stanisław Wielgus (Wrocław 1984); Edward I. Zieliński, *Jednoznaczność transcendentálna w metafizyce Jana Dunsza Szkota [Transcendental univocity in the metaphysics of John Duns Scotus]* (Lublin 1988); Stanisław Wielgus: *Badania nad Biblią w starożytności i w średniowieczu [Studies on the Bible in antiquity and the Middle Ages]* (Lublin 1990); *Średniowieczna łacińskojęzyczna biblistyka polska [Medieval Latin-language Polish biblical studies]* (Lublin 1992).

¹⁴ Warszawa 1977.

The years 1981–2004

The third stage in the development of the School was the continuation of the previous direction of inquiries and taking up new problems, while at the same time some of the research projects of particular chairs of the Department of Philosophy at Catholic University of Lublin (including the Chair of Methodology, the Chair of Logic, the Chair of the Theory of Cognition) were made autonomous, which despite what the School's founders had proposed, marked the abandonment of the function of being an "organon" of realistic philosophy (metaphysics), and they began to focus on the development of contemporary philosophical currents or methods of cultivating philosophy. Discussion with contemporary currents of philosophy was inscribed in the School's program, but instead of critical discussion, the promotion of selected currents and methods of philosophizing appeared, which led to the violation of the methodological and epistemological unity of the philosophy cultivated in the School.

The above mentioned chairs concentrated their inquiries on important contemporary philosophical trends (often without a critical reflection on them). Studies concerned questions from fields including the philosophy of the mind (Urszula Żegleń, Stanisław Judycki), analytic philosophy and hermeneutics (Andrzej Bronk, Tadeusz Szubka), and the cognitive sciences (Paweł Kawalec). The studies of the Chair of Logic concentrated on the problems of multi-value and modal logics (Stanisław Kiczuk, Urszula Żegleń), and the Chair of Artificial Intelligence was established, which studies programming languages (Zdzisław Dywan, Piotr Kulicki).

Despite the autonomous inquiries made by the particular chairs that formed the so-called philosophical organon, the bonds of collaboration in the framework of the continuation of the School's program were not broken.

In the second decade of this period, Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, Zofia J. Zdybicka, and Antoni B. Stępień—the first two generations that made up the School—retired. They continued, however, to be actively involved in the School's work. Some of the students went to work in other institutions (Żegleń, Szubka). A new generation of students arrived, including Andrzej Maryniarczyk, Henryk Kiereś, Piotr Jaroszyński, Krzysztof Wroczyński, Piotr Moskał, Włodzimierz Dłubacz, Ignacy Dec, Jan Sochoń, Hugh McDonald, Wojciech Chudy, as well as younger students: Paweł Gondek, Arkadiusz Robaczewski, Katarzyna Stępień, Bogdan Czupryn, Zbigniew Pańpuch, Arkadiusz Gudaniec, Paweł Tarasiewicz, Paweł Skrzydlewski,

who were employed in the Section of Metaphysics and involved in the work in the framework of the program of the School, and also worked to make widely known the results of the works of the School.

New students came in the framework of other sections. In the Section of Ethics: Barbara Chyrowicz, Marek Czachorowski, Alfred Wierzbicki, Kazimierz Krajewski, Jacek Frydrych, Artur Szutta, Jan Kłos, Małgorzata Borkowska; in the Section of the History of Philosophy: Marian Ciszewski, Agnieszka Kijewska, Marcin Podbielski, Stanisław Janeczek, Joanna Judycka, Piotr Gutowski, Przemysław Gut, Maciej S. Zięba, Paweł Sajdek; in the Section of Logic and the Theory of Cognition: Stanisław Judycki, Jacek Wojtysiak, Arkadiusz Gut, Paweł Kawalec, Monika Walczak, Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik, Rafał Wierzchosławski, Piotr Kulicki, Paweł Garbacz, Bożena Czernecka-Rej, Agnieszka Salamucha.

