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Gilsoniana

A JOURNAL IN CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHY

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GILSON ON DOGMATISM

In the 1936 William James Lectures at Harvard University, Étienne Gilson cautioned against philosophical mistakes among which a prominent place is occupied by dogmatism. In this article I am going to analyze Gilson’s exposition of the pre-Thomistic dogmatic “isms” and the post-Thomistic dogmatic “isms,” as discussed in his *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*,¹ in order to uncover reasons why philosophy may become conducive to dogmatism. Such a task seems to be up-to-date, as dogmatism is not only a historical problem left behind by past generations, but also an actual issue explicitly addressed by contemporary scholars.²

Pre-Thomistic Dogmatism

Abelard’s Logicism

Dogmatism preceding the times of St. Thomas Aquinas can be exemplified by the logical dogmatism of the scholastic age. According to Gilson, it consists in giving precedence to logical answers in re-

¹ See Étienne Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1937).

² For example, see Madhuri M. Yadlapati, *Against Dogmatism: Dwelling in Faith and Doubt* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2013); Vassilis Saroglou, “Beyond Dogmatism: The Need for Closure as Related to Religion,” *Mental Health, Religion & Culture* 5:2 (2002): 183–194; Wentzel van Huyssteen, “Beyond Dogmatism: Rationality in Theology and Science,” *HTS Teologiese Studies* 44:4 (1988): 847–863.

sponding to philosophical (metaphysical) questions. Focusing on Peter Abelard's³ conceptual nominalism, Gilson identifies that the dogmatism of the scholastic age could have been avoided if as much energy as spent on providing good answers was also spent on understanding what kind of questions were being considered:

If you ask logic to answer a philosophical question, you can expect but a logical answer, not a philosophical one, with the unavoidable consequence that your question will appear as unanswerable, and as a pseudo-question. This was precisely the kind of mistake that Abailard would make. A forward, and sometimes a presumptuous man, he never had forewarnings while he was crossing some danger line . . . The upshot of Abailard's experiments is that philosophy cannot be obtained from pure logic . . . So experience taught me a manifest conclusion, that, while logic furthers other studies, it is by itself lifeless and barren, nor can it cause the mind to yield the fruit of philosophy, except the same conceive from some other source . . . If, as I hope, we succeed in finding a number of similar cases, all of them pointing to the same conclusion, we shall perhaps be justified in turning them into a single concrete experience of what philosophy actually is, and in ascribing to it an objective unity.⁴

Apart from logicism (of Abelard), Gilson indeed found a "number of similar cases" and he also identified them variously as "theologism," "mathematicism" (of Descartes), "physicism" (of Kant), "psychologism" (of Ockham), etc. All of these dogmatisms share a common characteristic, as they represent a kind of "rational ailment" that besieged medieval philosophy as early as in the eleventh century and eventually led to the breakdown of scholasticism in the twilight of the fifteenth century.

³ It should be noted, however, that Gilson takes up Abelard's experiments as an example of a "pre-Thomistic" attempts to solve the problem of universals (see id., 4–30). His intention is to highlight St. Thomas Aquinas as a shining example of *perennis philosophia* in the Medieval Ages.

⁴ Id., 11–12, 29–30.

With regard to “logicism,” Gilson was rightly convinced that such thinkers as Pierre Abelard (1072–1142), Roscellinus of Compiene (1050–1125, Abelard’s teacher), William of Champeaux (1070–1121, Abelard’s teacher), Berenger of Tours (999–1088) and a great majority of late eleventh and early twelfth century thinkers were trained as logicians rather than as philosophers. “Hence their natural tendency to deal in a purely logical way with all possible questions.”⁵ This intoxication with logic was at the root of the intractability of the logically satisfying but philosophically deficient answers they proffered to the philosophical problems they had confronted. Peter Abelard earned for himself the reputation of an honest traveler who failed to reach his destination but remained on the high way of truth (wisdom) incapacitated, however, with the wrong map. As a shining example of the efforts of that age, Gilson describes him in the following words:

Here is one of the brightest intellects the Middle Ages has ever produced; he begins by interpreting logic in terms of grammar; then he proceeds to interpret philosophy in terms of logic, and he fails to find a positive answer to his question, we see him ultimately reduced to a psychological solution. But was it a solution? . . . The difficulty was so real that Abailard himself felt it, but even his last allusion to an order of divine ideas is less an answer than a casual remark suggested to him by a short text in Priscian’s Grammar . . . Had Abailard been in a position to understand the import of that problem [of universals] and to realize its specific nature, he would at last have discussed a philosophical problem in a philosophical way . . . In point of fact, there is hardly a single one among the great logicians of that time who has not been accused of heresy . . . Yet Abailard himself was a moderate in those matters . . . It is a pity that goodwill plus logic can no more make a theologian than a philosopher.⁶

⁵ Id., 31.

⁶ Id., 28–32.

During his General Audience at St Peter's Square on November 4th, 2009, Pope Benedict XVI threw more light on the strength and weakness of Abelard's logicism in theology. Contrasting Abelard's theology with the theology of St. Bernard of Clairvaux, he described the latter as a "theology of the heart" (i.e., borne of the architectural principles of Revelation) and the former as a "theology of reason" (i.e., borne of the principles of interpretation from philosophy), and alluded that in the context of the traditional definition of theology originating from St. Anselm's *Proslogion*, "fides quarens intellectum (faith seeks understanding)," St Bernard, representing *monastic* theology, puts the accent on the first part of the definition, namely on *fides* (faith), whereas Abelard, who represents *scholastic* theology, "insists on the second part, that is on the *intellectus*, on understanding through reason."⁷

Dogmatic Theologism

Theologians of Abelard's epoch already knew what dangers excessive and arbitrary logicism had posed and they actually made some frantic efforts to meet the challenges of the time. The "monastic theology" of St Bernard as Pope Benedict hinted is only one of the many instances of the "history of that long struggle which went on between logicians and theologians for more than a century."⁸ Theology, at the time, was struggling to remain a separate discipline but when philosophy rapidly got involved in another subsequent arbitrary mix of logic and theology, it did not take long for theology to experience the same fate which philosophy underwent in the "court of logicians." The setting was already laid out ahead of time, when popular opinion started to have problem with distinguishing between philosophy and logic:

⁷ Benedict XVI, *Two Theological Models in Comparison: Bernard and Abelard*, General Audience on Nov 4th, 2009, at St. Peter's Square, Rome.

⁸ Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, 32.

Unaware of any dividing line between logic and philosophy, any twelfth-century professor of logic, who had never learned or taught anything but grammar and logic, would naturally call himself a philosopher. The theologians saw no reasons to worry about the mistakes made by the logicians. If there were such reasons, they utterly failed to perceive them. The only thing they were conscious of on this point was that the men who were teaching logic were also the men whom everybody called philosophers, and who were themselves convinced that philosophy is nothing but logic applied to philosophical questions . . . As theologians, their task was not to save philosophy from logicism, but through faith and grace, to save mankind from eternal perdition. Any obstacle that stood in the way to this had to be removed, be it philosophy itself. But what was the best way for theology to get rid of philosophy was a rather intricate question.⁹

The response of medieval theologians to the perceived “danger” of philosophy was two-fold: the first experiment was to destroy philosophy and the second experiment was to tame or domesticate philosophy. Gilson does not consider either of the two experiments to be appropriate, as both presume the reduction of philosophy to theology (i.e., theologism), as was suggested by one of the best balanced treatises of that period, the treatise by St. Bonaventure entitled *On Reducing the Arts to Theology*.¹⁰ These two approaches are neither original to medieval theologians nor peculiar to Christian theologians. Historically, both approaches were already experimented upon by Tertulian and Origen in the second and the third century.

Moreover, in the medieval times, both Christian and Islamic theologians shared the same suspicion about the intrusion of philosophy into theological issues. A thematic consideration of the “neo-

⁹ Id., 32–33. It is noteworthy that grammar, logic and rhetoric constituted the medieval *trivium*, i.e., the lower division of the seven liberal arts, which formed the foundation for the *quadrivium*, the upper division of the medieval education in the liberal arts consisting of arithmetic (number), geometry (number in space), music (number in time), and astronomy (number in space and time).

¹⁰ Id., 49.

Tertulianism”¹¹ and “neo-Origenism”¹² of the medieval theologians (Christian Neoplatonism as well as Islamic Aristotelianism) serves a good background to William Ockham’s “post-Thomistic” theologism.

a) Christian Scholastic “Neo-Tertulianism” versus “Neo-Origenism.” It can be noted that as early as in the second century, when such names as Quintus Septimus Florens Tertulianus (155–240) and Origen Adamantus (184–254) were prominent, both suspicions and affirmations concerning the “marriage” of Greek philosophy and Christian theology had pitched religious thinkers into two camps. Tertulian was noted to have insisted in his *De Praescriptione Haereticorum* (*Prescriptions against Heretics*) that philosophy as “pop-paganism” is a work of demons, hence “What has Athens to do with Jerusalem? Or the Academy with the Church?”¹³

On the other side of the debate on the value of philosophy for theological discourse, we find Origen Adamantus, Tertulian’s contemporary, who maintained the intrinsic value of philosophical principles for theological discourse in his *De principiis* (*On First Principles*). He went as far as to employ scholarly philosophical tools in his exegetical work *Hexapla* (*Sixfold*). Origen’s *On First Principles* continued to be a widely studied philosophical treatise up until the time of the fourth century neo-Platonic theological school of Alexandria which was

¹¹ I use the expression “neo-Tertulianism” in a metaphoric sense to refer to the attitude of Christian and Islamic theologians who did not consider purely philosophical reasoning as a valid source of truth which can be useful in explaining the rational aspects of religious faith.

¹² I also use this expression “neo-Origenism” in contrast to “neo-Tertulianism” to metaphorically refer to the attitude of both Christian and Islamic thinkers who were convinced of the value of philosophical reasoning in explaining the rational aspects of religious faith.

¹³ In the chronological ordering of Tertulian’s works, John Kaye, Bishop of Lincoln, indicates that *De Praescriptione* was among Tertulian’s “pre-montanist” opuses. Cf. J. Kaye, *The Ecclesiastical History of the Second and Third Centuries* (1845, 3rd edition), <http://tertullian.org/articles/kaye/index.htm>, accessed on Feb 9th, 2016.

commonly paired with the neo-Aristotelian theological school of Antioch.¹⁴

Some eight hundred years after Tertulian and Origen, when logicism in the garb of philosophy threatened the fundamental assumptions of theology, a repeat of the brawl between faith and reason resurfaced. Gilson reports: “wherever there is a theology, or merely a faith, there are overzealous theologians and believers to preach that pious souls have no use for philosophical knowledge, and that philosophical speculation is basically inconsistent with a sincere religious life.”¹⁵ This, however, is an attitude similar to that of Tertulian.

In the Medieval Ages, there are not only Christian theologians, but also Islamic theologians, and thus what philosophy is exposed to is not just a Christian theological onslaught, but a combination of a broader religious attack, so to speak. But just as there were Tertulians, so there also were Origenes of that time. Thus,

¹⁴ As a theologian, Origen articulated one of the earliest philosophical expositions of the Christian doctrine in his *De principiis*. It is important to underscore here as well that the philosophical tradition of Origen in Alexandria was overtly a Platonic tradition which was taken over by the subsequent Alexandrian school of theology, two centuries after him influencing both directly and remotely such Christian Platonic scholars as Arius (256–336), Athanasius (296–373), Augustine of Hippo (354–430). This Platonic tradition held sway up till the time of Yuhanna Ibn Haylan, the Christian philosopher who by the year 820 had gone to Baghdad and later became a teacher of the first Islamic scholar in Greek philosophy named Abu Nasr Muhammad ibn Muhammad Farabi, or simply Al Farabi (872–950). See “Yuhanna Ibn Haylan,” in *Tahoor Encyclopedia*, <http://www.tahoor.com/en/Article/View/117917>, accessed on Feb 9th, 2016. The Aristotelianism of Al Farabi is, however, thanks to the simultaneous influence that traced back to the rival Christian Antiochean school of theology which espoused Aristotelianism in contrast to the Alexandrian Platonism. Al Farabi (872–950) transmitted Aristotelianism to Islamic philosophers such as Avicenna (980–1037), Al-Ghazali (1058–1111), Averroes (1126–1198) and the Jewish Muslim Moses Maimonides (1135–1204). At the turn of the eleventh century, it can loosely be said that most Christian theologians were Neo-Platonists under the influence of Plotinus, Porphyry and Boethius, whereas most Islamic theologians were Neo-Aristotelians or Peripatetics, thanks to Arabic translations of Al Farabi. From Al Farabi’s translations of Aristotle’s works other translations were made into Latin, which simultaneously granted Christian theologians ample access to Aristotle.

¹⁵ Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, 33.

among those who favour such an attitude, there are some of a rather crude type, but others are very intelligent men, whose speculative power is by no means inferior to their religious zeal. The only difference between such men and true philosophers is that instead of using their reason in behalf of philosophy, they turn their natural ability against it.¹⁶

b) The Islamic *Mutakallemim* (i.e., Muslim theologians): Islamic “neo-Tertulianism” versus Islamic “neo-Origenism.” Granted that Islamic scholars of the Medieval Age were mostly Aristotelians rather than Platonists, our reference to “Islamic neo-Origenism” here, is only a metaphor referring to those who experimented with the project of domesticating Aristotelianism into Islamic theology. In the same metaphorical sense, our use of “Islamic neo-Tertulianism” connotes those Islamic theologians who experimented with the project of destroying philosophy in order to build Islamic theology on the ruins of philosophy. Gilson reports the religious zeal of these opposing Islamic theological camps as follows:

Since, according to tradition, the Prophet had said: “The first thing which God created was knowledge or Reason,” some Mohammedan theologians concluded that speculation was one of the duties of believers . . . To other Mohammedan theologians, on the contrary, “whatever went beyond the regular ethical teaching was heresy . . . for faith should be obedience, and not . . . knowledge.”¹⁷

Thus, in the Medieval Ages, as it was among Christian theologians, so also was it among Islamic theologians that neo-Tertulianism and neo-Origenism co-existed and both camps proffered conscientiously contradictory arguments in defense of theology against the excesses of philosophy. While Al-Ashari represented neo-Tertullianism, Al-Ghazali was a good example of neo-Origenism.

¹⁶ Id.

¹⁷ Id., 33–34.

Decades before Al-Ghazali (1058–1111), dialectics had been introduced into Islamic theology by Al-Farabi¹⁸ and Avicenna.¹⁹ Expectedly, it met a violent reaction within Islamic religious circles. The suspicion of the danger of philosophy was expressed in Al-Ghazali's famous work, *Destruction of the Philosophers* (1090), where "against Aristotelianism, as it had been taught by Alfarabi and Avicenna, Gazali was able to turn Aristotle's own weapons in a masterly way."²⁰

Anti-Aristotelianism, however, was not unique to Islamic theology, for even Al-Ghazali borrowed from a Christian commentator of

¹⁸ Al-Farabi was trained as an Aristotelian logician and so he discussed such Aristotelian-inspired topics as the future of contingents, the number and relation of categories, the relation between logic and grammar. But also he is credited for other non-Aristotelian forms of inference as well as the categorization of logic into two separate groups, the first being "idea" and the second being "proof." He is also considered to have dealt with the theories of conditional syllogism and analogical influence which were part of the Stoic tradition of logic rather than Aristotelian. He introduced the concept of poetic syllogism in his commentary on Aristotle's *Poetics*. Cf. Seymour Feldman, "Rescher on Arabic Logic," *The Journal of Philosophy* 61 (1964): 726; A.A. Long, D.N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, Vol. 1, Translations of the Principal Source with Philosophical Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); T. Ludescher, "The Islamic Roots of the Poetic Syllogism," *College Literature* 23:1 (1996): 93–99.

¹⁹ Avicenna wrote extensively in Arabic on logic, ethics and metaphysics. Some of his works were translated into Latin. In his works (*History of Islamic Philosophy* (Routledge, 2014), 174, and *Avicenna and the Visionary Recital* (Princeton, 2014), 103), Henry Corbin claims that Latin Avicennism had paralleled Latin Averroism until it was suppressed by the Parisian decrees of 1210 and 1215. Avicenna's psychology and epistemology had influenced Albertus Magnus, whereas his metaphysical insights on essence (Mahiat) and existence (Wujud) influenced Thomas Aquinas. The "Avicenna and Essentialism" by Nader El-Bizri (*Review of Metaphysics* 54 (2001): 753–778) and *Kitab al-shifa'*, *Metaphysics II* by Avicenna (ed. G. Anawati et al., Cairo 1975, 36) support a claim that Avicenna elucidated the essence-attribute questions in terms of ontological analysis of the modalities of being, namely impossibility, contingency and necessity. As a devout Muslim, he sought to reconcile rational philosophy with Islamic theology. After his death, Avicennism split into three different schools: al-Tusi (application of philosophy to the interpretation of political events and scientific advances), al-Razi (separation of the theology from philosophical concerns), and al-Ghazali (selective use of philosophy to support spiritual mysticism). Naturally, al-Razi had the greatest support of Islamic religious leadership of the time.

²⁰ Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, 34.

Aristotle, Johannes Philoponus.²¹ Notably, there were costly prices to pay for that religious zeal striving to dismantle philosophy in order to build a theological edifice:

Using reason against reason in behalf of religion is by itself a legitimate, and eventually a noble attitude; yet, if we adopt it, we must be ready to face its necessary consequences. In the first place, when religion tries to establish itself on the ruins of philosophy, there usually arises a philosopher to found philosophy on the ruins of religion. After a Gazali, there often comes an Averroes, who answers the *Destruction of the Philosophers* by a *Destruction of the Destruction*, as was the case with the famous book published by Averroes under that title; such apologies of philosophy, suggested . . . by theological opposition, are usually destructive of religion. In the second place, philosophy has as little to gain by such conflicts as has religion itself, for the easiest way for theologians to hold their ground is to show that philosophy is unable to reach rationally valid conclusions on any question related to the nature of man and his destiny . . . We gain nothing by destroying one in order to save another, for they stand and fall together. True mysticism is never found without some theology, and sound theology always seeks the support of some philosophy; but a philosophy that does not at least make room for theology is a short-sighted philosophy.²²

It is obvious that Al-Gazali's project of destroying philosophy in order to save religion missed its target, and even backfired against the very foundations of religious commitments. Notably, a century before Al-Gazali, an alternative approach which was to "befriend" (domesticate) philosophy was experimented by Al-Ashari (873–935).

If Al-Ghazali is considered to be an Islamic "neo-Tertulian," then Al-Ashari is to be an Islamic "neo-Origen." Gilson cites Prof. T. J. de Boer who describes Al-Ashari as "a man who understood how to render to God the things that are God's and to man the things that are

²¹ Id.

²² Id., 34–36.

man's.”²³ Certainly, such lofty intentions are not lacking in all religious scholars who toe the path of Origen, but it can be easily attested by history that more often than not it turns out to be a tension of any servant of two Masters who in an attempt to please both ends up pleasing neither. The best such a servant can afford is to “rob Peter to pay Paul,” in which case more often than not deference is disproportionately tilted towards the greater of the two Masters. The most apt example which Gilson employs to illustrate this tension of the servant of two Masters is that of the religious admonition to philosophers on the considerations regarding “grace and freewill” by St. Bonaventure:

However much you ascribe to the grace of God, you will not harm piety by so doing, even though, by ascribing to the grace of God as much as you can, you may eventually wrong the natural powers and the free will of man. If, on the contrary, you wrong grace by crediting nature with what belongs to grace, there is danger . . . Consequently that position which . . . ascribes more to the grace of God and, because it establishes us in a state of more complete indigence, better harmonizes with piety and humility, is for that very reason safer than the other one . . . Even though that position were false, it would not harm piety or humility; it is therefore fitting and safe to hold it.²⁴

It is thus obvious that the eulogy of a “man who understands how to render to God the things that are God’s and to man the things that are man’s” is not as innocuous as Prof. de Boer assumes. However, it is better to assess Al-Ashari through the lens of Maimonides, a neutral (i.e., neither Christian nor Muslim) Jewish scholar, than through the categories of Bonaventure (i.e., the Christian categories of the Bible).

²³ T.J. de Boer, *History of Philosophy in Islam*, 56 (cited after id., 38–39).

²⁴ Étienne Gilson, *La Philosophie de Saint Bonaventure* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1926), 456–457 (cited after id., 51–52).

Gilson alludes to some of propositions common to all Muslim theologians of the time as reported by Moses Maimonides:²⁵

- All things are composed of atoms.
- There is a vacuum.
- Time is composed of time-atoms.
- Both positive and negative properties have a real existence, and are accidents which owe their existence to some *causa efficiens*.
- All existing things, i.e., all creatures, consist of substance and of accidents, and the physical form of a thing is likewise an accident.
- The test for the possibility of an imagined object does not consist in its conformity with the existing laws of nature, according to the Mutakallemim.

Taking just the first three of the above propositions, one can agree with Maimonides that

even these men themselves were aware of the fact . . . that, in a sense, their whole doctrine was but a toilsome justification of their attitude. Knowing as they did, that their statements were open to that criticism, they assumed that it was quite useless to worry about the real nature and order of things . . . Even though its existence be convincingly established, that which actually is, proves nothing at all because it is merely one of the various phases of things, the opposite of which is equally admissible to our minds.²⁶

As Maimonides concluded, “these men were doing the very reverse of what Themistius rightly invites us to do, which is to adapt our opinions to things, instead of adapting things to our opinions; for this indeed cannot be done and it is a waste of time to try it.”²⁷

²⁵ Cf. Moses Maimonides, *The Guide to the Perplexed*, trans. M. Friedlander (as found in id., 39).

²⁶ Cf. Maimonides, *The Guide to the Perplexed* (cited after id., 41–42).

²⁷ Id., 41.

Gilson went on to draw the consequences out of such mind-dependent ontologies of the Islamic theologians:

The first proposition was that all things are composed of atoms . . . In order to account for the possibility of motion, these theologians admitted that there is a vacuum [second proposition] . . . wherein the atoms may combine, separate and move . . . Now, God is constantly creating anew a certain number of atoms which are separated from each other by empty space, [thus] their existence is as discontinuous in time as it is in space. In other words, time is composed of time-atoms [third proposition], each time-element being as indivisible in itself as are the atoms themselves. The consequence . . . just as space is made up of elements that are deprived of extension, so time is made up of elements that are deprived of duration . . . If longer times are not made up of shorter times, if time elements do not last, the obvious implication is that motion itself has nothing to do with duration.²⁸

It is obvious that such a “distortion of nature” cannot be upheld for too long without “the protest of nature itself asking justice from philosophy.”²⁹ Little wonder then, the Asharites did not travel long on the highway of religious zeal before they met with a philosophical gridlock just as the Ghazalites did. One cannot but feel their futile struggles to grapple with the consequences of their propositions. An insight from Maimonides is apt to describe their Waterloo:

In accordance with this principle [i.e., that time is composed of time-atoms] they assert that when man is perceived to move a pen, it is not he who has really moved it; the motion produced in the pen is an accident which God has created in the moving hand; but the creative act of God is performed in such a manner that the motion of the hand and the motion of the pen follow each other closely; but the hand does not act and is not the cause of the pen’s motion; for, as they say, an accident cannot pass from one

²⁸ Id., 42–43.

²⁹ Id., 45.

thing to another [further propositions] . . . There does not exist anything to which an action could be ascribed; the real *agens* is God . . . In short, most of the Mutakallemin believe that it must never be said that one thing is the cause of another; some of them who assumed causality were blamed for doing so.³⁰

It is significant to note that the above experiments of the Asharites in the ninth century, intended to domesticate philosophy to serve the cause of theology, were not peculiar to the Islamic scholars, as their refurbished version resurfaced in Malebranche's "occasionalism."

Gilson also cites another example of such experiments by a puritan theologian, Cotton Mather, who wrote that

The body, which is matter in such and such a figure, cannot affect the immaterial soul, nor can the soul, which has no figure, command the body; but the great God, having established certain laws, that upon such and such desires of the soul, the body shall be so and so commanded, *He* 'tis, who by his continual influx does execute His own laws; 'tis to his continual influx that the effects are owing.³¹

Therefore it is not a coincidence that the same mistake can be found across theologians of different creeds—Muslim (Asharites), Catholic (Nicholas Malebranche), and Protestant (Cotton Mather),

each of whom would have sternly consigned the other two to hell, yet who could not but agree on the same philosophy, precisely because theirs was a philosophy of theologians. With a little less zeal for the glory of God . . . these men would no doubt have realized that the destruction of causality ultimately meant the destruction of nature, and thereby of science as well as of philosophy.³²

³⁰ Id., 46.

³¹ Id., 47.

³² Id., 47–48.

Post-Thomistic Dogmatism

Ockham's Psychologism

Few decades after the death of Thomas Aquinas (i.e., in fourteenth century), a new trend of psychological response to what was wrongly considered as the “dangers of philosophy” emerged. William of Ockham is an example of this “post-Thomistic” psychologism. Already two centuries before him (i.e., in twelfth century), the distinction between philosophy and logic was completely blurred by the logicism of Peter Abelard. By virtue of being a Franciscan, William of Ockham (1285–1347) inherited the philosophical legacy of Franciscan scholasticism³³ as transmitted from Bonaventure, Anselm, and Duns Scotus.

The Franciscans were noted for their Platonic-Augustinian leanings in contrast to the Aristotelian leanings of the Dominicans. One could really expect that Ockham would not reach the same conclusions as Thomas Aquinas. Such an expectation, however, would be mistaken, since Ockham, “like St. Thomas Aquinas and Averroes, considered himself indebted to Aristotle for the principles of his philosophy.”³⁴ It is not therefore his philosophical background that led him to theologism, as in the case of the Islamic scholars.

Nevertheless, “if Ockham was an Aristotelian, and St. Thomas Aquinas an Aristotelian, and perhaps even Aristotle an Aristotelian, this at least remains to be explained: how is it that Ockham’s ultimate conclusions are so completely destructive of those of Aristotle as well as

³³ For an overview of the prolific output from this period of scholasticism, see *A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham*, ed. Eugene R. Fairweather (Philadelphia: Westminster John Knox Press, 1956). The book attests that the scholastics held sway in European universities for about six centuries (1100–1700), but around the 13th century, it is commonplace to speak of two schools of scholasticism, namely that of the Platonic-Augustinian Franciscans (Bonaventure, Anselm, Duns Scotus, Peter Auriol, Matthew of Aquasparta, Roger Marston, William of Ockham) and that of the Aristotelian Dominicans (Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas).

³⁴ Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, 63.

those of St. Thomas Aquinas?”³⁵ Gilson’s response to this *aporia* is tailored towards the religious zeal of William, zeal which drove him to theologism:

Ockham gives great weight to the first article of the Christian creed: I believe in God Almighty. Since it is an article of faith, it is needless to say that it cannot be proved. Yet, not only did Ockham use it as a principle in theology, which was a very proper thing to do, but he also resorted to it in discussing various philosophical problems, as if any theological dogma, held by faith alone, could become the source of philosophical and purely rational conclusions . . . [Unfortunately], if we allow pious feelings to decree what nature should be, we are bound to wrong nature . . . In theology, as in any other science, the main question is not to be pious, but to be right. For there is nothing pious in being wrong about God!³⁶

It is already evident from the above description, what sort of philosophical conclusions Ockhamism would entail. It is remarkable that “on precisely the same problem that had puzzled Abailard: what is the object of abstract knowledge; what are the so-called universals?”³⁷ Gilson assesses Ockham’s experiments with theologism. A singular example of an earlier attempt by his immediate predecessors on this same problem of universal is illustrative of Ockham’s project. The example of Henry of Harclay serves this purpose.

Harclay criticized Duns Scotus and Avicenna and an elaborate position similar to that of William of Champeaux’s *concept-realism*, according to which each concept represents an essence, each essence has an entity and unity of its own and is equally shared in by all the individuals of a certain class. Instead, Harclay leaned towards Peter Abelard and insisted on a *nominalistic* notion of universals such that the general idea of animal, for instance, either is nothing or is a mere defi-

³⁵ Id., 64.

³⁶ Id., 52.