The students who worked at different times in the Section of Metaphysics, directed since 1997 by Andrzej Maryniarczyk, were involved in the School's program. The main effort in the continuation of the School's program was to be concentrated, as in previous periods, in the framework of the Section of Metaphysics. In this period the works published by Krąpiec pointed to new domains of inquiry that would become the object of further works within the School. These works would concern the problems of language, culture, politics, and art. The inquiries concerning general metaphysics would concentrate on the methods of realistic metaphysics, the system of metaphysics, the questions of substance, the transcendentals, and the philosophical theory of creation *ex nihilo* (Maryniarczyk). Investigations in philosophical anthropology were concentrated on a search for the foundations of the transcendence of the human being, and human lovable (Latin: *amabile*) and moral action (Weksler-Waszkinel, Czupryn, Gudaniec, Pańpuch, Robaczewski).

New domains of inquiry were taken up within the newly created chairs: the Chair of the Philosophy of Art (Kierś), and the Chair of the Philosophy of Culture (Jaroszyński). Also there were made inquiries in the area of the philosophical foundations of law, human rights, and the conditions in civilization for the theory of law (Wroczyński, Stępień, Skrzydlewski). Inquiries would go more into depth in the domain of the philosophy of God and the philosophy of religion (Moskal, Dłubacz), general and particular ethics (Wierzbicki, Czachorowski, Krajewski), in the domain of bioethics (Chyrowicz), and the ethics of science (Lekka-Kowalik).

In this period works directly or indirectly looking to the program of the School were written. In the domain of general and particular metaphysics

ics,¹⁵ in the domain of the philosophy of culture and art,¹⁶ in the domain of the philosophy of law and man's rights, and civilization,¹⁷ in the domain of

¹⁵ Mieczysław A. Krapiec: *Język i świat realny* [Language and the real world] (Lublin 1985; 1995, 2nd ed.); *U podstaw rozumienia kultury* [At the foundations of an understanding of culture] (Lublin 1991); *O ludzką politykę* [On a human politics] (Katowice 1993, Lublin 1998, 2nd ed.); *Poznawać czy myśleć. Problemy epistemologii tomistycznej* [To cognize or to think. Problems of Thomistic epistemology] (Lublin 1994); *Psychologia racjonalna* [Rational psychology] (Lublin 1996); *Ludzka wolność i jej granice* [Human freedom and its limits] (Warszawa 1997, Lublin 2000, 2nd ed.); *Arystotelesowska koncepcja substancji* [The Aristotelian conception of substance] (Lublin 2000); *Filozofia co wyjaśnia? Filozofia w teologii* [Philosophy—what does it explain? Philosophy in theology] (Lublin 2000); the works of students, including the following: Romuald Waszkinel, *Geneza pozytywnej metafizyki Bergsona* [The genesis of Bergson's positive metaphysics] (Lublin 1986); Andrzej Maryniarczyk: *Tomizm. Dla-czego?* [Thomism. On account of what?] (Lublin 1994; 2001, 2nd ed.); "Transcendentalia a poznanie metafizyczne [The transcendentals and metaphysical cognition]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 39:1 (1991–1992): 305–322; "Kreacjonizm jako punkt zwrotny w interpretacji rzeczywistości [Creationism as a turning point in the interpretation of reality]," in *Filozofia – wloty i upadki* [Philosophy—flights and falls] (Lublin 1998), 59–85; *Zeszyty z metafizyki* [Notebooks in metaphysics], vol. I: *O rozumieniu metafizyki. Monistyczna i dualistyczna interpretacja rzeczywistości* [On the understanding of metaphysics. The monistic and dualistic interpretation of reality] (Lublin 1998), and under the title *Monistyczna i dualistyczna interpretacja rzeczywistości* [Monistic and dualistic interpretation of reality] (Lublin 2001, 2nd ed., 2006, 3rd ed.); vol. II: *Pluralistyczna interpretacja rzeczywistości* [Pluralistic interpretation of reality] (Lublin 1998); vol. III: *Realistyczna interpretacja rzeczywistości* [Realistic interpretation of reality] (Lublin 1999; 2005, 2nd ed.); vol. IV: *Racjonalność i celowość świata osób i rzeczy* [Rationality and teleology of the world of persons and things] (Lublin 2000); vol. V: *Odkrycie wewnętrznej struktury bytów* [Discovery of inner structure of being] (Lublin 2006); vol. VI: *O przyczynach, partycypacji i analogii* [On causes, participation and analogy] (Lublin 2005); *Metafizyka w ekologii* [Metaphysics in ecology] (Lublin 1999), and under the title *Człowiek wobec świata. Studium z metafizyki realistycznej* [A Man towards the world. Studies from realistic metaphysics] (Lublin 2009); Paweł Gondek, "Funkcja przyczyny celowej w kontekście wyjaśniania naukowego u Arystotelesa [The function of the final cause in the context of scientific explanation in Aristotle]," in *Wierność rzeczywistości* [Fidelity to reality] (Lublin 2001), 89–99.

¹⁶ Piotr Jaroszyński: *Metafizyka piękna* [Metaphysics of beauty] (Lublin 1986); *Estetyka czy filozofia piękna?* [Aesthetics or the philosophy of beauty] (Lublin 1990); *Spór o piękno* [Controversy over beauty] (Lublin 1992, Krakow 2002, 2nd ed.); *Metafizyka i sztuka* [Metaphysics and art] (Warszawa 1996, Radom 2002; English trans. *Metaphysics and Art*, New York 2002); *Nauka w kulturze* [Science in culture] (Radom 2002); *Podstawy retoryki klasycznej* [Foundations of classical rhetoric] (Warszawa 2002); Henryk Kiereś: *Czy sztuka jest autonomiczna? (W związku z tzw. antysztuką)* [Is art autonomous? (In connection with so-called anti-art)] (Lublin 1993); *Spór o sztukę* [Controversy over art] (Lublin 1996); *Sztuka wobec natury* [Art in relation to nature] (Warszawa 1997, Radom 2001, 2nd ed.); *Co zagraża sztuce?* [What poses a threat to art?] (Lublin 2000, 2004, 2nd ed.); *Trzy socjalizmy. Tradycja łacińska wobec modernizmu i postmodernizmu* [Three socialismisms. The Latin tradition in relation to modernism and postmodernism] (Lublin 2000); *U podstaw życia społecz-*

anthropology,¹⁸ and in the domain of the problematic of religion and culture.¹⁹

The philosophy of history appeared as a new set of problems.²⁰ Also the problematic of the philosophy of God and the philosophy of religion was treated in depth.²¹

znego. Personalizm czy socjalizm? [At the foundation of social life. Personalism or socialism?] (Radom 2001).

¹⁷ Krzysztof Wroczyński: "Droits de l'homme dans la perspective thomiste," in *Atti del IX Congresso Tomistico Internazionale*, vol. IV (Citta del Vaticano 1991), 84–90; "De la loi naturelle et droits de l'homme," *Angelicum* 70 (1993); Katarzyna Stepień: "Afirmacja prawa naturalnego czy pozytywizm prawny [Affirmation of the natural law or legal positivism]," *Człowiek w Kulturze* 6–7 (1995): 251–260; "Błąd antropologiczny w dziedzinie prawa [The anthropological error in the domain of law]," in *Błąd antropologiczny [Anthropological error]* (Lublin 2003), 277–296; Paweł Skrzydlewski: "Rodzina w cywilizacji łacińskiej a wolność człowieka [The family in Latin civilization and man's freedom]," *Człowiek w Kulturze* 11 (1998): 203–233; *Polityka w cywilizacji łacińskiej. Aktualność nauki Feliksa Koniecznego [Politics in Latin civilization. The current relevance of the teaching of Felix Konieczny]* (Lublin 2002); "Państwo i jego cel w cywilizacji łacińskiej a wolność człowieka [The state and its purpose in Latin civilization and man's freedom]," in *Wierność rzeczywistości [Fidelity to reality]* (Lublin 2001), 527–543; "Błąd antropologiczny w teoriach społecznych [The anthropological error in social theories]," in *Błąd antropologiczny [Anthropological error]* (Lublin 2003), 223–254.