³⁷ Id.

inition by the intellect of particular things that really exist outside the intellect. Thus, “every positive thing outside the soul is, as such, something singular.”³⁸

For Ockham, Harclay conceived of universals as images, pictures, or representations with which something similar corresponds in the nature of things, i.e., with some, *fundamentum in re*, hence for him, Harclay was not a *nominalist* but certainly a *realist*. Thus, in his characteristic “sharp-razor-mode” (Ockham’s razor), he argued that since everything that really exists is purely individual (Aristotelianism), our general ideas cannot correspond to anything in reality (anti-Aristotelianism). Hence, it is not universals’ nature to be either images, or pictures, or mental presentations of any real or conceivable things.

The comparison of Ockham’s position with Harclay’s position on the universals presents in clear terms that the difficulty raised by Ockham’s “pure position” is quite discomfoting. Gilson succinctly describes this difficulty by making the following distinction between concepts and pure ideas:

Every time philosophical speculation has succeeded in circumscribing what we might perhaps call a “pure position,” its discovery has regularly been attended by a philosophical revolution. Begotten in us by things themselves, concepts are born reformers that never lose touch with reality. Pure ideas, on the other hand, are born within the mind and from the mind, not as intellectual expressions of what is, but as models, or patterns, of what ought to be; hence they are born revolutionists. And this is the reason why Aristotle and Aristotelians write books on politics, whereas Plato and Platonists always write Utopias.³⁹

Though Ockham considered himself an Aristotelian, it is obvious that the “yoke of Plato” never left him. William of Ockham was a classic example to show that “the propensity to see nothing in philosophy

³⁸ J. Kraus, “Die Universalienlehre des Oxforder Kanzlers Heinrich von Harclay,” in *Divus Thomas XI* (1933): 290 (cited after id., 65).

³⁹ Id., 68.

but a particular department of theology was no less common among Christian theologians than among the Muslim interpreters of the Koran.”⁴⁰

After the Medieval Ages, “utopic” trails found patronage in some modern thinkers who were themselves trained as students of the scholastic Aristotelians (*substance* philosophers); for instance, René Descartes and Immanuel Kant, whose “clear and distinct ideas” and “formal apriorism of transcendental categories” respectively became seeds of philosophical revolutions, each of which kept pure reason “out of touch” with reality.

The vicious wheel of dogmatic deadlocks, which besieged medieval philosophy culminating in the breakdown of scholasticism, afflicted modern philosophy such that up until the twentieth century—when analytic philosophy proclaimed its manifesto of “logical atomism”—its attitude towards metaphysics was quite “unfriendly.” The pattern is repeated in the same cycle:

A certain man adopts a certain attitude in philosophy, and he follows it consistently, until he finds himself face to face with unwelcome consequences. He does his best to dodge them, but his own disciples, beginning as they do just where the master stopped, have less scruples than he about letting his principles publicly confess their necessary consequences. Everybody then realizes that the only way to get rid of those consequences is to shift the philosophical position from which they spring. Then the school dies; but it is not unlikely that one or two centuries later, in some university whence history has been banished as harmful to philosophical originality, some young man, still blessed with his native ignorance, will rediscover a similar position. As he will live and write in another time, he will say very old things in a new way . . . The trouble is that when philosophers fail, their

⁴⁰ Id., 49.

disheartened supporters never blame their master; they blame it on philosophy itself.⁴¹

Conclusion

The aim of this article was to uncover reasons why philosophy may become conducive to dogmatism which inevitably leads to the failure of philosophy. In the light of Gilson's considerations contained in his *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, it can be stated that philosophy is always exposed to the influence of dogmatism when it is done from a non-philosophical standpoint. For each time when the engagement in the philosophical enterprise is driven by non-philosophical needs, it is usually the case that the goal of philosophy is misconstrued as merely that of providing an instrumental ontology to non-philosophical areas of knowledge. To avoid such mistakes as logicism, theologism or psychologism, philosophy must recover its proper object that is the real world of persons and things, and its proper method that is metaphysics.

GILSON ON DOGMATISM

SUMMARY

The article aims at uncovering reasons why philosophy may become conducive to dogmatism which inevitably leads to the failure of philosophy. In the light of Gilson's considerations contained in his *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, the author concludes that philosophy is always exposed to the influence of dogmatism when it is done from a non-philosophical standpoint. For each time when the engagement in the philosophical enterprise is driven by non-philosophical needs, it is usually the case that the goal of philosophy is misconstrued as merely that of providing an instrumental ontology to non-philosophical areas of knowledge. To avoid such mistakes as logicism, theologism or psychologism, philosophy must recover its proper object that is the real world of persons and things, and its proper method that is metaphysics.

⁴¹ *Id.*, 59.

KEYWORDS: philosophy, dogmatism, skepticism, scholasticism, Étienne Gilson, Peter Abelard, Al-Ghazali, William of Ockham.

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CAPITAL GRACE OF THE WORD INCARNATE ACCORDING TO SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

Saint Paul uses the image of a body's head and members to describe Christ's leadership, his grace, and the mutual respect that should exist among the members of the Church. During the Scholastic period, theologians developed this theme in the doctrine of capital grace. Capital grace is concerned with the place of the human nature of Christ in the giving of grace to the faithful. At first glance this seems simple: Christ satisfied for our sins and merited infinite graces for us, and thus he is the cause of our reception of grace. But capital grace describes how Christ is a source of grace for us, not just in the historical event of the passion, but in his very person. At the heart of this question we are confronted with a difficulty: how can Christ be a source of grace for us according to his human nature when only God can give grace?

Medieval theologians attempted to solve this problem by describing Christ's causing of grace in our souls dispositively, ministerially, and meritoriously. Saint Albert's description is striking: Christ is a cause "meritoriously, because he merits for us the influx of grace" and "by the mode of a mediator or a redeemer, because he removes the obstacle to the influx into us, which obstacle is the debt of Adam which he

took away.”¹ Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, and the young Thomas give similar explanations of Christ’s causality.²

In this article, after briefly noting what Aquinas received from his predecessors, we will trace the development of his thought, particularly noting how his arrangement of the arguments contributed to the development of the doctrine. We will show that Thomas’s stance on the place of Christ’s humanity in the giving of grace was much like that of his predecessors at the writing of his *Scriptum*, but that by the completion of the *De Veritate*, he espoused a view in which the human nature of Christ is an instrumental efficient cause of grace to his members. This view blossomed into a conception of Christ as one acting person with two natures, as shown in the his *Summa Theologiae* and *Commentary on the Gospel of John*.

Thomas’s Predecessors

The locus of the medieval debate over capital grace seems to be in Peter Lombard’s *Sentences*. Here headship is not addressed directly but only adverted to it in an explanation of Christ’s having the fullness

¹ Albert, O.P., “Scriptum super Sententiis,” in *Opera omnia*, ed. Stephen C.A. Borgnet (Paris: Vivès, 1894), III, d. 13, a. 3, <http://watarts.uwaterloo.ca/cgi-bin/cgiwrap/albertus/searchAlbertus.cgi?browse=%3B+Lib.III%3B+dist.13%3B+art.2%3B+p.238a&choose nTexts=36&exclude=0&language=0&word=capitis&newstart=1&quantity=%28null%29&format=Edited>, accessed on March 24, 2016; hereafter *Sent*. This and all translations of Albert and Thomas’s *Scripta* by John Baptist Ku, O.P.

² See for example, Hales, III *Sent.*, q. 12, a. 3 (2), r. 3; Albert, III *Sent.*, d. 13, a. 2; Bonaventure, III *Sent.*, d. 13, a. 2, q. 2; Thomas, III *Sent.*, d. 13, q. 2, a. 1. Alexander of Hales, *Summa Theologiae* (Colloniae Agrippine, 1622), https://archive.org/stream/bub_gb_Vi6kVcrf__UC#page/n3/mode/2up, accessed on February 14, 2016; hereafter *ST*. In this edition, note that there is an error in numbering. Membrum 2 on p. 73 is written as membrum 3, and article 3 on p. 76 is written as article 2. Bonaventure, O.F.M., *Opera Omnia*, vol. 4 (Paris: Vivès, 1864), <http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001935889>, accessed on February 21, 2016; hereafter *Sent*. Thomas Aquinas, O.P., *Scriptum Super Sententiis*, ed. Roberto Busa, S.J. (Parma: Petrus Fiaccadori, 1858), <http://www.corpusthomicum.org/snp3013.html>, accessed on February 21, 2016; hereafter *Sent*.

of grace. Referencing Augustine's letter *Ad Dardanum*,³ Lombard notes that the head has all of the senses while the body only has one. Analogously, he maintains, Christ has all the graces while the members of the Church have "as it were, only touch."⁴

Commentators used this distinction as a starting point for the discussion of Christ's headship, his capital grace. As far as we are able to ascertain, beginning with Alexander of Hales, who was the first to use the *Sentences* as a lecture text,⁵ the argument took on a standardized form. Theologians noted how the physical head is related to the members, and then showed how these relations could be taken in a spiritual sense to explain the relationship between Christ and the members of the Church. For example, Hales clarifies that the term head is used metaphorically to describe a king's power, a lion's dignity, and a father's providence.⁶ Above all other aspects of headship, the Franciscan Master insists that the aspect of influence is the most proper to headship—the head influencing the members with its sense and motion, and Christ influencing his members with the sense of faith and the motion of love.⁷

³ Augustine of Hippo, "Letter to Dardanus," in *Letters*, trans. S. Wilfred Parsons, S.N.D., ed. Roy J. Deferrari et al. (New York: Fathers of the Church Inc., 1955), ch. 40, 253.

⁴ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* (Rome: Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971), III *Sent.*, d. 13, ch. 1, n. 2.

⁵ Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work*, trans. Robert Royal, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 40.

⁶ Hales, *ST III*, q. 12, m. 2, a. 1, obj. 1–3.

⁷ Hales, *ST III*, q. 12, m. 2, a. 1, ad op. and res. Here Hales references *De Spiritu et Anima*, a work attributed to Augustine, but later thought to be Alcuin of Clairvaux's. In this text, the author notes three kinds of influence (*vis*) in man: natural, having to do with the functions of the body, and not willed, vital by which the motion of the heart reaches the members, and spiritual (*animalis*) by which the body receives sense and motion from the head, and the last is voluntary. Hales concludes that because we are members of Christ in a way that is wholly voluntary, it follows that the influence exercised from the head to the members is most like the influence exercised by Christ toward the members of the Church. For more on the authorship of *De Spiritu et Anima*, see Gaetano Raciti, "L'Autore del «De Spiritu et Anima»," *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica*, vol. 53, n. 5 (September–October 1961): 385–401.

Franciscan and Dominican scholars maintained the importance of the aspect of influence in describing Christ's headship; and although they had different approaches to the question of capital grace, both schools took great care not to blur the lines between the human and divine causality of the actions of Christ. Hales and Bonaventure's approaches focus on questions of grace itself, whether capital grace is created or uncreated, and how it is related to grace of union and habitual grace.⁸ Because grace is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, their treatments of capital grace tend to focus more on the giving of the Holy Spirit than on the person of Christ. In fact, Bonaventure, considering whether personal grace and capital grace are really distinct, goes so far as to appropriate capital grace to the Holy Spirit insofar as he is the efficient cause of spiritual sense and motion to the members.⁹ Albert and Thomas, on the other hand, discuss capital grace not as a metaphor for Christ's relationship with the members of the Church, as Hales does,¹⁰ but as something real in Christ.¹¹ And because of this focus,

⁸ Hales, *ST III*, q. 12, m. 1, a. 2 (page 73), q. 12, m. 2, a. 1, r. 3, Bonaventure, *III Sent.*, d. 13, a. 2, q. 1–2.

⁹ Bonaventure, *III Sent.*, d. 13, a. 2, q. 2, r.: “[U]no modo potest nominare principium effectivum sensus et motus spiritualis in membris Christi, et sic nominat ipsum Deum, et per appropriationem Spiritus sanctum . . .”

¹⁰ Hales, *ST III*, q. 12, m. 2, a. 1, r.

¹¹ Albert, *III Sent.*, d. 13, aa. 2–3; Thomas, *III Sent.*, d. 13, q. 2, a. 1; *DV*, q. 29, a. 4; *In Col.*, ch. 1, lect. 5 (nn. 47–57); *In I Cor.*, ch. 11, lect. 1 (n. 587); *In Eph.*, ch. 1, lecture 8; *ST III*, q. 8, a. 1. Thomas Aquinas, O.P., *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate*, trans. Robert W. Schmidt, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954), <http://www.dhspriority.org/thomas/QDdeVer.htm>, accessed on March 10, 2016; hereafter *DV*. And Thomas Aquinas, O.P., *Commentary on the Letters of Saint Paul to the Philippians, Colossians, Thessalonians, Timothy, Titus, and Philemon*, trans. Fabian Larcher, O.P. (Lander, Wyoming: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 2012), <http://www.dhspriority.org/thomas/SSColossians.htm#15>, accessed on March 10, 2016. And also Thomas Aquinas, O.P., *Commentary on the Letters of Saint Paul to the Corinthians*, trans. Fabian Larcher, O.P. (Lander, Wyoming: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 2012), <http://www.dhspriority.org/thomas/SS1Cor.htm#111>, accessed on March 10, 2016. Also, Thomas Aquinas, O.P., *Commentary on Ephesians*, trans. Matthew L. Lamb, O.C.S.O. (Albany: Magi Books, 1966), <http://www.dhspriority.org/thomas/Eph1.htm#8>, accessed on March 10, 2016. And also Thomas Aquinas,

they are eager to find how influence, being an efficient cause of grace, can really be attributed to Christ's human nature.

Thomas's Initial Work on Capital Grace in the *Scriptum* and *De Veritate* (q. 27)

In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Thomas attributes three main aspects of headship to Christ.¹² According to his divinity, Christ has dignity because he has the fullness of the deity,¹³ influence because he is the source of every spiritual grace in us, and order because he directs us to himself. As man, he has dignity on account of the grace of union and his saving work, which is the "noblest action in the Church;" influence because "through him we have received the sense of faith and the impulse of charity, 'for grace and truth are from Jesus Christ' (John 1:17);" and order because he directs us by his teaching and example.¹⁴ Although his position is like that of his predecessors, his arrangement of the argument sets him in a position to advance the doctrine.

Aquinas does this in two ways: first, by including the aspect of dignity (which is related to the grace of union and habitual grace) as an essential part of considerations of capital grace, and second, by constructing his argument in such a way that he gives equal place to Christ's human and divine natures, showing how the aspects of dignity, order, and influence can be applied to each.¹⁵ With regard to the first

nas, O.P., *Summa Theologica*, trans. the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, vols. 1 and 2 (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947).

¹² In Thomas's many treatments of capital grace, he is fairly consistent with the concepts which constitute Christ's headship, but he is not consistent with the use of words that describe these concepts. For the sake of simplicity, we will employ the terms used in the *De Veritate*: dignity, order, and influence, throughout this article.

¹³ This reference is to Colossians 2:9 which is the same passage that Augustine uses in his letter *Ad Dardanum*, n. 40, and that Lombard quotes in his *III Sent.*, d. 13, ch. 1, n. 2.

¹⁴ Thomas, *III Sent.*, d. 13, q. 2, a. 1.

¹⁵ The title of the article is "Utrum Christus sit caput Ecclesiae, secundum quod homo," but in his analysis Thomas gives equal weight to both the human and divine natures.

way, Thomas's linking of these two other kinds of grace to capital grace makes what he will say about the instrumental efficient causality of Christ's human soul possible: it is *because* Christ is a divine person acting through a human nature that is perfectly conformed to the divine will by its fullness of grace that he can be an instrumental efficient cause of grace in his human nature.¹⁶ In the second way, in which Aquinas affirms that the divine and human natures are like a physical head in these *same* three ways, Thomas advances toward the understanding of Christ's being one acting person with two natures. This will soon enable him to say that Christ's human nature is an efficient cause of grace as an instrument of his divinity, but as his replies to objections prove, here in the *Sentences Commentary* Aquinas only allows for ministerial and dispositive causalities to be attributed to Christ's human nature.¹⁷

According to Jean-Pierre Torrell, "the passage to a true instrumental cause in [Thomas's] thinking only happens between question 27 and 29 of the *De veritate*; from that point on in Thomas's work, Christ's humanity concurs in reality with the production of grace and leaves its mark upon it."¹⁸ Torrell can pinpoint this time so exactly because in q. 27, which asks whether "any creature can be the cause of grace," Thomas's position clearly differs from his stand in q. 29. In the third article of the earlier question, with regard to capital grace, Thomas argues that Christ imparts grace efficiently by his ministry, and that he

¹⁶ As Thomas Joseph White, O.P., points out, the beatific vision (part of Christ's having the fullness of grace) "alone permits the Lord as man to know immediately his own divine will, being moved by it and cooperating with it at each instant. This in turn permits his human intellect and will to function *instrumentally* with his divine, personal will as the two wills of one subject," Thomas Joseph White, O.P., "The Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ and the Necessity of the Beatific Vision," *The Thomist* 69 (2005): 526.

¹⁷ Thomas, III *Sent.*, d. 13, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1 and ad 3.

¹⁸ Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: Spiritual Master*, trans. Robert Royal, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 128, n. 16.

is the head of the Church because his ministry is higher than any other minister's:

He had a higher ministry than the others inasmuch as we are justified by faith in Him, we undergo the influence of the sacraments by calling upon His name, and by His passion the whole of human nature is cleansed of the sin of our first parent; and there are many other such marks of pre-eminence that are peculiar to Christ.¹⁹

Instrumental Causality

The change in Aquinas's thought was caused by a deeper reading of Saint John Damascene's work. Before proceeding to Thomas's mature position, it seems best to pause to examine Damascene's text and some further considerations of efficient causality. In *De Fide Orthodoxa*, Damascene wished to show how Christ's human and divine natures are both at work, not mixing, but at the same time both present and active. He writes:

But also [as Maximus the Confessor says in his *Disputation with Pyrrhus*] just as "in the unmistakably fiery sword" the natures "of both fire and steel are preserved," so also are both actions and their effect (that is, the perfections of this work) preserved. For steel has cutting power but fire has burning power; and the cut is the effect of the action of the steel (that is, the perfection of the work), but burning is the effect of the fire. And the difference between these is preserved in the burning cut and in the cutting burn, although "after the union, the burning will not come about without the cut, nor will the cut come about without the burning; nor on account of the twofold character of the natural action do we say that there are two fiery swords; nor on account of the mo-

¹⁹ *DV*, q. 27, a. 3, ad 6.

nadic character (that is, the singularity) of the fiery sword do we produce confusion over their substantial difference.”²⁰

Damascene’s work was instrumental in the development of the doctrine of capital grace because it made it possible for Aquinas to see how instrumental efficient causality can be attributed to the human nature of Christ without sacrificing the efficient causality that belongs to God alone.

Within the area of instrumentality Aquinas must clarify what kind of instrument most resembles the way that the human nature of Christ is related to his divinity in the giving of grace. In his expositions which describe the human nature of Christ as an instrument of his divinity, Thomas adverts to three main examples: an inanimate instrument, such as an ax, which is acted upon but does not act; an animate instrument, such as a slave, who is acted upon by the command of his master and acts by his own free-will; and a conjoined instrument, such as a hand, which carries out the will of a man. For the sake of clarity, we would also like to add the “vicarious” instrumentality of ordained ministers. In confecting the Eucharist, a priest speaks the words of Christ in the person of Christ; and through the priest, by the power of his ordination, God acts to accomplish what the priest has expressed.²¹ At first glance, it might seem that the role of a priest at Mass is most fittingly applied to Christ’s human agency, but this vicarious instrumentality goes too far to the side of God to explain Christ’s human instrumentality in causing grace. Vicarious instrumentality is not materially hindered by the unworthiness of a priest but the holiness

²⁰ John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, ed. Elgius M. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1955), ch. 59, n. 13 (Migne III, 15), 234 (trans. John Baptist Ku, O.P.). See also Dominic Legge, O.P., “The Trinitarian Shape of the Mystery of the Incarnation According to Saint Thomas Aquinas” (S.T.D. diss., University of Fribourg, 2014) for more on instrumental efficient causality and Thomas’s reading of Damascene.

²¹ My thanks to John Baptist Ku, O.P., for this idea of “vicarious” instrumental causality.

of Christ's soul, his dignity, is an essential aspect of the doctrine of capital grace because it makes him an apt instrument and because by grace he makes us like himself, the exemplar of graced humanity.

Similarly, the ax's instrumentality would also give too little regard to the operation of Christ's human nature. While the sharpness of the ax plays a role in the effectiveness of the efficient cause (the carpenter cannot carry out his work if the ax is not a good instrument), the ax is passive in the operation of the carpenter.²² The idea of Christ's humanity being like a conjoined instrument of his divinity is useful for explaining his role in bestowing grace through the sacraments,²³ but the notion of a conjoined instrument does not sufficiently describe Christ's human nature. The conjoined instrument of a hand, though completely obedient to the commands of the mind, is not rational, and does not choose to act. Indeed, Thomas does not use this image in reference to capital grace either in the *De Veritate* or in the *Summa Theologiae*. In the former Thomas compares Christ's instrumental causality to that of a slave, and in the latter he explains that Christ's humanity is "an instrument animated by a rational soul, which is so acted upon as to act."²⁴ It is necessary for Christ to have habitual grace because his actions are those of a divine person. When Christ's grace is viewed in this way, his humanity is understood to be fully active. His human intellect and will are working in union with his divinity to accomplish the work of our salvation.

²² As we will see below, Thomas does make use of the ax analogy to describe the interplay between the human and divine natures of Christ when considering Christ's operation in *ST III*, q. 19. The ax analogy is helpful in this regard because the proper action of an ax can be easily separated from the action of a carpenter, while it is more difficult to separate the operations of a diving person, having an intellect and will, from those of his assumed human nature, also having its own intellect and will.

²³ See *ST III*, q. 62, a. 5 and q. 64, aa. 3–4.

²⁴ See *ST III*, q. 7, a. 1, ad 3.

***De Veritate* (q. 29): The First Articulation of Thomas's Mature View**

In the center of question 29 of the *De Veritate*, surrounded by considerations of Christ's personal grace and merit, Aquinas puts forth his mature view of capital grace, strongly influenced by Damascene's work on the instrumentality of Christ's human nature. Article 4 follows the familiar format used by Thomas's contemporaries of examining the relationship between the physical head and members then applying this relationship in a spiritual way to Christ and the members of the Church. But here Aquinas's masterful approach signals a change in his thinking.

Instead of showing how each aspect applies to Christ as God and then how the same applies to him as man, as he did in the *Sentences*, Thomas subtly replaces this language by drawing our attention to the head's relations of distinction from and conformity with the members—distinction on account of his divinity and conformity on account of his humanity. He then arranges these six criteria by joining each criterion of distinction with a criterion of conformity, and shows how each of these elucidates headship. A lion is in conformity with all animals in animal nature but is head by dignity, since it has all of the senses that the other animals have distributed among them.²⁵ A prince is called the head of his people by government because he rules them, but he is in conformity with them by a "union of order, being ordained to one end."²⁶ And a spring is in continuity with a river because it is the same water which flows from the spring into the river, but it has influence over it as its head by causing an influx of fresh water into the flowing stream.²⁷ By momentarily removing the ever-present necessity to dis-

²⁵ Although Aquinas does not assert this explicitly, it is the implication of his comparison. He offered a bit more detail to the analogy in the *Scriptum*: "Therefore by reason of the first property, namely perfection, anything that is most perfect in any nature is called the head, as the lion among animals" (III *Sent.*, d. 13, q. 2, a. 1).

²⁶ *DV*, q. 29, a. 4.

²⁷ Thomas first uses these metaphors in his *Commentary on the Sentences*, but they seem to have their origin in Hale's work, as noted above.

tinguish what applies to the human and what applies to the divine nature of Christ, this masterful teacher allows us to grasp the idea of one subject with a double relation.

It is only now that Thomas turns to the considerations of how headship applies to Christ according to his human nature. First, Christ has conformity of nature with men, but also headship by dignity because “grace is found more abundantly in him”²⁸ in a way similar to a lion’s being the head of the animal kingdom by his excellence. Second, Christ rules the Church as her head, whose members share an order with him in that they “are of service to each other and are ordained to God.”²⁹ Third, Christ is the head by influence because of an inflow of grace from him, as a spring is the source of a river, but he has continuity with the members of the Church as the water of a river is the same water as that which comes from the spring; his soul is filled with grace and he gives grace, or the Holy Spirit, to his members: “We also find in the Church a certain continuity by reason of the Holy Spirit, who, being one and numerically the same, fills and unites the whole Church.”³⁰ It is one Spirit who is in Christ and flows from him into the members of the Church. Now Thomas is ready to show how influence applies to Christ according to each nature:

In causing spiritual sensation and motion a thing can be understood to be operative in two ways: (1) As a principal agent. In this way it belongs to God alone to pour grace into the members of the Church. (2) Instrumentally. In this way the humanity of Christ also is the cause of that in-pouring. For as Damascene says, “just as iron burns because of the fire joined to it, the actions of Christ’s humanity were salutary because of the divinity united to it, of which the humanity was like an instrument.”³¹

²⁸ *DV*, q. 29, a. 4.

²⁹ *Id.*

³⁰ *Id.*

³¹ *Id.*, ad 1.

Christ's human nature is not an instrument that is merely acted upon but is one which is both acted upon *and* acts.³² For this reason Thomas argues strongly for the necessity of habitual grace in the soul of Christ in the first article of this question.³³ His human actions as man have a certain nobility because they are the free actions of a human nature united to the person of the Word in a bond closer than the bond between our body and soul.³⁴

It is due to this bond that Aquinas makes his boldest statement on the subject of capital grace.³⁵ After citing Pseudo-Dionysius's notion that the nearer a thing is to the goodness of God, the more it participates in his goodness, Thomas notes that Christ's soul must have the fullness of (habitual) grace if he is to give grace to others:

As a result there was a fitness in this humanity not only to have grace but also to communicate it to other beings, as the most shining bodies transmit the light of the sun to others. And because in some sense Christ communicates the effects of grace to all rational creatures, this is why He is in some sense the source of all grace in His humanity, just as God is the source of all being. Then, as all the perfection of being is united in God, in Christ the fullness of all grace and virtue is found, and because of

³² *Id.*, a. 1, ad 9.

³³ In *id.*, a. 1, Thomas asserts that Christ had to have habitual grace in order to enjoy the beatific vision, that is, for operation, and he strongly rejects the view that the grace of union can account for the graced operation of Christ's human soul: "This shows the inanity of a certain opinion which affirmed that the higher part of Christ's soul did not have habitual grace but was united immediately to the Word and from this union grace flowed into the lower powers. For if it refers to personal union, then not only the higher part of Christ's soul but the whole soul is united to the Word. But if it refers to union by operation, then habitual grace is required for this kind of union, as has been said."

³⁴ *ST III*, q. 2, a. 9.

³⁵ See Torrell, *The Person and His Work*, 66: "The way in which he speaks of grace in the *Summa* supposes a path that has passed from the *Sentences* through the *De veritate*. In the domain of Christology, the way in which he speaks of Christ-the-head as being in his humanity the cause of all grace, somewhat in the way in which God himself is the cause of all being shows the progress that he has made since an early, overly strict vision of the instrumentality of that humanity."

it He not only is capable of the work of grace Himself but can bring others to grace. For this reason He has the headship.³⁶

Now Saint Thomas's momentous advance in the doctrine of capital grace becomes clearer. The young Thomas's attribution of ministerial causality to the humanity of Christ gives Christ a dignity like that of an ordained minister, but this does not confer on him the exalted status of head under the aspect of influence.³⁷ Being the meritorious cause through his saving work certainly gives Christ great dignity, and perhaps this is why Albert and his more famous student leaned heavily on this aspect to describe Christ's headship in their respective *Scripta*, but meritorious causality is distinct from efficient causality and is only tangentially connected to influence.³⁸ With the advance inspired by Damascene's work, Thomas is able to present Christ's human nature as an instrumental efficient cause of grace, one which is acted upon and acts. The whole of humanity is accorded a greater dignity by being given to participate in its own redemption. Christ as man is acted upon by grace and acts according to his own human intellect and will as an instrument of his divinity, and by the power of that divinity working through him, he gives us grace. This gift is nothing less than God himself conforming us to himself and drawing us into his own life.

Christ as One Acting Person

We would like to conclude by briefly examining a few passages from the Common Doctor's mature works that illustrate the breadth of

³⁶ *DV*, q. 29, a. 5.

³⁷ *DV*, q. 27, a. 3, ad 6: "The reason why Christ in His human nature is called the head of the Church in preference to all the other ministers is that He had a higher ministry than the others inasmuch as we are justified by faith in Him, we undergo the influence of the sacraments by calling upon His name, and by His passion the whole of human nature is cleansed of the sin of our first parent; and there are many other such marks of pre-eminence that are peculiar to Christ." These kinds of causality do not properly belong to being a source of the influx of grace that is proper to the aspect of influence.

³⁸ In *ST III*, q. 8, a. 1, ad 1, Thomas clearly separates these two kinds of causality as regards Christ's giving us grace.

this conception of Christ's human nature being an instrumental efficient cause of grace. From the *Summa* we will further document the interplay between the action of the mover and the instrument, and from his *Commentary on the Gospel of John* we will draw out the awe-inspiring reality that the mover of the human instrument is the Eternal Word himself.

The concept of the two natures of Christ each working according to its own operation, but also in unison, is explored in *ST III*, q. 19, a. 1, where Aquinas asks whether there is only one operation of the Godhead and the manhood of Christ. Using the example of an ax, whose proper operation is to cut, Thomas explains that an operation that belongs to a thing's form is proper to it and does not belong to its mover. In other words, it belongs to the ax to cut, not to the carpenter. But the operation of the thing as moved is not distinct from the operation of the mover; for instance, the proper operation of the ax as moved is to make a bench. In the same way, the human and divine natures in Christ have their proper operations: "The Divine Nature makes use of the operation of the human nature, as of the operation of its instrument; and in the same way the human nature shares in the operation of the Divine Nature, as an instrument shares in the operation of the principal agent." Thomas is very clear. Although the human nature of Christ has its own proper operation, its operation "as the instrument of the Godhead, is not distinct from the operation of the Godhead; for the salvation wherewith the manhood of Christ saves us and that wherewith His Godhead saves us are not distinct."³⁹ The Son assumed a human nature and acts through it to carry out his saving work.

Perhaps the richest exposition of this doctrine is found in Thomas's *Commentary on the Gospel of John*. The Angelic Doctor brings his readers' attention to the reality that it is the Word Incarnate speaking and acting in these passages. Christ's human nature is always acting as the instrument of the Word.

³⁹ *ST III*, q. 19, a. 1, ad 2. See also Torrell, *Spiritual Master*, 130–131.

As noted earlier, an essential part of Thomas's teaching on capital grace is the inclusion of considerations of Christ's dignity, his fullness of grace, because it is grace that makes Christ's human nature a perfect instrument of his divinity. Commenting on John 3:34, "God does not bestow the Spirit in fractions," Aquinas identifies three reasons why it should not be said that Christ received habitual grace in any limited measure: because of the one receiving grace, because of the grace received, and because of the cause of the grace. Concerning the third reason, namely the cause of grace, Thomas supplies the illustration of a man who owns a fountain that can produce an infinite amount of water. The man is said to have infinite water because he owns the fountain; just so, "the soul of Christ has infinite grace and grace without measure from the fact that he has united to himself the Word, which is the infinite and unfailing source of the entire emanation of all created things."⁴⁰ As a corollary to this third reason, Thomas notes that Christ's capital grace is infinite in influence. Christ pours out graces without measure "so that the grace of Christ is sufficient not merely for the salvation of some men, but for all the people of the entire world . . . and even for many worlds, if they existed."⁴¹

Thomas's work on the Last Supper discourse emphasizes the person of the Word acting through his human nature. Commenting on the passage "No one comes to the Father but by me" (John 14:6), Thomas compares the way that we reveal what is in our hearts by the use of words with the way that God reveals himself to us through his Word:

And just like one of us who wants to be known by others by revealing to them the words in his heart, clothes these words with letters or sounds, so God, wanting to be known by us, takes his Word, conceived from eternity, and clothes it with flesh in time.

⁴⁰ Thomas Aquinas, O.P., *Commentary on the Gospel of Saint John*, trans. James A. Weisheipl, O.P. (Albany, NY: Magi Books, 1998), ch. 3, lect. 6, (n. 544), <http://dhspriority.org/thomas/SSJohn.htm>, accessed on February 21, 2016; hereafter *In Ioan-nem*. See also *ST III*, q. 7, a. 9.

⁴¹ *Id.*, ch. 3, lect. 6 (n. 544).

And so no one can arrive at a knowledge of the Father except through the Son.⁴²

And it is this person, who is both God and man, who sends us the Holy Spirit: “Note that it is the same person who asks that the Paraclete be given and who gives the Paraclete. He asks as a human being, he gives as God.”⁴³ We see here the full flowering of the doctrine of capital grace: the Word Incarnate acts as a divine person through the means of a human nature, full of grace and truth, to bring men to God.

Conclusion

In this article we have traced the development of Thomas’s thought as it relates to the doctrine of capital grace. Like his predecessors, the young Thomas held for Christ’s human nature being a cause of grace ministerially, meritoriously, and dispositively. Thus Christ as man made it possible for man to receive grace, but he could not be an efficient cause of grace because this must be the agency of God alone. After deeper reflection on the work of Saint John Damascene, Aquinas was able to see his way to attributing instrumental efficient causality to Christ according to his human nature. This view ennobles the place of man in salvation, which includes not only the suffering of one man for all but the giving of grace through that same man. Thomas’s mature view of instrumental causality also makes it possible to understand Christ as one acting person in two natures. This is not only important for analyzing the actions of Jesus in theology, but more importantly it helps us to know the person of Christ as he is: the Word made flesh.

⁴² *Id.*, ch. 14, lect. 2 (n. 1874).

⁴³ *Id.*, ch. 14, lect. 4 (n. 1910).

**CAPITAL GRACE OF THE WORD INCARNATE
ACCORDING TO SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS****SUMMARY**

The doctrine of capital grace was developed during the Scholastic period and bears on many areas of theology including ecclesiology, Christology, sacraments, and Trinitarian theology with regard to the missions of the Word and the Holy Spirit. Viewed from a Christological standpoint, capital grace sheds light on how Christ in his human nature can be said to be a source of grace to the members of the Church. Following his contemporaries, the young Thomas Aquinas espoused a view in which Christ is a meritorious, ministerial, and dispositive cause of grace according to his human nature, and an efficient cause according to his divinity. After a deeper reading of John Damascene's treatment of Christ's humanity being an instrument of his divinity, Thomas was able to articulate a view in which Christ's human nature is an instrumental efficient cause of grace. This view undergirds Aquinas's strong conception of Christ as one acting person in two natures.

KEYWORDS: Jesus Christ, capital grace, habitual grace, instrumental efficient causality, human nature, divine nature.

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JÓZEFA TISCHNERA KONCEPCJA TRAGEDII ESTETYCZNEJ: OCZAROWANIE I UWODZENIE

Refleksja nad fenomenem piękna, jak również miejscem, jakie zajmuje ono w porządku ludzkiego doświadczenia poznawczego i egzystencjalnego, ma w historii filozofii bogatą tradycję. Perspektywy, obecne w ramach owej refleksji, cechuje istotne zróżnicowanie. Różnorodność ta rozpościera się od pitagorejskiego namysłu nad pięknem, jaki zmierzał w stronę uchwycenia go pod postacią matematycznej harmonii, poprzez platońskie pojmowanie piękna jako stopnia partycypacji bytu materialnego w swym idealnym pierwowzorze, arystotelesowsko-tomistyczny prymat formy, jako zasady organizującej piękno widoczne w materii, aż po stanowisko reprezentowane przez Bazylego Wielkiego, który kluczową rolę w ujmowaniu oraz konstytuowaniu się doświadczenia piękna przypisał relacji podmiotowo-przedmiotowej. Rys ten wywarł znamienny wpływ na klasyczne rozumienie piękna, wedle którego—pozostając transcendentálną własnością bytu—pełnię swego wyrazu uzyskuje ono w spotkaniu z poznającym podmiotem. Tropem tej intuicji filozoficznej podąża myśl Józefa Tischnera w zakresie, w jakim opisuje on podmiotowy biegun doświadczenia piękna, które to—zdaniem krakowskiego myśliciela—posiada moc ukierunkowania ludzkiej egzystencji w stronę ocalenia lub tragedii.

Celem naszych rozważań będzie próba przedstawienia istoty tragedii estetycznej w rozumieniu Józefa Tischnera. Tischner, opisując dramat piękna, przedmiotem swych dociekań czyni tylko jeden rodzaj piękna—piękno drugiego człowieka. Ta forma piękna, zdaniem Tischnera, jest jedyna w swoim rodzaju i dlatego nie może być potraktowana na równi z innymi przeżyciami piękna, np. piękna przedmiotowego, które pomimo swego doniosłego znaczenia, nie stanowi w tym wypadku pierwszoplanowego obiektu zainteresowań myśliciela.

Uwagi wstępne

U podstaw swych analiz Tischner nie zakłada jakiegóś konkretnej teorii piękna. Uważa on, że przeżycie piękna drugiego człowieka jest wydarzeniem, którego nie sposób pomylić z jakimkolwiek innym. Dzieje się tak dlatego, że piękno ma, według Tischnera, sobie tylko właściwą płaszczyznę, na jakiej dokonuje się jego poznanie. W analizach nad percepcją piękna Tischner sprzeciwia się wyodrębnianiu znaczenia władz poszczególnych zmysłów, a później w ich ramach—elementarnych dat wrażeniowych.¹ Filozof przychyła się do twierdzenia, że całość nie może być rozpatrywana tylko i wyłącznie jako suma części, gdyż wtedy nie zawierałaby w sobie nic ponad owe części. Wiemy zaś, że tak nie jest, co, zdaniem Tischnera, szczególnie dobrze obrazuje proces percepcji piękna. Cała sfera zmysłowości wraz z właściwymi sobie elementarnymi wrażeniami jednoczy się w tym jedynym i niepowtarzalnym doświadczeniu, które uobecnia się w fakcie, iż drugi człowiek jest piękny. Bazując na danych zmysłowych, potrafimy bez rozgraniczania ich od siebie osiągnąć poznanie piękna. Nie trzeba znać filozoficznych podstaw estetyki, aby w momencie obcowania z drugim móc bez wahania wydać sąd, iż jest on piękny. Zdaniem Tischnera, w doświadczeniu tym obecna jest tak ogromna siła perswazji, że sa-

¹ Por. Józef Tischner, *Filozofia dramatu* (Kraków 1999), 129.

mym faktem swego istnienia niweluje ona jakiegokolwiek ryzyko błędu.² Ta sama siła pozwala człowiekowi wyodrębnić istotową różnicę pomiędzy pięknem człowieka a pięknem rzeczy. Tę właśnie egzystencjalną pewność czyni Tischner podstawą swych dalszych analiz fenomenu spotkania z ludzkim pięknem.

Spotkanie z pięknem osobowym Tischner rozważa jako swego rodzaju błądzenie w żywiole piękna. Założeniem takiego stwierdzenia jest przekonanie, że piękno nie jest w stanie doprowadzić człowieka do ocalenia, jako ostatniego słowa dramatu. Piękno zatem jest źródłem ułud i pozorów, które wiodą człowieka na manowce egzystencji. Czy tak jest w istocie?

Tischner stara się sprecyzować ten problem w następujący sposób. Piękno sprawia, że człowiek w nim błądzi, jeżeli usiłuje zeń uczynić rację usprawiedliwiającą swoje istnienie. Nie wchodząc zbyt daleko w problem usprawiedliwienia, trzeba zauważyć, że piękno prowadzi do tragedii na dwa sposoby. Pierwszy z nich urzeczywistnia się w sytuacji, gdy podmiot dramatu uznaje piękno za właściwą drugiemu człowiekowi twarz, która wyraża całą prawdę jego egzystencji. Człowiek dąży do spotkania z twarzą drugiego, której istotę chce widzieć w pięknie. W ten sposób piękno, zdaniem Tischnera, staje się zasadą błądzenia, ponieważ zasłania i zagłusza głos dobra, jakie wyraża rzeczywista prawda twarzy.³ Gdy człowiek chce widzieć twarz drugiego taką, jaką ona nie jest, droga do spotkania zostaje zamknięta.

Jest jednak i drugi sposób błądzenia. Polega on na wspomnianym wcześniej wyborze piękna jako usprawiedliwienia swego istnienia z jednoczesnym odrzuceniem usprawiedliwienia poprzez dobro i prawdę.

Człowiek uznaje za niemożliwe ocalenie przez prawdę, ponieważ kwestionuje możliwość adekwatnego i ostatecznego jej poznania. Co więcej, zakłada że nawet poznawszy prawdę, jego ludzka kondycja

² Por. id., 119.

³ Por. id., 118.

uniemożliwia mu szukanie w niej ocalenia. Tischner przykładem takiego rozumowania czyni mitycznego Edypa, który mimo słów wyroczni nie zdołał odmienić złowrogiego fatum. W świecie rządzonym przez bezwzględny los z poznania prawdy nie można wyciągnąć żadnych praktycznych wniosków.⁴

Podobnie ma się sprawa z ocaleniem poprzez dobro. Zasadą odrzucenia staje się twierdzenie, że człowiek nie jest w stanie jednoznacznie rozgraniczyć dobra od zła. Podobnie jak w przypadku omawianym powyżej, pojawia się tutaj swoisty rys agnostycyzmu, gdzie ostateczne poznanie dobra staje się niewykonalne. Człowiek odrzucający dobro jako rację swego usprawiedliwienia argumentuje, że nawet poznawszy owo dobro, nie może w nim szukać ocalenia, ponieważ w świecie ma miejsce nieprzewidywalny paradoks, który wyraża się we wzajemnym warunkowaniu się dobra i zła. Nie byłoby możliwe mówienie o dobru, gdyby nie było zła i na odwrót. W ten sposób droga ocalenia poprzez dobro zostaje również zamknięta.⁵

W przekonaniu podmiotu dramatu jedynie piękno ma moc usprawiedliwiania, ponieważ jest wartością absolutną. Nie potrzebuje ono do istnienia niczego poza rzeczą, w której może się przejawić, chociaż wówczas mówimy już o pięknej rzeczy lub człowieku. Interesuje nas przecież piękno rozumiane jako wartość, a jako taka nie potrzebuje ono do istnienia niczego prócz siebie. Piękno jest pięknem samym w sobie. Tischner porównuje tutaj usprawiedliwiającą funkcję piękna do oczyszczającej roli greckiego *katharsis*, gdzie tragizm prowadzi do swoistego uwznioślenia ludzkiego bycia.⁶ Można tu nawet mówić o zbawczym charakterze sztuki, a co za tym idzie—piękna.

Ostatnia uwaga dotyczy źródeł, na bazie których Tischner opracowuje swoją koncepcję tragedii estetycznej. W pierwszej kolejności

⁴ Por. Józef Tischner, *Zarys filozofii człowieka dla duszpasterzy i artystów* (Kraków 1991), 53.

⁵ Por. id., 53.

⁶ Por. id., 53–54.

sięga on do pism duńskiego egzystencjalisty S. Kierkegaarda, a zwłaszcza do jego tekstu *Dziennik uwodziciela*. Inspiracją Tischnerowskich analiz są również odwołania do dzieł L. Tolstoja, J. W. von Goethego oraz W. A. Mozarta. Tischner zagłębiając się w fenomen dramatu piękna, czyni to nie tylko w oparciu o klasyków filozofii europejskiej, ale również wielkie nazwiska światowego dziedzictwa kulturowego. Dzięki temu zabiegowi myśl Tischnera ujawnia istotę tragedii estetycznej w kilku dopełniających się wzajemnie perspektywach.

Oczarowanie jako moment doświadczenia piękna

Pod pojęciem oczarowania kryje się, zdaniem Tischnera, moment doświadczenia oraz inicjowane przez nie przeżywanie piękna drugiego człowieka. Krakowski Myśliciel ma świadomość, że filozoficzne opracowanie fenomenu tak silnie zabarwionego emocjonalnie jest nad wyraz trudne, jednak podejmuje próbę bliższego scharakteryzowania tegoż zjawiska.

W pierwszej kolejności, według Tischnera, należy zwrócić uwagę na fakt, że oczarowanie jest czymś tak jakościowo odmiennym od innych przeżyć ludzkiej codzienności, że domaga się nadania mu specjalnego znaczenia. Tischner uważa, że oczarowanie należy zaliczyć do wydarzeń w Heideggerowskim sensie tego słowa. Chodzi tu mianowicie o to, że tak rozumiane wydarzenie zawsze jest ukonstytuowaniem się pewnego sensu.⁷ Ów sens tworzy nową hierarchię aksjologiczną w świecie osoby oczarowanej, buduje nową oś dla tegoż świata. Odtąd wszystko, co wydarzy się w życiu oczarowanego, uzyska na drabinie wartości swe miejsce, uwarunkowane przez piękno, jako punkt odniesienia. Piękno staje się teraz wartością nadrzędną, a dokładniej mówiąc—absolutną, która może istnienie usprawiedliwić, bądź usprawiedliwienia tego odmówić.

⁷ Por. Tischner, *Filozofia dramatu*, 120.

Pisząc o pięknie, odwołuje się Tischner do metafory światła. Czyni tak zwłaszcza pod wpływem lektury *Anny Kareniny* L. Tolstoja. Światło jest tym, co umożliwia widzenie, samo pozostając niewidzialne. Podobnie, zdaniem Tischnera, jest w przypadku piękna, które wydobywa przed oczarowanym pewne sensory i aspekty. Światło piękna jest światłem preferencyjnym. Począwszy od oczarowania moje zainteresowanie drugim coraz bardziej się pogłębia, pragnę by nasz dialog trwał i rozwijał się. Preferencyjność wyraża się w tym, że dążę ku dramatowi z drugim właśnie dlatego, że jest on piękny. Piękno jest tym, co skłania mnie do tego, abyśmy dzielili nasz wspólny dramat. Wszystko, co odtąd urzeczywistni się w naszym dramacie, będę ujmował poprzez pryzmat piękna i ze względu na nie. To jeden z typów odniesienia człowieka, można by rzec—odniesienie ekstrawertywne, czyli skierowane na to, co zewnętrzne i co teraz ma swoją wartość w perspektywie piękna.

Tischner pisze też o drugim, introwertywnym odniesieniu, jaki staje się udziałem podmiotu. Przeżywane piękno wydobywa z oczarowanego swoiste zdziwienie samym sobą. W tym momencie dokonuje się ukonstytuowanie świadomości samego siebie jako oczarowanego czyjś pięknem.⁸ Poznanie siebie w tym specyficznym aspekcie jest zapośredniczone poprzez piękno. Tischner w swych rozważaniach przywołuje wątki platońskie, gdyż piękno przejawia się na podobieństwo siły zdolnej porwać człowieka na wyższy poziom przeżywania otaczającego świata oraz własnej samoświadomości.

Rozumienie oczarowania jako wydarzenia w sensie Heideggerowskim niesie ze sobą jeszcze jedną konsekwencję. Wydarzenie konstytucji nowego i odmiennego od wszystkich innych rodzaju sensu, jakim jest przeżycie piękna, dokonuje się w sposób niemożliwy do przewidzenia. Uobecnienie piękna wymyka się możliwości jego zaplanowania czy przewidzenia. Wartość piękna polega bowiem na przekraczaniu wszelkich treści zgromadzonych do tej pory w świadomości

⁸ Por. id., 121–122.

podmiotu. Jest ono radykalnie inne niż wszystko wokół, i właśnie potęga tej inności wyznacza intensywność przeżycia piękna. Tischner pisze: “Piękno jest transcendentne: wykracza nie tylko poza wszystko, co nim nie jest, ale różni się także od innych odmian piękna. Jest niepowtarzalne.”⁹ W ten sposób piękno zaskakuje odmiennością nie tylko od wszystkiego, czego dotąd się doświadczyło, ale również odmiennością od swych poprzednich przejawów. To samo piękno potrafi zaskoczyć oczarowanego objawiając mu się w nowym aspekcie. Obrazując tę cechę piękna, Tischner stwierdza: “Napotkany człowiek raz tylko jest tak piękny, jak jest. Jutro będzie piękny inaczej.”¹⁰ Co więcej, właśnie owo ujawnianie przez piękno coraz to nowych twarzy jest tym, co, zdaniem Tischnera, podnosi jego wartość jeszcze bardziej. Piękno, które jest pięknem dynamicznym, oddziałuje na oczarowanego z jeszcze większą mocą, wzmagając w nim w ten sposób pragnienie zatrzymania i uwiecznienia momentu obcowania z pięknem. Na ile jednak zostanie uwiecznione piękno, na tyle też zostanie uwiecznione własne oczarowanie, które jest wymiernym efektem uczynienia z piękna najwyższej wartości, wokół której toczy się dramat.

Piękno jest nie tylko zaskakujące i dynamiczne, ale również darmowe. Tę darmowość Tischner pojmuje jako bycie darem, łaską darmo daną. Piękno objawia się z własnej woli—staje się jawne, bo samo tak zdecydowało. Jeżeli Tischner wspomina wielokrotnie o swojej “logice dobra,” to analogicznie do niej istnieje też coś, co można by nazwać “logiką piękna.” Wyrazem tej logiki są właśnie wymienione wcześniej cechy objawiającego się piękna. Jego darmowość pociąga za sobą jeszcze jedną konsekwencję—piękna nie można zatrzymać przy sobie, czy rościć do niego prawa własności. Coś, co objawiło się decyzją swej woli, może również na mocy tej decyzji odejść. Piękno wyklucza posiadanie go przez oczarowanego, co zresztą stanie się jedną z głównych zasad jego tragiczności. W tym sensie, w jakim piękna nie

⁹ Id., 123.

¹⁰ Id.

można posiadać na własność, można, według Tischnera, mówić o jego bezinteresowności. Bezinteresowność ta wyraża się w fakcie, że nie można doświadczać piękna po to, aby je posiadać. Czyniąc coś bezinteresownie, dokonuje się tego bez korzyści dla siebie; podobnie jest w przypadku piękna—można je przeżywać, ale nie można go używać do swych celów.¹¹

Oczarowany obcuje z pięknem. Czym jednak jest samo to piękno? Tischner stara się doprecyzować wszystko to, dzięki czemu możemy orzekać bez żadnych wątpliwości, że stojący przed nami człowiek jest piękny. W pierwszej kolejności myśliciel ten zauważa, że należy odróżnić samo piękno od tego, co jest w człowieku warunkami możliwości pojawienia się piękna. Piękno nie jest samą doskonałością ciała, “ani harmonią, ani proporcją, ani rytmem—jest czymś innym i czymś więcej.”¹² Tischnerowi chodzi o uwypuklenie okoliczności, że piękno jest wyniesieniem egzystencji oczarowanego na wyższy poziom bycia, gdzie nie panuje już proza życia, lecz poezja bycia. W tym sensie słuszne jest przekonanie, że językiem piękna jest właśnie język poezji. Nie jest to bynajmniej stwierdzenie zapożyczone z potocznej retoryki. Zdaniem Tischnera, piękno drugiego człowieka organizuje w oczarowanym nowe i zgoła odmienne od dotychczasowego centrum życia duchowego.¹³ Odtąd moje otwarcie na drugiego będzie się pogłębiać, mając za swój najistotniejszy wyznacznik fakt, że drugi jest piękny.

Ciekawym rysem oczarowania jest to, że odnosi się ono tylko do piękna drugiego człowieka. Wprawdzie Tischner nie stwierdza tego *expressis verbis*, jednak nie wydaje się być zasadnym przypuszczenie, aby fenomen oczarowania wiązał on z pięknem przedmiotowym. Pozwala to sądzić, że Tischner skłaniałby się raczej w stronę określenia relacji z dziełem sztuki mianem zachwytu, uniesienia, czy też porywu. Piękno rzeczy może nas zachwycać, ale tylko piękno drugiego zdolne

¹¹ Por. id., 123–124.

¹² Id., 124.

¹³ Por. id.

jest do oczarowania. Tischner, aby podkreślić odmienność piękna przedmiotowego od piękna ludzkiego, stwierdza, że nie jest tak, iż najpierw napotykamy piękne ciało jako bytowe *suppositum*, zaś refleksja nad faktem, że jest to ciało człowieka przychodzi potem. Myśliciel ten zdecydowanie broni tezy, że piękno, jakie spotykamy, jest od razu pięknem człowieka jako takiego i co do tego nie ma żadnych wątpliwości. Piękno wyraża się poprzez ciało, lecz nie jest pięknem ciała. Innymi słowy, człowiek nie jest pięknym ciałem, ale poprzez ciało. Tischner rozwija przed czytelnikiem wachlarz najbardziej wyrazistych fenomenów, za pośrednictwem których przejawia się piękno drugiego. Pisze: “Człowiek, którego widzę, jest piękny spojrzeniem, swobodą ruchów, wrażliwością na świat, mową, smutkiem, radością, zamyśleniem, płaczem, wewnętrznym zdziwieniem, wyniosłością, pokorą i pogardą. Piękno—odsłaniając, odsłania od samego początku duszę człowieka.”¹⁴ Tischner podkreśla w ten sposób fakt, że piękno wyrażane poprzez ciało jest z istoty pięknem ducha.

Piękno jest, według Tischnera, specyficznym kontekstem, w świetle którego nabiera znaczenia cała sfera ludzkiej aktywności. Cokolwiek czyni oczarowany, czyni to ze względu na piękno. Jeśli więc piękno jest dla oczarowanego zasadą dramatu z drugim, to pozwala o tym dramacie myśleć na dwa przeciwstawne sposoby wyrażające jego ostatnie słowo. Jeśli tym słowem będzie ocalenie, wówczas piękno okaże się pięknem zwycięskim; jeżeli jednak podmiot czeka zguba, to piękno, które go ku niej przywiodło, będzie pięknem tragicznym. Mimo, że oczarowany nie wie, jak zakończy się jego przygoda z pięknem, musi ona być od samego początku ujmowana w perspektywie zguby i ocalenia. Obcowanie z pięknem może, zdaniem Tischnera, doprowadzić oczarowanego nawet do szaleństwa, które ujawnia się tam, gdzie przeżywana treść przekracza egzystencjalną “pojemność” ludzkiego ducha i zdolności percypowania. Piękno drugiego może oddziaływać z taką mocą, że potrafi przerosnąć władze poznawcze oczarowanego.

¹⁴ Id.

Stąd, na przykład, dotknięci szaleństwem bohaterowie doby romantyzmu nie są, według Tischnera, czystym wytworem literackiej fantazji.¹⁵

Piękno jest przyczyną odniesienia osoby nie tylko do tego, co zewnętrzne, lecz również do tego, co wewnętrzne. Pod wpływem przeżycia piękna oczarowany zwraca się ku sobie w taki sposób, iż uzyskuje on samoświadomość bycia oczarowanym. Ten moment uświadomienia decyduje o dalszej postawie, jaką oczarowany zajmie względem piękna. Pierwszym z wrażeń, których piękno dostarcza, jest świadomość swoistego paradoksu. Piękno pociąga i oczarowuje, zarazem jednak nie pozwala ani zbliżyć się do siebie, ani się dotknąć.¹⁶ Jest wartością absolutną, a domeną wartości absolutnych jest świętość; ktokolwiek więc ośmieli się dotknąć piękna, dopuści się aktu profanacji. Oczarowany jest świadom tej ambiwalencji, dlatego też wielbi piękno, akceptując jednocześnie dystans, jaki pojawia się między nimi. Mimo, że akceptacja ta jest źródłem udręki, oczarowany wie, że wola pozostania w oddali jest nienaruszalnym prawem, jakie przysługuje pięknu, i którego to prawa pogwałcić nie wolno.