¹⁸ Bogdan Czupryn, "Podstawowe tendencje we współczesnej filozofii człowieka [Basic tendencies in the contemporary philosophy of man]," *Studia Płockie* 25 (1997): 109–115; Andrzej Maryniarczyk: "Filozoficzne podstawy nienaruszalności życia ludzkiego [Philosophical foundations of the inviolability of human life]," in *Człowiek nieuleczalnie chory [Unhealably sick man]* (Lublin 1997), 89–94; "Konceptje bytu a rozumienie człowieka [Conceptions of being and the understanding of man]," in *Błąd antropologiczny [Anthropological error]* (Lublin 2003), 73–121; Arkadiusz Gudaniec: "O dychotomii miłości i przyjaźni u św. Tomasza z Akwinu [On the dichotomy of love and friendship in St. Thomas Aquinas]," *Ethos* 11:3 (1998): 161–170; "Amore come *complacentia boni* in Tommaso d'Aquino," in *Atti del Congresso Internazionale su l'umanesimo cristiano nel III millennio. La prospettiva di Tommaso d'Aquino, 21-25 settembre 2003*, vol. I (Citta del Vaticano 2004), 497–504; Zbigniew Pańpuch, "Znaczenie cnót dla realizowania się człowieka jako osoby [Significance of the virtues for the realization of man as a person]," *Człowiek w Kulturze* 13 (2000): 145–164.

¹⁹ Zofia J. Zdybicka: "Rola religii w kulturze [The role of religion in culture]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 28:2 (1980): 5–16; *Religia i religioznawstwo [Religion and the study of religion]* (Lublin 1988; 1992, 2nd ed.); "Kulturowe zawirowania wokół człowieka XX wieku [Cultural revolutions concerning man of the twentieth century]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 43–44:2 (1995–1996): 55–68.

²⁰ Piotr Moskal, *Problem filozofii dziejów. Próba rozwiązania w świetle filozofii bytu [Problem of the philosophy of history. An attempt to find a solution in the light of the philosophy of being]* (Lublin 1993).

The inquiries initiated by Wojtyła on the anthropological foundations of ethics and on the problematic of the dignity connected with the inviolability of human life were continued.²² Also further works connected with the methodology of philosophy and metaphysics were written.²³ In the history of philosophy new works were written looking to the School's pro-

²¹ Piotr Moskal: *Spór o racje religii* [Controversy over the reasons of religion] (Lublin 2000); *Czy istnieje Bóg? Zarys filozofii Boga* [Does God exist? Outline of the philosophy of God] (Pelplin 2002); Włodzimierz Długobaj: *Problem Absolutu w filozofii Arystotelesa* [The Problem of the Absolute in Aristotle's philosophy] (Lublin 1992); *U źródeł koncepcji Absolutu. Od Homera do Platona* [At the sources of the conception of the Absolute. From Homer to Plato] (Lublin 2003).

²² Tadeusz Styczeń: *Etyka niezależna?* [Independent ethics?] (Lublin 1980); *ABC etyki* [ABC of ethics] (Lublin 1981, 1990, 4th ed.); *Nienarodzony miarą demokracji* [The unborn is the measure of democracy] (Lublin 1991); *Wprowadzenie do etyki* [Introduction to ethics] (Lublin 1993; 1995, 2nd ed.); Andrzej Szostek: *Normy i wyjątki* [Norms and exceptions] (Lublin 1980); *Natura, rozum, wolność* [Nature, reason, freedom] (Lublin 1989); Piotr Jaroszyński, *Etyka. Dramat życia moralnego* [Ethics. Drama of the moral life] (Warszawa 1993); Barbara Chyrowicz: *Zamiar i skutki. Filozoficzna analiza zasady podwójnego skutku* [Intention and effects. Philosophical analysis of the principle of double effect] (Lublin 1997); *Bioetyka i ryzyko* [Bioethics and risk] (Lublin 2000, 2002, 2nd ed.).

²³ Stanisław Kamiński: "O redukcyjnym wyjaśnianiu w filozofii [On reductive explanation in philosophy]," *Summarius* 9 (1980): 53–57; "O klasyfikacji rozumowań [On the classification of acts of reasoning]," *Summarius* 10 (1981): 381–396; "Poznanie Boga a typy racjonalnego poznania [Cognition of God and types of rational cognition]," *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 17:1 (1981): 145–154; "Kryteria wartościowania wiedzy teoretycznej [Criteria of valuation of theoretical knowledge]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 30:1 (1982): 125–130; "O metodzie filozofii klasycznej [On the method of classical philosophy]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 34:1 (1986): 5–20; Andrzej Maryniarczyk: *Metoda separacji a metafizyka* [Method of separation and metaphysics] (Lublin 1985); "Is There a System of Metaphysics," in *Atti del IX Congresso Tomistico Internazionale*, vol. II (Citta del Vaticano 1991), 237–246; *System metafizyki. Analiza "przedmiotowo-zbornoego" poznania* [System of metaphysics. Analysis of "objective-containing" cognition] (Lublin 1991); "Uwarunkowania logicznej charakterystyki języka metafizyki [Conditionings of the logical characterization of the language of metaphysics]," *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 27:2 (1991): 109–117; "Logika formalna a metafizyka [Formal logic and metaphysics]," in *Wprowadzenie do filozofii* [Introduction to Philosophy], ed. Mieczysław Krąpiec [et al.] (Lublin 1996, 2nd ed.), 643–673; Józef Herbut, *Metoda transcendentálna w metafizyce* [Transcendental method in metaphysics] (Opole 1987); *Dyscypliny i metody filozofii* [Disciplines and methods of philosophy], ed. Antoni B. Stepień, Tadeusz Szubka (Lublin 1993); Antoni B. Stepień, "Metafizyka i ontologia. Dwa oblicza teorii bytu? [Metaphysics and ontology. Two profiles of the theory of being?]," in *Poznanie bytu czy ustalanie sensów? [Cognition of being or the establishment of meanings?]* (Lublin 1999), 101–106; *Kategorie filozoficzne. Istnienie i sąd* [Philosophical categories. Existence and judgment], ed. Antoni B. Stepień, Jacek Wojtysiak (Lublin 2002).

gram.²⁴ Collaborative works were written concerning dialogue with the Marxists.²⁵