Oczarowanie postępuje dalej w procesie swego rozwoju, konstytuując nowe sensy w świadomości oczarowanego. Po uświadomieniu sobie bycia oczarowanym, następuje kolejny postęp w polu świadomościowym. Oczarowany uzyskuje świadomość bycia odkrywcą piękna. Dotykamy tutaj pierwszego rysu wzajemności—nie tylko piękno oczarowało mnie, lecz również ja mam w tym zjawisku aktywny udział, który wyraża się w odkryciu przeze mnie piękna. Piękno, które pozostałoby nie odkryte, byłoby pięknem dla nikogo; piękno, aby było pięknem wymaga potwierdzenia tego faktu przez podmiot poznający. Piękno nie poznane nie byłoby pięknem, gdyż brakowałoby mu uznania tego faktu w sądzie afirmującym. W ten sposób oczarowany odkrywa fakt, że to właśnie jemu piękno zawdzięcza sytuację, w której nie jest pięknem zmarnowanym. Tischner pisze, że w tym momencie oczar-

¹⁵ Por. id., 124–125.

¹⁶ Por. id., 127.

wany jest “geniuszem tego jednego odkrycia.”¹⁷ Oczarowany sprawił, że piękno uzyskało swój najważniejszy rys bycia pięknem podziwianym i w związku z tym on, jako odkrywca, ma w swym przekonaniu prawo oczekiwać wzajemności. Owa wzajemność ze strony piękna winna przybrać formę wdzięczności za potwierdzenie i uznanie piękna. Oczarowany staje się odkrywcą piękna i z tego powodu uważa, że jest wart więcej niż inni, którzy z rozmaitych względów nie wykorzystali tej jedynej szansy zostania odkrywcami. Oczarowany żywiąc nadzieję, iż piękno zauważy w nim swego odkrywcę, trwa przy nim “przywiązany do jedyności, niepowtarzalności, wyjątkowości.”¹⁸ Ma złudną nadzieję na przemianę otaczającej go teraźniejszości w wieczność, w której mógłby wielbić piękno nieustannie. Ku takiemu przekonaniu popycha go “genialność zmysłów,” które przywiódłszy go do odkrycia piękna, teraz stoją już na krawędzi szaleństwa.¹⁹ Postawa oczarowanego ma charakter wybitnie roszczeniowy i z punktu widzenia logiki piękna nieuzasadniony, o czym oczarowany przekona się w toku dalszego ewoluowania więzi łączącej go z pięknem.

Nawiązując do myśli Kierkegaarda, Tischner próbuje dokonać wstępnej charakterystyki oczarowanego. Postępując za duńskim egzystencjalistą, myśliciel ten rozpoczyna swój opis od stwierdzenia, że oczarowany wobec piękna zajmuje postawę pazia.²⁰ Postać ta najlepiej charakteryzuje stosunek odkrywcy do piękna. Paź bowiem trwa przy pięknie w milczącym uwielbieniu, gotów mu służyć w każdej chwili. Jest tak, ponieważ “zmysłowość jest tu już obudzona, lecz nie do ruchu, ale do cichego trwania, nie do radości i rozkoszy, ale do głębokiej melancholii.”²¹ Ponieważ słowa nie są zdolne oddać pięknemu należnej mu czci, dlatego paź jest milczący. Ponownie powraca paradoks, gdy piękn-

¹⁷ Id., 128.

¹⁸ Id.

¹⁹ Por. id.

²⁰ Por. id., 130.

²¹ Søren Kierkegaard, *Dziennik uwodziciela*, w: *Albo—albo*, t. I, tłum. Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz (Warszawa 1976), 83 (cyt. za: Tischner, *Filozofia dramatu*, 130).

no nie pozwalając się dotknąć, zmusza jednocześnie do cichego trwania przy swym boku. Na tym etapie piękno domaga się dla siebie pierwszej ofiary; jest nią wyrzeczenie się przez oczarowanego swobody przemieszczania się. Jeżeli bowiem chce być przy pięknie, nie może się nigdzie odeń oddalić—musi stale być w pobliżu.²² W ten sposób piękno wzięło oczarowanego w posiadanie, choć odkrywca wie, że nie ma prawa wziąć w posiadanie piękna, które odkrył. Tym samym rys ciężący ku tragedii ponownie zostaje uzewnętrzniony. Egzystencjalny ból wynikający z niemożności posiadania piękna wyraża się, zdaniem Tischnera, w westchnieniu pazia. Westchnienie to spełnia kilka funkcji: po pierwsze—jest wyrazem wspomnianego bólu, po drugie—jest ekspresją skierowaną ku pięknu, wreszcie po trzecie—stanowi prośbę o litość. Prośba ta wynika z resztek nadziei oczarowanego na to, że piękno jednak zrezygnuje ze swej powszechności, aby stać się wyłączną własnością swego odkrywcy.²³

Wzajemność relacji artysty i dzieła w akcie uwodzenia

Sposobem, w jaki oczarowany i odkryte przezeń piękno dążą do wzajemności w posiadaniu, jest—zdaniem Tischnera—relacja uwodzenia. Potoczne rozumienie słowa “uwodzenie” odsyła nas do kobiety i mężczyzny oraz całej gamy ich wzajemnych relacji, zachowań, słów czy też gestów, których zadaniem jest sprawić, aby jedno z nich uznało drugie za podmiot “inny od wszystkich pozostałych,” jakie je otaczają. Słowo “inny” oznacza tu raczej “wybrany,” czyli taki, który zasługuje na potraktowanie odmienne od tego, które uzewnętrznia się wobec innych ludzi. Takie rozumowanie towarzyszy zarówno faktowi uwodzenia kobiety przez mężczyznę, jak i sytuacji odwrotnej.

Tischner opisując akt uwodzenia postępuje za Kierkegaardem, który w swym *Dzienniku uwodziciela* odnosi uwodzenie do mężczyzny

²² Por. Tischner, *Filozofia dramatu*, 130.

²³ Por. id., 135.

i kobiety rozumianych jako artysta oraz dzieło sztuki. Uwodzenie uzyskuje w ten sposób status procesu twórczości artystycznej—staje się tworzeniem przez artystę swego arcydzieła.²⁴ Można powiedzieć, że potoczne znaczenie uwodzenia zostaje tą drogą w specyficzny sposób “uwznioślone,” nie tracąc przy tym nic z tego, co dla niego istotne.

Skąd w dramacie piękna rodzi się potrzeba uwodzenia? Geneza jej wynika z faktu, że choć oczarowany pięknem ma bolesną świadomość niemożności posiadania piękna na własność, to pragnie urzeczywistnić odmienny cel. Oczarowany chce sprawić, by piękno uznało go za swego odkrywcę. Innymi słowy, chodzi mu o zawiązanie relacji wzajemności. Do tej pory tylko oczarowany był świadom siebie jako odkrywcy piękna; teraz czas na to, aby piękno ujrzało samo siebie jako odkryte przez tego, którego zdołało oczarować. W ten sposób oczarowany staje się artystą, zaś piękno dziełem sztuki, które nie mogłoby istnieć bez swego artysty, wydobywającego je na światło dnia. Jednak, aby dzieło należało do artysty, a artysta należał do dzieła, musi między nimi zaistnieć relacja uwodzenia, której celem jest wzajemne uświadomienie roli, jaką każde z nich odgrywa w dramacie piękna.

W relacji uwodzenia artysta i dzieło sztuki dążą do wzajemności. Dotąd tylko oczarowany wiedział o pięknie, które go urzekło, teraz zaś piękno wie, że jest pięknem; co więcej—pozwala to w sobie wielbić. Zdaniem Tischnera, oczarowanie nie kończy przygody z pięknem, lecz otwiera drogę do kolejnego jej etapu. Wzajemność uzyska swą pełnię wtedy, gdy artyście uda się umieścić własne oczarowanie we wnętrzu swego dzieła tak, aby mogło je ono przeżywać świadomie. Tischner stara się to sprecyzować w następujący sposób: “Idzie o to, by drugi odkrył w sobie i uznał to, co ja w nim odkryłem i uznałem. Tym sposobem moje oczarowanie nim stanie się jego wewnętrzną rzeczywistością. Na jego twarzy znać będzie mój ślad.”²⁵ Właśnie ten ślad oczarowania na twarzy drugiego spełnia rolę porównywalną do podpisu arty-

²⁴ Por. Tischner, *Zarys filozofii człowieka dla duszpasterzy i artystów*, 61.

²⁵ Tischner, *Filozofia dramatu*, 135.

sty na swym arcydziele. Tylko w ten sposób artysta i dzieło mogą do siebie należeć i na tym ostatecznie polega sens całej teleologii uwodzenia.

Dzieło, o którym mówi Tischner, nie jest dziełem byle jakim. Wbrew początkowemu, intuicyjnemu skojarzeniu wcale nie musi to być dzieło sztuki wizualnej, na co mógłby wskazywać cały horyzont estetyczny. Dzieło, o jakie chodzi Tischnerowi, jest dziełem sztuki dramatycznej.²⁶ We wspólnym dramacie jesteśmy tym, kim jesteśmy poprzez siebie, zatem bycie artystą jest zapośredniczone przez istnienie dzieła i odwrotnie—dzieło jest dziełem z racji posiadania tworzącego je artysty. Dramat ma realizować wątek wzajemności i w przypadku uwodzenia rzeczywiście tak się dzieje. Dzieło, nawet jeśli posiada świadomość, że jest, to z pewnością nie ma świadomości, jakie jest. Nie wie, że jest piękne. Oto właśnie zadanie artysty—doprowadzić do zniesienia owej niewiedzy, odkryć przed dziełem jego własne piękno. Zdaniem Tischnera, artysta i dzieło podejmują wspólny wątek dramatyczny wiedzeni jedną nadzieją, “by finał sztuki był jeszcze piękniejszy, niż jej początek.”²⁷

W trakcie tego wspólnego dramatu artysta dąży ku temu, aby uświadomienie dziełu jego piękna postępowało ściśle określonym szlakiem. Chodzi o to, aby “Ja aksjologiczne” dzieła przeszło swoistą metamorfozę. Ma ona na celu wyznaczenie nowej wartości, wokół której koncentrować się będzie wszelka aktywność owego “Ja.” Jest to wartość naczelna, umożliwiającą hierarchizację pozostałych wartości. Zadaniem artysty jest doprowadzenie do stanu, gdy owa naczelna wartość przyjmie postać piękna, czyli stanie się wartością estetyczną. W ten sposób “Ja aksjologiczne” dzieła sztuki zostanie zorganizowane wokół nowego centrum oraz uzyska nowe oblicze, którym będzie odtąd twarz “Ja estetycznego.”²⁸ Tylko mając za aksjologiczny ośrodek życia “Ja

²⁶ Por. id., 135.

²⁷ Id., 136.

²⁸ Por. Tischner, *Zarys filozofii człowieka dla duszpasterzy i artystów*, 62.

estetyczne,” dzieło sztuki jest w stanie wyzwolić w sobie szczególnego rodzaju zdumienie i podziw dla swego piękna (a nie byłoby ich gdyby nie wydobywający je artysta). Od tej zależności uciec nie można. Nie tylko artysta współtworzy swe dzieło, lecz także dzieło współtworzy artystę.²⁹ Powstaje pytanie o zakres owej twórczości. Miarą oddziaływania dzieła na artystę jest siła oczarowania, z jaką uobecnia się ono w jego świadomości. W ten sposób artysta wraz z dziełem tworzą zamknięty i samonapędzający się krąg zależności, odsłaniający łańcuch wzajemnych zapośredniczeń. Według Tischnera, wzajemność i dopełnianie się artysty i jego dzieła stają się jedną z centralnych osi dramatu piękna.

Tischner, przyznając rację Kierkegaardowi, twierdzi, iż relacja artysty i dzieła sztuki jest w przeważającej większości przypadków obrazem więzi między mężczyzną i kobietą. Artysta-mężczyzna stwarza swe największe arcydzieło-kobietę i jednocześnie sam jest nią stwarzany. Każde z nich jest sobą dzięki drugiemu. Według Tischnera, stawką uwodzenia jest tu posiadanie. Kobieta oddaje się mężczyźnie i odwrotnie. Oddaniu się każdej ze stron towarzyszy wzięcie w posiadanie. Dlatego artysta i dzieło pod postaciami mężczyzny i kobiety mogą powiedzieć o sobie “mój” i “moja,” gdyż współtworząc się wzajemnie, w autentyczny sposób do siebie należą.³⁰

Tischner podkreśla jednak, że perspektywa estetyczna nie otwiera horyzontu macierzyństwa i ojcostwa jako odpowiedzialnego wyboru dobra etycznego.³¹ Owszem, macierzyństwo i ojcostwo mogą pojawić się na płaszczyźnie estetyki, lecz tylko jako konsekwencja estetycznej afirmacji piękna drugiego człowieka uzewnętrznionej na poziomie cielesności. Nie są to jednak macierzyństwo i ojcostwo wybrane jako wartości. Dlatego też Tischner pisze, że horyzont estetyczny ludzkiej egzy-

²⁹ Por. Józef Tischner, *Spór o istnienie człowieka* (Kraków 2001), 178.

³⁰ Tischner, *Filozofia dramatu*, 137.

³¹ Por. id., 115.

stencji zastawia na człowieka swoistą pułapkę, której efektem jest to, że “mężczyźni stają się ojcami, a kobiety matkami—z przypadku.”³²

Mówiąc o akcie tworzenia arcydzieła sztuki dramatycznej, należy określić założenia, będące u podstaw owej twórczości. Jest to pytanie ważne, ponieważ w strukturze aktu uwodzenia znajduje się bardzo istotny rys, który jest zwiastunem zbliżającej się tragedii. Artysta dąży do momentu, w którym dzieło uzna, że cała prawda jego twarzy wyraża się w pięknie i w ten sposób uświadomi sobie to, dlaczego jest—że jest, aby być pięknym. Jest to wskazanie kierunku, w jakim musi podążać artysta; musi dążyć do tego, aby jego dzieło stało się dziełem pełnym i doskonałym. Takie dzieło, uzyskawszy świadomość swego piękna, nie potrzebuje już nikogo, a co za tym idzie, również artysty.³³ Stanie się ono dziełem samoistnym, któremu zbędny jest wszelki podmiot potwierdzający jego piękno. Tischner konkluduje to jednoznacznym stwierdzeniem, że piękno nie stwarza, ani nawet nie obiecuje więzy wierności. Nie może być wierne swemu twórcy, gdyż wypacza to całą ideę bycia arcydziełem. Arcydzieło nie jest bowiem dla jednostki, lecz jest dziełem dla wszystkich, którzy podziwiając je, oddają jednocześnie sprawiedliwość jego obiektywnemu pięknu. Dzieło zatem nie może zobowiązać się do wierności wobec artysty, któremu jednocześnie nie wolno oczekiwać wdzięczności za odkrycie piękna. Tischner stwierdza, że skoro afirmacja piękna dokonana przez artystę była aktem bezinteresownym, to ze swej natury nie może on dopominać się o wdzięczność. Sprawa przybiera jednak wymiar bardziej radykalny. Zdaniem Tischnera, ma tutaj miejsce próba estetycznego usprawiedliwienia niewierności.³⁴ Artysta i jego dzieło stają się ofiarami aktu uwodzenia, który miał sprawić, że każde z nich będzie stanowić własność drugiego, a tymczasem doprowadza ich do nieprzewidywalnej konieczności wyrzeczenia

³² Id.

³³ Por. id., 136.

³⁴ Por. Tischner, *Spór o istnienie człowieka*, 116.

się siebie. Taka jest, według Tischnera, cena stworzenia pełnego i samoistnego dzieła sztuki.

Na czym polega tragiczność, jaka zawiera się w akcie uwodzenia? Jej istota zasadza się na tym, że artysta doskonale zdaje sobie sprawę z faktu, iż nie może osiąść swego dzieła na własność, a mimo to decyduje się zostać jego autorem.

Można powiedzieć, że artysta już u źródła gry uwodzenia decyduje się na tragedię. Ma pełną świadomość, że samoistne dzieło, które chce stworzyć nie będzie go już dłużej potrzebowało, gdy akt artystycznej twórczości dobiegnie końca. Taka jest wszak logika piękna. Tragiczność uwodzenia przejawia się również w tym, że artysta wiedząc o konieczności wyrzeczenia się swego dzieła, nie jest zdolny dobrowolnie tego dokonać. Dzieło jest potrzebne artyście jako nieodzowny element całego ciągu usprawiedliwień. Tischner pisze o artyście: "Jego wielkoduszność jest zarazem wielką zazdrością."³⁵ Artysta nie byłby sobą, gdyby nie dążył do oderwania od siebie własnego dzieła, choć jest w nim wewnętrzna niezgoda na taki krok. Właśnie ta wewnętrzna sprzeczność przywodzi artystę na krawędź tragedii. Tragiczność jest ceną poddania się logice piękna, która zmusza do tworzenia coraz wspanialszych dzieł. Tischner stwierdza: "Artysta, który stworzył jedno dzieło, nie może spocząć na laurach, lecz musi tworzyć następne."³⁶ Konieczność ta jest nieprzewycięzalna. Nawet gdyby artysta chciał pozostać artystą tylko jednego dzieła, logika piękna uniemożliwia mu to, ponieważ "człowiek, który w pierwszych chwilach oczarowania wydawał się absolutem—i rzeczywiście nim był, tyle że *absolutem estetycznym*—po jakimś czasie okazuje się co najwyżej *siłą potrzebną do tworzenia*."³⁷

³⁵ Tischner, *Filozofia dramatu*, 137.

³⁶ Tischner, *Spór o istnienie człowieka*, 115.

³⁷ Id.

Podsumowanie

Postępując szlakiem powyższych analiz wydobyliśmy to, co wydaje się najbardziej charakterystyczne i najistotniejsze dla Tischnerowskiej koncepcji tragedii estetycznej, mianowicie fenomeny oczarowania i uwodzenia. Doszliśmy do punktu, w którym odkrywca uświadamia sobie, że nie może dokonać przywłaszczenia piękna, które odkrył. Ma jednak nadzieję, że istnieje taka forma perswazji, która jest w stanie przekonać piękno, aby stało się jego własnością dobrowolnie. Zdaniem Tischnera, sposobem, w jaki oczarowany i odkryte przezeń piękno dążą do wzajemności w posiadaniu, jest relacja uwodzenia. Uwodzenie jednak ze swej natury jest fenomenem paradoksalnym i to paradoksalnym tragicznie. Jest bowiem zawsze podejmowane ze świadomością wyrzeczenia, które ma nadejść. Okoliczność, w której artysta i dzieło skazani są na rozstanie, wskazuje, że tragedia estetyczna nie jest dramatem samego dzieła, czy też samego artysty. Jest to ich wspólna tragedia, której początkiem staje się złudna nadzieja na przezwycięzenie nieusuwalnej konieczności rozstania. Uwodzenie, podjęte w nadziei na posiadanie siebie na własność, staje się dla uczestniczących w nim podmiotów przyczyną rozstania, które, zdaniem Tischnera, jest tym, co zapaści w dramacie zgubę człowieka.

JÓZEF TISCHNER'S CONCEPTION OF AESTHETIC TRAGEDY: ENCHANTMENT AND SEDUCTION

SUMMARY

The article analyzes essential factors for Józef Tischner's conception of aesthetic tragedy, namely enchantment and seduction. For Tischner, the aesthetic tragedy takes place in the realm of interpersonal relations. The article describes the discoverer of the beauty as the one who becomes aware of that he cannot appropriate the beauty discovered; nevertheless, he still hopes that there must be a form of persuasion able to convince the beauty to be his possession voluntarily. According to Tischner, the way in which the enchanted and the beauty discovered by him seek to possess each other is the relation of seduction. Seduction, however, by its nature is a paradoxical phenomenon;

for it is always associated with the consciousness of a renouncement which is to come. The fact that the artist and his work are doomed to part shows that the aesthetic tragedy is a drama not only of the work, but also of the artist; it is their mutual tragedy which stems from an illusory hope for the overcoming of the irremovable necessity of parting. The act of seduction undertaken in hope for having each other as a property becomes the reason of a parting for participating subjects, a parting which—according to Tischner—is announced in drama as the bane of man.

KEYWORDS: Józef Tischner, aesthetics, tragedy, enchantment, seduction, art, man, woman.

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PERSONALISM IN THE LUBLIN SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY

(CARD. KAROL WOJTYŁA, FR. MIECZYSLAW A. KRAPIEC)

As we know, the problem of person has a very long history in the philosophical tradition. We also know that, in the beginning, this was a question of Divine Persons—the concept of person which, on the basis of Greek terminology (*hypostasis*, *prosopon*), was formulated in connection with this question, and made it possible to explain the crucial truths of Christianity: namely, the One God in Three Persons and the ontic unity of Jesus Christ. The Fathers of the Church (e.g., St. Augustine) had already been aware that the notion of person is the most suitable for expressing the specific and special character of the human being. The awareness of this became even sharper in the modern times when the problem of human being started to be undertaken outside a theological context. But the anthropological turning point came only in the twentieth century, which was connected, firstly, with the rise of philosophical anthropology as a separate branch of philosophy, and secondly, with a philosophical trend called “personalism.” This trend was neither uniform nor clearly defined. Some viewed it as a kind of protest against an incredible contempt for the human person which was so pervasive in twentieth century totalitarianisms. Some treated personalism as an intellectual and cultural movement which, analogically to

Renaissance humanism, was designed to focus general attention on the issue of the human person and his problems. Others noticed the possibility and, at the same time, the necessity to consider the whole reality from the perspective of the person and to treat the person as the starting point and the key to interpretation of any reality. This has given rise to personalistic systems which originated from the primary experience of personhood as the phenomenon directly given; then, in the light of this phenomenon, these systems formulated a universal and systematic explanation of different realms of being. Personhood appears here not only as the cognitive, methodological, and praxeological key, but it is also the principle of existence. As Czesław S. Bartnik puts it “not only the world of things but even God Himself could not exist nor could they be the object of cognition provided they were not personal.”¹

Nevertheless, the rise of personalistic systems has not proved to be powerful enough to bring the problem of person into the issues domineering contemporary philosophical and cultural reflection. The variety of attitudes, significant differences in the understanding of personhood, and consequently, mutually exclusive interpretations of different spheres of human life and activity, have caused the concept of person to be perceived as having little merit for cognition and even for ethics. Such perception of the concept of person has been quite considerably influenced by naturalism—so popular nowadays—which by program rejects any transcendental sphere in human being, having granted the right for scientific study of man mainly to naturalistic and evolutionary anthropology. Another factor which contributes to the diminishing and relativization of the concept of person is the fast-developing cultural and social anthropologies. These perspectives advocate conventional definitions of person, claiming that cultural variety does not justify any unanimous criteria of “being a person.” Also, certain difficulties stem from some sort of “confessionalization” of the

¹ Czesław S. Bartnik, *Szkice do systemu personalizmu* [Sketches for the System of Personalism] (Lublin 2006), 49.

issue of person. The religious origin of person means, in the opinion of some people, that this concept should not be used and explained outside a religious context. This is opposed by the view that because the concept of person comes from the Christian theological tradition, it cannot set up claims to universality. So introducing such concepts into contemporary cultural discourse which has “liberated” itself from religious determinants is just a “conceptual surplus” or “semantic abuse.” The above-mentioned difficulties contribute to gradual elimination of the category of person from both philosophical and cultural discourse. Some other concepts such as “personality,” “character,” “dignity,” “freedom,” “creativity,” “value,” “human rights” seem more adequate for describing humans.

Has personalism then become cognitively useless? Is the concept of person so “burdened” with the Christian tradition that it may not be used universally in a broader sense of describing all the richness of the reality called “human?” Are modern categories describing the specificity of man more primary than “person?” Do they not need justification by categories which stem from deeper layers of experience? How far can they be rationally systematized so that they could coherently describe and explain various realms of human existence and activity, avoiding, at the same time, all kinds of reductionism? And even if the category of person is allowed, is it not just one more anthropological category used as a certain linguistic convention? Similar questions may be asked about personalism. Is it not a purely cultural product? And is it not, just like other “isms,” a certain kind of narration which tries to describe reality in such a way so as to get its participant to acquire some habitual “linguistic behaviour” or “social practice” that would enable him to communicate well with other people and thus sustain the good communication necessary for the well-functioning and well-being

of society that, in turn, because of this becomes able to fulfil all needs of its members?²

I will try to show that the concept of person results from a philosophical reflection on human being and not only from a religious tradition, though, undoubtedly, the concept was discovered within Christianity. I will make an attempt to prove that this concept stems from fundamental human experience and this is why it is essential for discovering the basic characteristics of human being. Also, the concept of person allows one to grasp the specificity of man, placing him in the privileged position not only in the world of nature but also in society. In this light it will result that personalism is not just one of many “isms,” but it is a proposal of objectivistic interpretation of human fact. As such, personalism is universal and able to enter into dialogue with other conceptions of man. But first of all, so-defined personalism is not just a dry theory describing the specificity of human person and his position in the world; so-defined personalism is a matter of practical life whose focus is all spheres around a human person, treating him as the highest and the most valuable ontic formation in the order of nature.³ As a result, all the spheres of human acting should be governed by what is good for the person; in other words, these spheres should serve for a fulfilment of man in which he could fully realize his personhood.

Such an understanding of person and such a conception of personalism were exercised by two Polish philosophers: Karol Wojtyła and Mieczysław A. Krąpiec. Both of these men were the framers and the main representatives of the Lublin School of Philosophy. I will start to present their conceptions of personalism with an attempt to place Wojtyła and Krąpiec within the framework of the above mentioned types of personalism. Then at the beginning of the proper presentation of

² Richard Rorty, *Filozofia jako polityka kulturalna* [Philosophy as Cultural Politics: Philosophical Papers, Volume 4], Polish trans. B. Baran (Warszawa 2009), 59, 69, 126.

³ Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Metafizyka. Zarys teorii bytu* [Metaphysics—An Outline of the Theory of Being] (Lublin 1998), 325.

their conceptions I will ponder the problem of the cognition of man as personal being. Next I will talk about the issue which is fundamental to personalism, namely the specificity of personal being. I will of course finish with some conclusions. This presentation, for obvious reason, does not pretend to fully embrace the topic; it aims at making the reader aware of the main motives in the personalistic thought of the two aforementioned Polish philosophers.

Some Specific Features of Wojtyła's and Krąpiec's Personalisms

Karol Wojtyła (1920–2005) and Mieczysław A. Krąpiec (1921–2008) received philosophical formation in exactly the same historical context and largely under the influence of the same people. This was, for Poland, the time of the Second World War and the post-war period, when intellectual circles were not very numerous, not only because academic professors were massively killed during the war in Katyn, Siberia, and the German concentration camps, but also because Poland, until 1918, had been under a one hundred and twenty year subjugation divided between three neighboring countries and, consequently, education had been severely limited. Both Wojtyła and Krąpiec studied in Cracow, their thinking was shaped by Catholic thinkers. As kindred spirits in their views they quickly became cooperators at the Faculty of Philosophy in the Catholic University of Lublin (CUL), at that time the only university independent of communist ideology. Up to a point and in reaction to Marxism, they both developed realistic philosophy that was metaphysically oriented, focused on the problem of man, and explained different dimensions of man's life and acting. Krąpiec started with developing metaphysics and on the ground of metaphysics he formulated philosophical anthropology which, in turn, became the basis for a philosophy of cognition, philosophy of morality, law, culture,

politics, and art.⁴ Wojtyła, as the head of the Ethics Department at the CUL Faculty of Philosophy, was assigned the task of developing ethics. Next he underpinned his ethics with anthropology, claiming that it is impossible to deal with ethics without anthropological and metaphysical foundations.⁵

As I suggested, up to a certain degree, the personalistic thought of the two philosophers was developed in the act of protest against a Marxism which as a result of its collective orientation, violated human rights and the human dignity of an individual person in both theory and practice. But more than just a protest it was rather another philosophical proposal which, on the ground of realism, sought answers to fundamental questions concerning man and the world. The two philosopher's main objective was not to join some intellectual and cultural movement. They wanted to build solid theoretical foundations under the Christian and humanistic culture that suffered under Marxism's huge pressure, both intellectually and institutionally, not infrequently violently. For this very reason it is not quite accurate to view Wojtyła's and Krąpiec's philosophies as personalistic systems in the strict sense of the word. They did not build their philosophies around the notion of person, subordinating the whole structure of philosophy and the explanation of the whole being to the interpretation of person. Moreover, these philosophers broadly drew upon other philosophical currents, taking from all philosophical traditions everything that could enrich human cognition and lead to—more faithfully to experience and more systematically—a broad, adequate vision of the world, man, and God. Nevertheless, both philosophers' thought is thoroughly personalistic because the question of man is at the center and the unique value of the human person is explained and emphasized. Both philosophers' thought lays claim to complementarity in the sense that it views man in a broad context of the

⁴ For more extensive information, see *Encyklopedia Filozofii Polskiej* (Encyclopedia of Polish Philosophy) (Lublin 2011), vol. 1, 764–770.

⁵ See *id.*, vol. 2, 826–834.

world, society, and God; also, it takes into consideration the respective achievements of other currents of philosophy as well as theology and particular sciences. Both thinkers devoted much space to the person in their lifelong work. Let us mention their chief philosophical books on person: *Person and Act* by Wojtyła⁶ and *I-Man* by Krąpiec.⁷

Having sketched the broader context of both philosophers' thought, I will now touch upon the philosophical conditions that played a decisive role in the way they developed their conceptions of person and their theories of personalism. Of course, a comprehensive presentation of this problem would involve a separate lecture, so I will just limit myself to mentioning these philosophical conditions.

Firstly, their personalism is based on metaphysics, which means that it takes into account the whole of reality understood as the objective world, external to man and not being a construction of man's mind, the world whose unique and exceptional element is man.

Secondly, the philosophers presented here do not start from the position of skepticism, but in the very beginning they note and acknowledge man's ability to both cognize objective truth and to communicate it in universal categories as well as to verify it on the ground of experiential rational procedures.

Thirdly, they share a substantialist concept of person, which means that they acknowledge the existence of permanent identity and ontic continuity whose core is a substantial subject existing in himself and for himself.

Fourthly, they both acknowledge the existence of an objective human nature that determines the specific features of human being dis-

⁶ Here I refer to: Karol Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne* [Person and Act, and Other Studies in Anthropology] (Lublin 1994). Hereafter cited as: *Osoba i czyn*. In English, the *Person and Act* by Wojtyła is known as *The Acting Person*, trans. A. Potocki and ed. A.-T. Tymieniecka (Dordrecht 1979).

⁷ Here I refer to: Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Ja-człowiek* (Lublin 1991). For English translation, see *I-Man: An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology*, trans. M. Lescoe and others (New Britain 1983).

tinguishing man amongst other beings, especially in the aspect of acting.⁸ So conceived nature embraces what is common to all humans and makes them belong to the human species. This also defines what is specific to a concrete individual and constitutes the source of his specific individual actions. Thus human nature includes rationality, freedom, emotionality, subjectiveness, sexuality, social character, morality, creativity, and spirituality; such a nature, with all its components, enters, as its inseparable part, the conception of a personal human being.

Now after defining Wojtyła's and Krapiec's position within the framework of personalism and after outlining the main metaphysical assumptions of their personalism, we have come to the problem of cognition of man as a personal being.

The Cognition of Man as a Personal Being

On the background of metaphysical assumptions the cognition of man presents itself as transcending external perception and directing itself towards the inner dimension of man, towards his human psyche and consciousness. Analyzing the long tradition of strife between objectivism and subjectivism, both philosophers proclaim themselves in favor of the fundamental role of inner experience in the cognition of a human being as a person. Their analyses are, to a great extent, complementary because they view the same experience from different perspectives.

Karol Wojtyła starts from the experience which he labels as "the experience of man." He considers it the richest of all the experiences man has and, at the same time, the most complex. By the "experience of man" he means the cognitive contact that man has with himself; this experience is present in all other experiences of man, since "he never experiences anything beyond himself without having, at the same time,

⁸ See Juan M. Burgos, *Personalizm. Autorzy i tematy nowej filozofii* [Personalism. Authors and Themes of the New Philosophy], Polish trans. K. Koproński (Warszawa 2010), 162–172.

the experience of himself.”⁹ Although a man is for himself mostly “in-ner-ness,” he always experiences himself simultaneously both from the inside and from the outside, so it is impossible to separate the internal experience from the external experience and *vice versa*. In such a whole experience engaging a whole man he is given his own subjectiveness. Such experience embraces not only himself but also all the other people who are in direct cognitive contact with the man.¹⁰ According to Wojtyła, a special moment of the experience of man is man’s action understood as *actus humanus*, that is a conscious and volitional action, and not as *actus homini* (activation independent of consciousness and will). Man’s action (*actus humanus*) opens his subjectiveness to cognition. Also, through action man actualizes himself as a person, so action gives not only the best insight into man’s subjectiveness, but also into man as a person—into the inner ontic structure of personhood. So the object of experience is a dynamic correlation between a person and his action reflected in consciousness. In such experience the fact “man acts” is experienced consciously and sourcefully. The fact “man acts” reveals the basic personalistic value, that is the value of a person who performs volitional and conscious action. This is the starting point for Wojtyła’s analyses which consist in “studying action that reveals person” and aim at “a study of person through his action.” A person’s action is composed of some stable elements which can be grasped through induction and then through the procedure of reduction they can be reduced to what is basic or constitutes the ultimate reason for person and his action. So for objectivization of the experience of person and his action Wojtyła uses both phenomenological and metaphysical methods. The former serves as an exploitation of the content of the fact that “man acts,” the latter enables him to discover the ontic reasons by which a given fact is determined. The purpose of Wojtyła’s investigation is to find out what the efficacy of action consists in or, in other words, he

⁹ Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn*, 51.

¹⁰ *Id.*, 10–11.

wants to discover the inner structure of the person who performs his action. The analysis of a person's actions allows one to discover three main moments of which the dynamics of person is composed. These are: transcendence, integration, and co-acting (participation). We will come back to these aspects while talking about the specificity of personal being as understood by Wojtyła.

Mieczysław A. Krąpiec sees experience a bit more strictly, connecting it with common-sense cognition in which one grasps the factuality (especially the existence) of concrete objects and oneself. He distinguishes between the outer and the inner layer of experience emphasizing that cognizing oneself is the only moment when those two aspects of experience overlap. However, it is necessary to distinguish between them because of the different kinds of perception involved in each of them. Additionally, the distinction of those two aspects of experience make the cognition of a human being more valuable, because personal being as subject is revealed in two ways: from the inside and from the outside. Following common sense, Krąpiec emphasizes that already in the outer experience man-subject is revealed together with his specificity among other beings. This specificity is indicated by creating tools whose purpose goes beyond biology, by language, culture, conceptual cognition, apparently useless contemplative cognition, reflective cognition, decision-making, etc. But it is the inner experience that Krąpiec values even more. In the inner experience man experiences himself directly as the subject of his own actions. In the human action "I" is disclosed as the subject different from his actions which he views as his own ("my own"). "I" is always immanent in relation to what is "mine." "My" acting does not come from outside, it is "I" who is the author of it: "I" cognize, "I" feel, etc.; "I" is the only subject of my actions. Beside immanence a man experiences the transcendence of his "I" over his particular "my acts." "I" is never "used up" in any of those acts, "I" is always much more than the acting as such. "I never experience myself—writes Krąpiec—as the 'sum' of my actions, I never un-

derstand myself as the one who identifies oneself with the content of my actions . . . I never see myself, never experience myself, neither understand myself in the mode of understanding things.”¹¹ Experiencing his own “I” (his “self”), a man experiences, at the same time, the primacy of the “I’s” existence as subject over the essence of his being. This is because the cognitive experience of existence is the most basic act in our cognition. This experience expresses itself in double affirmation: the affirmation of the existence of things around me and the affirmation of the existence of my “self” as the subject of my actions. This double affirmation of the existence of “the world as the object of my actions and the existence of myself gives me the right to understand person as ‘I’ endowed with the rational nature.”¹² In transcendence and in immanence of “I” over “mine” the rationality of man is disclosed because its first sign is the ability to call myself “I.” While existence is given to man primarily and directly, he cognizes his nature only indirectly through his actions. Experiencing the immanence and the transcendence of his “I,” man perceives the identity of his own subjectiveness as the only source of heterogenic acts (physiological, psychological, spiritual). Krąpiec recalls here a significant text by St. Thomas Aquinas: “Everyone experiences himself that he exists as the one who understands . . . one and the same man is he who conceives of himself that he understands and feels; and it is impossible to feel without the body.”¹³ Both the experience of the relation “I”–“mine” and the experience of the identity of man-subject needs explanation. His metaphysical approach to problems makes Krąpiec look for the ultimate objective reasons for the experienced facts. The same applies to external experience and, in the face of these, “the human fact” demands explanation.

¹¹ Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Człowiek jako osoba* [Man as Person] (Lublin 2005), 121.

¹² Id.

¹³ “Experitur enim unusquisque seipsum esse, qui intelligit . . . ipse idem homo est, qui precipit se et intelligere et sentire, sentire autem non est sine corpore” (S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Summa theologiae*, cura et studio P. Caramello, vol. 1 (Torino 1963), p. I, q. 76, a. 1).

The key to understanding the human fact is the analysis of “my” acts through which we can discover the nature of personal being, showing itself, above all, in subjectiveness, rationality, and transcendence. To Krąpiec’s mind, without embracing those matters one cannot objectivize the specificity of the human person.

The Specificity of Man as Personal Being According to Wojtyła

The original contribution of Wojtyła to the concept of person is that he sees the specificity of man as a personal being in “performing action” (*actus humanus*), which reveals the whole ontic content of personal human being. Exclusively through the analysis of performing action, it is possible to reach ontic structures conditioning the efficacy of action. The primary question is the question about the source of the efficacy of action thanks to which action is experienced in one’s consciousness as action and as one’s own. What is at stake is efficacy in its basic intransitive meaning through which a human subject becomes simultaneously a human “I.” One’s consciousness, through cognitive acts, accompanies one’s action as well as through the acts of self-cognition, reflects the action and, in this way, objectivizes it. Thus in one’s consciousness the synthesis of one’s subjectiveness and one’s efficacy takes place. Through the *operari* characteristic of man, on the ground of the *suppositum*, human “I” is revealed and, at the same time, constituted by the *operari*. The analysis of human action from the perspective of consciousness and experience leads to understanding man-subject in the sense of the concrete and the unique “I.”¹⁴ “It is the mode of specifically human *operari* called ‘human action’ that—as says Wojtyła—has basic and essential significance for the cognition of the subjectiveness of man-person.”¹⁵ The specific and rich structure of the

¹⁴ Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn*, 382.

¹⁵ *Id.*, 383.

personal subjectiveness of man is revealed through a thorough and all-embracing analysis of human action. In other words, in order to fully understand and objectivize person, we must penetrate thoroughly and comprehensively into his proper *operari*. A specific bond of person's action to person-subject is the key to understanding person and his personhood. This character of this bond discloses itself as transcendence, integration, and co-acting. Those very moments bring out man's inherent personal subjectiveness together with the ontic structure of his personhood. Let us comment briefly upon each of these moments.

Wojtyła deals basically with the aspect of transcendence that decides human action and, whereby, constitutes personhood. He omits transcendence in the metaphysical sense, that is, in the sense of the most universal sphere of being, namely, transcendental features of being. He first of all seeks the source of a person's transcendence in the acts of will which are decisive for the inner structure of person. The chief structural moment in which the above-mentioned transcendence is revealed is defined by Wojtyła as "self-governance." It consists in determining oneself to act or, in other words, in freedom understood as self-determination. According to Wojtyła, this is the basic understanding of freedom, different from the freedom which is the feature of the faculty of will called the "freedom of choice." This phenomenological explication of the experience of self-governance allowed Wojtyła to discover structural elements of a person's will in which will has different functions. Those elements are called by Wojtyła "self-owning" and "self-ruling," since a person is "the one who owns oneself and, at the same time, the one who is owned exclusively by oneself" as well as "the one who rules oneself and, at the same time, the one who is ruled by oneself."¹⁶ These ontic structures make self-governance possible because one can govern oneself only if one "owns oneself" and, in turn, one can only own what one rules over. In the case of self-owning the will appears as the feature of person while in the case of self-ruling the

¹⁶ Id., 152.

will fulfills the function of the faculty which is employed by a person to serve himself. Both aspects constitute the moment of self-governing decision—"I want"—in which a man determines himself to undertake a specific action. Therefore free choice is not only an intentional act but, first of all, it is an act of self-governance assuming the awareness of who one is and the disposition of the will to choose the value which is proportional to that awareness. In this way freedom, according to Wojtyła, reveals the spirituality of man which, thus conceived, does not have to be defined merely as the opposite to materiality.¹⁷

So freedom in the sense of self-governance is the source of a person's dynamism. The basis of so-conceived freedom is the dependence on one's own "I." This dependence is the condition for the experience of efficacy. The superiority of "I" over one's own dynamism is called by Wojtyła "vertical transcendence," which is the proper transcendence of person over his action. This vertical transcendence is distinguished from a horizontal transcendence which has an intentional character and consists in transcending a person-subject's borders and going out horizontally towards objects in the acts of cognizing and wanting them.¹⁸ Self-governance, due to its vertical transcendence, reveals an autonomy of person that radically distinguishes him from all natural beings. This means that personal being does not realize himself exclusively through a "reactive" dynamism, that is, through activations resulting from vegetative or emotive potentialities. This means that a personal being, first of all, realizes himself through the dynamism of a will which comes from a person as such and consists in "being-from-himself" and "belonging-to-himself." That is why, according to Wojtyła, transcendence is the second name of person.¹⁹

¹⁷ Ignacy Dec, *Transcendencja człowieka w przyrodzie. Ujęcie Mieczysława A. Krąpca OP i kard. Karola Wojtyły* [The Transcendence of Man in the Nature. An Approach of Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Krol Wojtyła] (Wrocław 2011), 213.

¹⁸ Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn*, 123.

¹⁹ Id., 15.

The dynamism of performing action by a person involves a motivation which is constituted by a value perceived by the person as an objective good. An “I want” (or “I don’t want”) act appears here as a free response to the value which is defined by the truth about its goodness that indicates the will’s dependence on the truth which is external to the will. Because of this, performing action always has a moral aspect where a crucial role is played by conscience, whose role is to show the dependence of action on the truth. In this way, value passes into shouldness and shouldness, in turn, passes into responsibility. On such a basis Wojtyła claims that man as a person inheres within the realm of responsibility in an essential way and he must always feel responsible “for”—of course each time differently—and, ultimately, he is responsible for the moral value of his own “I,” for actualizing and realizing it according to the measure of his existence and his essence.²⁰ Therefore, performing action is strictly connected with fulfilling oneself as a human being who, through his actions, realizes his potentialities, aiming at happy serenity.²¹ This means that man cannot develop his personal potentialities without freedom. Man’s fulfillment through performing (fulfilling) actions is accompanied by another feature characteristic of the strict connection between person and his act that is the integration of person in his action.

Whereas the efficacy of action reveals transcendence, the subjectiveness reveals its integration. Integration first occurs within the realm of person and his action where the action is not a simple sum of dynamisms, but the effect of self-governance; then integration happens in the psychical and somatic spheres. Integration basically means that a person subordinates to his self-governance both the sphere of his psyche and the sphere of his somatics. Therefore integration consists in

²⁰ *Id.*, 214–215.

²¹ In Polish there is the same word “spełniać” for “performing” action and “fulfilling” oneself; so there is a natural immediate connection between “fulfilling [performing] action” and “fulfilling oneself.”

actualizing one's wholeness and oneness which pass from person and his action into the sphere of psyche and somatics. As for the psyche, Wojtyła attaches a particular importance to emotiveness which is mainly expressed in one's sensitivity to values. On the basis of various emotional forms such as desire, arousal, being moved, or affectionate, one's psychic subjectiveness is created. It is the result of the integration of different areas of emotiveness conditioned, ultimately, by the strict connection between person and his action in the act of self-governance. As far as somatics is concerned, the integration causes the body together with its inherent drives and reactivity to become the expression of the person himself. So, as we see, the integration of person in his action is, for Wojtyła, the key to understanding the psychosomatic unity of man.²²

Another moment which reveals the connection between person and his action is the co-acting of persons or, in Wojtyła's words, participation. Participation is such a feature "whose power causes a man—who exists and acts together with others that is in different configurations of inter-human or social relations—to be able to be himself and fulfill himself."²³ Thus participation is about such forms of social life which can be formed thanks to the transcendence and the integration of person in his action. Those forms are labeled as "personalism" by Wojtyła in contrast to individualism and collectivism. The latter actually lead to the alienation of person (the opposite to participation). Within the framework of personalism it is the common good that makes the basis for community. Only thanks to transcendence and integration authentic attitudes are possible and in having authentic attitudes a person is able to recognize the common good and accept it as his own. In this way the need for love arises in man. This need for love does not exhaust itself in relation to his own self, neither does it exhaust itself in

²² Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn*, 236

²³ Karol Wojtyła, *Osoba: podmiot i wspólnota* [Person—the Subject and the Community], in Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn*, 393.

relation to the dearest ones; it acquires the universal character of loving another person just because he is a human person. This fully corresponds to Wojtyła's theory of morality based on the personalistic norm which proclaims that "a person is such a being towards whom the only proper and fully valuable relation is love."²⁴ According to Wojtyła, love means "firstly to notice a person and what is good for him and, secondly, transcend one's own egoism and direct oneself towards another man."²⁵

On the basis of what has been said so far about Wojtyła's concept of person, we may define a person as a substantial being existing by itself and for itself in both the subjective and the objective sense, spiritual and material, rational and free, realizing himself both within himself and in community with others, fulfilling himself in acting and efficacy.²⁶

Specificity of Man as Personal Being According to Krąpiec

As we said, according to Krąpiec, the specificity of personal being manifests itself mainly in subjectiveness, rational nature, and transcendence. Let us have a look at how Krąpiec tries to deepen the understanding of this characteristic of human person.

Emphasizing the relation of "I" towards "mine," Krąpiec undertakes the question of man as a subject who is revealed by actions coming from him. The character of those actions, just like a mask (*prosopon*) in a Greek theatre, shows the character of the man-subject who is their source. Man's subjectiveness is strictly connected to his substantiality which, except for a concrete existence in itself, is rational. As Boetius defined it *persona est individua substantia rationalis naturae*.

²⁴ Karol Wojtyła, *Miłość i odpowiedzialność* [Love and Responsibility] (Lublin 1986), 42.

²⁵ *Id.*, 33.

²⁶ See Czesław S. Bartnik, *Personalizm* [Personalism] (Lublin 2008), 85.

When we analyze the manifestations of man's rationality, especially their irreducibility to pure materiality, we must pose a question about the nature of man-subject. Besides traditional pointing out to the composition of a substantial human being from soul and body, where a soul is a substantial form of the body and determines essential features of *compositum humanum*, Krąpiec deals with a problem which, according to him, is more basic for the understanding of human subjectiveness, namely, the problem of man's existence (*esse*). If soul explains the unity and the identity of a subject and the strict connection between the acts emanated by him, what then explains the very existence of the subject and the specificity of this existence? Standing on the ground of a metaphysical theory which stresses the primacy of existence (*esse*) in the structure of being, Krąpiec claims that soul as a substantial form of the body must, at the same time, be the act of existence of the human being, in accordance with St Thomas Aquinas' intuition that "the substantial form gives being absolutely."²⁷ For this reason soul, relating to the body as an act towards potency, defines the way man-subject exists. But then a question arises: Is man's existence subjected in the whole psycho-physical subject or is it only subjected in the soul as the subject existing in itself? If man's existence is subjected in the psycho-physical subject, and not in the soul itself, then how could we explain the transcendence of such acts as cognition and love? When acting is the prolongation of existing, then here in the case of those acts acting would be ontically higher than the mode of human existence. Yet the being that has material structure cannot be the cause of the act of immaterial structure. For this reason we must assert that soul as the proper source of human acting may exist in itself as the subject, which means that some form of substantiality must be attached to it. If then a soul is the subject of existence it cannot exist with the potentiality of matter, it must have its own existence whose contingency demands an explanation by showing the ultimate cause of existence. To Krąpiec's mind, the only non-

²⁷ "Forma autem substantialis dat esse simpliciter" (*Summa theologiae*, p. I, q. 76, a. 4).

contradictory explanation of the genesis of the soul is pointing out the common cause of all being, that is, the Absolute Being.²⁸

The body, in addition, is in a sense “owned” by soul, it is the primary “mine,” but on the other hand, this very statement assumes the mediation of the body indicating the inseparable unity of the two elements: for, ultimately, the body and the soul are a substantial unity at the fundament of which there is one act of existence, that is, the soul. This is the only way one can explain the oneness of a human being as well as the experience of this oneness in performing various actions. So there is one existence for a human being and as such it cannot be subjected in many heterogenic elements. For Krąpiec, it is clear that a man exists with the existence of his soul though as man-subject he possesses a carnal-and-spiritual nature.²⁹ It means that at the basis of viewing man as a personal being there lies the fact of the existence of the soul since a man is a substance because of the act of existence. So a human person possesses a spiritual way of existence which distinguishes him among all other natural beings. He is, as Thomas Aquinas says, “the one who is the most perfect in the order of nature.”³⁰ But above all he is a “self-existing ‘I’-subject.”

As such the ontic structure of a human person allows one to understand his dynamism. Analyzing this problem, Krąpiec refers to the notion of a rational nature which he re-interpretes in his own way. Originally the notion of a rational nature was linked to substantiality and it was explained with the help of such notions as essence, matter, form, or accidents. However, according to Krąpiec, none of those notions explain an element constitutive for personhood, though, in spite of that, for ages they tried to connect person with some ontic content having some kind of oneness. Most often it was oneness resulting from

²⁸ Krąpiec, *Człowiek jako osoba*, 18.

²⁹ *Id.*, 19–20.

³⁰ “[P]ersona significant id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura” (*Summa theologiae*, p. I, q. 29, a. 3).

belonging to one species. Ontic self-containment and a subject's completeness within the framework of rational nature defined the specificity of a personal being, which was expressed in Boetius' definition.

In modern times the problem of personal being is closely connected with the consciousness which constitutes the essence of such being. In Krąpiec's view, we can find a much better solution in St. Thomas Aquinas' thought, although this solution was not given any notice by later Thomistic schools; what Krąpiec means here is that only this element of rational being constitutes a person which constitutes being and this is one individual existence of this one concrete rational nature.³¹ So if the act of existence actualizes rational nature, then it also determines its specificity. And because soul is the act of existence of a human being, it is the soul that determines the specificity of both rational nature and the personal being. In this light a man is a "self-existing" personal being who is consciously experienced as an "I-subject" that organizes for himself his individual nature through emanating from himself both spiritual and physiological acts which are "my acts" endowed with the content given by "I."³² Although spiritual acts are not "more mine," it is them that shape "individual 'nature' as the permanent source of determined acting having definite personal features."³³

So human nature is not the result of organizing matter, but "the organization of human matter is an essential, formal function of a self-existing soul that in spiritual and bodily acts expresses oneself as a self-existing 'I-subject' vivifying all the material elements and calling them into existence."³⁴ This does not of course exclude purely biological elements, though in the situation of personal nature's self-realization

³¹ Krąpiec, *Ja-człowiek*, 404.

³² *Id.*, 415.

³³ *Id.*

³⁴ *Id.*, 416.

these elements are, up to a certain degree, subordinated to “the laws of spirit.”

For showing more fully the connection of I-subject with an individual nature, Krapiec introduces a notion of potentiality which is necessary for explaining the subject’s dynamism. This dynamism is realized according to the dispositions inhering in nature and determined by the principle which founds existence, namely by the soul. Dispositions reveal the dynamism of the self-existing “I” manifested, first of all, in the acts which transcend matter. For, in spite of the fact that those acts are connected with matter, it is impossible to conceive of them quantitatively—to measure them or define them in terms of time and space, which points out to their transcendence. These are such acts as intellectual cognition, love, decision, or creating. It is these kinds of acts that make up human activity, its external expression is culture created by man. Thus the purpose of culture is to create conditions for realizing and perfecting personal acts. A special attention is attached by Krapiec to the acts of decision in which the connection between “I” and what is “mine” is most fully revealed, since it is through one’s decision that actually what is “mine” constitutes itself as a new being for the existence of which I am responsible. Thus person is a self-existing “I,” conscious of his acts, forming for himself the concrete individual source of rational acting. Having such a source, acts performed by a person show the transcendence of the person over the surrounding reality, since a person is the only being who self-determines (determines himself) and who constitutes his own “individual nature.”³⁵ That is why the conception of person must be complemented by showing his transcendence.

Krapiec sees two kinds of person’s transcendence: over the world of nature and over society. The first form of transcendence is manifested in such personal qualities as intellectual cognition, freedom and love. These qualities are closely inter-related and they determine one

³⁵ Id.

another.³⁶ The synthesis of these acts makes one talk about oneself as “I” and experience oneself as a real subject of one’s acting. Transcendence is also indicated by religious acts which in the whole order of nature are characteristic only of man. Thanks to cognition, love, and the acts of decision, man enters relationships with other people and then such his qualities are revealed that indicate his transcendence over society. These qualities, as the subjectiveness in relation to the law, completeness and dignity, are strictly connected with the ones previously mentioned and all of them condition one another.³⁷ Thus only through an act of decision a person can accept a norm of the law as his own and make it the norm of his own actions. Otherwise the law binds man as an object in the mode of forcing him instead of being rationally and freely accepted by him as the law binding him in his conscience. This, however, assumes the necessity to distinguish between natural law and positive law, because it is exclusively the former that is the object of inner obligation to realize what is good for man. That obligation results from interpersonal relationships. Only when related to the natural law, the proclaimed law becomes a common good. The completeness of person, which is another factor contributing to the primacy of person over society, means that thanks to a unique and unrepeatable personal existence, a concrete person is a fuller form of being than society; this does not change the fact that society is the only guarantee of the personal development of man. Mutual subordination of a person and society is special and unique because it goes along the plane of actions which transcend the world of nature. Consequently, as Krąpiec put it, “the better is a society—that is the organization of various interpersonal relationships—the more it enhances personal development of man.”³⁸ Dignity

³⁶ As a result “man’s personal cognition is specific, because it is free, selective, emanated under the influence of love. Personal love is a spiritual love characterized by rational willing and freedom. Freedom is also rational, directed by rational will that is a responsible love” (Krąpiec, *Człowiek jako osoba*, 129).

³⁷ *Id.*, 130.

³⁸ *Id.*, 131.

of person means placing personal human being in the highest position in the hierarchy of beings on the basis of his way of being that transcends the world of nature and indicates his relationship with the Personal Absolute. It is exactly for this reason why a human person, as I. Kant noticed, should be the end in itself and never a means. The culture that overlooks or hinders the growth of people's personal qualities is, *de facto*, a defective culture and, in extreme cases, even anti-culture.

In the light of what has been said, according to Krąpiec, a human person is an ultimate spiritual and material subject of a human being's existence and of all his actions and, also, he is the basis of his dignity and his rights.

Conclusions

The conceptions of person, sketched above, were the basis for philosophical anthropology, developed by Karol Wojtyła and Mieczysław A. Krąpiec whose ambition was to find a solid theoretical fundament for Christian and humanistic culture. This was the reason why their anthropology sought grounding in metaphysics on the one hand and, on the other hand, it was opened to investigating all crucial spheres of human life in both its individual and social dimensions. Wojtyła studied the problem of man's morality, anthropological basis for community and social life, the meaning of love and human body; all of these problems found their fullest expression in his papal teaching in which it would be difficult even to count the topics linked to human person. In the case of Krąpiec, his anthropological reflection on human person included in fact all the main areas of human acting, being focused on the four primary branches of culture: human cognition, morality, art, and religion. So the efforts of the two Polish thinkers led to a personalistic—broadly conceived—thought that may be labeled as integral personalism. In conclusion and to sum up this article, I would like to note general features of such a personalism, both in the aspect of the research method and in the aspect of the achieved results.

First, this conception of personalism comes from experience and it seeks verification in experience; it does not accept any a priori explanations or theses, though it does not shy away from drawing upon different branches of knowledge in its attempts to broaden experience, being aware that not everything is given to immediate experiential perception. With this, knowledge based on experience expands, in turn, the scope of experience. In the interpretation of experience a crucial role is played by systematic explanation which reflects the systematicity of beings and this is why cognition of person is being carried out both in relation to society and in relation to other beings.