²⁴ Stefan Swieżawski: *Dzieje filozofii europejskiej XV wieku [History of European philosophy of the fifteenth century]*, vol. I–VII (Warszawa 1974–1983); *Między średniowieczem a czasami nowymi [Between the Middle Ages and new times]* (Warszawa 1983; 2002, 2nd ed.); *Święty Tomasz na nowo odczytany [St. Thomas read anew]* (Kraków 1983, Poznań 2002, 3rd ed.); *Dzieje europejskiej filozofii klasycznej [History of classical European philosophy]* (Warszawa 2000); articles by Marian Kurdziałek published posthumously: *Średniowiecze w poszukiwaniu równowagi między arystotelizmem a platonizmem [The Middle Ages in search of equilibrium between Aristotelianism and Platonism]* (Lublin 1996), which provided a picture of currents of historical studies helping metaphysical studies—this collection includes the following: “Zachęta Boecjusza do jednania poglądów Arystotelesa i Platona oraz Boecjańskie i Augustyńskie wezwanie do łączenia wiary z rozumem [Boethius’ exhortation to unite the views of Aristotle and Plato, and the Boethian and Augustinian call to join faith with reason],” 47–60; “O tak zwanej metafizyce Księgi Wyjścia [On the so-called metaphysics of the Book of Exodus],” 99–119; “Theologiae philosophantes,” 131–146; “Jedność filozofii i teologii [The unity of philosophy and theology],” 147–168; “Dlaczego św. Tomasz z Akwinu komentował *De Trinitate* i *De hebdomadibus* Boecjusza? [Why did St. Thomas Aquinas write commentaries on the *De Trinitate* and the *De hebdomadibus* of Boethius?],” 169–182; “Wielkość św. Alberta Lauingen zwanego także Albertem Wielkim [The greatness of St. Albert Lauingen also called Albert the Great],” 183–210; “Dawid z Dinant i jego próba uzgodnienia dwunastowiecznej filozofii przyrody z filozofią Arystotelesa [David of Dinant and his attempt to reconcile the twelfth-century philosophy of nature with Aristotle’s philosophy],” 211–232; “Średniowieczne doktryny o człowieku jako mikrokosmosie [Medieval doctrines on man as a microcosm],” 271–310; Stanisław Wielgus: *Z badań nad średniowieczem [On studies on the Middle Ages]* (Lublin 1995); *Polska średniowieczna doktryna “ius gentium” [On the Polish medieval doctrine of the “ius gentium”]* (Lublin 1996); *Z obszarów średniowiecznej myśli islamskiej, żydowskiej i chrześcijańskiej [From the regions of medieval Islamic, Jewish, and Christian thought]* (Płock 2002); Aristoteles [Aristotle], *De generatione et corruptione. Translatio vetus*, ed. Joanna Judycka (Leiden 1986); Jan Czerkawski: “Renesansowe koncepcje godności człowieka [Renaissance conceptions of man’s dignity],” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 35:1 (1987): 251–281; *Humanizm i scholastyka [Humanism and scholasticism]* (Lublin 1992); Marian Ciszewski: *Kardynała Bessariona interpretacja filozofii Platona i Arystotelesa [Cardinal Bessarion’s interpretation of Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy]* (Lublin 1990); *Franciszka de Sylvestris koncepcja nieśmiertelności duszy ludzkiej [Francis de Sylvestris’ conception of the immortality of the human soul]* (Lublin 1995, 1996, 2nd ed.); Agnieszka Kijewska: *Neoplatonizm Jana Szkota Eriugeny. Podmiotowe warunki doświadczenia mistycznego w tradycji neoplatońskiej [John Scotus Eriugena’s neo-Platonism. Subjective conditions of mystic experience in the neo-Platonic tradition]* (Lublin 1994); *Księga pisma i Księga natury. Heksaameron Eriugeny i Teodoryka z Chartres [The book of scripture and the book of nature. The Hexaameron of Eriugena and Theodoric of Chartres]* (Lublin 1999); Stanisław Janeczek: *Oświecenie chrześcijańskie. Z dziejów polskiej kultury filozoficznej [Christian enlightenment. On the history of Polish philosophical culture]* (Lublin 1994), *Filozofia na KUL-u. Nurty, osoby, idee [Philosophy at KUL. Currents, persons, ideas]* (Lublin 1998); *Logika czy epistemologia? Historyczno-filozoficzne uwarunkowania nowożytnej koncepcji logiki [Logic or epistemology? Historical-philosophical condi-*

New Initiatives and New Challenges

The experience acquired over many years in the cultivation of realistic philosophy in the framework of the School was harnessed to the preparation and publication of the *Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy* [*Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*], the first such work in the history of Polish culture. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec was the initiator of the project, and the chief editor and organizer is Andrzej Maryniarczyk, Krąpiec's successor in the Chair of Metaphysics. The younger workers of the Section of Metaphysics also have been involved in the organizing of the *Encyclopedia* (Katarzyna Stępień, Arkadiusz Gudaniec, Paweł Gonddek). The *Encyclopedia* consists of nine volumes (Lublin 2000–2008) and the *Supplement* [*Supplement*].

The *Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy* looks to the best traditions of the Lublin Philosophical School. It is a universal encyclopedia, since although it considers in a special way the legacy of classical philosophy, i.e., the legacy that forms the foundation of the identity of European culture, it also shows the legacy of Arab and Jewish philosophy, as well as oriental philosophy (Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese), and that of Africa and America. The *Encyclopedia* provides a broad philosophical perspective and philosophical issues (there is no such work with a similar perspective in world literature).

The *Encyclopedia* is the work of the authors; this means that the authors of the articles assume responsibility for their content and the understanding of reality contained in the articles, an understanding that is the result of their true study and investigations.

The *Encyclopedia* is an international collective work. Philosophers from Polish scientific centers (Lublin, Warsaw, Kraków, Poznań, Gdańsk,

tionings of the modern conception of logic] (Lublin 2003); Piotr Gutowski: *Filozofia procesu i jej metafizologia. Studium metafizyki Ch. Hartshorne'a* [*Process philosophy and its metaphysics. Study of the metaphysics of Ch. Hartshorne*] (Lublin 1995); *Między monizmem a pluralizmem. Studium genezy i podstaw filozofii Johna Deweya* [*Between monism and pluralism. Study of the genesis and foundations of John Dewey's philosophy*] (Lublin 2002); Przemysław Gut, *Leibniz. Myśl filozoficzna w XVII wieku* [*Leibniz. Philosophical thought in the seventeenth century*] (Wrocław 2004).

²⁵ *Wobec filozofii marksistowskiej. Polskie doświadczenia* [*Face to face with Marxist philosophy. Polish experiences*], ed. Antoni B. Stępień (Lublin 1990); *Oblicza dialogu. Z dziejów i teorii dialogu: chrześcijaństwo-marksizm w Polsce* [*The profile of dialogue. On the history and theory of dialogue: Christians-Marxists in Poland*], ed. Antoni B. Stępień, Tadeusz Szubka (Lublin 1992).

Szczecin, Toruń, etc.) and foreign philosophers (from Spain, Germany, Italy, France, the USA, Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia, Switzerland, etc.) took part in developing the articles.

In the *Encyclopedia*, philosophically and existentially important problems, biographies, currents, and philosophical directions are discussed. Philosophical questions are presented in objective language; this means that the purpose of explanation is to indicate the real factors (not theories), the rejection of which would entail the negation of the fact itself given for explanation. The authors of the articles concerning problems do not limit themselves to reporting various views and positions, but they propose rationally grounded solutions. The various philosophical currents that have arisen in history are presented in such a way as to show the sources from which they have come and the consequences to which they lead.²⁶

The first philosophical society to be registered in sovereign Poland, namely the Polish Society of Thomas Aquinas (PTTA), which is a section of the Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino (SITA), assumed patronage over the preparation and publication of the *Encyclopedia*. This society is one of the best known philosophical societies in the world (one of its founding members was Karol Wojtyła). The basic aim of the society is to propagate and develop realistic philosophy.

In the framework of the works of the Section of Metaphysics, a three-language edition of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (in Greek, Latin, and Polish) was published, something unique in Polish philosophical literature. The publication of selected writings of St. Thomas Aquinas in two languages (in Latin and Polish) along with commentaries and studies has begun.²⁷

²⁶ In the *Encyclopedia*, Polish philosophers are considered in a special way so as to show the contribution of Polish philosophy to general human culture. Moreover, the *Encyclopedia* is an initiative that comes from a milieu that—in the times of the latter half of the twentieth century that were most difficult for Polish philosophy and the humanities—has developed, protected, and nurtured independent philosophical cognition, in this way standing on guard for Polish culture. The editorial team dedicated the *Encyclopedia* to the Polish Nation and presented the greatest son of the Nation, the Holy Father John Paul II, with it.