Second, Wojtyła's and Krąpiec's personalism wants to draw on the whole philosophical tradition, taking into account, at the same time, the findings of different sciences of man or humanities which broaden the experience of man or contribute something to the interpretation of experience. Both philosophers' achievements include, among other things, deepening many classical notions such as person, man-subject, substance, nature, innerness, consciousness, freedom, love, relation, common good, carnality, sexuality, etc.

Third, bringing together genetic empiricism and methodical rationalism, the two Polish philosophers were able to avoid radicalism in the explanation of man, making a successful attempt to join in a complementary way these aspects of personal human being which carry some opposition. The list of these opposition-laden aspects reconciled by Wojtyła and Krąpiec is long, here are some of the most significant ones: person–nature, somatics–psyche, substance–self, carnality–spirituality, an individual man–society, rationality–emotionality, morality–law, subject–object, innerness–outerness, etc.

Fourth, their conception of person does not bear any traces of antagonism since it is not directed against anyone. In the light of this conception every human person has a character of the honest good which is the unconditional good, that is the highest and the ultimate good not competing with the value of anything else. That good is always the end

in itself and as such it has always a character of the common good, so the realization of this good never leads to the alienation of any human person.

Fifth, Karol Wojtyła and Mieczysław A. Krąpiec proved that the conception of human person lies at the basis of understanding society, culture, ethics, law, politics, economy, art, and even religion. Therefore, in their opinion, the spirit of personalism should penetrate all realms of human life in order to serve and enhance the integral development and self-fulfillment of person. Otherwise, when person is not granted the highest value in the natural order, the above-mentioned realms become anti-personalistic. The effects of this are not only theoretical, but also practical. When society is understood in an either collectivistic or individualistic manner, culture is deprived of any criteria, so no matter what man does becomes culture; ethics is deprived of any objective and universal norms, so it gives way to technology; law becomes the result of the power-games between influential interest groups; politics is reduced to the battle for power; economy is exclusively oriented towards financial profit which becomes the only measure of human work and labor; and religion which disregards the personal goodness of a human being is nothing but ideology serving the purposes of politics. Wojtyła and Krąpiec knew all too well from their own experience about these kinds of abusing man, because as members of the Polish nation they were witnesses to radical anti-personalism during the Second World War and then in the long communist period after the war. So their theoretical reflection deserves careful attention because it was, in a way, verified by practice. All in all thanks to sticking closely to experience as well as rational systematicity and drawing upon the most enduring philosophical traditions, their conception of person and personalism can be a good inspiration for contemporary man to seek answers to his most significant and urgent questions.

**PERSONALISM IN THE LUBLIN SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY
(CARD. KAROL WOJTYŁA, FR. MIECZYSLAW A. KRĄPIEC)**

SUMMARY

The article presents the conception of personalism and the understanding of human person developed by two Polish philosophers: Karol Wojtyła and Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, the framers and the main representatives of the Lublin School of Philosophy. The author comes to the following conclusions: (1) Wojtyła's and Krąpiec's conception of personalism comes from experience and seeks verification in experience; it does not accept any a priori explanations or theses, though it does not shy away from drawing upon different branches of knowledge in its attempts to broaden experience, being aware that not everything is given to immediate experiential perception; (2) Wojtyła's and Krąpiec's personalism wants to draw on the whole philosophical tradition, taking into account, at the same time, the findings of different sciences of man or humanities which broaden the experience of man or contribute something to the interpretation of experience; (3) bringing together genetic empiricism and methodical rationalism, Wojtyła and Krąpiec are able to avoid radicalism in the explanation of man, making a successful attempt to join in a complementary way these aspects of personal human being which carry some opposition; (4) Wojtyła's and Krąpiec's conception of person does not bear any traces of antagonism since it is not directed against anyone; in the light of this conception every human person has a character of the honest good which is the unconditional good, that is the highest and the ultimate good not competing with the value of anything else; (5) Wojtyła and Krąpiec prove that the conception of human person lies at the basis of understanding society, culture, ethics, law, politics, economy, art, and even religion.

KEYWORDS: Lublin School of Philosophy, Karol Wojtyła, Mieczysław Krąpiec, personalism, philosophy, metaphysics, person, man, experience, nature, culture.

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METAPHYSICS IN THE LUBLIN PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOL

The introduction of the term *τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά* into philosophical language as a description that was more a librarian's indicating sign than an indication of subject matter is attributed to Andronicus of Rhodes (around 50 B.C.), who in organizing and publishing Aristotle's works gave this description to a collection of fourteen of the Stagyrte's books on philosophy in general, its chief questions (about what substance is, the principle of non-contradiction, unity, causes, ideas, and God), and for this reason placed them after the books of the *Physics*. This description was intended to indicate the writings that follow the physical writings. Nicholas of Damascus reaffirmed this name in the twenty years following Andronicus' edition of Aristotle's writings. As a historian, Nicholas also made a summary of Aristotle's doctrines. The term as a description of Aristotle's "first philosophy" persisted in the Latin language in the Middle Ages.

As philologists try to demonstrate, the ancient Greek language did not use the word *μεταφυσικά* either in the form of the adjective

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μεταφυσικός or as a noun, τὰ μεταφυσικά (or ἡ μεταφυσική). However, in the catalogue of Aristotle's writings called the *Vita Menagiana* (or *Hesychiana*), the most ancient manuscript of which dates back to the ninth century, the noun form of the adjective μεταφυσικός appears twice to designate the books of the *Metaphysics*: μεταφυσικά ι and μεταφυσικά κ (books "j" and "k"). This fact lends credence to another view (H. Reiner), that the term μεταφυσικά may have appeared already in the third century BC, and that its author was Eudemos of Rhodes or Ariston of Chios (as P. Moraux holds).

The Definition of Metaphysics

Just as it is problematic to establish when the word "metaphysics" appeared, so it is to establish the meaning of the word. It is not perfectly evident that the meaning should be treated in merely technical terms as a librarian's mark for a position in a collection of books. In his division of the sciences, Aristotle put first philosophy (what would be called metaphysics) after mathematics, not after physics.

In the neo-Platonic tradition (e.g., Simplicius), metaphysics was the science concerning divine things, those which are found above the world of nature (physics), but then a more proper term would be ὑπερφυσικά rather than τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά.

Alexander of Aphrodisia proposed another explanation for the term. He thought that metaphysics had been put after physics because the matters with which it dealt were the most difficult for the human mind and should be studied at the end.¹ Therefore, this term would indicate the order of metaphysical cognition, which should follow the cognition of the world of nature (physics), more than it would indicate the order of the things to which it refers (that is, things beyond the physical).

¹ See Pierre Aubenque, *Le problème de l'être chez Aristote* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962).

St. Thomas Aquinas explained the term and the specific character of metaphysical cognition and the object of metaphysics in a similar spirit. For him metaphysics is a science that “goes beyond physics, since for us it is what we do after physics, as we should move from what is knowable by the senses to what cannot be known by the senses.”² The term “metaphysics” appears in Thomas’ work as a synonym for the terms “theology,” “divine science,” and “first philosophy,” since it investigates the ultimate reasons and reaches to the first cause, the Absolute—hence the term “theology” (*theologia*). It is also the most noble body of knowledge, pertaining to God, and man should be concerned for such a body of knowledge,³ hence the term “divine science” (*scientia divina*). It also concerns everything that exists, and for this reason all the sciences receive principles from it, hence the term “first philosophy” (*philosophia prima*).⁴ However, the term τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά conceived as *transphysica* designates a science that teaches how “from what can be known by the senses one should proceed to what cannot be known by the senses.”⁵ It is thus the science whose object is not some extra-physical (transphysical) world, but the same world that the physicist and the natural scientist study, the world in which we can discover what the physicists does not discover, since he holds to what is given to the senses without entering more deeply into it.

According to Aristotle, the science thus understood “considers being as being and that that belongs to it in an essential way . . . No other [science] apart from it considers being as being in general, but singling out some domain of being, it considers what belongs to it in

² S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Super Boethium de Trinitate*, cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum (Roma 1992), q. 5, a. 1, resp.: “Metaphysica, id est trans physicam, quia post physicam discenda occurrit nobis, quibus ex sensibilibus oportet in insensibilia devenire.”

³ Aristotle, “Metaphysica,” in *Aristotelis opera*, ex recensione J. Bekkeri, vol. II (Berolini 1831), 982 b 31–33.

⁴ *Super Boethium de Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 1, resp.

⁵ Id.

some given aspect.”⁶ Metaphysics as Aristotle intended it designates the type of philosophical thought that concerns the things given to us in experience (*φύσις*—the physical world), that includes the entirety of the world and the entirety of things (*τὰ ὄντα* in the scope of its investigations, and the purpose of these investigations is to reach the truth (*θεωρία*) concerning the first and ultimate causes (principles) of the being of the universe.

From the beginning, the term “metaphysics” was referred to and reserved for the philosophical inquiries initiated by Aristotle. These inquiries were directed at the reality of the world given to us in empirical experience, and so to the same reality that occupies the philosophizing physicist (natural scientist) or the mathematician, but with the difference that whereas the physicist and natural scientist discovered the qualitative richness of this reality, and the mathematician discovered its quantitative richness, the metaphysician intended to enter most deeply into the nature of these things and discover in them that due to which they have being and are what they are (their essence) and he intended to reach the ultimate cause (*ἀρχή*) of the being of the universe. Metaphysics was conceived of as the specific science that teaches how to read out the truth about the nature of things and the internal and external causes of their existence.

Metaphysics in the strict sense was not, and cannot be, understood as some sort of “transphysics” or even less as “hyperphysics” or “theodicy,” which would have as its object a reality above or outside the senses; not is it the way for man “to liberate himself;” but in the basic understanding of metaphysics provided by Aristotle, it is the most empirical of the empirical sciences, since its object is real reality (and only this). It is also a theoretical-contemplative science (*θεωρία*) since its aim is the “intuition and contemplation” of the truth for its own sake (*scire propter scire*), which truth the intellect reads out in the things given to us in empirical experience.

⁶ Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, 1003 a 20–26.

By the autonomous method of cognition that metaphysics employs, the philosopher can read out and discover more than can the physicist, natural scientist, or mathematician. This “more” is the discovery of the causes of the existence of beings, the discernment of the universal (transcendental) properties of being, and among these, properties such as being the truth, the good, and the beautiful, the discovery of the first metaphysical laws that show the foundation of the rational order of the being and cognition of things, the discernment of the ontic compositions that reveal the internal structure and nature of beings, and among these, compositions such as essence and existence, matter and form, body and soul, act and potency, substance and accidents. Further this “more” includes the discovery of the caused and analogical mode of the being of things, which constitutes the foundation for the formation of the theory of causal and analogical cognition, and for reaching—in the area of philosophy—to the truth concerning the creation of the world “ex nihilo.” This all constitutes the “more” that only metaphysics can teach us how to discover and perceive, and which alone allows us fully to understand particular beings and reality as a whole.

As long as philosophy worked on the investigation of the really existing world (of plants, animals, people, things), the word “metaphysics” was synonymous with “philosophy.” Over time, the word “metaphysics” and this type of philosophical inquiry lost their fundamental meaning. In the eighteenth century, the word “metaphysics” came to be replaced by the word *ὄντολογία* due to C. Wolff (although the term had appeared in the seventeenth century due to R. Goclenius and J. Clauberg). Clauberg, however, had first used the term *ὄντοσοφία* as a synonym for “metaphysics.” With the change in the term came a change in the object of metaphysical meditations. Clauberg, in his work titled *Metaphysica de ente, quae rectius Ontosophia*⁷ argued that the metaphysical investigations do not concern concrete being given in

⁷ Johann Clauberg, *Metaphysica de ente, quae rectius Ontosophia* (Amstelodami: D. Elzevir, 1664).

empirical experience, but “being in general” (*ens in genere*), and they do not include “this or that particular being distinct from others, designated by a special name or property” (*non circa hoc vel illud ens speciali nomine insignitum vel proprietate quadam ab aliis distinctum*).

The term “ontology” entered the language of philosophy for good through Wolff as a term interchangeable not so much with the word “metaphysics” as “first philosophy.” Wolff used this word in the title of his work, *Philosophia prima sive Ontologia*.⁸ Here as well it is not a question only of a change of names. With the change in name from “first philosophy” (*philosophia prima*) to “ontology,” there was a change of method. Wolff abandoned the autonomous method that first philosophy or metaphysics had employed for a scientific method (*methodo scientifica pertractata*) that first philosophy or ontology would use. Wolff took the scientific rendering of method from Descartes; the method would consist in transferring the *more geometrico* method to philosophy. These two instances where the term “philosophy” was replaced by the word “ontology” or “ontosology” are an example of that which was connected with the understanding of metaphysics in the history of philosophy. This understanding was always connected with a conception of the object and method of metaphysics. We encounter an example of this in I. Kant who wrote:

First, concerning the *sources* of metaphysical cognition, it already lies in the concept of metaphysics that they cannot be empirical. The principles of such cognition (which include not only its fundamental propositions or basic principles, but also its fundamental concepts) must therefore never be taken from experience; for the cognition is supposed to be not physical but metaphysical, i.e., lying beyond experience. Therefore it will be based upon neither outer experience, which constitutes the source of physics proper, nor inner, which provides the foundation of em-

⁸ Christian Wolff, *Philosophia prima, sive Ontologia, methodo scientifica pertractata, qua omnis cognitionis humanae principia continentur* (Francofurti et Lipsiae 1730).

pirical psychology. It is therefore cognition *a priori*, or from pure understanding and pure reason.⁹

It is not surprising that “positivism in its different forms, of which the most radical will be the neopositivism of the Vienna Circle, follows the footprints of Kant. Materialistic and radically scientific directions turn out to be metaphysics’ greatest enemies.”¹⁰

The history of modern philosophy is, on the one hand, the history of overcoming Aristotle’s metaphysics, on the other hand, the new grounding of metaphysics, although often in conditions such that this metaphysics is present more in name than by virtue of a rational and grounded interpretation of reality.

We may often encounter two different attitudes toward the term “metaphysics” and toward metaphysics as such. The first attitude leads to the replacement of the term “metaphysics” with the term “ontology,” and in this way metaphysics is taken out of the domains of the philosophical disciplines, and joins ontological inquiries (and thus ontology) into logical inquiries (e.g., Leśniewski’s and Ingarden’s ontology). It is not surprising that at present, apart from John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, there are no chairs of metaphysics in philosophy departments in Poland, although from philosophers’ declarations it could be inferred that they practice metaphysics. The second attitude among philosophers is that that term “metaphysics” is transferred to different philosophical disciplines, e.g., to Cartesianism, Kantianism, phenomenology, existentialism, processualism, analytic philosophy, and others. We may also encounter the practice of transferring the term “metaphysics” to domains outside of philosophy such as poetry, art, and even mysticism (metaphysical poetry, metaphysical art, metaphysical space, metaphysical experience, and other things).

⁹ Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, trans. and ed. Gary Hatfield (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 15.

¹⁰ Władysław Strożewski, *Ontologia* [Ontology] (Kraków 2004), 22.

The transfer of the term “metaphysics” outside the area of the realistic philosophy that grows from Aristotle’s thought, and was completed by St. Thomas Aquinas and continued in the framework of contemporary realistic philosophy, is a linguistic and cognitive mistake leading to misunderstanding, and primarily leading to the deformation of philosophy itself. Someone who practices the philosophy of consciousness, the philosophy of language, or process philosophy while declaring that he is practicing metaphysics performs a twofold deformation: he is deforming the understanding of the philosophy he practices (e.g., Cartesian philosophy, Kantian philosophy, phenomenology, or the philosophy of language), suggesting that he is practicing something else (e.g., Aristotelian metaphysics); furthermore he is obliterating the distinct and separate character of other philosophical systems as he makes a synthetic unification of them, and he also distorts how realistic metaphysics is understood as he calls by that name something that has nothing in common with metaphysics.

In the philosophical tradition, metaphysics provides a foundation for, and determines the set of basic questions concerning reality (substance, man, the soul, truth, the good, generation and corruption, the first principles of being and cognition) that form the basic trunk of the philosophical problematic. These questions were the object of thought and commentary to such a degree that different philosophical directions received their names according to how they resolved metaphysical questions. Sometimes they tried to remove the problematic of metaphysics, trivialize it, or even ridicule it. This was done consciously or unconsciously as each relied on his own special understanding of the questions that traditionally formed the problematic of metaphysics. The effort to get rid of the term “metaphysics” and replace it with the terms “ontology,” “theodicy,” “logic,” and “dialectic” basically confirmed the importance of the perennial fundamental questions concerning the understanding of reality, that is, metaphysics.

In the tradition of classical philosophy, metaphysics in a strict sense is the name for a way of knowing in which the reason employs the universal laws of being and thought and strives to discover the first and singular factors or causes that will render free of contradiction that which exists and which is given to us in a germinal way in the empirical intuition of the material world.

Metaphysical Cognition

Metaphysical (philosophical) cognition took shape out of the common-sense and spontaneous cognition of reality. In ancient Greece in the first period it was a rationalization of the mythological-religious understanding of the world. Common-sense cognition, which designates man's most original cognitive response to reality as he finds it, should be distinguished from naive and pre-scientific cognition, which is already cognition mediated in some theory. Mythology considered many natural questions about the beginning of the world and man, and so its presentations in images were an illustration that was understood by all in the rational translation of that which is initial, original, and essential for reality. A sign of the use of reason is that questions are posed concerning reality. As a child man is already constantly asking questions like: What is it? Where does it come from? And: Why is it? Humankind has been answering these questions for centuries in a reflected and rationally justified manner. Among these questions appeared the one that became the fundamental question of metaphysics: *διὰ τί*—why? Questions and more and more profound answers were the canvas of philosophical metaphysical cognition and the formation of science. In the beginning, scientific cognition was identified with philosophical cognition, and philosophical cognition was identified with metaphysical cognition.

The Proprieties of Metaphysical Cognition

Intellectual intuition is a characteristic feature of philosophical cognition. By intellectual intuition we arrive at a comprehensive grasp of plurality in unity, and complexity in the whole. Intellectual intuition is a basic power of the cognitive faculty. If metaphysics investigates the ultimate causes and ultimate principles of things, then it achieves them by intellectual intuition. Intellectual intuition enables man to understand reality more than it enables him to have discursive cognition of reality.

History has credited to the Greek mind the discovery of the scientific spirit and the perception of the leading and sovereign significance of the human reason. The ancient Greek mind called attention to the purpose of human life, which is to explain and understand the world. For the Greeks, knowledge as wisdom, taking in all domains of cognition, was the explanation of things performed by the reason with the help of an appeal to the ultimate causes of their being (this was most evident in Aristotle). This was the most generally apprehended conception of a cognition of reality that was singularly scientific and philosophical. Aristotle emphasized the unity of all the sciences, which unity is expressed in one science (i.e., philosophy), just as the entire world was marked by unity.

The Aristotelian conception of philosophical knowledge persisted in different variations and modification up to our time. However, after Aristotle, the great edifice of philosophical science was divided in parcels and developed into the particular sciences by the singling out of separate objects of inquiry and the application of different methods. But the conception of philosophy in the Aristotelian understanding was preserved, philosophy as cognition that is *de jure* rational, indubitable, and which concerns existing things in the light of ultimate rational justifications. This cognition is obtained by indicating such aspect of reality that cannot be investigated by the particular sciences.

The specific character of philosophical cognition can be reduced to the problem of seeing the ultimate structure of things and the ques-

tions that follow from it. The perceived structure of things gives rise to questions: What is the reason, cause, and rational justification of the inner structure of things? What is the source, that is, the efficient cause, of the existence of the thing itself? Such questions cannot be understood without asking what is the destination (or purpose) of things. Thus metaphysical cognition, which is cognition of causes, forms spontaneously.

One property of metaphysical cognition is that in it we are dealing with the cognition of being, of that which really exists. It is not a question here of knowing abstract contents, or of knowing concrete contents separated from existence, but of the cognitive apprehension of what really exists. This is done in judgments conceived *sensu stricto*, and so in a certain human cognitive act whose feature is either truth or falsehood. This cognition concerns necessary aspects. The necessary aspects of being are at the same time universal aspects that can be of two kinds: universal concerning a defined category of beings, and transcendental concerning all existing beings. The ultimate rational justifications that are indicated in metaphysical cognition are not any logical reasons, but objective (ontic) reasons, or real rational justifications, and so they are called reasons of being.

In metaphysics it is a question of knowing being in its ordering to the real causes of being as such. The real causes of being can only be ultimate causes (real rational justifications), i.e., chief causes. For if in metaphysics as an ultimate cognition we must seek the ultimate reasons common to all beings, then the discovery of these ultimate reasons of being allows us in proportion to understand being apprehended as being (as existing). Our vision of the common object is not an arbitrary construction, but it is the perception of common elements and proportional common perfections that belong to each concrete thing and at the same time to all things.

All the reality of the world (the cosmos), apprehended cognitively in an indistinct way (*actu confuse*) in one common object, can be

studied by an analysis of the object including all concrete things. Everything that exists apprehended as one analogically common object shows in philosophical analysis its ultimate ontic reasons. The world apprehended as a whole in the light of the chief real causes becomes the intelligible world. The cognition of it fills man with happiness, and understanding allows us to situate man in the context of other beings, so showing him the meaning of his action.

One task of metaphysics, which follows from the character of its judgments apprehending the reasons for the existence of beings in necessary and transcendental aspects, is the achievement of truth-based cognition. Truth-based cognition, although general, becomes the basis for all human actions.

Metaphysics cultivated methodically is not always found at the foundations of the branches of human creativity and science. Most often in science we do not ponder the ultimate foundations of a cultivated branch of knowledge. A *quaestio iuris* is one thing, and a *quaestio facti* is another. It is not really necessary for a scientist from within a particular discipline to know metaphysics (and perhaps sometimes it is better that he does not know metaphysics), the general principles of which he intuitively feels in the data of common sense, which, however, does not mean that metaphysics' objective principles do not (of themselves) constitute the foundations of all the domains of science and creative work. The way to reach a verifiable and thereby rational and realistic metaphysics is a similar way to those which lead to the formation of every science: it goes from the data of common sense to scientific refinements of precision and rational justifications. If then we take the position of common-sense cognition, upon which all the sciences, both the particular and the philosophical sciences, rely, then as a result we affirm the existence of the world, and so the existence of the extra-subjective cosmos—together with man, his life, his cognition, conation, and action. Metaphysics, like every other science, starting from the

premises of common sense, has as its aim the ultimate cognition of the world so conceived.

Common-sense cognition provides the rational justification for this direction in philosophical inquiries, which took as its object existing reality (chiefly extra-subjective reality). The human self, ideas, and values are situated in reality so conceived, but they are not investigated in the sense of personal experiences (there is no science concerning individual episodes of experience; it is literature which is concerned with them), but in a general way, in the sense of an analogical generality. Ideas, the human self, and its values, constitute reality, since they are real beings.

The object of philosophy is being, that is, everything that exists, and metaphysics provides an ultimate explanation of the structure of reality. The basic structures of being constitute the basis for real rational justifications. On their basis we indicate what something is—more in a negative way (i.e., presenting the factors that render free of contradiction the existence of the world and its parts) than in a positive way (although this is also done). So it is a question of knowing reality (that which is, and what we know first in empirical intuition) from the aspect of the ultimate rational justifications of being and thought, and so from the aspect of philosophically conceived principles: the principles of identity, non-contradiction, and sufficient reason (the reason of being). Metaphysics discovers and makes precise these principles, as the first intellectually conscious intuitions of being (the object of man's intellectual cognition), and then rationally justifies them by the method of thought proper to itself.

The Object of Metaphysical Cognition

The question of discerning the object of metaphysics and its method is connected with the theory of science. There are two characteristic features of the process of reasoning in metaphysics: (1) the interpretation of the states of things in light of the concept of being (being

as existing), a concept produced in a rationally justified manner, and (2) historicism.

*On the History of How the Object of
Metaphysics Was Discerned*

The first operation performed in metaphysics is an act of discerning, or rather of “seeing” the object of metaphysical cognition in a proper context, the object which is being as existing. In the history of philosophy there have appeared theories that see the basic factor constituting the being-ness of things in one or another element of reality. It was stated, e.g., that in absolute changing reality, the law itself (*λόγος*) of changing is what determines the universe’s act of being. This was the view of Heraclitus and the thinkers who supported such a reading of his thought.

Others (notably Parmenides) thought that an absolutely unchanging and self-identical element determines the reality of being. As the result of different historical conditions, different thinkers saw this unchanging element that constituted reality in different factors of reality: in number (Pythagoreanism), in a self-identical idea separate from the world of shadows (Platonism), in the form of the thing that constitutes it in the aspect of unity, capacity to be known, and being-ness (Aristotelianism), in an ecstatic good that overflows by necessity according to a necessary hierarchy, and which constitutes reality (Plotinianism), and in the *natura naturans* that is the soul of universe, a soul just as material as the entire universe (Stoicism). Many more examples could be presented, since in every system there were modifications in how the nature of the object of metaphysics was understood, and thereby there would also be modification in the system.

In the current of philosophy that tries to explain reality (being), different proper objects of metaphysics appeared, which constituted specific interpretations of being: (1) being as absolute potentiality; (2) being as absolute invariability or unity (being as being); (3) being as

number; (4) being as idea; (5) being as form; (6) being as the ecstatic good.

Since the time of Parmenides, his definition of the object of philosophical inquiries, that is, “being as being,” has been used. This description appears among almost all ontologists or henologists. However, the difficulty is how to understand the reduplicative phrase “as being.” We can read it properly only in the context of the whole system.

The proper object of philosophical inquiries, singled out in a natural or constructed way, influences philosophy’s conclusions, for these conclusions are always within the area of the proper object (if a given thinker is consistent in his thinking). The act of singling out and perceiving the proper object is usually not done in a far-reaching reflection. There have been primary intuitions, spontaneous abstractions, the content of which in particular circumstances and conditions interpreted many facts, and then this content was absolutized. A new generation of thinkers who made use of the legacy of their predecessors often modified the concept of the proper object. This modification was made as a result of their seeing the inadequacy of the previously constructed object as applied to the interpretation of the real phenomena observed in reality. The reconstructed object took under consideration new aspects of reality that the previously constructed proper object of inquiries did not consider or explain (it did not allow such explanation).

Thus conceptions of the proper object that would make possible an adequate explanation of the phenomena occurring in the real world were constantly corrected and modified. This was done by virtue of intellectual intuition or by virtue of what could be called heuristic induction directed not only by a general vision of the world but also by a vision of reality in terms of a system. However, constructions of the proper object of philosophy were inadequate for they still were not constructions cognitively neutral, but rather those which set philosophical thought in a defined direction of interpretation. Such a system was

no longer engaged in investigating the world, but was entirely based on the immanent logic flowing from the nature of the object of philosophy.

The Object of Realistic Metaphysics

If philosophy is to avoid the errors and distortions to which it is exposed by reason of a “non-neutrally” constructed proper object, then it should meet the conditions that result from the nature of the philosophical cognition of the world: (1) the proper object of philosophical thought should concern the real world, that is, what is universally called reality; (2) the proper object should include reality as a whole, i.e., it should concern everything that exists; (3) the proper object should be apprehended neutrally, i.e., it should not imply definite solutions to questions, and it should not set thought on a predetermined track of reasoning, but should make possible constant contact with reality and allow the objective philosophical interpretation of reality. The first two conditions connect the proper object of philosophy with the real world in the aspect of reality and in the aspect of entirety. The third condition is most essential, since it is intended to guarantee cognitive objectivity.

In the discerned proper object of metaphysical inquiries the fact (or act) of this object’s existence should be considered. Every proof for the existence of the world in the framework of the constructed system would be unacceptable under the many aspects that have been shown in the history of philosophy. This would be a passage from an ideal state to a real state, that is, from definition to existence, which is a typical Anselmian error; all sorts of variations on this error are repeated in different philosophical systems.

The construction of the proper object of philosophy in isolation from the fact of its existence would be something arbitrary, *a priori*, and unverifiable through ontic states. This would be a construction belonging to the domain of art (as defined by Aristotle), not to science. This happens in different philosophical systems (which does not mean

that these systems are irrelevant or not suited for understanding the world in their content).