²⁷ The following have been published: *De veritate – O prawdzie* [*De veritate—On truth*] (Lublin 1999); *De bono – O dobru* [*De bono—On the good*] (Lublin 2003); *De ideis – O ideach* [*De ideis—On ideas*] (Lublin 2006); *De passionibus – O uczuciach* [*De passionibus—On emotions*] (Lublin 2008). In preparation are: *De conscientia – O sumieniu* [*De conscientia—On conscience*], *De cognitione – O poznaniu* [*De cognitione—On cognition*] and other works after these.

In order to go into depth systematically into the metaphysical problematic in the context of contemporary philosophy, since 1998 the Chair of Metaphysics has organized annual symposiums in a series called “The Tasks of Contemporary Metaphysics.” The purpose of these symposiums (followed by the publication of their proceedings) is the realization of the program of the School, which in a critical way enters into discussion with contemporary currents of philosophy.²⁸

Since 2002 the Chair of the Philosophy of Culture has conducted annual international symposiums in a series called “The Future of the Civilization of the West,” during which there are discussion on current cultural issues and these are submitted to analysis in the context of realistic philosophy.²⁹

The renaissance of interest in metaphysical and realistic philosophy that has been more and more apparent since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the turning toward a philosophy that does not fear seeking the truth and explaining reality, is evidence that the program of the Lublin Philosophical School is an important and continually current proposition of a philosophy that serves the truth, and through the truth serves man and culture.

Translated from Polish by Hugh McDonald

²⁸ In the framework of these symposiums, the following problems have been taken up and their proceedings have been published: *Poznanie bytu czy ustalanie sensów?* [*The Cognition of Being or the Establishment of Meanings?*] (Lublin 1999); *Rozum otwarty na wiarę* [*Reason open to Faith*] (Lublin 2000); *Osoba i realizm w filozofii* [*The Person and Realism in Philosophy*] (Lublin 2002)—this volume contains proceedings from Symposium III: “Osoba ludzka i sposoby jej spełniania się w kulturze [The human person and the ways he is realized in culture],” and from Symposium IV: “O realizm w uprawianiu filozofii [On realism in the cultivation of philosophy];” *Błąd antropologiczny* [*The anthropological error*] (Lublin 2003); *Metafizyka w filozofii* [*Metaphysics in philosophy*] (Lublin 2004); *Analogia w filozofii* [*Analogy in philosophy*] (Lublin 2005); *Substancja, natura, prawo naturalne* [*Substance, nature, natural law*] (Lublin 2006); *Dusza, umysł, ciało* [*Soul, mind, body*] (Lublin 2007); *Spór o cel* [*The dispute concerning the end*] (Lublin 2008).

²⁹ Proceedings from these discussions have been published: *Przyszłość cywilizacji Zachodu* [*Future of the civilization of the West*] (Lublin 2003); *Kultura wobec techniki* [*Culture in*

**THE LUBLIN PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOL:
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND FUTURE PROSPECTS**

SUMMARY

The article is concentrated on the Lublin Philosophical School which came into being in the institutional framework of the Department of Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland; it describes its achievements, which took place at different stages of the School's development, as well as the School's new initiatives and challenges.

The development of the School was connected with the involvement of new people and successive generations of new students who joined in the cultivation of realistic philosophy. One can regard the years 1950–1966 as the first stage of the School's development, in which the School's program was formulated. The following stages are the years 1967–1980, and 1981–2004, and the years that follow, in which new generations of students who take up inquiries in the spirit of the School's program arrive.

The article also explains the reasons why today the Lublin Philosophical School cannot be identified with the Department of Philosophy of the Catholic University of Lublin, but rather with a special style of cultivating philosophy.

KEYWORDS: Lublin Philosophical School, metaphysics, realism, philosophy, Krąpiec, Kalinowski, Swieżawski, Wojtyła.

relation to technology] (Lublin 2004); *Filozofia i edukacja* [*Philosophy and education*] (Lublin 2005); *Człowiek i państwo* [*A man and the state*] (Lublin 2006); *Polityka a religia* [*Politics and religion*] (Lublin 2007); *Ewolucjonizm czy kreacjonizm* [*Evolutionism or creationism*] (Lublin 2008).