The construction of the proper object of philosophy in isolation from the direct and original fact (*in actu signato*) of its existence is a methodological error, because secondary and less clear matters would be used to explain original and self-evident matters. We come to the point of singling out the proper object of realistic metaphysics, the object that meets the conditions of reality, universality, and neutrality, on the basis of proper cognitive acts—called metaphysical separation—which are built upon existential judgments.

The most difficult condition to meet is the third one, which requires objectivity through a neutral conception of the proper object of metaphysics. Unfortunately, the history of philosophy, with Thomas Aquinas as the sole exception, does not know the conception of a neutral object of philosophy. It is not known whether this single case in the history of philosophy was fully reflected upon by Aquinas, but it is known only that it was never fully accepted by those who regarded themselves as the interpreters or continuators of Aquinas' thought.

A neutral conception of the proper object of philosophy is provided in the traditional formula "being as being," but understood as "being as existing being," because only real (actual) existence constitutes reality. That which actually and really exists is really real. Even so-called potential existence, although it belongs to the world's reality, is real in the measure in which it is conditioned by the real and actual existence of a subject (enriched by the most various dispositions). There is no need for proof that the real world as real is constituted by existence, because no proof is more convincing than the original perception of the existence of real being.

The existence of real being does not imply anything about its nature, content, or action, because existence is not identical with the content of a being. To see that reality is constituted by existence does not connect our thought with any philosophical preconception and does not

set thought on tracks of logical consistencies in which nothing is left for the reason except to reason logically, but in isolation from the really existing world. If, however, it is accepted that this existence constitutes reality, then this existence is commensurate to each and every being, and it is modified in each and every being. This being the case, the intellect must constantly be in contact with beings, besides reflection it must constantly use intuition in order to make any rationally justified assertion.

All constructions known in the history of philosophy of the proper object of philosophical inquiries are in relation to the neutral conception of the object of philosophy the result of a too rapid inductive generalization (given a philosopher's realistic attitude). Often these were *a priori* constructions dictated by the preponderance of a school or by non-philosophical aims in the cultivation of philosophy.

The Method for Singling Out the Object of Metaphysics

The determination of the proper object of realistic metaphysics was initially connected with metaphysical abstraction (in Aristotle and the current of Aristotelianism), and subsequently—along with the discovery of a new understanding of being (St. Thomas Aquinas) and its propagation in contemporary realistic metaphysics—with metaphysical separation.

The basis for the method of separation is existential judgments whereby the proper object is singled out and the specific type of metaphysical cognition that guarantees the cognition of really existing things is established on solid ground.

Metaphysical Separation

The proper understanding of metaphysical separation as a specific type of cognition is supported by the meaning the term has in the Code of Canon Law. The term “separation” describes a situation of spouses who in a marriage crisis, in order to avoid the marriage break-

ing up, agree to be apart (separated) from the shared table, dwelling, and relations, in order to rediscover in this way the value of their bond and to put the unity of the marriage again on solid ground. The rediscovery of the value and unity of the bond will be shown, among other things, in the fact that each party experiences his or her insufficiency and need to be joined with his or her partner, without whom life loses its meaning and value. Separation thus conceived is not the activity of tearing apart and shattering either of the parties in the bond, but the activity of distinguishing the factors that compose the bond, so—by such a distinction—to learn the truth about the unity and wholeness of the marriage.

By transferring the intuition of the meaning of the word “separation” from the field of Canon Law to the terrain of metaphysics, this term indicates a method, and also a type of cognition in which we make a distinction between (but we do not tear apart) the factors of being without which no being can exist. For this reason, the method of separation leads to cognition of that whereby something really exists (whereby it is a being) by discovering and distinguishing the necessary and universal (transcendental) factors without which no thing could exist.

Meanwhile in metaphysical abstraction we try to divide and tear apart the aspect of the thing that is the object of our inquiries and which is identified with being, an aspect distinguished for the purposes of inquiry. In abstract cognition the reason appears in the function of tearing apart, and as a result it chooses (tears off) a certain aspect according to the accepted criterion (physical, mathematical, metaphysical) from sense data, making it the proper object of philosophical cognition. As a result of this kind of abstraction in Aristotle’s philosophy, the objects of cognition were singled out, such as number, quality (e.g., color, material, shape), or form (substance); at the same time they form the basis for differentiating the mathematical, natural, and philosophical sciences.

Cognition by separation is a cognition directed primarily at affirming the objective reasons (or causes) of the unity and wholeness of the existence of beings or processes, and secondarily at determining their content. Cognition by abstraction, on the other hand, is a type of cognition that excludes a part from a whole so that the cognition of a part can be transferred to the whole of a composite thing. Metaphysical separation also constitutes a guarantee for realistic cognition and provides cognition of a thing in terms of the whole.

St. Thomas Aquinas went further than Aristotle in providing a foundation for cognitive realism and in determining the principles for building certain knowledge. He agreed with Aristotle that there was not and could not be any realistic cognition without a real object of thought, but he saw the limitations of the Aristotelian theory of cognition (built for the needs of philosophy) called metaphysical abstraction. In cognition by abstraction we do not grasp the moment of the existence of things; it eludes our cognition. In abstractive cognition an image of the thing becomes restricted to the arrangement of a content, a content organized by some form. But the form as such does not represent by itself the truth concerning the thing as a whole.

Definition-based and concept-based apprehensions of being obtained as the result of abstraction concern the arrangement of a content. The content of a being can be an object of abstract cognition in which the mind grasps necessary arrangements of content and creates from them a concept of being. This leads to an essentialization of metaphysical cognition consisting in this: general “essences” of things, not individual things, are the object of cognition. In this way it came to the point where the image of being was reduced to an arrangement of content of which the sign was a concept or a definition, and the cognition of the concrete thing was replaced by analysis of general concepts common to many thing. Regarding this, it was necessary to rebuild the method of realistic cognition, and therein also the entire conception of metaphysics.

Instead of the method of cognition by abstraction, in which the way matter is organized into the determined content of a being is apprehended, St. Thomas proposed the method of cognition by separation in which we apprehend being as a whole and reach the elements that constitute the existence of being. Aquinas indeed did not formulate this method explicitly, but—by his existential conception of being and by singling out the conception of cognition by judgment as suited to apprehending the existence of being—he created the foundations for the method. The contemporary continuators of the heritage of realistic (existential) metaphysics provided metaphysical separation with its final form and with a theoretical justification.

Spontaneous and Reflected Separation

We can characterize separation at two stages of human cognition. At the pre-scientific stage, where it constitutes man's natural cognitive attitude directed at affirming in existential judgments what is given to us in experience, without determining the content of what is affirmed; and at the scientific stage, where separation is treated as a method for singling out the object of metaphysics, and also as a kind of metaphysical cognition in general. At the second stage of cognition we encounter metaphysical separation in a strict sense.

(1) *Spontaneous separation.* Spontaneous separation consists in singling out and affirming the existence of the particular things given to us in experience. It is the man's most original and at the same time most fundamental cognitive response to the fact that things exist. In spontaneous separation we distinguish the objects of the real world and we mark the field of our cognition, the field which really existing things create. The results of this stage of cognition by separation are expressed in so-called existential judgments of the type: "something is," or "someone is," in which we are affirming the fact of a thing's existence. They are individual judgments, although they are vague, in which information concerns the fact of the existence of "something."

At this stage metaphysical separation can be treated as a defined cognitive attitude (analogous to spontaneous abstraction), which is characterized by openness to affirming that which actually exists and by the grounding of cognition as a whole in the world of real things.

(2) *Metaphysical separation.* Metaphysical separation as a way of singling out the object of metaphysics is a complex operation. In metaphysical separation we arrive at the formation of the object of metaphysical cognition, which will be conceived as that which exists. In separation thus understood as the method for singling out the proper object of metaphysics we distinguish three basic stages.

At the first stage in existential judgments we indicate the scope of cognition, which is set by individually existing objects (hence we affirm “John’s existence,” “the tree’s existence,” “a thought’s existence,” “the existence of the color of the table”). However, this is not an inductive procedure directed at gathering data; the purpose of this stage is to connect our cognition with really existing things. Hence one existential judgment in which we affirm the existence of something, and so the existence of something beyond us, is sufficient for separation. However, the fact that we make more of these judgments is a fact that clarifies the nature of existential judgments rather than obliges us to multiply them.

The existential judgment is the foundation for cognition by separation; in it the whole of metaphysical experience concerning the existence of a concrete being and the implicitly contained knowledge about reality have been verbalized. For this reason the existential judgment is the direct object of analyses in the process of separation.

The existential judgment as the result of cognition by judgment, as distinct from predicative judgments (of the type, “John is a teacher”), is not something secondary (in relation to a concept), but is most fundamental and original. This judgment is characterized by a strong moment of affirmation directed at the affirmation of the actual existence of

a thing (and only the thing's existence!). Hence the theoretical thought and informative content that occur in it are at a minimum.

The existential judgment, being a direct cognitive apprehension of an existing thing, is characterized also by the fact that it does not possess the qualification of truth or falsehood. The act of affirmation cannot come into existence without the presence of an object, hence the intellect cannot be in error regarding whether "something exists," since in affirming the "existence of something" it makes a pronouncement on its proper object (just as happens in the case of each faculty: hearing, touch, sight, etc., which cannot be in error when it affirms its proper object: e.g., a sound or color). The intellect, however, can be in error when it asserts that "the existing something is John," and so when it is already starting to connect or separate predicates to or from a subject. Therefore the existential judgment cannot be reduced to predicative judgments; the existential judgment is represented by a predicative proposition of the type: "something exists," in which the subject indicates the affirmation of content, and the predicate indicates the act of affirmation.

Existential judgments can be direct ("John exists," "something exists") or indirect ("the soul exists," "a thought exists"), vague ("something exists") or clear ("John exists"). In each case, however, they are individual existential judgments. General existential judgments cannot occur on account of the lack of any object of affirmation (in the real world no general objects exist, but they are only thought-constructs).

The second stage of separation is connected with the analysis of existential judgments. In the course of analyses we see that existential judgments carry information concerning the content of an affirmed being and concerning the fact (or act) of this content's existence. In judgments we also affirm some content, and the fact of its existence when we affirm that "John exists," "the apple tree exists," "the red rose exists," "my thought about Eve or Adam exists").

When we separate (or distinguish) the factors apprehended in every existential judgment, we discover (1) that every concrete being is “composed” of a content-factor and a factor that actualizes this content to existence, that is, an act of existence, and (2) that to be something real does not necessarily entail being some single strictly defined essence (e.g., John, the apple tree, or the rose), since other objects exist.

The second stage of analysis by separation allows us to see the strict connection of content (essence) with existence, and at the same time their non-identity. Furthermore, we can see that existence in particular concrete things is limited (in the sense of being determined) by an essence (content): the existence of John is determined by the system of the content that determines John as such (e.g., body, height, skin color, smile, etc.). We see as well that content is also determined by a definite existence. Therefore we speak of John’s existence, and not that of someone else. We distinguish the existence of a tree from the existence of a man, the existence of one chair from another, even though they may be similar to each other externally.

At the third stage there is a transition from categorial apprehensions of things (John, Eve, the red rose), and their components (as John’s “existence” and John’s “content” have been indicated) to transcendental apprehensions, and so to apprehensions of the elements in John that determine the existence of “this here concrete John,” but also determine him as a being, that is, as someone real. We obtain the transcendentalization (or universalization) of this apprehension as a result of resorting to analogy in the existence of things.

In this way we arrive at the formation of an understanding of being, which is always “some concrete content of a determined existence,” and so we arrive at the point where we single out the proper object of metaphysics. From this moment, being in the terrain of metaphysics acquires a new meaning. Being is what exists individually and concretely, and so not some generalization or idea, a form or a proto-

element, but a concrete thing which is created by a determined content and an existence proportional to the content.

Cognition by Separation

Besides separation understood as a method in singling out the proper object of metaphysics, we distinguish separation as a specific type of realistic cognition. Cognition by separation is the development of the most spontaneous, common-sense, human cognition, which concerns the fact that “a thing is,” not “how a thing is” or “what a thing is.” The first results of this cognition were verbalized in existential judgments of the type “something is,” or “something exists.” These judgments were not so much the first results of direct cognitive acts, as an expression of the first states of man’s (as a knowing being’s) conscious existence. They are also an expression of the beginning of man’s cognitive activity, which takes various forms, and which cannot begin without some contact with a real being. In this way we arrive at the grounding of human cognition (metaphysical cognition in particular) in the really existing world.

One of the chief problems that abstractive cognition brought with itself was the problem of the mediation of cognitive tools (concepts) in relation to the cognized object. The result of this mediation was that in the “starting point” it was impossible to reach a real thing. The rationally justified fear arose that in transferring the Aristotelian conception of abstractive cognition to contemporary realistic cognition, the realism, universalism, and neutrality (objectivity) of the proper object would disappear in metaphysical cognition, and instead of knowing concretely existing beings, we would have to begin with the analysis and explanation of concepts, the establishment of the meanings of expressions of language, etc. The conception of cognition by separation is proposed as a way of resolving this difficulty. The basis of cognition by separation consists of judgment-apprehensions that in the starting point do not have any moment of mediation, and thereby they put us

do not have any moment of mediation, and thereby they put us directly in touch with the existing thing.

In realistic metaphysics the existential judgment is the basis (and so the starting point, not the final goal) for further cognition. In the language of metaphysics we verbalize the theoretically reflected existential judgment (having as its original form “something exists,” “something is”), with the help of the expression “being” (as an abbreviation of the judgment “something exists”) and with the help of the expressions called the transcendentals, such as thing, one, separateness, the true, the good, and the beautiful, and also with the help of metaphysical terms of the type: substance, accident, matter, form, essence, existence, and person. In the process of cognition by separation we obtain a basic understanding of a thing, on which basis we can better understand the aspective apprehensions with which we are dealing in other types of scientific cognition. As we read out the content of particular transcendentals, we discover the first metaphysical laws that rule the being of things and our cognition of them. In this way, we delineate the foundations of the rational order. For this reason, metaphysical cognition is the base cognition (also for the other types of sciences) permitting us to achieve an aspective understanding of things.

Historicism in metaphysics

An important feature of the track of reasoning by demonstration in the philosophy of being is so-called historicism. All philosophical assertions about reality possess their own history. They arose in certain conditions of the development of philosophical thought. All philosophical problems, even if they were formulated abstractly, are manifestations of concrete human life and as connected with this life they explain something, rationally justify something, or express protest against the way things are. Philosophy cannot be divorced from the context of life. In the investigation of the different contents of philosophical theses this moment in particular cannot be ignored.

Apart from the context in which a particular philosophical problem arose, we also see its historical development. A closer acquaintance with different systems of philosophical thought convinces us that in essence we are constantly dealing with the same problems that in different systems receive different names and various formulations. The history of philosophy is also the place where we can study the formulations and rational justifications of philosophical problems in the most varied systems and directions of philosophical thought. Then we also obtain an additional confirmation of the rightness or wrongness of philosophical theses. If some problem (even if formulated in various ways) was studied by many thinkers over the centuries, then the results of those studies should be learned, since then our personal view will be clearer and our formulations and rational justifications will be more profound through the results of the analyses of our predecessors.

Historicism in metaphysics lets us eliminate many pseudo-problems resulting from other conceptions of the object of philosophical thought. Metaphysics is not afraid of the results of thought shown in other philosophical directions or systems, since it is only metaphysics which can show their objective reasons and the consequences to which they lead. For this reason, controversies over the value of cognition can be considered in the history of philosophy (in the context of revealing the mistakes and distortions of philosophical thought). The history of philosophy should also provide factual material for choosing the proper way to cultivate metaphysics. The history of philosophy so understood is indispensable for metaphysics, since it is the introduction to metaphysics by the fact that it follows various solutions to philosophical problems as they have appeared in the course of history, and since it constitutes the plane for resolving epistemological problems, and is an aid in choosing the right type of metaphysics in which the explanation of the world has been verified objectively and also historically.

Ways of Demonstration and Rational Justification

The process of thought in metaphysics has the character of reductive demonstration in the form of so-called negative demonstration, which takes a threefold form. Demonstration from the coherence of a system, that is, from an appeal to the conception of being, plays an important and sometimes decisive role in metaphysical demonstration.

(1) Demonstration by showing absurdity (*probatio per absurdum*). This consists in justification of the truth of a philosophical thesis by showing that its contrary is an evident falsehood. This means that the acceptance of the contrary thesis would be the realization of a contradiction conceived metaphysically. The absurdity of such a thesis is seen and understood basically in a system, since a system can show the absurdity of a thesis by showing its consequences.

(2) Contradiction with real facts (*contradictio in re*). Showing that the negation of a philosophical thesis stands in disagreement with ontic facts or states (easily observed by people in general) given to us to explain. Here, however, a difficulty arises, since science does not know so-called naked facts, that is, facts that have not been interpreted cognitively or spontaneously (often in an unconscious way) in the framework of some system. Such an objection would be fitting if the interpretation of facts by a system were performed “non-neutrally,” and so if it were performed by a non-neutralized proper object of philosophy. Then the facts would always appear as a manifestation of a given aspect of cognition. In the case of metaphysics, where there is a neutralized interpretation (where facts occur only as existing), there is no room for non-neutral interpretation, but the conditions of truth are preserved, namely agreement with what is.

The moment of agreement or disagreement with facts in a system of metaphysics has decisive significance, and it requires a constant cognitive intuition of reality. Even the most logically constructed and most coherent theses are meaningless if they turn out to be in disagreement with the facts.

The method of finding agreement with the facts is most proper to realistic metaphysics. For if the object of metaphysics (i.e., actually existing being) virtually “contains” the whole truth about reality, then it cannot be in disagreement with any fact. Considering this, the intuition of a concrete thing in the light of the understanding of being (based on metaphysical separation) and of the metaphysical principles (of identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle), that govern being, constantly checks the value of a stated metaphysical thesis.

(3) Reduction to absurdity (*reductio ad absurdum*). The third possible form of negative proof consists in reducing an assertion to absurdity. This reduction is understood as the demonstration of the falsehood of a thesis that is negative in relation to the stated assertion by showing that a false proposition follows from the thesis, whereby the truth of the defended (stated) thesis is shown indirectly. The reduction to absurdity presupposes one of the important philosophical principles, namely the principle of the reason of being or the principle of being (this principle should not be identified with the principle of sufficient reason as G. W. Leibniz formulated and understood it). The principle of the reason of being indicates the fact of the so-called intelligibility of being: being is intelligible to our intellect because it is rational (it has a reason for its existence in itself and beyond itself). Thus both the being and its component elements have an ontic rational justification whereby being cannot be identified with non-being. For this reason, being is understood and explained ontically only by being, not by thought or desire. When having the reason for its own being-ness in itself (and it has this reason only in the constitutive aspects), being does not cause further intellectual unrest. To satisfy our intellect so that it could understand being in itself, it is enough to indicate the constitutive elements of being. However, if we see some being which does not have a reason of being-ness (an ontic justification) in itself, then it has this reason beyond itself in another being whose ultimate reason of being-ness is in that being itself. Otherwise, if a given being exists but does

not have a reason for its existence in itself or in some being beyond itself (one that already has this reason—an ontic justification—in itself “by definition”), the result would be absurdity: a being is at the same time a non-being. It is a being because it exists, and at the same time it is not a being, because it does not have a reason for its existence in itself or beyond itself. Such a rational justification would be closest to the negative justification by reduction to absurdity known in logic.

Demonstration from the Coherence of a System

Besides the negative arguments that occur in the philosophy of being, there are still other ways of demonstration from the coherence of a system. In metaphysics we encounter a system understood in specific terms. The system of metaphysics is not so much a collection of axioms, rules, and theses derived from axioms with the help of rules, but the result of an objectively cohesive system in which the system of theses, their organization and their relations of dependence are grounded in the internal structure of being. The cohesiveness of being in its constitutive elements marks the cohesiveness of the theses that concern these elements. The organization of these theses is not the result of the consequences of logical implication but of whether these theses refer to constitutive or accidental, categorial or transcendental elements.

As we call to mind the ways of demonstrating and rationally justifying philosophical theses, we should note the following:

(1) In metaphysics, deduction as understood in the contemporary sense does not occur, for metaphysical thought is not formal thought that uses implication in an inferential sense.

(2) Syllogistic deduction in the Aristotelian sense does not occur in metaphysics either. For this reason there is no apodeictic argumentation (also understood in an Aristotelian sense). The basic reason for this is that metaphysical concepts cannot be defined “though proximate genus and the specific difference” (*per genus proximum et differentiam*

specificam). The concepts of metaphysics are above-generic concepts and have universal (transcendental) scope.

(3) If we gave the name “deduction” to thinking with the use of necessary states of affairs, then deduction so conceived would occur in metaphysics. However, this deduction would assume the following: (a) being conscious of the structure of the object of metaphysics (also in the form of the noetic first principles: identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle, reason of being); (b) purely negative argumentation by indicating the evident absurdity of the contrary proposition; the disagreement of an opposing proposition with the facts: the reduction of an opposing proposition to absurdity; the impossibility of another presentation of the matter by a real (or even fictitious) opponent.

All negative arguments are made in light of a perceived proper object of philosophy (not perceived arbitrarily, but on the basis of the process of separation), the object in isolation from which philosophy cannot be cultivated at all, just as no particular science can be cultivated in a cognitively valid way in isolation from its proper object.

(4) Aside from rational justifications based on necessity and demonstrations, in metaphysics there are also hypotheses (understood in a particular way). By a metaphysical hypothesis we understand a proposition with philosophical content that at least in itself is free of contradiction, which explains facts not yet explained by philosophical theories, in agreement with the general proper object of a philosophical system and its theses.

(5) In the philosophical explanation of reality we can see a special reductive method of thinking. Considering only the process of reasoning from effect to cause—which in the noetic order is explained as reasoning from consequence to reason—we can call certain philosophical processes of rational justification by the name of reduction. However, such reduction has nothing in common with the method of reductive thought as described by the methodology of the science. It is not based on the logic of probability and does not lead to uncertain proposi-

tions, as takes place in the natural sciences, where the method of reductive thinking has its chief application.

We can also see the elements of understanding called “demonstration” (wherein a consequence is matched to a reason previously recognized as true), insofar as we interpret concrete ontic states in the light of a rationally justified concept of being as the proper object. Here, however, we are dealing with another order of reasoning than the one distinguished by contemporary methodology. In methodology types of reasoning are distinguished from the point of view of formal cognitive procedures, expressed in the form of propositions, among which relations are established, while in metaphysics we operate with analyses of the states of things. Although in these analyses all the methods of reasoning known in the contemporary methodology of the sciences can be distinguished, we are dealing here with a special kind of cognition that does not fit in disjoint formal classifications.

The basic problems in metaphysical cognition, explanation, demonstration, and rational justification, can be reduced to that concerning the proper understanding of being (as analogically existing). This understanding is constructed upon the cognition of the internal structure of being and its causes, as well as on the analogy of being and the analogy of the cognition of being.

Metaphysics and Other Domains of Philosophy

In cultivating realistic metaphysics, we pay attention to the unity of philosophy that general metaphysics and particular kinds of metaphysics create. This unity results from the fact that philosophy has one analogical object (this object is everything that exists), apprehended generally (transcendentally and analogically), and explained in metaphysics. For this reason metaphysics constitutes the base philosophical discipline. It discovers the properties that belong to all beings (transcendental properties), it reads out the laws that govern everything that exists, and it cognizes the internal structure of every being and its

causes. The ultimate explanation of beings requires the affirmation of the existence of the Absolute Being as the single reason that ultimately explains the existence of composite, changing, and non-necessary beings.

Metaphysics is the fundamental philosophical discipline, which performs a central role in the whole cultivation of philosophy. This particular place of metaphysics in realistic philosophy results from the fact that

the theory of being thus conceived includes all the disciplines of realistically conceived metaphysics and constitutes a uniform philosophical cognition in an epistemological-methodological respect. This means that the theory of being covers the entire fundamental problematic of so-called classical philosophy and resolves it basically in the same way in all its disciplines. Here we do not distinguish the theory of cognition from metaphysics as two disciplines of philosophy (on account of the method of ultimate explanation). The theory of cognition as a separate philosophical discipline simply loses its reason for existence, since many of its main questions arose on erroneous ways of metaphysics and it has a meta-philosophical character. For example, a discussion on different kinds of idealism can occur on the occasion of the meta-philosophical rational justification of the way the concept of being is formed. While controversies over the value of cognition can be examined in the history of philosophy (in the context of revealing errors and distortions of metaphysical thinking). The history of philosophy indeed should provide the theory of being with factual experience to choose the proper way to cultivate metaphysics.¹¹

If it is a question of disciplines such as logic, methodology, or the theory of cognition, they constitute a group of auxiliary disciplines

¹¹ Stanisław Kamiński, "Osobliwość metodologiczna teorii bytu" [The special methodological status of the theory of being], in his *Jak filozofować?* [How to philosophize?] (Lublin 1989), 76.

for cultivating metaphysics, and their status is described as that of metaphilosophical disciplines.

Philosophy so understood constructed on metaphysics constitutes an organic unity. It is a unity conceived analogically, not univocally. The unity of cognition in metaphysics

is achieved by the acceptance of object-based philosophical thought and of the explanation in ultimate terms entirely on the basis of being's internal structure. He who assumes, however, that a non-dogmatic philosophical explanation must be metaobjective (of the reflective or interpretative type) or can appeal ultimately to the exclusively qualitative structures of reality, sets up the theory of cognition as the fundamental (first) philosophical discipline and breaks metaphysics into methodologically different disciplines. Meanwhile, metaphysical cognition in the theory of being splits into particular disciplines only in view of the different starting point (the separate type of an object of the data of experience), not in view of the way of ultimate explanation (and the formal object of the most theoretical theses).¹²

In the system of philosophical disciplines the philosophy of God (theodicy) is not treated as a separate particular metaphysics, since neither God nor the experience of God is accessible in the starting point of metaphysical inquiries (the distinction that we encounter in practice has purely didactic ends). In the starting point of metaphysics we operate with the experience of being as being or of particularized being (i.e., the being of cognition, the being of man, moral being, the being of culture, the being of religion, the being of art, the being of society, etc.). For this reason, the problematic of the Absolute (God) appears as the ultimate reason of metaphysical explanation and as the completion of the rational cognition in ultimate terms of the world (of persons and things).

¹² Id.

Besides general metaphysics, we distinguish several particular metaphysics in view of different starting points, such as the philosophy of nature, the philosophy of man, the philosophy of morality (individual ethics, economic ethics, and politics) and the philosophy of culture and art. However, each discipline of the philosophy of culture (that has human actions and products as its object) looks to the philosophy of man and other particular metaphysics.

The disciplines of particular metaphysics, although they are independent in their starting point, depend structurally upon general metaphysics, for in their ultimate explanation they also appeal to the theses of general metaphysics. This applies also to axiology and the philosophy of culture. Such a position allows us to preserve the unity of explanation in the entire theory of being without falling into philosophical naturalism.¹³

Regarding the relation of metaphysics to the particular (mathematical-natural) sciences, we should note that he who cultivates metaphysics (both general and particular) should use

the results of appropriate sciences, but only as an initial erudite foundation, particularly in a negative way, i.e., for the determination of his own object of inquiry. Such a position does not deny the need (e.g., in inspiring a new scientific problematic) or the cognitive value (e.g., to overcome a partial agnosticism) of scientific philosophy, that is, philosophy of the epistemological or critical-ontological type, beside the theory of being as philosophy of the metaphysical type. It rejects the methodological combination of these ways of cultivating philosophy and rejects the idea that non-metaphysical philosophies are indispensable for natural non-dogmatic philosophical thought (from this, after all, comes metaphilosophy) and for the ultimate grounding of the rational foundations of a view on the world and philosophical assumptions of scientific cognition. In particular it excludes the possibil-

¹³ *Id.*, 77.

ity that the theory of being would be replaced by scientific types of philosophy.¹⁴

By such a way of cultivating metaphysics, a universal type of philosophizing is obtained, since every domain of philosophical cognition concerns only one particularized object of metaphysics. This object is being apprehended analogically in the aspect of existence. There is also ultimately one method of inquiry. Differences are delineated in the fact that while in metaphysics we investigate the structure of being in general terms, in the particular philosophical disciplines we consider domains or aspects of being that are important for specific reasons, e.g., human society, the material structure of the object, products of culture, or human decisions. In this way disciplines such as social philosophy, the philosophy of nature, the philosophy of culture, and ethics, are differentiated. Although the philosophical apprehension and explanation of categorial beings—man, morality, culture, society, art, or religion—is done on the basis of an experience that is separate from metaphysics, but in explaining in ultimate terms, the particular philosophical disciplines resort to the method of metaphysical explanation conceived analogically, and they use the concepts elaborated in metaphysics. This guarantees the unity and cohesion of philosophical explanation.

Translated from Polish by Hugh McDonald

METAPHYSICS IN THE LUBLIN PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOL

SUMMARY

The article is aimed at presenting the way in which metaphysics is understood and cultivated in the Lublin Philosophical School, Poland. It includes such topics as: the definition of metaphysics, metaphysical cognition (its object and the method for singling it out), ways of metaphysical demonstration and rational justification, and the

¹⁴ Id., 77–78.

relation of metaphysics to other domains of philosophy. In the light of the information delivered, it can be concluded that metaphysics in the Lublin Philosophical School is understood as a way of knowing in which the reason employs the universal laws of being and thought and strives to discover the first and singular factors or causes that render free of contradiction that which exists and which is given to us in a germinal way in the empirical intuition of the material world.

KEYWORDS: Lublin Philosophical School, metaphysics, philosophy, cognition, object, being, method, demonstration, justification, reason, cause, separation, reality, world.

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ON THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROPERTIES OF REAL BEINGS

If we want to make progress on the path of the rational cognition of the world of persons and things, we can do this by revealing their essential and universal properties and the laws that govern their being. Among these properties, the most important are as follows: to be a thing (that is, to have a concretely determined essence), to be one (that is, to be non-contradictory in itself), to be separate or distinct (that is, to be sovereign in being), and also to be a vehicle of truth, good, and beauty. Among the laws of being, in turn, we find the law of identity, the law of non-contradiction, the law of the excluded middle, the law of the reason of being, the law of finality, and the law of perfection. These laws primarily show the source and foundation of the rational order.

The World is Like a Book

The properties and laws listed above are the key by which we open the doors leading to the knowledge of the rationality and finality of the world of persons, animals, plants and things. The rationality of beings is manifested in the fact that particular beings realize in their

Editio prima (in Polish): Andrzej Maryniarczyk SDB, *Racjonalność i celowość świata osób i rzeczy* [The Rationality and Finality of the World of Persons and Things] (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2007), 13–18, 21–30.

existence the plan (or thought) developed by their Creator or maker. This plan is assigned to natural beings together with their essence, or is inscribed in human products under the form of a project, idea, or laws that our reason can discover.

St. Thomas Aquinas remarks: “It is clear, therefore, that . . . natural things from which our intellect gets its scientific knowledge measure our intellect. Yet these things are themselves measured by the divine intellect, in which are all created things—just as all works of art find their origin in the intellect of an artist . . . A natural thing, therefore, being placed between two intellects [the divine and the human intellect—completion by A. M.] is called *true* in so far as it conforms to either.”¹

The finality or teleology of the world comes to light when we discover that particular things in their existence realize a definite end that has been established by the will of the Creator or a maker. Therefore their existence has meaning. They are goods that come “from” someone and are at the same time addressed “to” someone. Thus we may say that natural things are put between two wills: the will of the Divine Creator and the will of man. Also we may say that real things are the end (purpose) of the appetite of our will. Our will—together with our intellect—discovers this end and orders all human action and conduct according to this end.

Aristotle writes: “For he [the philosopher] is the only one who lives looking toward nature and toward the divine and, just as if he were some good navigator who hitches the first principles of his life onto things that are eternal and steadfast, he moors his ship and lives life on his own terms.”²

¹ St. Thomas Aquinas, *The Disputed Questions On Truth*, trans. from definitive Leonine text by Robert W. Mulligan, Vol. 1: *Questions I–IX* (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1952), q. 1, art. 2, c.

² Aristotle, *Protrepticus or Exhortation to Philosophy*, ed. & trans. D. S. Hutchinson and Monte Ransome Johnson (The Notre Dame Workshop in Ancient Philosophy,

The universal properties that have been mentioned constitute indispensable criteria for distinguishing between what is real and what is illusory, between what is from nature and what is from culture, between being and thought concerning being. The laws discovered by the reason, laws that govern the being of real things, show the deepest foundations of the world's rationality and finality. The human reason discovers these laws and, in turn, makes them laws of human rational cognition, conduct, and action. Thereby the reason, which is directed by the truth of things, becomes really rational (*recta ratio*), and the will directed by the good becomes really free (*recta voluntas*).

Not only can we know the world that surrounds us, but we can transform it. In this way we can make it subject to the laws of the spirit. In this way, along with the world of nature, the world of culture appears, a world that is the work of human hands and the human spirit (the reason). The cognition of the world of persons and things, gained by the discovery of their universal properties and by the discernment of the laws according to which they exist and they are known, leads primarily to our understanding of them. For indeed these properties show that without which a real being, a real action, and a real thought about being, cannot be. Moreover, they unveil new aspects of metaphysical experience such as intelligibility, loveability ("amability"), and perfection.

These properties were called transcendental properties (the transcendentals) on account of their universality, since they belong to everything that really exists. The laws that govern the being of things received the name of metaphysical first laws or principles concerning the existence and cognition of beings. In turn, these transcendental properties were verbalized in linguistic expressions that differed from other expressions because the scope of their predication is unlimited. This means that they can be predicated of everything that really exists. Thus

2015), 53, see "The provisional reconstruction:" <http://www.protrepticus.info/>, accessed on May 20, 2016.

we can give the name “being” to Jan, Eve, a tree, a thought, and even God, and so everything that is something real. Moreover, all the transcendental expressions (being, thing, one, separate, truth, good, beauty) differ from universal expressions (man, tree, animal, etc.) because despite their distinctness with regard to content they possess the same scope of predication (concerning everything that exists). For this reason in the transcendentals knowledge concerning the whole reality is apprehended on the basis of the discovery of analogy in the existence of beings.³

The knowledge we gain about reality in the framework of the transcendentals forms the foundation for all other knowledge, both philosophical and scientific;⁴ thus it is a certain kind of pre-cognition. For indeed it concerns aspects of the existence of being that are necessary for each thing, and at the same time are universal for all things. Moreover, that is wisdom-oriented or “sapiential” knowledge, the foundation of which is not so much the gathered pieces of information concerning a thing as it is the understanding of a thing. Understanding is achieved when by cognition we arrive at the discovery of the ultimate and necessary causes of existence, of action, and of the cognition of beings, and so we arrive at the discovery of the ultimate reasons for the being-ness, rationality, finality, amability, and perfection of the world of persons and things.

In the history of metaphysical cognition, it has been common to distinguish between seven universal properties of that which really

³ This is guaranteed by the structure of the transcendentals. The transcendentals are not concepts but are judgement-based expressions (abbreviations for existential judgements). Cf. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Metafizyka* [Metaphysics], 5 ed. (Lublin: RW KUL, 1988), 127–129; Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, “Transcendentalia i uniwersalia” [Transcendentals and Universals], *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 7:1 (1959): 5–39; Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, “Metafizyczne rozumienie rzeczywistości” [Metaphysical Understanding of Reality], *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 29:1 (1986): 3–15; Étienne Gilson, *Byt i istota* [Being and Essence], Polish trans. Donata Eska, Jerzy Nowak, 2 ed. (Warsaw: IW PAX, 2006), 196–216.

⁴ Krąpiec, “Metafizyczne rozumienie rzeczywistości,” 4–8.

exists. These properties show us that to be a being is at the same time to be a thing, to be one, separate, a vehicle of truth, of good, and of beauty. Among them the chief and fundamental transcendental is the transcendental being (*ens*). This transcendental contains the content of all the other transcendentals, and those are interchangeable with it (*convertuntur cum ente*). For indeed this transcendental shows the most primary and fundamental property of what really exists, namely the possession of a definite content and an existence proportionate to that content. For indeed being as such first shows itself to our intellect and it forms the foundation of all cognition and conceptualization.⁵

The rest of the transcendentals reveals—under various aspects—the subsequent properties of what really exists, and what is virtually contained in the transcendental being. Thus the transcendental thing (*res*) shows us that what is real must always be determined in content, that is, it must possess its own essence. Thus what is real must exist as John, Ann, a red rose, etc. The transcendental one (*unum*) shows that real being cannot be contradictory in itself. Someone cannot be at the same time John and not John, a human and an angel, a square circle, etc. In turn, the transcendental separateness (*aliquid*) shows sovereignty and individuality as universal properties of real beings. Thus we cannot regard mathematical classes or sets as real being; at most we can regard them as thought-constructs.

The transcendental truth (*verum*) helps us to discover that all that really exists is a vehicle of truth, since all that really exists originates from the intellect (of the Creator or a maker). The transcendental good (*bonum*) makes us conscious that real beings are also vehicles of good, since they come from the will (of the Creator or a maker). In turn the transcendental beauty (*pulchrum*) reveals that real things are always a synthesis of truth and good, that is, in their essence they are perfect,

⁵ “Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens, ut Avicenna dicit in principio Metaphysicae suae” (St. Thomas Aquinas, *The Disputed Questions On Truth*, q. 1, art. 1, c.).

since they result from the correspondence of the intellect and the will of the Creator (natural beings) or a maker (works of art).

Each of the above-mentioned transcendentals opens before us new possibilities for a deeper understanding of the world of persons and things. As we discern them, we acquire knowledge that refers to all concretely existing things, and therefore it is not abstract knowledge. For indeed metaphysical cognition is directed at concretely existing things, and it does not go beyond these concrete things. We can apprehend the concrete things we know in that which is proper to them alone, or in that which is proper to everything that really exists. So, for example, we can apprehend John cognitively in what is proper to him alone (that he is a human being, a man, etc.) or in that which is proper to him as someone who really exists (that he is someone real, that he has a definite content and an existence proportionate to that content). In the latter case, in the concrete object we discern an aspect that is necessary and universal (transcendental) for every really existing thing.

The discovery of the universal properties of being has inestimable value for our understanding of the world of persons, animals, plants, and things. Thereby we perceive the world in which we live not only as a collection of various objects that we can use, but above all as the natural environment in which man lives and acts, as a reality that is rational and loveable, and so as a reality that in its existence realizes the plan and will of the Creator or a maker. We discover the world as a book in which information about the truth, the good, and the end-purpose of particular things and the entire world has been recorded.

Being (*ens*)

The transcendental being (*ens*) is the first and fundamental key whereby we open the doors to discover the secret of the truth about the nature of the really existing objects that form the world that surrounds us. This transcendental indicates the most fundamental and necessary proper characteristic of real things. Real things are discerned from un-

real things by the fact that they possess a determined content and an existence proportionate to that content. Quite simply they exist and are something concrete and determined (Eve, John, the red rose, etc.).

The word “being” (Gk. τὸ ὄν, οὐσία; Lat. *ens*, *substantia*), as a linguistic expression, in the broad sense denotes “that which actually exists.” In a strict sense it denotes the object of metaphysics, just as number is the object of mathematics, and the cell is the object of biology. Therefore Aristotle writes in Book IV of the *Metaphysics*: “There is a kind of knowledge that considers being as being and that which belongs to it in an essential way.”⁶ And he explains that being as such

is conceived of variously, but indeed in relation to something one, on account of some one nature, and not completely equivocally. Then, just as anything whatsoever healthy is in a relation to health, namely insofar as it conserves health, causes it, or is a sign of it, or is also capable of possessing it . . . So also being is conceived of variously, but always in relation to one principle. Namely, some things are called beings since they are substances, and all others because they are determinations of substance or processes leading to substance . . . For indeed to one science belongs the consideration of objects that are named not only unequivocally, but also objects that are conceived of in relation to some one nature, since in a certain sense this is also a certain naming according to something that is one. Therefore it is evident that the consideration of beings insofar as they are beings belongs to one science.⁷

As we analyze the content of our experience of the existence of things, we discover two constitutive elements that enter into the structure of this experience. They are the “content of the experienced object” and “the existence of this content.” This discovery is the first and most basic step in the way to understanding the nature of really existing be-

⁶ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1003 a 20, cited after the Polish edition: Arystoteles, *Metafizyka*, trans. T. Żeleźnik, ed. M. A. Krąpiec, A. Maryniarczyk (Lublin 1996).

⁷ Id., 1003 a 32–1003 b 17.

ings. At the same time we discover the first transcendental property that characterizes real objects.⁸

In the framework of the transcendental being, the most fundamental knowledge concerning the nature of objects is apprehended. For indeed we become aware that the world of real things is made only of objects that possess “some sort of determined content” and “an existence proportionate to the content.” And thus such objects as the existing John, the existing apple tree, the existing red rose, etc., can be components of the real world. For indeed these objects have a determined content (John, the apple tree, the red rose) and an existence proportionate to the content (the existence of John, the existence of the apple tree, etc.). Therefore general forms such as “human being,” “animal,” or “nature,” etc., will not belong to the world of real beings, since something such as “human being” is indeterminate in content and does not have any own existence in itself. For indeed this is neither man nor woman, neither white nor black, neither tall nor short, etc. Forms (constructs) of this type belong to the world of the products of our intellect, and they exist by the existence of our intellect, not by an existence proportionate to their content.

In the framework of the transcendental being, we also discover that the concrete existing thing is the base upon which our neutral (free from the deformation of scientific theories) cognition and understanding of the world of persons and things are built. At the same time we become aware that only the existing concrete thing can be regarded as an assumption-free “starting point”⁹ in metaphysical cognition. The fact

⁸ The primary importance of this transcendental follows from the fact, as Thomas says, that it is the most primary cognitive verbalization of human experience. “Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens . . .” (*The Disputed Questions On Truth*, q. 1, art. 1, c.). The other transcendentals “exprimunt ipsius modum, qui nomine ipsius *entis* non exprimitur” (id.).

⁹ One such possibility is to find a basis in being, or to be more precise, in the original experience of reality. Then, as Krąpiec remarks, the problem of the “starting point” disappears. Cf. Krąpiec, “Metafizyczne rozumienie rzeczywistości,” 8; and Étienne

that particular things exist is not and cannot be an assumption, but it is a foundation and source of all kinds of evidence. Thomas Aquinas, looking to Avicenna, explains as follows: “That which the intellect first conceives as, in a way, the most evident, and to which it reduces all its concepts, is being.”¹⁰ In other words, this is the concrete existing thing. “Consequently, all the other conceptions of the intellect are had by additions to being.”¹¹

The primacy of the transcendental being in relation to the other transcendentals follows from the fact that it is the most potentialized apprehension of the whole truth concerning the existing concrete thing, as a result of which metaphysics as a science “is not identified . . . with any other of the so-called particular sciences. For indeed no other science apart from metaphysics considers in general being as being.”¹² In metaphysical cognition there occurs an explicit-making of the virtual content of this original apprehension, and there occurs a formation of the understanding of that which are really existing objects, and that which decides their nature.¹³

The transcendental being also unveils before us the most original and fundamental type of human experience, which is the experience of the fact of the existence of the concrete thing (being). For indeed we

Gilson, *Realizm tomistyczny* [Thomistic Realism], group work (Warsaw: IW PAX, 1968), 44–51.

¹⁰ St. Thomas Aquinas, *The Disputed Questions On Truth*, q. 1, art. 1, c.

¹¹ Id. Cf. Avicenna, *Metaphysics*, cited in Awicenna, *Księga wiedzy* [Book of knowledge], Polish trans. Bogdan Składanek (Warsaw: PWN 1974), 78–79.

¹² Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1003 a 20–25.

¹³ “It should be noted that the cognition of reality that occurs in existential judgments is the starting point in the singling out of the object of metaphysics, and it is man’s germinal cognition—germinal both in the sense of its genesis, and in the sense of epistemic justifications—in his everyday and natural cognition. As ‘immersed in the world’, we first learn that something is, that something exists as real, before we learn more or less exactly the content of that which exists” (Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, “Analiza ‘punktu wyjścia’ w filozoficznym poznaniu” [Analysis of the “Starting Point” in Philosophical Cognition], in his *Byt i istota. Św. Tomasza “De ente et essentia” przekład i komentarz* [Being and Essence. Translation and Commentary on St. Thomas’ “De ente et essentia”], 2nd ed. (Lublin: RW KUL, 1994), 111–112).

discover that existing things (beings) are what is first given to us in cognition—*quod primum cadit in intellectu*—and what makes that our cognitive life begins to be actualized.¹⁴ This experience, on account of the object which is the existing concrete thing (being), is called metaphysical, and as such it is the neutral base of philosophical cognition, since in this experience the existing object is directly given to us. It is, as Krapiec remarks, “the purest human experience, a pre-reflective experience, an experience not subject to error (excepting sickness!).”¹⁵

The freedom from error and evidence of this experience applies to the proper object of our cognition, and so applies to the fact that “something is,” as distinct from “what something is.” This happens because “that which really exists” (being) is the proper object both of the senses and the intellect. And no faculty can err as to its own object. For example, the faculty of hearing cannot err that it hears a sound, or the eye that it sees a color, etc. Also, the ear cannot see, and the eye cannot hear. Error, however, can concern the pitch of a sound, the hue of a color, etc. The situation is the same with the freedom from error and infallibility of the senses and the intellect with regard to the assertion of the fact of existence (and only with regard to the fact of existence!) of a real being. Just as the ear cannot err that it hears a sound, for sound is its proper object, or the eye that it sees a color, so the senses and the intellect cannot err that they know “something that is.”¹⁶ For precisely this reason, this type of apprehension of a thing is called “super-veridical” but not in the sense of “super-true,” rather in the

¹⁴ Thomas emphasizes that perfect cognition pertains to man’s happiness. Cf. S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Summa contra Gentiles*, ed. Ceslaj Pera (Taurini: Marietti, 1961), lib. II, c. 39. Cf. Leo Elders, “Le premier principe de la vie intellectuelle,” *Revue Thomiste* 62 (1962): 571–586.

¹⁵ Krapiec, “Analiza ‘punktu wyjścia’ w filozoficznym poznaniu,” 112.

¹⁶ For example, in the case of the proper object of hearing, errors can and do concern the genus of a sound, whether the sound is the note “C” or the note “G;” in the case of the proper object of vision, the quality of a color, whether it is “red” or “green;” and in the case of the proper object of cognition, whether “this something that exists” is John, Casimir, an apple tree, or a pear tree, etc.

sense of being free from error. For indeed when the intellect asserts that something is, it asserts the existence of its proper object as to which it cannot err, since the existing object is the reason for the assertion. The qualification of truth or falsehood does not yet belong to apprehensions of this type (this qualification appears only at the stage where the content of a known object is being clarified). Apprehended under the transcendental (universal) aspect and expressed in the transcendental being, the content of a metaphysical experience is very imprecise and vague (*in actu confuse*). It is a potentialized apprehension.¹⁷ For indeed in this apprehension the most essential, universal, necessary, and at the same time, border or critical properties of being something real are apprehended.¹⁸

The transcendental being unveils before us also the deepest foundations of the rational and loveable order. This order is made explicit in the form of the metaphysical first principles such as the following: the principle of identity, the principle of non-contradiction, the principle of the excluded middle, the principle of the reason of being, the principle of finality, and the principle of integrity. These are not principles established by the intellect or given before the cognition of being, but they are read out or interpreted from being as laws that govern the existence and cognition of being. They are laws that primarily govern the being of real things. As we discover these first principles, we become aware that the foundations of rationality are first inscribed

¹⁷ “The most original and still misty cognition of existence is the reason for our immediate stances to the contents of a being that acts upon us, the contents provided to us ‘under actual existence’. This is intelligible insofar as this ‘processing’ of the real world that man constantly performs cannot be suspended in a ‘vacuum’, but is situated in the real and cognitively asserted existence of the world”—as Krąpiec explains (*Metafizyka*, 107).

¹⁸ Of course this is an analogical and transcendental apprehension. By the analogicality we can cognitively “reach” to the Absolute, and by the transcendentality we must be satisfied in cognition with existing reality (being), which constitutes the limit of our cognition. This limitation will be indicated from various aspects of the existence of being.

in existing objects and in the entire world, and subsequently read out and appropriated by the intellect; they constitute the principles of the intellect's rational action.

As thus understood, the transcendental being can be treated as the metaphysical "principle of principles." For indeed this transcendental is the criterion of the cognition of the truth concerning real existence and cognition of being. As a consequence, in the framework of the transcendental being the following occur:

- the field of the realism of the world is unveiled before us; this field is made up of concretely existing things (and only them!) with the entire wealth of their endowment of content;

- we discover the originality or primacy of the order of the existence of a thing in relation to the cognition of it;

- we become aware that both cognition and action are connected with being and directed to being;

- we arrive at the understanding of what being is and why being is, which allows us to distinguish between what is real and what is a product of our thought; that which makes the world real from that which is a theory or hypothesis concerning the world; that which is from nature from that which is from culture, and so, that which is a product and construct of man, etc. Thereby we can remove at the very beginning of rational life all points that would lead to absurdity in the explanation of the world of persons and things.

Equipped with this kind of key, we can easily define the field of realism. For indeed to be something real is to have a defined content and to have an existence proportionate to that content. Thereby we can distinguish between the real John and a concept of John, between the world of nature and the world of culture, between the object of the real world and the ideas and constructs of our fantasy. We can distinguish between the existence of John, Eve, an apple tree, a red rose, etc., and the existence of our thought concerning them. While the constructs of our imagination have a definite content, they do not have an existence

proper (proportionate) to them; they have the existence of our imagination and exist by the existence of our imagination. Therefore this here John is a real being, a real being is not some rather indefinite “man;” this red rose is a real being, a real being is not some undetermined “nature.” Both “man” and “nature” are schemata of thought (concepts) constructed for cognitive purposes.

A content and an existence, that are proportional to each other and determine each other, are the fundamental and necessary properties that each object must possess if it is to belong to the real world.

The Explicit-Making of Being

Metaphysical cognition is a constant explaining of that which really exists. It is the process of explaining (making explicit) the content of the original apprehension of what is real, and that which has not been explicitly expressed by the word “being.”¹⁹ The process of explicit-making occurs through the singling out of newer and newer properties pertaining to the universal and necessary aspects of the mode of being of that which is real, and through the apprehension of these properties in corresponding linguistic expressions called transcendentals. The specific character of transcendental expressions is that their scope of predication does not change, although the content to which they point changes, and for this reason they are all interchangeable with being (*convertuntur cum ente*). The transcendentals singled out always add something new to the understanding of being, and as a result of this being is made explicit. However, this is a specifically understood process of “addition” (*additio*). This process consists in the fact, as Thomas explains, that each new transcendental adds something to the under-

¹⁹ “[A]liqua dicuntur addere supra ens, in quantum exprimunt ipsius modum, qui nomine ipsius *entis* non exprimitur” (St. Thomas Aquinas, *The Disputed Questions On Truth*, q. 1, art. 1, c.).

standing of being in the sense that it shows a new aspect of its act of being (*ipsius modus*) which was not expressed by the word “being.”²⁰

The transcendentals singled out unveil (or make explicit) modes of being that are characteristic of all that really exists. They show what is real in two ways: (1) either as the mode of being of what is real in itself, (2) or as a mode of being in ordination to something else.²¹

In the first case, the transcendentals show in a positive or negative way the mode of being of what is real. Thomas explains it as follows:

We can, however, find nothing that can be predicated of every being affirmatively and, at the same time, absolutely, with the exception of its essence by which the being is said to be. To express this, the term *thing* is used . . . “thing differs from being because being gets its name from to-be, but thing expresses the quiddity or essence of the being.” There is, however, a negation consequent upon every being considered absolutely: its undividedness, and this is expressed by *one*. For the *one* is simply undivided being.²²

In this way, in the framework of the first transcendentals, being is unveiled as thing (*res*) and as one (*unum*). Also both thing and one show the universal modes of being in themselves of what is real, namely as the act of being determined as to content, that is, as something that has its own essence, and as something that is undivided in itself into being and non-being.

In the second case the transcendentals unveil the mode of being of what is real in ordination to another being. This ordination can concern the fact of division (*divisionem*) of one being from another, or the agreement (*convenientia*) of one being with another.

²⁰ Cf. *id.*

²¹ “*Alio modo*, ita quod modus expressus sit modus generaliter consequens omne ens; et hic modus *dupliciter* accipi potest: *uno modo* secundum quod consequitur omne ens in se; *alio modo* secundum quod consequitur unumquodque ens in ordine ad aliud” (*id.*).

²² *Id.*

The mode of division of one being from another as a universal property of the being of what is real is expressed by the transcendental *aliquid* (something separate). Every real being always exists as “something-else” (*aliud quid*). Thomas explains it as follows: “For, just as a being is said to be *one* in so far as it is without division in itself, so it is said to be *something* in so far as it is divided from others.”²³

The transcendentals that follow unveil being as connected in its existence with other beings. It is a matter here of showing the specific connection of being with personal beings, or more precisely with the intellect and will of the Creator or a maker. The fact of the universal connection of every being with the intellect of a person is unveiled by the transcendental truth (*verum*), and the connection with the will by the transcendental good (*bonum*). For this reason, Thomas explains:

Good expresses the correspondence of being to the appetitive power, for, and so we note in the *Ethics*, the good is “that which all desire.” *True* expresses the correspondence of being to the knowing power, for all knowing is produced by an assimilation of the knower to the thing known, so that assimilation is said to be the cause of knowledge.²⁴

²³ “*Uno modo* secundum divisionem unius ab altero; et hoc explimit hoc nomen *aliquid*: dicitur enim *aliquid* quasi *aliud quid*; unde sicut ens dicitur unum, in quantum est indivisum in se, ita dicitur *aliquid*, in quantum est ab aliis divisum” (id.).

²⁴ Id. “*Alio modo* secundum convenientiam unius entis ad aliud; et hoc quidem non potest esse nisi accipiatur *aliquid* quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente. Hoc autem est anima, quae quodammodo est omnia sicut dicitur in III *De anima* [text. 37]. In anima autem est vis cognitiva est appetitiva. Convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen *bonum*, ut in principio *Ethic*. dicitur: *Bonum est quod omnia appetunt*. Convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen *verum*. Omnis autem cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam, ita quod assimilatio dicta est causa causa cognitionis: sicut visus per hoc quod disponitur per speciem coloris, cognoscit colorem. Prima ergo comparatio entis ad intellectum est ut ens intellectui respondeat: quae quidem correspondentia, adaequatio rei et intellectus dicitur; et in hoc formaliter ratio veri perficitur. Hoc est ergo quod addit *verum* supra ens, scilicet conformitatem, sive adaequationem rei et intellectus; ad quam conformitatem, ut dictum est, sequitur cognitio rei. Sic ergo entitas rei praecedat rationem veritatis, sed cognitio est quidam veritatis effectus” (id.).

Conclusion

The principles Thomas outlined for unveiling and making explicit the universal modes of being of what is real have been included over time in the structure of metaphysical separation. Metaphysical separation would also become in realistic metaphysics the fundamental method for knowing beings and showing their universal properties. We should also take note of an important remark by Krąpiec in his *Metaphysics*, namely that the transcendentals as special cognitive apprehensions of being cannot be “quantified and univocally communicated to another, but they must be communicated in a ‘living’ way by a special ‘agitation’, formulating in the mind of the receiver many mental images and associations in which he himself is to see the cognitive content communicated to him.”²⁵

Translated from Polish by Hugh McDonald

ON THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROPERTIES OF REAL BEINGS

SUMMARY

The article analyzes the metaphysical approach to the rational cognition of the world of persons and things. It shows the way in which metaphysicians reveal the essential and universal properties of the world and the laws that govern their being. Among these properties, the most important are as follows: to be a thing (that is, to have a concretely determined essence), to be one (that is, to be non-contradictory in itself), to be separate or distinct (that is, to be sovereign in being), and also to be a vehicle of truth, good, and beauty. Among the laws of being, in turn, the article indicates the law of identity, the law of non-contradiction, the law of the excluded middle, the law of the reason of being, the law of finality, and the law of perfection. These laws primarily show the source and foundation of the rational order.

KEYWORDS: Lublin Philosophical School, transcendental, metaphysics, being, reality, world.

²⁵ Krąpiec, *Metafizyka*, 140.

